STAFF NOTES: SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000400080026-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 31, 2012
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: April 21, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
AGEI~ICY ,Aguv.ra, Apri 1 21, 1175
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Top Secret
ORD
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AL REC
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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel-
ligwtce, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intellignnco. Comments and queries are welcome.
April 21, 1975
Soviet Press on Central Committee Foreign
Policy Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
European CP Conference Preparations
Beset by Soviet Pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Dolanc and Kardelj on Yugoslav-Soviet Relations. . 4
East German Aid to "Liberated." Vietnam . . . . . . 5
Romanian initiative on CSCE. . . . . . . . . 6
Hungarian - West German Talks. . . . . . . . . . . 8
East German Trade Deficit with the USSR:
A Sign of the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Poles Doubt Goverrmunt's Explanations
for Meat Shortages, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Agricultural Investments Exceeding
Five-Year Plan Goals. 13
Exchange Over "Dubcek Letter" Cools
Prague's Relations with Sweden. . . . . . . . . . 16
Shelepin Through the Unsettled Dust
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Soviet Prosu on Central Committee
Foreign Policy Resolution
nations.
The Soviet, central press has editorialized at
length on last week's party Central Committee plenum,
fleshing out the bones of the published foreign policy
resolution. Pravda's lead editorial on April 17 is
apparently d sanitized version of Foreign Minister
Gromyko's report to the plenum. Both Pravda and
Izveatia have echoed the confident, relatively tough
tone of the plenum resolution itself, tempering
endorsements of detente with sharp reminders that
powerful reactionary forces in the US are "complicating"
bilateral relations.
On the positive side, Pravda praised the state
of Soviet relations with the US and the other major
Western powers, pointing to the "enormous significance"
of the strategic arms agreement reached at Vladivostok.
(Brezhnev's successful summitry there and elsewhere in
behalf of detente is applauded by both papers.) In
another paragraph the party organ reiterated that the
USSR remains a champion of military detente.
Pravda and Izvestia both attacked US trade legisla-
tion, however, and firmly rejected discrimination and
attempts at interference in Soviet internal matters.
Pravda noted that "it is supposed" in the USSR that
the US will repeal the offending legislation.
Both papers replayed familiar Soviet themes
regarding world trouble spots such as Vietnam, Cambodia,
and Cyprus. The Middle East Peace Conference was in-
voked as essential to progress in that region, but no
timetable was set out, suggesting Soviet uncertainty
and perhaps flexibility on that question.
China, which was not mentioned at all in the
plenum resolution, received its usual lumps in Pravda's
summary of the deliberations of the Central Committee.
The plenum reportedly concluded that nothing can be
done at this time to improve relations between the two
April 21, 1975
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European CP Conference Preparations
Beset by Soviet Pressure
The third session of the committee that is
drafting documents for the European Communist
conference will reportedly open in East Berlin
in about two weeks. It will attempt to under-
cut Soviet initiatives that the Yugoslav and
Italian parties particularly oppose.
]the Soviets are trying hard
wing independent-minded parties into line.
the first meet-
ing of the committee in February made little prog-
ress. At the second meeting during April 8-10,
however, the Soviet representatives strongly argued
that the formal conference should issue two docu-
ments that would be binding on all participants:
A propaganda resolution intended to foster rap-
prochement between European Communist parties and
leftist parties, such as socialists and social
democrats; and a collection of principles intended
to impose common behavior on European Communist
parties.
Italian and Yugoslav opposition.
oubt that the CPSU s approach provoked strong
The latter parties, together with the Romanians,
have feared from the outset that the Kremlin would
use the formal conference to reassert hegemony over
the European Communist movement.
April 21, 1975
there is little, if any,
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I I L3A I
At the April session, however,
the Romanians showed
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themselves "to be more, independent as a state than
as a party." Bucharest's rep-
resentatives had often resorted to "stupid slogans"
that occasionally damaged arguments the
Yugoslavs and Italians were seeking to advance. It
is likely that Bucharest's delegation simply exasper-
ated its Latin brethren with an inordinate display of
Romanian nationalism.
no programmatic or binding documents.
In any event, the recent stridently independent
tone of the Bucharest press clearly suggests that the
Romanians, Italians, and Yugoslavs will continue their
common efforts to hold Moscow to the original guiding
principles of the conference--unanimity on all docu-
ments, plenary sessions for all "important work," and
April 21, 1975
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Dolanc and Kardelj on
Yu oc o3llav-Sov et Relations
Yugoslavia's two most influential leaders aside
from Tito, Executive Committee secretary Stane Dolanc
and Presidium member Edvard Xardelj, last week as-
sured the US ambassador that they continue to dis-
trust the Soviets and are determined to follow an
independent path.
In a discussion of why Moscow has been trying
to belittle the Yugoslav role in World War II
port from some Soviet leaders, but "not from Brezh-
nev personally," and stressed that the threat of
the Continformists inside Yugoslavia is insignificant.
He said that Belgrade will mo"e neither East nor
West, but will continue to follow its own independ-
ent path.
bluntly that "first and most important one must
remember that the Soviets are not talking about the
pa3ts they are talking about the present and the
future." Dolanc said that the change in Soviet
attitudes over the last several years waa "only one
of degree." He agreed with the ambassador's asser-
tion that the changes are tactical and not strategic
and that long-range Soviet objectives are unchanged.
Kardelj said that the Cominformistc had sup-
Dolano said
On a personal note, Kardelj said he had re-
covered from his recent serious surgery and had re-
turned to full activity. The ambz:?;^ador noted he
seemed to be in good health.
April 21, 1975
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East German Aid to "Liberated" Vietnam
The regime launched a public appeal last Friday
for additional funds to "relieve the suffering of
people of the liberated areas of South Vietnam
The East Germans have already dispatched seven tons
of,medicine to the "liberated" area.
"South Vietnamese patriots."
duty time, with some of the proceeds going to the
In the past, East German workers have criti-
cized calls for increasing their "voluntary" con-
tributions, and the new demand to dig deeper into
the pocketbook will probably cause renewed grousing.
The regime may attempt to tie the aid collection
campaign to the domestic need for expanded produc-
tion by calling for extra work during normally off-
April 21, 1975
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Romanian Initiative on CSCE
Bucharest is increasing its efforts to see
that guarantees for national sovereignty are
clearly written into the European security docu-
ments.
The current Romanian campaign carries note,
of urgency, probably for a variety of reasons:
the recent upsurge in Soviet-Romanian tensions over
CEMA policy, the proposed European communist con-
ference, and the Kremlin's alleged pressure for
greater ideological and political conformity in
East Europe. Although, Bucharest has little hope
of strengthening the conference's documents at
this late juncture, the initiative does provide
Romania with an opportunity to register its mis-
givings and to air its differences with Moscow.
April 21, 1975
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Bucharest views the establishment of a per-
manent body to oversee implementation of the Euro-
pean security agreements as essential to ensuring
national sovereignty. The Romanians reason that
without an international forum to which they can
appeal real or imaginary Soviet threats or pres-
sure, European security would mean little more than
the formalization of the status quo division of
Europe into the post-World War II spheres of in-
fluence. Romanian's iniependent policies would
then be open to new pressure from the Soviets while
cutting off any recourse to the West.
April 21, 1975
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Hungarian - West German Talks
The Hungarians did, however, express concern over
eral ties
generally satisfied with the development of bilat-
Recent consultations between Foreign Ministry
officials indicate that both Budapest and Bonn are
their large trade deficit with the FRG and renewed
their demands for World War II reparations
Budapest seems prepare to
visits Bonn in late May.
During the talks, Hungarian Deputy Foreign Min-
ister Nagy reportedly spoke grandiosely about large-
scale West German assistance for Budapest "along the
lines of the Marshall plan." He pressed for com-
pensation for goods removed from Hungary at the end
of the war, and claimed that Hungary's "significant"
loss had contributed to the post-war merman economic
miracle. It is unclear whether Nagy reiterated the
Hungarian demand for a joint commission to settle
claims.
press these issues again when Foreign Minister Puja
Hungarian overtures may be part of a Soviet-
inspired effort to step up economic demands on West
Germany, although there is no evidence to-this end.
Budapest itself may see reparations as a way to off-
set last year's large trade deficit with Bonn. Nagy
pointedly said that some way must be found to reduce
the deficit, but added that Budapest does not- want
to cut down on its imports. The Germans are not
eager to give credits or concessions, and skirted
the issue by suggesting increased attention to joint
ventures that would lessen Hungarian hard currency
expenditures.
April 21,'1975
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On European-wide economic issues, Nagy argued
against any role for the EC in economic relations
between the Western and Eastern European countries.
He said Budapest does not want a CEMA-EC agreement
that would transfer responsibility for trade matters
from individual countries to CEMA, and is unwilling
to negotiate a trade agreement directly with the
EC, even though it is dissatisfied with the present
lack of a contractual basis for trade. Nagy's as-
sertion that Hungary opposes a CEMA-EC agreement
covering trade affairs implicitly puts Budapest at
odds with Moscow, which has been pressing for some
type of CEMA-EC agreement. In the absence of a firm
reading on what type of accord the Soviets want, however,
the depth of the differences is difficult to gauge.
On other issues, the Germans asked Nagy to re-
lay to Moscow Bonn's "disappointment" over the ac-
cusations being made against it in connection with
its Eastern policy.
Both sides expressed satisfaction at the great
increase in travel between the two countries. Ger-
man figures show that 380,000 West Germans visited
Hungary in 1974, while 60,000 Hungarians visited
the FRG.
April 21,'1975
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East German Trade Deficit wi .h the USSR:
A Sign of the Fu ute
Higher prices for Soviet raw materials, as well.
as East Germany's limited capacity for increasing
exports, has reportedly spurred SED First Secretary
Honecker to ask Moscow for credits to help finance
imports. East Germany registered a $56-million
trade deficit with the Soviet Union in 1(474, the
first since 1970. An even larger deficit is likely
this year.
East German exports to the USSR did not in-
crease significantly last year, apparently because
of East Germany's inability to meet Sov:.et demands
for particular kinds of equipment. In addition,
East Berlin has agreed not to exceed export quotas
set by Moscow. East Germany had previously pushed
for overfulfillment of the quotas, delivering goods
that were either of poor quality and not saleable
on the world market or not really needed by the
Soviets. Growing domestic requirements and the push
to increase exports to the West have also reduced
sales to the USSR.
April 21, 1975
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Poles Doubt Government's Explanations
for Meat Shortages
Many Poles apparently are unconvinced by War-
saw's explanations as to why there were meat and
milk Shortages during February and March.
The regime has presented a number of reasons
for the shortages, including a long economic anal-
ysis that appeared in the socio-political weekly
PoZityka on March 15. Letters from Polityka'a
readers, published on April 5, show a doubting and
scJ:netimLs cynical side of Polish public opinion that
is i.o'-. of ten exposed.
None of the letters agreed with the explanation
offered in PoZityka. Some readers criticized the
economic statistics cited in the article, and many
others were doubtful of its assertion that,exports
had no significant impact on the availability of
meat. One writer went so far as to say that "al-
though for 30 years we have become used to misin-
formation in the press, what you write in your ar-
ticle is the limit." The author has replied to these
comments, but, according to the US embassy, his
answer is unlikely to be any more convincing than
his original statements.
PoZityka'o respected and often controversial
chief editor, Mieczyslaif Rakowski, has often been
in hot water with the regime, but has nevertheless
managed to maintain good access to the leadership.
His standing was so good, in fact, that in March
1973 PoZityka and the party daily Trybuna Ludu were
exempted from prior censorship. The embassy re-
ports, however, that Rakowski was personally rep-
rimanded by Gierek during the First Secretary's
meeting with the press on January 29. Rakowski
reportedly pointed out that, despite the govern-
ment's efforts to satisfy consumers, he continued
to receive letters critical of consumer policies.
April 21, 1975
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Rakowski apparently published the current spate
of critical letters as a form of saying "I told you
so." ilia audacity has led to rumors in Warsaw that
he is "in trouble" again, but his reputation and
influence will probably prevent the kind of retribu-
tion that would befall a lesser known editor.
April 21, 1975
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Agricultural Investments Exceeding
Five-Year Plan Goals
The Soviet agricultural sector, accustomed to
seeing its investments continually siphoned off for
other, higher priority sectors during past five-
year plane, is not only retaining ail its funds in
the current five-year plan but is receiving even
more resources than planned. The 1971.-75 five-year
plan investments in agriculture have risen from an
originally announced preliminary goal of 120.6
billion rubles in 1970 to the official 128.6 billion
goal in 1971 and now to a recently announced new
figure of 131.8 billion. Agriculture's success at
holding and even expanding its share of Soviet re-
sources reflects Brezhnev's unremitting support and
also the strenuous efforts by State Planning Com-
mission (Gosplan) First Deputy Chairman T. I. Sokolov
to protect agricultural interests in the planning
bureaucracy.
The new priority for agriculture was dramat-
ically underscored by the recent revelation that
2.8 billion rubles more than planned have already
been invested in agriculture during the current
five-year plan; Sokolov himself was first to an-
nounce this and the new total five-year plan figure.
In a March 1975 Economics of Agriculture article,
Sokolov declared that the state and kolkhozes would
invest 131.8 billion rubles in agriculture (in-
cluding both production and non-production projects)
for the 1971-75 period, and he bragged that during
the first four years of the present five-year plan,
the original investment goal for agriculture had
been overfulfilled by 2.8 billion rubles.
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AlLhough much of the rise comes from kolkhoz
funds, it appears that almost 1i if comes from an
increase in state investments. A substantial part
of the rise in state investments apparently is in
non-production rural projects (housing, kindergartens,
clubs and other facilities), as against the produc-
tion category. Non-production expenditures have
traditionally enjoyed less support than those which
result in increased production.
The current overfulfillment of agricultural
investments is in sharp contrast to previous five-
year plans, when planners customarily diverted
agricultural funds to heavy industry and defense.
Thus, when Brezhnev pushed through a big new boost
in agricultural investments in the spring of 1970,
he moved to protect this increase by placing long
time agricultural lobbyist T. I. Sokolov in Gosplan
7s first deputy chairman. Sokolov immediately wrote
an article in the Septembber. 1970 issue of Gosplan's
organ Planned Economy, warning that "attempts to
resolve particular economic problems at the expense
of agricultural development must be decisively sup-
pressed."
Sokolov quickly took two important initiatives.
He assigned quotas to ministries starting ir. Jan-
uary 1971 to force them to fulfill deliveries of
machinery, parts,. and fertilizer to agriculture.
Also starting in January 1971, he moved to protect
investments in non-production agricultural projects
by tying these to planning of agricultural produc-
tion projects. Previously, construction of rural
housing, kindergartens, clubs, and other such fa-
cilities was scattered among such low-priority
planning categories as education and culture, hous-
ing, and public services.
Sokolov clearly worked hard to change Gosplan's
anti-agriculture bias and to block any nibbling away
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of agricultural allocations. Moreover, in a Feb?-
ruary 1971 Economics of Agriculture article, So-
kolov declared that the task was not just to utilize
all the funds allocated to agriculture, "but also
to seek out additional sources for overfulfilling
the capital construction plan." The recent over-
fulfillment in investment is testimony to Sokolov's
success, and in his March 1975 article he declared
that the 2.8 billion-ruble overfulfillment of in-
vestments represented an important change in Gos-
plan's attitude toward agriculture.
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Exchange over "Dubcek Letter" Cools
Prague's Relations with Sweden
A bitter exchange in the press between Czecho-
slovak party boss Husak and Swedish Premier Palme
threaten8 to disrupt the relatively placid relations
that the two countries have enjoyed in recent years.
Palme's exploitation of the "Dubcek letter" on
April 13 to reiterate Stockholm's well-known displeas-
ure with the immediate post-1968 situation in Czecho-
slovakia evidently brought latent differences to the
surface. In the speech to the National Front on
April 15 in which Husak condemned Dubcek's acts of
dissent, he added that Palme could have the ousted
party leader as an expert on democratic socialism.
Palme could hardly miss either this personal insult
or Husak's sarcasm in professing his own "great es-
teem for the Swedish people." After weighing Husak's
remarks, Palme on Saturday reportedly attacked the
Prague leadership. The hall 's now in Prague's
court and there have been rumors that the regime
might even recall its ambassador.
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Shelepin Through the Unsettled Dust
His political strengths: The career pattern of
Shelepin, a Russian with an unusually strong all-union
background, made him a standout. As all-union Komsomol
secretary for cadres, 2nd secretary and 1st secretary
(1942-58), he was in a position to identify and help
rising young men throughout the Soviet Union who were
headed for party careers. In 1958 he was assigned by
Khrushchev to clean out the Beria remnants from the
KGB; three years there gave him yet another institution
in which to build personal support. As his career has
declined in recent years, some of his more visible
clients in the center have been sent into diplomatic
exile. Total expunging of his influence throughout
the republics, however, would be extremely difficult.
By the late 1950s and early 1960s, he was one of
Khrushchev's bright young men headed for the top. in
1964 he abandoned his patron and was rewarded (briefly)
with the unique distinction of having a seat on the
Politburo, on the Secretariat, and on the Presidium
of the Council of Ministers. Moreover, he was chair-
man of the Party-State Control Committee, since split
up as too potentially powerful. He peaked too early,
however, and successively lost his deputy premiership
(1965) and his seat on the Secretariat (1967).
His policy preferences: Shelepin is one of the
very Yew -recent occupants of the Kremlin with a back-
ground in the humanities rather than in technical
training. Among Soviet intellectuals he is regarded
as unusually bright and sophisticated ("for a Soviet
leader" seems always to be implied).
Under Khrushchev, through expediency or conviction,
Shelepin supported Khrushchev's somewhat ham-handed
efforts to reform the Soviet system. When Khrushchev
was ousted, Shelepin seems to have opted to ride the
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wave of reaction to Khrushchev's excesses, which
took the form of neo-Stalinism. The maneuver al-
lowed him to shake off the onus of having been one
of Khrushchev's "reformers," but ultimately led him
into competition with .Brezhnev. The latter, then as
later, held to a relatively middle-ground position
leaning--because the center of the Kremlin political
spectrum had shifted in that direction--toward neo-
Stalinism. Some sort of collision seems to have
taken place in 1965, in which Shelepin lost.
With Brezhnev having pre-empted the neo-Stalinism
issue, which in fact lessened in importance as the
reaction to Khrushchev waned, Shelepin began to search
for another constituency, wooing the liberal reform-
minded intellectuals.
In 1967 another of Khrushchev's bright young men,
who had survived as Moscow party boss, criticized in
retrospect some aspect of Moscow's handling of the
Six Day War. A case can be made that he charged that
Soviet forces were not in a state of readiness when
the war broke out; his criticism may have spilled
into the question of military aid to the Arabs as
well. Shelepin's protege heading the KGB also appears
to have been involved in some way. That challenge
failed and Shelepin, whose personal role in the dis-
pute has never been clear, slid precipitously downward
in the hierarchy to the essentially powerless slot of
trade unions chief, although he retained his seat on
the Politburo.
In the split decision in the leadership over
whether to invade Czechoslovakia in the summer of
1968, Shelepin was widely reported to have opposed
the move. Brezhnev characteristically retained a
middle position until the majority--in favor--emerged,
and only then threw in his hand with them.
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By early 1972, Shelepin had adopted a public
stance of total support both for Brezhnev personally
and for Soviet detente policies. His allegiance to
the General Secretary 1,~as been expressed in almost
cloying terms, and he has not allowed a hint of
reservation concerning detente to creep into his
public utterances. There is no evidence that he
has behaved any differently in private. Aside from
the fact that there is nothing in his past record to
suggest anti-detente prejudices, his hold on his
Politburo seat has been so 4:enuous that he has had
little choice except to keep his-head down. There
is no evidence so far to support speculation--in the
wake of his departure from the Politburo--that he
might have mounted a final unsuccessful challenge
to Brezhnev.
The scandal in the UK: One of the still un-
resolved questions concerning Shelepin's recent
activities is why, in the face of the storm signals
in the British press, he went through with his trip.
One theory is that, like Moczar in Poland in the
late 1960s, he was m'+neuvered by others into a no-
win situation with a choice between refusing an assign-
ment and going through with it in the face of certain
failure. Shelepin'himself may have made the decision,
gambling that he could pull it off. Clearly his con-
tinued usefulness as head of the trade unions in a
period of detente would be brought into question if
he were unable to visit Western countries without
public uproar.
April 21, 1975
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/31 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400080026-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/31 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400080026-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/31 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400080026-3
 eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/31 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400080026-3
25X1
Little information is available at present con-
cerning Shelepin's activities between his return to
25X1
Moscow on April 2 and the plenum on April 16.
On April
8 he
addressed an all-union labor safety conference in
Moscow. According to the report in Trud the folliwing
25X1
day he paid the now standard tribute to Brezhnev in
..he formula "Politburo headed by."
The phrasing of the announcement: "The plenum
has released Comrade Shelepin from his duties as a
member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee
in connection with his request." Admittedly, dump-
ing the youngest full member (age 56) while trying
to preserve appearances calls for some flexibility
of phrasing, but this formulation demands attention
by its terseness. Shelest lost his seat on the
Politburo "in connection with his appointment as
deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers"
and ultimately departed to "retirement on pension."
Voronov similarly departed to "retirement on pension."
In Armenia las?': year the republic central committee
"complied with (Kochinyan's) request to retire on
pension because of ill health." In Azerbaidzhan,
Akhundov left "in connection with his election as
Vice President of the Azerbaidzhan Academy of Sciences."
Mzhavanadze made a "request to retire on pension be-
cause of age." Only Ovezov in the Turkmen republic
was removed in 1969 for "serious shortcomings" in his
work.
It is conceivable that the failure of the announce-
ment to use such an easy out as "ill health" or even
April 21, 1975
eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/31 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400080026-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/31 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400080026-3
transfer to some academic post is significant and
that the announcement means exactly what it says--
that Shelepin resigned. The Yugoslav news agency
on April 16, reporting the plenum, noted that "there
has been mention of this possibility (Shelepin's
resignation) as Shelepin reportedly recently for-
warded a letter to the Soviet party leadership."
The embassy reports that
S e spin
genuinely resigned, having seen the handwriting on
25X1 the wall after the UK fiasco and decided that with
so many factors against him it was not worth going
on. The embassy views this as predictable political
disinformation, as indeed it may be. As we noted
above, reports that it was Shelepin who made the
decision would be more credible if "ill health" had
25X1 been cited as a reason for his departure. We would
prefer to reserve judgment in the hope that more
evidence will become available.
April 21, 1975
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/31 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400080026-3