WEEKLY REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080026-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2010
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: May 30, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Weekly Review
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The WEEKLY REVIEW, issued every Friday morning by the
Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant
developments of the weck through noon oi: Thursday. It fre-
quently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the
Office of Economic Research, 'he Office of Strategic
Research, the Office of Geographic and Cartographic
Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
Topics r iquiring more comprdhensive treatment and
therefore p.iblished separately as Special Reports are listed
in th6 contents.
a
CONTENTS (Mai' 30, 1975)
1 Laos: End of an Era
3 Cambodia-Thailard: Tolera
4 Lebanon: New Prime Minist
6 UK. At the Wire on EC M.em
7 Canadi: A Lin:( to the EC
8 NATO: Defense Ministers' M
9 Czech oslovi...l,,: President H
ble Neighbc
er
bersh;p
eeting
usak
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
11 Lurope: Communist Maneu
12 Portugal: Bypassing the Part
13 Ethiopia: Unrest and Dissen
vering
ies
s;:)n
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
WESTERN
15 Egypt-Israel: Looking to the
16 South Africa: Namibia Issue
17 ASEAN: Coming of Age
US
HE
MISPHERE
18 Uruguay: Who is the Boss?
19 OAS: A New Secretary General
19 Surinam: Inr'ependence Negotiations
Comments
publication
the editor
and queries on the contents of this
are welcome. They may bedirected
of the Weekly
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Pathit Lao guard and students outside US compound
Laos: End of an Era
The period of massive US involvement in
Laos came to an end this week following the
signing of a pact with Pathet Lai officials and
leftist student leaders in which the US agreed to
abolish US AID and turn over most of its equip-
I -)ent and facilities to the Lao government no
later than June 30. Over the past two weeks, the
number of official American personnel in Vien-
tiane has dropped from 1,100 to 161, and
within a few more days the official US presence
will consist of a skeletal embassy staff of less
than 50 people. Within another month or so, it
should become clear whether even this residual
presence can be maintained, or whether Wash-
ington will soon lose its last diplomatic position
in Indochina.
feeling make it clear that the Lao communists,
who are now moving rapidly to consolidate their
political control, are prepared to accept the risk
of a complete break with the US.
The North Vietnamese are clearly prepared
to provide their Pathet Lao clients with what-
ever combat and logistic support is needed in
former non-communist areas of Laos. Regular
North Vietnamese combat forces from the
Plaine des Jarres in north Laos hav' already
been committed to help stamp out resistance in
the area of General Vary Pao's former Meo
headquarters complex at Long Tieng. 25X1
The answer to this question is, of course,
largeiy up to the Lao communists and their
North Vietnamese mentors. Economic reaiities
and diplomatic factors suggest that the Lao
communists might still attach some value to a
continuing US role in Laos, but the degree to
which such rational considerations are influ-
encing the militant Pathet Lao leadership in Sam
Neua is unclear. In any case, the past three
weeks of carefully orchestrated anti-American
Pann 1 WFFKI V RFVIFN May 30, 75
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they seem to suggest major conflict and dis-
agreement between Pathet Lao troops and
student demonstrators over administration of
the cities. The Pathet Lao, in some cases, are
said to have arrested a number of demon-
strators. There are indications that serious rice
shortages may exist in all three areas, and this
may be sparking considerable disci r ent on tha
part of the general populace. 25X1
Elements of the North Vietnamese 335th
and 866th infantry regiments are participating
in the operation, and Ha:ioi's 25th Engineer
Battalion i3 clearing the way for armor and
artillery convoys to enter Long Tieng.
Meanwhile, there are reports that serious
disturbances have broken out in Pakse, Savan-
nakhet, and Thakhek-th;ae former rightist
urban strongholds in southern and central Lacs
taken over by the Pathet Lao nearly two weeks
ago. The reports are sketchy and confusing, but
Predominantly communist-controlled
area, February 1973 ceasefire
v Page 2 WEEKLY REVIEW May 30, 75
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Cambodia-Thailand: Tolerable Neighbors
More through accident than design, the
new C,. mbodian regime's relationship with
Thailand jot off to a bad start. During the past
several weeks, Cambodian naval units-ap-
parently under orders to enforce the country's
"territorial integrity"-seized a number of Thai
vessels fishing in or near Cambodian wat'rs in
the Gulf of Thailand. A more serious situation
developed at midmonth along the border in Trat
Province. Local Cambodian forces there de-
manded that Thai authorities pull back interna-
tional boundary markers d short distance into
Thailand by May 18. Bangkok refus3d and put
its border units on full alert.
Phnom Penh quickly moved to d,:, :!e the
situation by issuing u.1 authoritative stater,ier,t
on May 19 denying that an "ultimatum" had
ever been issued and claiming that the incident
was a "trick of US imperialism." The statement
also expressed the new regime's desire to "live
Thai border police and Khmer Rouge at border
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peacefully with neighboring countries."
Phnom Penh also appeared well aware of
Thai sensitivities regarding a handful of Cam-
bodian army troops that had until last week
been holding out in the Preah Vihear Temple.
The temple had been the subject of a widely
publicized border dispute in the early 1960s and
was awarded to Cambodia by the World Court
in 1962. In announcing the capture of the
temple this week, the Cambodian information
ministry stressed that the new leadership "has
no intention of violating territorial integrity or
even encroaching one inch" into Thailand.
The isolated border incidents notwith-
standing, the new Cambodian leadership appears
to be adopting a relatively conciliatory and
cautious policy toward Thailand. This stands in
marked contrast to the assertive and aggressive
attitude the Khmer have displayed in the.
deal-
ings with their wartime allies i,i Vietnam. While
some friction '- likely to continue along the
Thai-Cambodia, border and Bangkok will prob-
ably continue to 'iew its new neighbors with
nervousness for some time, the Thai may even-
tually come to regard Cambodia as an effective
buffer against Vietnamnec ' ommunists.
25X1
Lebanon: New Prime Minister
President Franjiyah made a significant con-
cession to hi_ leftist and Nlus;m critics this week
by designating Rashid Karami, a powerful Sunni
Muslim leader and long-time foe, to iorm a new
government. As a condition for serving as prime
minister, Karami almost certainly demanded and
was granted much greater authority to choose
his owr cabinet and to make government policy
than his weak predecessors were allowed.
Karami, who served as prime minister
several times between 1955 and 1970, has long
charged that Muslims are underrepresented in
Lebanon's government and should be granted
increased political power. Last March, he called
for fundamental changes in the country's
archaic electoral laws and in the 32-year-old
National Covenant, which provides for the dis-
tribution of political posts on the basis of what
is now only the fiction of a Christian majority in
the country's population.
Karami probably has no firm plan for deal-
ing with the present crisis, which has involved
ten days of armed clashes between the militia of
the right-wing Phalanges Party and radical feda-
yeen. At a minimum, however, he is likely to
move quickly to convene a Lebanese-Palestinian
summit to hammer out still another agreement
on the rights and responsibilities of the Pales-
tinians in Lebanon. Existing agreements-
notably those of 1969 and 1973-have been
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widely disregarded, always with the effect of
expanding the scope of fedayeen activities.
Syria and the Palestinians will welcome
Karami's appointment; Syrian Foreign Minister
Khzddam reportedly played a major role in his
selection. Karami is an Arab nationalist who in
1969 gave up an effort to form a government to
protest an attempt by then president Hilou to
use force to control the fedayeen. He later be-
came prime minister after the Lebanese and
fedayeen negotiated their Cairo Accord in
November 1969.
The Phalangists have long opposed Karami,
but appear willing to tolerate his government
pending evidence of its ability to restore order.
Phalangist leader Jumayyil said on May 28 that
his party "seeks stability, and supports a strong
prime minister to ensure this." The Phalangists
are now in an especially weak position to object
to Karami's appointment; their preferred solu-
tion-a military cabinet-met with overwhelming
opposition.
Experiment with the Military
In a dramatic attempt to end the civil
unrest in Beirut, Franiiyah on May 23 appointed
a predominantly military cabine. headed by a
retired security official, Brigadier General Nur
ad-Din Rifai. Announcement of Rifai's appoint-
ment drew intense criticin from all Muslim,
loftist, and even some Christian leaders, as well
as signs of disapproval from Syria and the Pales-
tinians. Rifai stepped down after three days.
This was Lebanon's first experiment with a
military cabinet since gaining independence in
1943. Although it proved an embarrassment to
President Franjiyah, it may at least have fright-
ened the civilian politicians into being more
cooperative than usual in helping the new prime
minister assemble a government less reluctant
than its predecessors to deal with the deterio-
rating security situation.
Fighting Subsides
The announcement of Karami's appoint-
ment had the immediate effect of lowering
tension and diminishing the street fighting that
has been going on in many areas of Beirut.
Major fedayeen units and the Lebanese army
stayed out of the clashes this month, which
primarily involved exchanges of small-arms and
mortar fire between the Phalangist militia and
the radical fedayeen, who have been joined by
far left groups armed and funded by Iraq and
Libya. These troublemakers, who operate
beyond the control of Lebanese or Palestinian
leaders, have engage,i in widespread sniping in
attempts to spark more serious violence.
Approximate&y 85 persons have been killed so
far this mcnih.
Meanwhile, a sharp clash occurred between
Israeli and Lebanese military forces on May 25
when an Israeli patrol that had crossed the
border in search of fedayeen was fired on by
Lebanese army units. After several hours, the
local UN contingent arranged a cease-fire, and
the Israeli force was allowed to withdraw. Seven
Lebanese and two Israelis were killed in the
incident, which was the most serious clash
between the two countries' forces since Septem-
ber 1972.
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UK: AT THE WIRE ON EC MEMBERSHIP
Most indicators point to a "yes" vote in
the referendum on EC membership to be held in
Britain on June 5. With such a result, th , gov-
ernment can then turn to the country's r..ount-
ing economic problems-an annual inflation rate
of over 30 percent and the largest balance-of-
payments deficit in the world.
The pre-referendum campaign has been
long and dull. The press has given extensive
coverage to the issue, and the more reputable
newspapers have tried to present both sides.
Government ministers have been free to express
their own views: Industry Secretary Benn and
Trade Secretary Shore have been the most v, cal
anti-EC spokesmen, while a few government
officials have taken a strong stand in defense of
EC membership.
Prime Minister Wi:son and Foreign Secre-
tay Callaghan have been conspicuously quiet
until recently, and even now they are maintain-
however, in attracting a sizable number of per-
sons to the pro-EC fold. In the most recent
Gallup poll, 60 percent of those queried were in
favor of continued membership, 29 percent
were opposed, and 11 percent were undecided.
Another poll indicates that a majority in all
parts of Britain, including Scotland and Wales,
supports the EC. Surprisingly the polls indicate
that majorities of Labor Party voters and trade
union members favor continued membership.
The pro-EC forces appear to be the better
organized. In addition to using the government
funds available to both sides, they have col-
lected considerable money and have used talent
from various fields. They have brought in a
highly paid US media expert and have dis-
tributed thousands of auto bumper stickers.
Through opinion surveys, they have discovered
that they are weak only among housewives and
the 18-to-24 age bracket.
ing a very low profile in support of membership. The anti-marketeers have presented
Their pro-market position has been influential, embattled image, trying desperately
Heath, Thorpe and Jenkins speak for EC
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overcome the odds. They have concentrated on pact would carefully avoid any preferential
blaming EC membership for the country's rising arrangements that might violate GATT obliga-
unemployment and high food prices. Their cam- tions.
paign next week is expected to focus primarily
on food prices in an effort to secure the house- The economic and industrial cooperation
wives' vote. The anti-EC forces have also tried to phase of the agreement would include ioint
generate publicity for their cause by alleging ventures and exchanges of commercial nd
that, in a recent interview, French President technological information. The External Affai;s
Giscard repudiated Britain's renegotiated official said Ottawa recognized that this part cf
membership terms. They have also raised ques- the agreement was primarily the concern of
tions about CIA involvement with European private business. The government's role would
groups committed to closer political and eco- be to stimulate interest, organize trade missions,
nomic integration. make information available, and help dentify
and solve any problems that might arise.
The most important remaining problem for
the pro-EC forces is to achieve a sufficiently The consultative arrangements contained in
high turnout of voters to settle once and for all the agreement would be designed to expand the
the question of London's commitment to Eu- already established semiannual consultations.
rope. The pro-market forces are better o?ganized Press reports refer to plans for establishment of
to get out their supporters, but rr polls in- a joint commission to help implement the
dicate that only 60 percent of t:,.-- electorate economic, commercial, and technical accords as
plans to vote. Local Tory and Liberal Party they developed.
organizations and pro-market Labor gro4's are
fully prepared to get the vote gut, while the Ottawa's interest in formalizing a link to
anti-marketeers can only count on scattered the EC is more political than economic. Trudeau
local Labor Party organizations and anti-EC sees it as a major public demonstration of his
trade unions that will be receiving little en- government's so-called "third option" in foreign
couragernent from their respective national policy, which calls for lessening traditional
C di d
organizati Canadian ependence on the US. On the eco-
nomic side, nevertheless, Ottawa also hopes to
25X1 increase the proportion of manufactured goods
CANADA: A LINK TO THE EC and processed raw materials included in its ex-
port trade. The EC countries, for their part,
Prime Minister Trudeau, in Brussels this hope to negotiate accords that would ensure
week for the NATO summit, will also meet with long-term access tc Canadian raw materials.
EC Commission President Ortoli to review prog-
ress toward developing a "contractual link" with While most EC states now favor some type
the EC. In a recently completed third round of of "contractual link" with Canada, a few-
exploratory talks, Canadian and EC officials re- notably France-are reluciant to give the Com-
viewed an EC Commission draft agreement mission more authority to deal with non-EC
covering trade and economic and industrial co- states. The Commission views an agreement with
operation, as well as improved consultative Canada as a model for future arrangements with
arrangements. states outside the Community and as legit-
imatizing its authority to negotiate with them.
A Canadian External Affairs ofl'icial told a
US embassy officer that the trade aspects of the The Commission plans to send its proposal
agreement would simply reiterate the most- to the EC Council favored-nation commitments already covered in the Council will then refer the report to the
existing GATT regulations. Their inclusion in a member states for detailed consideration. A
Canadian-EC agreement is intenued as ' political fir,al decision is expected in the fall.
to provide the "contractual" flavo . The
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The unfortunate highlight of the regular
spring meeting of NATO's defense ministers on
May 22-23 was a highly publicized and some-
times emotional debate on whether the ccm-
munique issued after the meeting should contain
a reference to Spain. The meeting, nevertheiess,
was a generally successful one. The ministers
had thorough and frank discussions of some of
NATO's major problems, and they established
new guidelines for defense planning that empha-
size a long-range concept.
With many West European governments
opposing creation of any ties between NATO
and Franco's Spain, the defense ministers aopar-
ently came to Brussels with the hope that there
would be no mention of the Spanish issue. The
Europeans were concerned that a reference to
Spain could cause domestic political reper-
cussions, threatening public support for NATO
in Europe. There was also the feeling that it
might be viewed in Spain and throughout
Europe as a gesture of support for Franco, and
that it could prove counterproductive in a post-
Franco Spain.
The European ministers therefore firmly
rejected the notion of formally recognizing
Spain's contribution to the defense of Western
Europe. After lengthy discussion, they
The opening session
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reluctantly agreed to take note that Secretary
Schlesinger had informed them of the state of
bilateral agreements governing the use of bases
in Spain by US forces.
The controversy over Spain may have had
at least one fortunate side effect. The Portu-
guese naval chief, who attended the meeting,
made some favorable remarks afterward about
NATO, noting that the alliance functions demo-
cratically and is not dominated by the big
powers. He also stressed during the meeting that
Portugal's loyalty to NATO remains unchanged.
The subject of standardizing NATO weap-
ons was a principal issue at the ministerial ses-
sion. British Defense Minister Mason presented
formally a proposal by the Eurogroup-the
caucus of most of the European members of
NATO-inat the US a - d Europeans seek a better
balance in military procurement programs and
the standardization of equipment. Mason said
that the Eurogroup members would like to use
existing Eurogroup and NATO organiz-?tions to
work out concrete proposals. The meeting seems
to have marked a step forward in overcoming
the growing proliferation of different weapons
systems within the a;liance, but the ministers
formally committed themselves only to discuss
the matter further at their session in December.
The ministers also established guidelines
for NATO defense planning through 1982. This
long-range plan calls on the allies to maintain
and modernize all their fo ces, but emphasizes-
in line with US desires-that conventional forces
must be improved. It also makes the point that
this will require modest increases in defense
expenditures. In discussing this point in another
context, many of the defense ministers la-
mented the difficulty of convincing their public
and parliament of the necessity for increased
defense spending during a period of detente.
The Czechoslovak Federal Assembly this
week elected party chief Gustav Husak to suc-
ceed President Ludvik Svoboda, who has been
ailing for more than a year. Parliamentary ?ction
followed a plenum of the party Central Com-
mittee that explicitly stated Husak will continue
to serve as party leader. Some reports claim,
however, that he will hold the country's two top
offices only until the party congress next spring.
Husak's election was formalized on May
28, after the assembly approved a constitutional
amendment-proposed by the Central Com-
mittee-providing for the removal of an inca-
pacitated head of state before his term in office
expires.
The change in presidents does not portend
any change either in Czechoslovak policy to-
ward the US or in Prague's subservience to PMos-
co%r,,, Furthermore, Husak's decision to hold the
country's top party and state posts concurrently
Boas not break any Czechoslovak precedent.
Antonin Novotny held both offices from 1957
until his ouster in early 1968, when Alexander
Dubcek became party chief and Svoboda was
elected president.
Svoboda's departure from the presidency
will eventually entail his removal from the
11-member party presidium-a question that the 25X1
Central Ccmmittee announcement this week did
not address. The choice of a replacement for
Svoboda on the presidium, and perhaps for
Husak as party chief, are sensitive issues that
may be deferred until p,-eparations for tie party
congress are further advanced.
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The road to the European Communist con-
ference is not proving an easy one for the
Soviets. At issue is the final document that will
be issued by the Communist meeting, to be
convened some time after the European security
conference. The Soviets and their supporters
want a reasonably detailed, programmatic docu-
ment that wil: commit the Communist parties in
Europe to Moscow's view of the fuiure develop-
ment of Europe and the Communist movement.
The Soviet:, do not stand a chance of
getting the more independent parties to buy
this, and Moscow knows it. But they want to get
as many parties as possible to participate in the
process. Their problem is how far they can push
for concessions from the Yugoslavs, the Ro-
manians, the Italians, the Spanish, and the
others without forcing a break.
The successes recently scored by the in-
dependent-minded parties in the drafting
process were achieved because Moscow was not
ready to force a break at that juncture. The
question is still open, however, as to how far
Moscow will bend to get signatures on a con-
cluding document in East Berlin next fall or
winter.
The tactical interplay so far has been com-
plex. At the second meeting of the working
group responsible for drafting the final docu-
ment, held in East Berlin in mid-April, a group
of parties-including the Yugoslav, Romanian,
Italian, and Spanish-rejected an East German
preliminary draft because it did not represent
the views of all parties and thereby went against
the principle of consensus that had been agreed
upon earlier. These parties offered to submit a
preliminary draft of their own, but the East
Germans proposed that a revised version be
drafted based on the East German original but
taking into account the written and oral com-
ments of the other parties.
This proposal to revise the East German
draft was unacceptable to the Yugoslavs, who
inspired reports in late April that they would
not take part in the conference. At the same
time, Yugoslav party secretary Dolanc issued a
tough statement that reiterated the position
taken by his party in East Berlin and implied
that there would be no compromise. Once it was
clear that the Yugoslavs were ready to cause
trouble, the East Germans issued a placatory
statement, pointing out that the final document
would give equal weight to the East German
preliminary draft and the proposals of the other
parties. The East Germans stressed that their
aim was to produce a document acceptable to
all and that there was no intention of directing
any party how to conduct its own business.
DRAFTING A DOCUMENT TO REFLECT
SOVIET VIEWS AFTER A EUROPEAN
COMMUNIST CONFERENCE INVOLVES
A COM11PLEX TACTICAL INTERPLAY.
Some reports say a compromise was
reached at a subcommittee meeting on May 12.
The East Germans were said to have withdrawn
their draft altogether, and a Yugoslav document
was submitted, probably by the Italians. The
East Germans promised to use this and other
submissions to come up with a new draft for a
discussion next month in which the Yugoslavs
will participate.
On May 13, Tito, Dolanc, and party sec-
retary Grlickov met in Belgrade, and Grlickov
subsequently left for Moscow and talks with
Soviet party secretaries Ponomarev and
Katushev. Grlickov evidently tried to extract a
promise that Moscow would no longer push for
a conference document such as the East Ger-
mans originally had drafted. Not surprisingly,
Ponomarev and Katushev would make no such
promise. The Yugoslavs will have to wait for the
new East German draft next month to see what
impact their arguments have had.
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PORTUGAL: BYPASSING THE PARTIES
The 240-member general assembly of the
Portuguese Armed Forces Movement announced
on May 26 that it intends to establish closer ties
between the military dnd the people in an effort
to nullify the impact of the continuing conflict
between the Communist and Socialist parties.
The concurrent decision of the assembly to
censure the Socialist Party for boycotting
cabinet meetings !. ; encouraged the Commu-
nists to publicize their loyalty to the military
government in hopes of retaining their influence
should political parties ultimately be abolished.
The assembly was reportedly divided over
how to link the Armed Forces Movement with
popular organizations. The details are to be
worked out by a special committee and will
undoubte;.ily be the subject of continuing
debate. Radical officers, influenced by the re-
cent visit of a Portuguese military delegation to
Cuba, -dvor the establishment of block commit-
tees and an armed civilian militia to be staffed
by Movement cadres. According to this plan,
political parties would eventually be replaced by
organizations controlled by the Movement. Most
moderates prefer that the organizations be
popularly elected and that they exercise civil
and military authority as a new form of govern-
ment for Portugal.
The assembly recommended that the
Revolutionary Council take firm control to end
the dispute over the Communists' seizure of the
Socialist Party newspaper Republica. The
assembly also voted to criticize the Socialists for
boycotting cabinet sessions and for threatening
to withdraw from the four-party government
coalition. By these actions, the military rulers
made clear their displeasure over the Socialist
tactic of using the newspaper issue to challenge
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the Movement's commitment to establishing a
multiparty democra't'.
The Socialists will decide whether or not to
quit the government after further negotiations
.with the military leaders. Socialist ministers
Scares and Zenha backed down, at least tempo-
rarily, from their boycott of cabinet meetings to
attend a session on May 28 dealing with the
situation in Angola. Cooler heads may be pre-
vailing among the Socialists as a result of initial
discussions with Movement leaders late last
week and by Soares' reassuring talks with West
European Socialist party leaders in France last
weekend. They may also be encouraqed by the
decision of the press council, responsible for
enforcing the new press law, which has found
the Communist printers at fault in the Re-
publica dispute. A favorable solution might give
the Socialists the opportunity to back off from
their challenge gracefully without overly en-
couraging the Communists.
The Communists have been taking advan-
tage of the Socialists' intractability to play up
the Communist Party's loyalty and obedience to
the military government. The Communists
called a street march on May 28 to support the
Movement and to counter recent Socialist
manifestations of strength. Communist state-
ments have gone so far as to warn that if the
Socialists break up the coalition government,
thE:e will be no need for the constituent
assembly, which is scheduled to convene on
June 2. The Movement itself, however, has made
no mention of calling off the constituent
assembly's opening session.
Power struggles w',thin the Movement
appear to have been put on a back burner while
the officers are preoccupied with the dispute
between the Communist and Socialist parties.
1 here had been rumors that the armed forces
assembly would attempt to oust moderates from
leadership positions, but no such action was
taken. The assembly did, however, reiterate its
unanimous support for Prime Minister Gon-
calves, thereby bolstering his position and that
of the dominant radical faction. The vote may
also have been intended to strengthen Gon-
calves' hand this week at the NATO summit in
Brusseis. The assembly further emphasized its
confidence in Goncalves this week by promoting
him to the rank of full general.
ETHIOPIA: UNREST AND DISSENSION
Fighting between government forces and
rebels in Eritrea Province has increased sharply
in recent weeks. The ruling military council has
also been unable to stem unrest in several other
provinces and remains beset by serious internal
stress-. As yet, however, none of the forces
opposiii j the council offers a clear alternative to
its rule.
On May 18, government troops in Eritrea,
supported by air strikes, began a brigade-sized
operation against rebel furces north of Asmara.
This has resulted in several sharp :lashes and
heavy casualties on both sides. The sweep,
which is still in progress, is designed to blunt an
offensive that the rebels reportedly have been
planning for June or July. The rebels, who were
hurt by government operations this spring, prob-
ably had hoped to regroup and resupply by
then.
At a congress held recently in western
Eritrea, the two main rebel factions reportedly
agreed to unite. The merger is an attempt to
form a common political front with which to
confront the government. The two rebel fac-
tions have been coordinating their military
operations, but have differed somewhat on po-
Iiiical goals.
The pending change in the chairmanship of
the Organization of African Unity may ciso
influence events in Ethiopia. Somalia's President
Siad will be replaced in July by General Amin of
Uganda, who has expressed support for the
Eritreans. Although the chances of a Somali
attack appear sliia at present, the end of Siad's
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tenure as chairmL,;. will increase Ethiopian fears
that Mogadiscio wi'i now feel free to use force
to gain control of ih. Ogaden region claimed by
Somalia. Many Ethiopian leaders believe that
Siad's position has been the only restraint pre-
venting Somalia from taking advantage of
Ethiopia's domestic turmoil.
Serious unrest is reported in at least 9 of
Ethiopia's 13 other provinces. A number of
insurrections are in progress led by local land-
lords opposed to land reform decrees. None of
these uprisings poses a direct threat to the
council, but security forces have not been able
to score any major s:rccesses and in some
instances have suffered numerous casualties in
fights with dissidents. Inter-tribal warfare and
banditry are also increasing. In urban areas,
student and labor problems are on the rise. The
council shut down the Confederation of
Ethiopian Labor Unions last week.
The council is attempting to reach an ac-
commodation with Sultan Ali Mirah, leader of
the large Afar tribe. The Afar believe the council
is maneuvering to replace Ali Mirah and to
impose entral government control over their
largely autonomous area, through which pass
both the highway linking Addis Ababa with the
port of Assab and the railway to the port of
Djibouti in the French Territory of Afars and
Issas. The Afar also strongly nnppose the
council's land reform program.
Dissension within the ruling council re-
flects personal and tribal rivalries as well as
differences between radicals and more mod-
erately inclined members who favor revolu-
tionary goals but would pursue them more
cautiously. An important source of friction is
the radicals' continuing demand for the execu-
tion of more political prisoners from among the
approximately 130 still being held. Other
council members, mindful of the foreign and
domestic repercussions, are resisting further
executions. The council is also divided as a
result of the uncovering last month of a coup
plot led by two council members. Ten more
people, in addition to the five already detained,
have been arrested in recent weeks for alleged
involvement in the plot. 25X1
The council announced last week that for-
mer emperor Haile Selassie will have to undergo
prostate gland surgery. The general health of the
83-year-old Haile Selassie reportedly is good, as
are his chances of surviving this operation. There
is an undercurrent of resentment among some
Ethiopians about the council's treatment of
Haile Selassie, who has been virtually isolated
since his detention last September. A deteriora-
tion in his health would arouse more accusations
about the council's callousness.
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Egyptian President Sadat will apparently
press for a clarification of US views on an Arab-
Israeli settlement when he meets with President
Ford at Salzburg this weekend. Israel's Prime
Minister Rabin will be in Washington to push his
country's cause on June 11-12.
Sadat has said repeatedly that he is going
to Salzburg to listen rather than to offer idea,, of
his own. He takes the position that Egypt's
stand is already on record and that the US,
having undertaken a reassessment of its Middle
East policy, must now enunciate an unambig-
uous position. Sadat is seeking n even-handed
US policy and, specifically, a clear statement of
whether Washington's commitment to Israel is
confined to protecting it within its 1967 borders
or extends also to the occupied Arab territories.
The issue, Sadat believes, goes to the heart of
the US attitude toward the entire Arab-Israeli
dispute.
Sadat has become increasingly more de-
manding of the US as the Salzburg meeting has
neared. In an interview with an Austrian cor-
respondent early this week, he specifically tied,
for the first time, his willingness to enter an-
other round of disengagement talks to the
demand for a definitive statement of US policy.
Asked if he would consent to another effort by
Secretary Kissinger to mediate an interim agree-
ment with Israel, Sadat replied that he would, if
the US first made an "unequivocal statement,
openly and before the world," of its position on
the shape of a final settlement.
Egyptian officials, undoubtedly including
Sadat himself, were angered and disheartened by
the letter sent to President Ford last week by 76
US senators urging strong support and aid for
Israel. Many Egyptians, particularly legi3lators
who recently visited the US for extensive dis-
cussions with congressmen, interpret the letter
as totally negating their efforts to present a
moderate image of Egypt and generally to
expand ties with the US. Egypt's People's
Assembly debated the letter last weekend and
issued a resolution denouncing the senators'
action as "a frank invitation" to Israel to ignore
"the efforts exerted by the whole world to ease
tension." Foreign Minister Fahmi, in a speech
following the debate, decried what he termed
the senators' effort "tc block the way of their
President and sentence his mission to failure in
advance."
Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, buoyed by
the senators' letter, publicly declared this week
that he will be entering his discussions with
President Ford in a stronger bargaining position.
In a speech on May 26, Rabin cited the letter as
evidence of the correctness of Tel Aviv's firm
stand in talks with Washington and of the failure
of what Israel regards as the US administration's
attempt to pin the blame on Israel for the col-
lapse last March of Secretary Kissinger's media-
tion effort. Some Israeli press commentators,
however, have cautioned that congressional
support is not unconditional and that the gov-
ernment is missing the point that the majority
of the signatories still expect new peace initia-
tives from Israel.
Rabin gave no hint of any new flexibility
when he wound up this week a formal debate
within the ruling Labor Alignment on the c'ov-
ernment's foreign policy. Instead, he reiterated
that Israel has strengthened its position by
saying "no" both to Arab dictates and "perhaps
also to US influence." Rabin acknowledged that
the most practical optics at this time is an
interim agreement with Egypt, but he said that
Israel will make no further concessions unless
Egypt makes significant new offers. According
to the US embassy in Tel Aviv, Rabin emerged
from the debate firmly in charge with no seri;-us
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challenge to his policies or to his refusa! to
define the terms of an overall settlement.
South African Prime Minister Vorster has
made it clear that Pretoria will not comply with
the resolution adopted last December by the UN
Security Council setting a deadline of May 30
for Pretoria to accept UN guidelines for pre-
paiing Namibia (South-West Africa) for in-
' ependence. Vorster is apparently gambling that
his version of self-determination for the former
League of Nations mandate will permit South
Africa to maintain its economic stakes in the
territory despite international pressure for with-
drawal. The Security Council is to discuss the
issue again late this week.
The UN resolution demands that Pretoria
recognize the tt~ ritorial integrity and unity of
Namibia, begin an actual transfer of power to
the inhabitants, and allow a UN agency to par-
ticipate in the process. In a speech on May 20,
Vorster flatly rejected the UN's claim that it
should supervise preparations for independence.
Vorster may hope that his tough stance against
UN "meddling" in Namibia will overcome
doubts of South African whites about continued
white control of those parts of the territory
with substantial mineral industries. The 90,000
whites in Namibia, who make up only 12 per-
cent of the population, have hoped that Pretoria
would eventually annex at least the areas of
white settlement.
In his speech, Vorster referred to his plan,
announced last September, to sponsor a con-
ference of representatives of the territory's 12
ethnic groups, who will he allowed to decide its
future form of government. South African offi-
cials say they are encouraging each group to
select genuinely representative spokesmen, but
some of the tribal groups are beset with fac-
tional conflicts. At this time, only two tribal
homelands-similar to the Bantustans in South
Africa proper-have popularly elected legislative
bodies. 25X1
Although Vorster disclaimed any intention
of imposing a political b!"eprint on the in-
habitants of Namibia, he suggested that the self-
determination process may well result in a loose
federation of ethnic homelands independent of
Pretoria but subject to South African economic
exploitation. Such a federation would be con-
trary to the UN goal of a unitary state con-
trolled by the black majority. Vorster appar-
ently hopes, however, that the smaller tribal
groups will support a loose federation in order
to avoid domination by the Ovambos, who com-
pose almost half the population. Should the
Ovambos pull out of a federation, the whites
would then be the largr;st ethnic group in the
remaining territory, where the mineral wealth is
concentrated.
Vorster promised to arrange for the "true
leaders" of the nonwhite groups to meet with
officials of the UN or the Organization of Afri-
can Unity. He reasserted, however, that the
"true leaders" are the members of homeland
governments-mostly traditional tribal chiefs
who have gc:-.a along with South African tute-
lage. He denounced as unrepresentative the
South-West African People's Organization-the
only nationalist group recocnized by the UN or
the OAU.
The South African leader's offer to facili-
tate contacts between Namibia's "true leaders"
and envoys from the UN or the OAU seems
intend?,J to show foreign critics that the Peo-
ple's Organization is not genuinely representa-
tive. Although the organization opposes the
Bantustan system, its membership is predomi-
nantly Ovambo. Some leaders from other tribes
have protested exclusive international support
for the People's Organization.
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The recent annual meeting in Kuala
Lumpur of foreign ministers of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (Malaysia, Singa-
pore, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines)
reflected the confidence of the participants that
the eight-year-old regional organization has
"come into its owr.." Even so, the meeting
resulted only in a series of half-measures.
The session this year was marked by
spirited political debate, a marked departure
from the previous concentration on noncon-
troversial social and economic topics. The dis-
cussions were dominated by the unsettling
events in Indochina, but Thai reluctance to
antagonize the new communist rulers stopped
an Indonesian proposal to define and assess the
threat to Southeast Asia. The ministers agreed
that it would be politic to take an accom-
modating attit'ide toward the new governments.
They maintained that US bases should be with-
drawn in time, but accepted the desirabiiity of a
continued US naval and air power presence in
the area.
Although the members are edging toward
more concrete forms of political cooperation,
they are still inhibited by deep-rooted suspi-
cions. Malaysian-Philippine antagonism over the
Muslim rebellion in the southern Philippines, for
example, has impeded progress toward establish-
ment of regional peacekeeping machinery. This
has been a pet project of the Philippines, but
othe. members continue to believe that the
organization is not sufficiently seasoned to take
on bilateral disputes. The meeting adopted a
draft treaty of amity, which spells out peace-
keeping procedures proposed by the Philippines,
but the reservations of the other four members
may delay its ratificati .,n.
Malaysia sought to capitalize on its
partners' anxiety over post-Vietnam prospects
by seeking approval for its long-standing
proposal for the creation of a Southeast Asian
neutral zone. Although the five members
approved the concept in principle four years
ago, some continue to feel that realization is
impractical. The Malaysians had to settle for
agreement on a "blueprint" that does not
presage implementation in the near future.
The members did decide to go ahead with
setting up a permanent secretariat in Jakarta,
which was agreed to at the meeting last year.
The failure +o name a secretary general, how-
ever, reflects continuing bilateral suspicions. The
Philippines, which gave up its bid to have the
secretariat in Manila, expected to be com-
pensated with the first secretary generalship, but
Malaysian objections brought about a com-
promise that the post would go to an In-
donesian.
At Indonesia's urging, the meeting agreed
to increased military and security cooperation.
Jakarta wanted a forum for regular considera-
tion of defense and security problems.
Malaysian insistence that ASEAN avoid any im-
pression of taking on a military cast limited
agreement to "informal and flexible" coopera-
tion. Joint patrolling of gunrunning in the South
China Sea by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore
will probably be the first undertaking.
Thailand and Indonesia were willing to go
along with Philippine desires for an ASEAN
heads of state meeting, but Malaysia and Singa-
pore have reservations that cloud prospects for
an early gathering. Singapore argued that a sum-
mit would be unproductive without careful pre-
paration and that a meeting shortly after com-
munist successes in Indochina could be taken as
provocative. Malaysia insists on prior agreement
to a tight agenda, with the hope that this would
curb Philippine tendencies to use high-level
meetings for grandstanding.
going concern.
Despite the limited accomplishments of the
session, the member states' determination to
project an aura of mutual goodwill, plus their
greater readiness to tackle political Questions,
testify that the association is maturing into a
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Preside.it Bordaberry has negotiated a com- Since the military began to exercise a
promise with the army, but the underlying cause major policy role in ear,_, 1973, frequent flare-
of the dispute that provoked a clash of wills last ups have occurred betweel-. the President and
week is stil, unresolved. the generals, in large part because lines of execu-
tive authority remained undefined. The military
and Bordaberry realize that they need each
other, but they have been unable to agree who
has ultimate power. The latest bickering has
been over economic policy.
For the past year and a half, European
r, arkets have banned beef imports to protect
local producers, and Uruguay has been unable to
find alternative markets for its major com-
modity. The subsequent fall in foreign-exchange
earnings has seriously handicapped the nation's
efforts to meet energy needs that depend
heavily on the purchase of foreign petroleum.
These current problems, added to prolonged
economic stagnation, have made agricultural
policy a subject of major controversy between
those military leaders who want more govern-
me,it regulation and large ranchers-with whom
Bordabe; ry sides-who oppose market restric-
tions on beef sales.
possibly future crises.
Lass week, Bordaberry angered army chiefs
by firing the head of the national beef institute
without first consulting them. The ensuing com-
promise reportedly requires Bordaberry to get
rid of his current minister of agriculture soon. In
return, the military has acquiesced in the
appointment of a new head of the :^stitute as
long as the former director remains on d regu-
latory board.
The inability of the military to speak with
one voice complicates the decision-snaking pro-
cess, since generals occupy subcabinet positions
and major administrative posts. The shuffle of
personalities temporarily protects the national
image, but the failure to reach a consensus on
fundamental economic issues-particularly the
beef problem-means that the economy will
continue to be the focus of national debate and
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OAS: NEW SECRETARY GENERAL
Latin American commentary following the
OAS General Pssembly has focused almost ex-
clusively on the election of Argentina's A'ejan-
dro Orfila as secreaary general. The government-
controlled press it both Brazil and Mexico at-
tributes Orfila's victory to US trickery, and
ambassadors of several other governments have
decried the election as an example of US
manipulation. Orfila, like Ecuador's Galo Plaza
before him, is regarded as "agringado"-
Americanized-from his many years of residence
and education in the states.
Brazil, which is in diplomatic conflict with
Argentina over the sensitive issue of shared
natural resources, and which had widely pub-
licized its opposition to Orfila, is particularly
bitter and embarrassed at this "defeat." The
Brazilians have floated the notion that there was
a gentlemen's agreement among the four largest
OAS members to leave the top post to the
Orfilao) being congratulated
smaller countries; in effect, they have accused
the US of welshing on that alleged pact.
If Brazil's outrage was contrived to warn
against partiality. O
l_ L__ __ _
rfi
likely to overcome much of his identification
with-US interests.
Substantive issues before the General
Assembly were for the most part deferred. A
special OAS conference will be held in July in
Costa Rica to revise the Rio Treaty's voting
procedures in a way that will ease the
sanctions a ainst CU
SURINAM: INDEPENDENCE NEGOTIATIONS
Arson and violence marred the round of
independence negotiations last week in Para-
maribo between the Netherlands and Surinam.
Internally self-governing since 1950, Surinam is
scheduled to attain independence in November.
The political parties representing the
Hindustani and Javanese minorities planned
deminstrations to coincide with the arrival of
Dutch Prime Minister den Uyl. The two groups
saw this as their last chance to gain Dutch sup-
port for constitutional changes they believe are
needed to guarantee their rights after inde-
pendence. They also hoped to press the Creole
government of Minister President Arron into
giving them greater participation in the inde-
pendence process.
Young extremists among the Hindustanis
apparently decided on more spectacular
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measures to demonstrate their grievances. On
May i4, an attempt was made to burn down the
parliament building. In the days that followed,
other fires were set, and there were numerous
incidents of rock throwing, beatings, and van-
dalism.
On May 19, Arron met with leaders of the
opposition parties in an effort to restore order.
He agreed to hold further talks on guaranteeing
minority rights, while the opposition leaders
called off planned demonstrations. Hotheads on
both sides refused the compromise, however,
and lawlessness continued, forcing the adjourn-
ment of the independence talks on May 21.
Arron and opposition leaders have ap-
pealed publicly for unity and an end to violence.
The arson and lawlessness have probably
shocked the various Surinamese communities
sufficiently to ensure at least a short period of
peace. Nevertheless, without significant con-
cessions by the Arron government, and some
effort at trust by the Hindustanis and Javanese,
internecine warfare is possible.
The Dutch and Surinamese had made con-
siderable progress before the early adjournment
of the independence negotiations. The Hague
agreed to sponsor Surinam's admission to the
UN and to associate membership in the Euro-
pean Community. In addition, terms of refer-
ence were established for Dutch negotiations
with -she French on the disputed Surinam -
French Guiana border. Finally, the Dutch con-
sented to station a military advisory mission in
Surinam after independence. Two major issues,
on which the two countries are still far apart-
the amount of Dutch aid, and continued access
of Surinamers to Holland-remain for renewed
talks in The Hamm on June 25.
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