WEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080017-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2010
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: April 11, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09 :
CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080017-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09 :
,CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080017-1b';
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April 11, 1975
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080017-1
The WEEKLY REVIEW, issued every Friday morning by the
Office of Current Intelligence, reports ;.tnd analyzes ,igniiic,ant
developments of The week through noor! on Thursday. It fra-
quontly includes me eriai coordinated with or preperc d by the
Office of Economi. Resoerch, the Office of Strategic
Rosoerch, the Office of Geographic and Cartogreiphic
Resoarch, and the Dlrectorc to of Science and Technology.
Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and
therofcro published separately as Special Reports arc hinted
in the contents.
4 The Arab Side of Confrontation
6 Rhodesia: Sithole Furloughed
7 Ethiopia: Security Concerns
8 Portugal: Road to Socialism 25X1
10 Greece-Turkey-Cyprus
12 Disarmament Conference End:
13 Eastern Europe: VE Day
14 Yugoslav-Romanian Cooperation
17 Mexico: The Presidential Sweepstakes
18 Venezuela: No Bonanza; Aid
20 Ecuador: Critic:sm Goes Public
20 Argentina: Buying Time
22 Honduras: New Leaders Emerge
rComments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be directed to
the editor of the Weekly Rnview.
CONTENTS (April 11, 1975)
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
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After a week's lull, the communists have
opened a new round of fighting with Saigon the
ultimate target. Hanoi now appears in position
to take whatever action is necessary to force the
war to an early conclusion. The remaining ques-
tions have to do with timing and tactics, and
whether a political solution can be ,rranged-on
communist terms-prior to a final South Vietna-
mese military collapse.
Va'Onaf ao 1Fo?us on Saigon
NOh1'll
V/ETNA I.'
DEMILITARIZED ZONE
At midweek, parts of three North Vietna-
mese divisions supported Ly artillery and armor
attacked the capital of Long Khanh Province
east of the capital while part of another division
moved against the capital of Long An Province
to the southwest of Saigon. Other communist
forces that had been threatening the provincial
capital of Moc Hoa in the northern delta nave
now withdrawn, apparently in keeping with
communist plans to step up the pressure closer
to Saigon.
New communist instructions call for
achieving i nal victory this year-rather than in
1976 as predicter+ in earlier communist direc-
tives. The new instructions c!aim that com-
munist gains have far exceeded expectations for
1975 and have created the "most opportune
moment" for total victory this year. The new
plans call for the communists to press the attack
and expand their territorial holdings 6uring
5110nkinng South Vietnams
C 100
April by "liberating" Tav Nirlh. Hau Nghia, and
Binh During provinces.
the communists are planning a three-pronged
assault on Saigon itself from the south, west,
and north.
The past week of relative inaction has liven
the government some chance to consolidate its
military position. Nevertheless, in terms of capa-
bilities, the strategic balance decisively favors
the communists. The North Vietnamese now
have 18 infantry divisions in South Vietnam
supported by numerous armor, artillery, and
air-defense units. Eight of these divisions are in
Military Regions 3 and 4. Moreover, there ate
strong indications that a North Vietnamese
army corps headquarters and three more reserve
divisions are moving to South Vietnam.
Page 1 WEEKLY REVIEW Apr 11, 75
' ` ,.`~~i r.,,..Inl Sped ,) 7. n?
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By comparison, the South Vietnamese at
this momeni nave only seven combat-ready
infantry divisions. They are, however, rebuilding
three divisions from personnel extracted from
the northern provinces and plan to form two
more by early summer.
The government's long-term r rospects are
bleak, no matter how well Saigon :, forces and
commanders acquit themselves in the fighting
that lies ahead. This is already beginning to
become an accepted judgment, within both
civilian and military circles in South Vietnam.
Meanwhile, in ;i obvious effort to encour-
age a political upheaval in Saigon, the com-
munists are again stating their willingness to
negotiate with a post-Thieu government. But
Hanoi is making it clear that it is not interested
USSR: REACTING TO INDOCHINA
Like almost everyone else, the Soviets
have been surprised by the pace of events in
Indochina, particularly in South Vietnam.
But Moscow has adjusted easily to the
changing circumstances.
The Soviet technique has been to use
many of the same formulations as before,
allowing the changed cis -umstances to give
those words new meaning. For example,
w her, calling for negotiations between the
communists and the Saigon government be-
fore the recant militar co!l nrn +1.C Su is
y
r 4~./ Ll ll. V'i l lJ
probably had in mind an end result similar
to the pattern of Laos-a set-up that gave
the communists room for political as well as
military maneuv3r. A`i this juncture, how-
ever, Moscow's call for negotiations can
mean little more than an interest in finding a
means for an orderly assu-.ption of power
by the communists. Moscow may also have a
genuine, although perhaps not intense,
interest in a denouement in Smith Vi,?tnam
that reflects well on the responsibility and
humaneness of its friends in Hanoi.
in a compromise but rather in a fig leaf for a
North Vietnamese take-over under military
pressure.
Pressure is building among the civilian op-
position and among some military commanders
for President Thieu either to exert vigorous lead-
ership or step aside. So far, Thieu has shown
considerable skill in keeping the opposition di-
vided. He is aided by the fact that there is no
single figure who his various political and mili-
tary critics believe would provide more effective
leadership. Thieu's new nominee for prime min-
ister, Nguyen Ba Can, hopes to have a govern-
ment formed by this weekend. Can will try to
encourage representatives from the civilian op-
position to join the cabinet. There is consider-
able reluctance, however, especially among im-
portant Buddhist and Catholic groups. to be
For the moment, the Soviets empha-
size the collapse of authority in South Viet-
nam rather than the actions of the North
Vietnamese. Pravda commentator Yuriy
Zhukov on April 5, stated that the new
situation in South Vietnam opened up a
clear prospect for peace, by which he pre-
sumably means that an early communist
take-over is 'a good prospect.
The Soviets are also still talking about
negotiations iii Cambodia, aRiwiugh again
they view any such talks only as a device to
provide an orderly transfer of power.
Deputy Chief Kuznetsov of the Soviet For-
eign Ministry's Southeast Asia Division re-
cently told an Italian diplomat that Moscow
recognizes that Prince Sihanouk will prob-
ably play some role in Phnom Penh after a
communist victory. Kuznetsov discounted
Sihanouk's long-range impor'.ance, however,
and repeated !ong standi:;g Soviet acofli-
plaints about the Prince's unreliability.
Pace 2 WFFKI V RFVIEW Apr 11, 75
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"P ay Veng
l Neak I.uong
t.
enclave in the Mekong River's east bank di-
rectly opposite the city. At week's end, commu-
nist recoilless-rifle fire began hitting along
Phnom Penh's waterfront.
Although the communists have begun call..
ing in units from the countryside to participate
in increased attacks on Phnom Penn, this did
not prevent them from attacking the govern-
ment-held provincial capitals of Prey Veng and
Kompong Speu. Defenders at Prey Veng gave
ground initial!y but appear to be holding. Kom-
pong Speu is more seriously threatened, with
some fighting having occurred near the center of
town.
False Hopes
Prime Minister Long Boret returned to
Phrom Penh this week amid speculation that
some sort of a breakthrough toward "negotia-
tions" had occurred. There is no evidence, how-
ever, that Sihanouk or the Khmer communists
have backed away from their outright rejection
or ~,y "compromise or negotiations." Specula-
tion t oncerniuig negotiations was fueled by Thai
claims that a meetinn had been arranged
Bangkok between Boret and a "rep.asentative
from the cppozition government." This repre-
sentative vies undoubtedly Sihanouk's son,
Prince Yuvaneath, who had been in Bangkok
before with the approval of the Thai govern-
ment. Yuvaneath-who has a reputation as a
playboy and who has been staying in Macao-
clearly has no authority' to speak for his father,
let alone the Khmer communists. At best, he
might be expected to relay some message from
Boret to Sihanouk. Under present conditions,
however, Boret would appear to have little to
oiler the other side except surrender.
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Cambodia: Continued Erosion
The erosion of Phnom Penh's outer de-
fenses reached the point at week's end where a
major Khmer communist penetration or a gen-
eral collapse of government units-or both-
appeared imminent. The most serious commu-
nist encroachments occurred along the defense
lines northwest of the city, where the insurgents
edged to within four miles of the airport. Steady
fighting had also worn holes in government de-
fenses near Route 5 north of the city. Commu-
nist gunners kept the airport under sporadic
artillery and rocket fire during the week, forcing
a partial halt to the US airlift on April 10.
Khmer air force operations have begun winding
down as the result of almost daily aircraft losses.
To the west, communist ground attacks
along Route 4 forced government units to aban-
don a number of positioos, and front lines in
this sector were within several miles of the
army's main ammunition dump. On the other
side of the capital, relentless insurgent pressure
forced government troops into a relatively small
S I ( i.
New
Kompong
Chnnang
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Communists gap 1VA
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