TUNISIA: MOVING TOWARD CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00314R000200120002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Tunisia:
Moving Toward Crisis
An Intelligence Assessment
NESA 84-10249
August 1984
Copy 3 23
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence 25X1
Tunisia:
Moving Toward Crisis
This paper was prepared byl Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
Secret
NESA 84-10249
August /984
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Tunisia:
Moving Toward Crisis 25X1
Key Judgments The prospects for stability in Tunisia are poor. President Habib Bourguiba
Information available shows no inclination to address the grievances of disaffected youth and the
as of 16 July 1984 unemployed, the urban and rural poor, and those wanting to revitalize the
was used in this report.
Arab-Muslim character of Tunisia. Disorders similar to the economic riots
last January could occur with little provocation and accelerate the erosion
of government authority.
Senior officers, struggling to maintain the apolitical character of the armed
forces, and moderate leaders of the country's growing Islamic fundamen-
talist movement continue to be forces for stability. Their strength is
eroding, however, under popular pressures for reform. Bourguiba's pater-
nalistic rule has created a sycophantic political elite that has acquired
privileges resented by the poor. The aged President's failure to build a
constituency beyond this group is encouraging the trend toward radicaliza-
tion and thus invites foreign, particularly Libyan, meddling.
Prospects for stability appear even worse should Bourguiba die in office.
Bourguiba's constitutionally designated successor, Prime Minister
Mohamed Mzali, has shown little ability to build a broad base of support.
His blatant efforts to weaken his rivals have damaged his political standing
even in official circles, setting the stage for a prolonged and bitter struggle
after Bourguiba's death. Such a crisis may prompt the armed forces to step
in to secure an orderly transfer of power or to ensure that their own
favorite assumes the presidency.
Opposition to US policies among newly radicalized Tunisians is growing
and may soon prompt the government to give additional emphasis to the
Arab and nonaligned aspects of its foreign policy. Although ties to the
United States and Western Europe probably will remain important for
defense support and economic investment, Tunisia's need to demonstrate
its nonaligned credentials may push it closer to the Soviet Union in the
post-Bourguiba era. This-in the worst case-could jeopardize the unre-
stricted passage of US naval vessels through the 140-kilometer strait
between Tunisia and Sicily. NATO would then have to devote more assets
to keeping this vital sea lane open during a confrontation with the Soviet
Union.
Secret
NESA 84 10249
August 084
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-' Ar
Rudayyif Qafsah
Al Metlaoui ' Al
Madilah
Tawzarj
Road
Railroad
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Tunisia:
Moving Toward Crisis
After Tunisia gained its independence from France in
1956, President Habib Bourguiba enacted broad
social and economic programs designed to modernize
the country at a gradual pace. These policies have
brought steady economic growth, a relatively modern
social and economic system, and an increasingly
Western-oriented lifestyle. They also have generated
unrealistic popular expectations for prosperity and
opportunity, as well as an uneasiness about the coun-
try's national identity, especially among the country's
youth. (Over 70 percent of the population is less than
27 years old.) Moreover, as Tunisians have gained
broader educational and social benefits, they have
chafed under a political system dominated by one
man, largely closed to all except Bourguiba's hand-
picked elite and increasingly insensitive to public
opinion.
Bourguiba has maintained a stranglehold on power,
stifling political expression and forcing the govern-
ment to rule from an increasingly narrow power base.
The US Embassy in Tunis reports that ruling group
insensitivity to the popular mood led to the decision
last year to double the price of bread, the staple of
poor Tunisians. The riots that followed in January left
hundreds dead or injured and several thousand under
arrest, and seriously dislocated economic plans. F_
The riots highlighted the declining popularity of the
ruling Destourian Socialist Party (PSD)-the coun-
try's principal political institution. Party leaders failed
to anticipate the intensity of the reaction to the price
hikes. Moreover, party members did not respond to
government efforts to mobilize them to help bring the
disorders under control. The riots finally ended when
Bourguiba ordered in the Army and rescinded the
price increases.
The PSD as an avenue for political participation has
been declining for some years. The US Embassy in
Tunis reports that the party, founded by Bourguiba in
1934 as the Neo-Destour Party, has developed into an
arm of the government serving the interests of a
narrowly based clientele. Government and party
members frequently have overlapping: responsibilities,
and their dispensation of patronage, licenses, and
other favors has alienated much of the population. As
a result, many Tunisians are searching for alternative
institutions to press their demands.
The Leadership Vacuum
Bourguiba in recent years has, with a few exceptions,
divorced himself from the main currents of national
life, ignoring Tunisia's growing social and political
problems. The 82-year-old President for Life dwells
on past achievements and is increasingly out of touch
The political ineptness of Prime Minister Mohamed
Mzali-the President's handpicked and constitution-
ally designated successor-has further hurt govern-
ment authority. Mzali's failure to fulfill promises to
supplement incomes of the poor to protect them from
the bread price increases helped trigger the January
disturbances. His statements concerning the restora-
tion of the increases-leaked by foreign newsmen-
prolonged tensions and further discredited the govern-
Mzali's effort to put the blame for the bread riots on
then Interior Minister Guiga, one of his political
rivals, further damaged his credibility outside official
circles. A Mzali-appointed commission investigating
the causes of the riots recommended that Guiga be
tried for treason for presumed political disloyalty
during the disorders.
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The US Embassy in Tunisia says that poor Tunisians
believe the government is unfairly indicting Guiga for
his unwillingness to order the killing of protesters. We
believe that Guiga misjudged the intensity of the riots
and that the poor performance of the security forces
clearly exposed operational deficiencies caused by
their mismanagement under Guiga.
We are unsure of Bourguiba's attitude toward Mzali,
although he apparently intends to retain him as prime
minister despite his political liabilities.
Mzali has never been a particularly popular prime
minister since he was appointed four years ago. The
US Embassy in Tunis reports that Mzali's standing
was especially hurt by popular misconceptions that he,
rather than Bourguiba, was responsible for rigging the
country's first legislative election in 1981. Mzali until
that time had been favorably regarded by many
Tunisians as a proponent of liberalizing Tunisia's one-
party system. By 1984 his popularity had eroded
severely, and many demonstrators called for his dis-
missal during the January bread riots.
The "Corrective" Movement
Despite his growing political difficulties, Mzali is one
of the few government leaders who is aware of the
depth of the problems Tunisia faces, including the
need for political reform, according to the US Embas-
sy in Tunis. Mzali has sought to introduce change and
ease discontent through economic development. He
apparently shuns political liberalization because it
would antagonize the authoritarian Bourguiba and
thereby weaken his position as prime minister.
Press reports indicate that Mzali is giving priority to
development projects in the poorer southern and
western regions, where the bread riots began. Tunis
has lobbied for increased aid on concessional terms
from the United States, Canada, Western Europe,
Australia, Saudi Arabia, and several regional devel-
opment organizations. Tunisia also has solicited a loan
of $70 million from France for food imports and
balance-of-payments support.
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Following the disturbances, Mzali revised the budget increasing taxes on items such as liquor, cigarettes,
at Bourguiba's direction to lessen the burden on the and gasoline. It retains most government subsidies on
poor. The new budget shifts more of the cost of bread and other cereal products.
development to the middle and upper classes by
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The Economy: Cause for Concern Tunisia Economic Indicators, 1979-83
Economic growth in Tunisia has slowed in the past
several years. Poor harvests have increased outlays
for food imports, which constituted 14 percent of the
value of total imports in 1983. The country also has
been hurt by the effects of global recession on its key
foreign exchange earners petroleum, phosphates,
and tourism. Inflation and rising unemployment are
compounding economic difficulties (see chart). F_
The government's revised 1984 budget probably is too
optimistic. Union demands for higher wages, higher-
than-anticipated food imports, or lower oil revenues
probably will force the government to introduce a
supplementary budget later this year.
The government then would face difficult political
choices. A decision to raise taxes on luxury goods or
to cut pet projects in the wealthy northern areas risks
alienating the upper and middle class-the govern-
ment's traditional base of support. Postponing devel-
opment projects in the south and east probably would
fuel discontent among organized labor and the poor.
An increase in foreign borrowing-currently project-
ed at $200 million for 1984-would weaken Tuni-
sia's credit standing and result in more economic
difficulties later.
These measures, however, have so far failed to placate
the poor. Disadvantaged Tunisians say that Mzali's Foreign Reserves, 1983-84e
programs are not working and accuse him of protect- Million US $
ing the interests of a corrupt privileged class that
siphons off funds meant for them. Moreover, the US 700
Embassy in Tunis reports that poor Tunisians are 600
concerned about the continued erosion of their pur- 500
chasing power by inflation, a problem they believe the 400
government has ignored. The Embassy says this is
causing restiveness among the poor and fostering the 300
view that the government gives with one hand and 200
takes back with the other.
The Opposition-What Next?
Radical Muslims are particularly interested in ex-
ploiting discontent because of Bourguiba's long record
as a secularist. quasi-
legal fundamentalist groups are winning a growing
following in the urban slums and countryside; among
Real GDP Growth Consumer Price Growtha
Percent Percent
Trade Balance b Total Debt c
Million US $ Billion US S
Official figures.
b Both imports and exports are f.o.b.
Including public and private, guaranteed and nonguaranteed debt.
Estimated.
c Excluding gold.
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university students with poor job prospects; and, most
dangerously, among lower- and middle-ranking mem-
bers of the armed forces. Attempts by Tunisian
security forces to end fundamentalist activity have so
far failed. Members of the mainstream Islamic Ten-
dency Movement (ITM)-the country's largest funda-
mentalist organization-claim credit for fomenting
some of the bread riots last January.
Bourguiba's continuing rebuff of ITM demands for
legal status, in our view, is eroding the political
strength of moderates in control of the organization.
Several ITM leaders recently stated publicly that they
were having difficulty restraining their younger, more
radical members from agitating against the govern-
ment. The ITM leadership supports policies based on
a return to more conservative Islamic doctrines to halt
what it regards as the moral decay brought about by
Bourguiba's strong secularism. More radical Muslims
in the ITM and among other small Islamic extremist
groups want to replace the government entirely with
religious leaders.
The country's trade union leadership is under similar
pressure from its more radical members to wring
political concessions from the government. The mili-
tants within the General Union of Tunisian Workers
(UGTT)-the country's main labor union federa-
tion-are calling for a more confrontational approach
to achieve a more equal distribution of wealth and
power between workers and privileged Tunisians. The
radicals have sponsored major strikes against the
government to achieve their aims. There has been no
recurrence, however, of the violent labor protests of
1978, which required Army intervention and the
arrest of key labor leaders. 25X1
ly hard pressed to maintain worker discipline.
Several wildcat strikes early this year prompted
UGTT Secretary General Habib Achour publicly to 25X1
urge negotiations. Achour has so far been able to
maintain a delicate balance between representing the
workers and cooperating with the government, but 25X1
without government concessions he will be increasing-
The Army-Where Does It Stand? 25X1
The officer corps-drawn from the Tunisian estab-
lishment-has a strong stake in stability. The swift
and effective performance of the Army in suppressing
the labor riots in 1978 and the bread riots last
January demonstrated its leaders' loyalty to Bourgui-
ba's political order. Moreover, the Army's quick
return to the barracks soon after the disturbances
subsided illustrated its discipline.
A recurring need to suppres
civilians. The officers, in our view, are trying to
dissuade Mzali from calling on them again. F_
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disturbances, resulting in civilian casualties, would 25X1
undermine the Army's cohesion and commitment to
the regime. The US defense attache in Tunis reports
that a group of senior officers has told Mzali that they
will not support orders to deploy against unarmed
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We believe that Mzali's efforts to strengthen the
security forces, including the National Guard, are
designed to lessen reliance on the Army during times
of unrest. Mzali appointed tough-minded "law and
order" men and political loyalists to the posts of
director general of National Security and commander
of the National Guard shortly after the January bread
riots. Tunisian National Guard officers say he also
has approved personnel increases for the National
Guard and is reequipping and retraining it for riot
control. Several hundred Army personnel were trans-
ferred to the National Guard two months ago as part
of the program, according to the US defense attache
in Tunis. 25X1
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Tunisia's Principal "Forces of Order" Succession Politics
Maneuvering among party and government officials
for the right to succeed Bourguiba began after he
Army
30,000
(Leadership reports to Minister
(14,400 in
of National Defense)
combat units)
Internal Security Forces
(Leadership reports to Minister
Primarily
along the
coast and
near major
urban centers
in the north.
suffered a major heart attack in 1967. Prime Minis-
ter Mzali's predecessor in office, Hedi Nouira, proved
unable to develop the base of support that would have
enabled him to withstand challenges by rivals during
a succession crisis. Prime Minister Mzali, however,
firmly established himself as the front-runner by late
1983 after two years of maneuvering. Exploiting
Bourguiba's increased confidence in him, the Prime
Minister purged several important political oppo-
of Interior) nents, including the proteges of Bourguiba's wife,
National Guard 5,500 total Various cities Wassila, who is a bitter foe of Mzali.
and border
areas.
Intervention Brigade 1,000
Mzali's efforts are unlikely to strengthen the internal
security forces significantly in the near term.
The Tunisian Constitution, promulgated by Bourgui-
ba, supports Mzali's bid to establish himself as the
heir apparent. Under the Constitution, in the event of
a presidential vacancy, the prime minister assumes
the functions of the presidency for the remainder of
the term of the National Assembly-which currently
runs until November 1986. If the prime minister is
incapacitated, next in line are the president of the
National Assembly and the Minister of Justice.
Presidential candidates for a new term must be
approved by a government commission and then run
against each other in a nationwide popular election.
This process has never been tested.
agreements between labor and government and proba-
bly result in disorders, sporadic terrorism against
symbols of government authority, and intervention by
Prospects
There is little likelihood either that Tunisia is in for
an economic boom or that the ruling elite is going to
share its power and wealth. The domestic scene,
therefore, is likely to become more volatile over time,
providing opportunities for extremist Muslims and
radical leftist trade union members to gain influence
and for foreign states such as Libya to promote
instability. In the worst case, the militants in Tunisia's
labor and Islamic movements will take control of their
organizations or establish independent groups with
broad appeal. This would endanger the fragile wage
the armed forces.
Bourguiba's stubborn resistance to reform is generat-
ing the political climate conducive to such disorders.
The inept leadership of Mzali has made him the
immediate target of discontent, but Tunisia's social
and political problems go beyond Mzali to the au-
thoritarian order established by the President. If
Mzali were dismissed as prime minister-and this
appears doubtful in the near term-Mzali's successor
would be likely to encounter similar difficulties in
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Averting Crisis:
Bourguiba Commutes Death Sentences
President Bourguiba's decision to commute the death
sentences for eight young men convicted of killing two
passers-by during the bread riots precluded a new
outbreak of civil disturbances. The death sentences
generated popular appeals for clemency, a formal
protest by the Tunisian Human Rights League, and
demurral from virtually all opposition groups, in-
cluding the Islamic Tendency Movement. Tunisian
lawyers part of the regime's traditional base of
support publicly accused the government of flouting
the law during the trial.
Statements by government officials highlighting their
insensitivity to the plight of a number of demonstra-
tors on trial heightened the prospects for unrest, in
our view. Prime Minister Mzali accused critics of the
regime's tough law enforcement policy of 'pretending
to forget the victims-and only concentrating on the
severity of the judgments and sentences. " The judge
who handed down the death sentences, meanwhile,
minimized the importance of popular opposition.
"The dogs may bark, " he said, "but the caravan
moves on. " This statement was reproduced in the
journal of the ruling Destourian Socialist Party.
We believe that President Bourguiba's decision to
commute the death sentences to life imprisonment at
hard labor resulted primarily from mounting interna-
tional pressure. Editorials in the French press con-
demned the death sentences, and the wife of aformer
French Prime Minister-a longstanding friend of the
Bourguibas-made a personal appeal for clemency,
according to the US Embassy in Tunis. These pres-
sures apparently strengthened arguments against the
death sentences by an influential minority of govern-
ment officials led by Foreign Minister Caid es-Sebsi.
gaining political credibility. Mzali's removal, how-
ever, might temporarily ease discontent and position a
leader with stronger political skills to assume the
presidency if Bourguiba died soon after the new prime
minister was appointed.
We believe that Bourguiba's death or incapacitation
and Mzali's succession could ignite popular protests.
There would also be bitter political squabbling within
official circles. The US Embassy in Tunis reports
there is increasing discussion among some Tunisians
of military intervention, and we believe that, if a
succession crisis were prolonged, there would be direct
military participation in the political process.
Worsening domestic problems in Tunisia almost cer-
tainly will stimulate Libyan troublemaking. F
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___]Qadhafi may already be urging radical Mus- 25X1
lims to cause trouble. Recent antiregime demonstra-
tions at Tunis University were sponsored by a radical
fundamentalist faction sympathetic to Libya.
Implications for the United States
The US Embassy in Tunis reports that resentment
toward US policies in the Middle East among increas-
ingly radicalized young Tunisians is growing rapidly.
The Embassy says that these attitudes, influenced by
Arab arguments of a US bias toward Israel, have 25X1
begun to affect political debates in official circles.
Tunisian leaders cannot afford to ignore this body of
opinion. These attitudes have resulted in increasingly
vitriolic attacks on US policies in the Tunisian press-
even in government-controlled publications. Tunis's
role as headquarters of the Arab League means that
these statements carry more weight in Arab circles
than Tunisia's small size and population would merit.
We believe the Tunisian Government may soon begin
withholding some diplomatic support for the United
States and strengthening its pro-Arab and nonaligned
posture in response to those domestic pressures. Tuni-
sia's continued dependence on US military and eco-
nomic assistance-it has received over $1 billion in
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US economic aid since 1956-militate against stron-
ger anti-US actions any time soon. Tunisian military
officers are well disposed toward the United States,
and Bourguiba himself has often referred to the US
Sixth Fleet as Tunisia's "shield in the Mediterra-
nean.'
Although less likely, Tunisia's need to demonstrate its
nonaligned credentials may push it closer to the Soviet
Union in the post-Bourguiba era. This-in the worst
case-could complicate US strategic planning in the
region. US contingency planning for a NATO-War-
saw Pact war presumes uninterrupted naval move-
ment between the eastern and western Mediterranean
through the Sicily Strait, the 140-kilometer passage
between Tunisia and Sicily. A Tunisian regime that
allows substantial Soviet access to Tunisian facilities
would compel NATO to devote more assets to keeping
this vital sea lane open during wartime. Soviet Navy
ships are now permitted port calls and use of Tunisian
ship repair facilities under a commercial agreement.
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