AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000301410001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 30, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Africa Review
ALA AR 86-011
30 May 1986
?y 38 5
Directorate of --
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Articles South Africa: Plight of Black Police
Black police, who are widely regarded in the townships as traitorous
enforcers of apartheid, have been frequent targets of violence by
militants. The loyalty of black police to the government is still firm,
but it will be tested severely as unrest continues.
Zimbabwe: Intraethnic Frictions on the Rise
Frictions among Shona officials in the government and ruling party
may worsen unless Prime Minister Mugabe, whose style of
consensus government often conceals indecision and prevarication,
moves forcefully in the months ahead to contain the rivalries.
Kenya: Crackdown on Dissident Group
President Moi has cracked down in recent months on Mwakenya, an
underground Marxist-Leninist organization drawn largely from the
Kikuyu, Kenya's largest ethnic group.
Briefs Zimbabwe: Air Force Problems
Zimbabwe-Malawi: Mugabe Pays a Call
Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis,
Reverse Blank 1
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ALA AR 86-011
30 May 1986
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Africa Review
South Africa:
Plight of Black Police
Black police, who are widely regarded in the
townships as traitorous enforcers of apartheid, have
been frequent targets of violence by militants during
the past 20 months. The government nonetheless
plans to expand greatly the number of black police
and, largely because of high black unemployment, its
recruiting efforts have been extremely successful. The
loyalty of black police to the government so far has
remained firm, but will be tested severely as unrest
continues.
Enemy of the People
Apartheid laws make no exception for black police,
who must live in black townships where all residents
with ties to the government are potential targets for
militants. A government spokesman said last month
that police have sustained heavy casualties since the
violence began-33 dead, 584 injured-and that most
of those killed or injured have been blacks. The homes
of over 800 black policemen have been attacked.
The violence has severely disrupted the lives of black
police, forcing many to move their families into
makeshift facilities at heavily guarded police stations
or Army bivouacs at the edges of townships. The
government recently built 56 houses in an isolated
area south of Johannesburg for the families of local
black police whose homes had been razed. The Dutch
Reformed Church has created a special fund to
provide for black police who have lost their homes.
The violence has forced some children of black police
to attend schools in relatively peaceful areas of the
homelands or to take correspondence courses,
according to press reports.
The government contends that black police have
remained loyal despite intimidation tactics and
African National Congress radiobroadcasts urging
them to sabotage equipment, burn down stations, and
resign. Although no reports of police defecting, to join
militants have surfaced, the South African media
have highlighted a few instances in which blacks
resigned because of the mounting pressures. The
government apparently tries to reduce the affinity
black security personnel might have for rioters by
sending police from certain tribal groups into areas
predominantly populated by blacks from other hostile
tribal groups, according to press reports.
Growing Police Manpower
Government spokesmen recently have noted-in our
view, accurately-that the present size of the South
African Police (SAP)-a 48,000-man, national
paramilitary force-is grossly inadequate to suppress
antigovernment violence and lower the high crime
rates prevalent in most black urban areas. The
government plans to add 8,000 new, members to the
SAP this fiscal year, and President Botha recently
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ALA AR 86-011
30 May 1986
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announced that the SAP will grow to 87,000' during
the next 10 years. The Minister of Law and Order,
however, publicly admitted later that it may take up
to four additional years to complete the buildup,
although police training facilities already are being
expanded to accommodate more recruits and many
new stations are planned, mostly in black townships.
Government spokesmen say that record high numbers
of blacks are applying to join the SAP, whose
membership is about 40 percent black. We believe the
high black unemployment rate-about 30 percent
nationwide and as high as 60 percent in some areas-
is a major factor driving blacks to apply, despite daily
attacks on black police and their families. South
African press interviews indicate that many black
police are extremely conservative and strongly
opposed to black activists who resort to violence.
Black Municipal Police
White local government departments that administer
black townships as well as many black local
authorities have long hired security personnel known
as "blackjacks." Their duties usually have been
restricted to guarding official property in the
townships. Many white municipalities, meanwhile,
employ police units separate from the SAP to enforce
traffic laws and municipal regulations.
The government announced in January 1985 that
some black local authorities would be given control
over new black police units. The Minister of Law and
Order told a journalist the following month that the
so-called black municipal police would be separate
from the SAP and responsible only for guarding local
government property and enforcing municipal
regulations by serving summonses and seeking out
residents who owe rent and utility fees. The
government gradually has increased their authority,
in January empowering them to carry out certain
functions normally performed by the SAP. Last
month, government spokesmen announced plans for
black municipal police to investigate all criminal
offenses in their municipal areas and to operate at
times outside of their own immediate areas.
The local police units, in our view, are designed
primarily to help shore up the black government
system that is threatening to collapse completely as a
result of widespread attacks by militants against
black councilors since September 1984. The
government also may hope that eventually local black
authorities commanding their own black police units
will be able to quell township disturbances without
involving the SAP, and by extension, the white
government.
Recruitment for the municipal police has been
successful. Pretoria allocated about $10 million to
black local authorities last October to assist in the
formation of municipal police units, and according to
press reports in March, more than 8,000 black men
and women are serving in these units; 4,850 members
belong to units among the 40 black town and village
councils and 3,500 others work for black community
The government has established a special Training
and Planning Committee to coordinate and monitor
training, according to press reports. The committee is
led by an official from the Department of
Constitutional Development and Planning (CDP).
Other committee members head the 10 training
centers. Six centers operate under the auspices of the
CDP. The remainder are administered by the South
African Defense Force (at the Lenz army base near
Johannesburg), the SAP (at the Hammanskraal police
training site), the South African Railway Police (at
Slagboom near Kirkwood), and the Soweto Town
Council (at Tladi College).
The reaction among blacks to the new units generally
has been negative. Many black activists believe that
the presence of the units adds to the volatility of the
townships. Some community groups vigorously oppose
the units, arguing that funds devoted to the police-
amounting to several millions of dollars per year in
some townships-could be used more effectively to
provide much-needed housing.
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Outlook
The expansion of the SAP and the introduction of
black municipal police units are unlikely to have any
major impact on the violence in the short term.
Despite being severely overmatched already in terms
of firepower, crowds of young blacks today continue
to confront the security forces in the townships. When
the planned police buildup is completed, however, the
government hopes to have a much greater ability to
control domestic unrest without using the Army, a
move that has divided white opinion and fueled
foreign criticism.
The government is not likely to face large-scale
defections among black police or insurmountable
problems in finding black recruits in the foreseeable
future. Historically, the white minority regime in
southern Rhodesia experienced almost no defections
from its largely black security forces despite their
being targeted by insurgents. We believe that blacks
who belong to the police have little incentive to resign
because most are unlikely to be "forgiven" by their
communities. South Africa's mediocre economic
prospects-including likely increased black
unemployment-suggest that the government will
continue to find blacks to fill police posts despite the
social stigma and growing risks that go with the job.
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Zimbabwe: Intraethnic
Frictions on the Rise
Recent events in Zimbabwe underscore the deep
intraethnic frictions that pervade senior levels of the
government and the ruling party, the Zimbabwe
African National Union (ZANU). While most ZANU
and government leaders are Shona speakers, they
belong to several distinct subgroups that have long
vied for influence within the party and more recently
within the government.
The US Embassy in Harare reports that intra-Shona
frictions are likely to continue and may worsen unless
Prime Minister Mugabe-whose style of consensus
government often conceals indecision and
prevarication-moves forcefully to contain the
rivalries in the months ahead. Moreover
accomplished player of intertribal politics himself,
according to Embassy reporting, and almost certainly
must have anticipated the problems his comments
would generate. Zvobgo, as well, no doubt understood
the tribal dimension of his anticorruption campaign
against Ushewokunze.
Intratribal tensions in ZANU intensified in the weeks
following Ushewokunze's public statements: Mugabe
expelled Ushewokunze from ZANU's Politburo and
Hove from the Central Committee, and Karanga and
Zezuru politicians traded insults at a stormy Central
Committee meeting on 12 April. These events created
a mood of edginess in the military in mid-April, and
several Karanga Army officers allegedly caused
unspecified incidents, according to Embassy
should Mugabe
continue to temporize, he risks limiting his freedom of
movement on other important domestic issues, such as
the prosecution of senior government officials on
charges of corruption or efforts to merge with Joshua
Nkomo's opposition Zimbabwe African People's
Union (ZAPU).
Tribalism Goes Public
Defending himself against a corruption charge during
a parliamentary debate in March, Transport Minister
Ushewokunze, a Zezuru, broke taboo by leveling
public charges of tribalism against unnamed
colleagues within ZANU and accusing them of the
assassination of ZANU leader Herbert Chitepo in
1975. Embassy reporting indicates that
Ushewokunze's comments were widely perceived as
an attack on the Karanga and specifically against
Deputy Prime Minister Muzenda and Eddison
Zvobgo, the Minister of Justice, Legal, and
Parliamentary Affairs.
Our interpretation of Embassy reporting, however,
leads us to suspect that Ushewokunze's outburst was
designed to distract attention from charges of
corruption that had been made against him only days
before in Parliament by Karanga politician Byron
Hove-at Zvobgo's urging. Ushewokunze is an
reporting.
Tensions To Continue
While the political situation has calmed considerably
since mid-April and appears outwardly quiet, ethnic
frictions continue to simmer. US Embassy
reports that the Karanga
remain angry about Hove's dismissal and concerned
about further moves against them, including the
possibility that the Zezuru will move to take
disciplinary action against Zvobgo. Meanwhile, senior
Zezuru politicians have made strong representations
to Mugabe to refrain from firing Ushwokunze from
the Cabinet for fear such a move would be interpreted
by the Karan a as a victory in the deepening tribal
frictions
Our interpretation of reporting from the US Embassy
in Harare suggests to us that this recent incident may
be more serious than earlier outbursts of tribal
tensions. There are aspects of this flareup that could
portend increased ZANU infighting:
? The rivalry of two of ZANU's best known hotheads.
Both Zvobgo and Ushewokunze are noted for their
intelligence, ambition, and unpredictability as well
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ALA AR 86-011
30 May 1986
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Key Shona Subgroups
The 6-million-plus Shona speakers in Zimbabwe are
the,country's largest ethnic group. They make up over
70 percent of the total population and occupy most of
the eastern two-thirds of the country as well as
substantial territory in the western one-third.
Ndebele speakers, the largest minority ethnic group,
constitute approximately 15 percent of the total
population and occupy much of the remaining western
third of the country.
Subgroups within the Shona reflect differences of
dialect, culture, and region. Indeed, most Shona
speakers-especially rural dwellers-identify
themselves by their subgroup rather than as members
of the larger Shona ethnic group. Key Shona
subgroups include:
? The Karanga. The largest Shona subgroup (27
percent of the tribe), they reside in Masvingo
Province as well as in parts of Midlands and
southern Matabeleland. Deputy Prime Minister
Simon Muzenda is their informal leader and the
senior Karanga in ZANU.
? The Zezuru. The second-largest subgroup that
comprises 22 percent of the Shona population. The
Zezuru, which includes Prime Minister Mugabe,
hail from the provinces of Mashonaland West
Central and East.
? The Manyika. They comprise 16 percent of the total
population and reside largely in Manicaland
Province. Since ZANU's inception in 1963, the
Manyika have pooled resources with the Zezuru to
prevent the numerically superior Karanga from
dominating ZANU affairs.
? The Korekore. Residing in the northern sections of
Mashonaland West and Central, they comprise 15
percent of the Shona. Cultural and linguistic
similarities with the Zezuru, coupled with the lack
of influential Korekore at senior levels of the party
and government, have led the Korekore to
collaborate closely with the Zezuru on most major
political issues in ZANU.
as their capacity to make trouble and take risks.
While both may currently be keeping their heads
down, they are unlikely to do so indefinitely.
? The addition of Deputy Prime Minister Muzenda to
those who are resentful of Mugabe's moves toward
the Karanga group. As informal leader of the
Karanga, Muzenda previously played an important
moderating role, cautioning other, younger Karanga
against making precipitous judgments or moves on
tribal grounds. The Deputy Prime Minister's
disaffection with the Zezuru bodes ill for a quick
containment of Karanga frustrations, and may stem
from recent Zezuru efforts to replace him.
? The spillover of intra-Shona frictions into the
military. The Embassy reports that Air Force
Commander Josiah Tungamirai is among the
Karanga in the armed forces who are resentful over
Zezuru-Manyika efforts to dominate ZANU.
? Finally, our reading of several reports from the
Embassy suggests
that anti-Mugabe sentiment is growing among his
own Zezuru group. Should he continue to remain
aloof from the recent tribal tensions, Zezuru
frustration will probably grow.
Outlook
Mugabe so far has avoided taking sides, probably a
sensible policy considering possible repercussions in
the politically charged atmosphere. Yet over the
longer run, the US Embassy is probably correct in its
judgment that Mugabe's continued inability to deal
forcefully with the tribalism issue increases prospects
for further factionalism. Personalities like
Ushewokunze and Zvobgo will not let the issue fade
away.
While our reading of the available reporting does not
suggest to us that Mugabe currently faces a direct
challenge to his rule, it does point up a leadership
weakness-his tendency to temporize in the hope that
a problem will go away. Mugabe's behavior is likely to
encourage his opponents and hinder action on
important domestic issues. With tempers running high
over ethnic matters, Mugabe is unlikely to rush into
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making major decisions on a merger with ZAPU for
fear of fueling Zezuru fears about a Karanga alliance
with the Nkomo's Ndebele supporters. And yet such a
merger-if worked out judiciously-is probably
Mugabe's best bet in defusing troubles in
Matabeleland. In addition, the Prime Minister will
probably avoid strong action on eliminating growing
corruption. Many senior officials suspected of being
corrupt are Zezuru or Karanga, and prosecution of
them at this time no doubt would be perceived as
tribally motivated. Finally, even though much needed,
Mugabe is unlikely any time soon to reorganize and
streamline the Cabinet because this would upset the
existing tribal balance.
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Kenya: Crackdown on
Dissident Group
President Moi has cracked down in recent months on
Mwakenya, an underground Marxist-Leninist
organization drawn largely from the Kikuyu, Kenya's
largest ethnic group. Police have arrested about 30
members of the group since January, and Moi has
ordered a full-scale investigation by his internal
security services. Although Mwakenya, Swahili for
Frontfor the Liberation of Kenya, poses no
immediate threat to his regime, Moi probably is
trying to prevent the group from expanding beyond its
largely civilian intellectual base into the armed forces
and other sectors of society.
Background and Goals of Mwakenya
We believe the group was founded in the mid-1970s,
possibly in reaction to the assassination in 1975 of
J. M. Kariuki, a radical Kikuyu Member of
Parliament. According to its propaganda, Mwakenya
was formed to bring an end to what it regards as
Kenya's fascism. Mwakenya's publications advocate
"scientific Communism," formation of a front of
revolutionary groups under Mwakenya's leadership,
and the installation of a "Kenya People's Socialist
Republic." A pamphlet published in January 1985
espouses the spread of revolutionary theory to workers
and peasants.
Government Actions
The government crackdown stems from the arrest of a
Nairobi University student-who has also studied in
the USSR-following his attendance at a Mwakenya
recruitment meeting in August 1985.
his interrogation led to the
arrest of four Soviet-educated University of Nairobi
lecturers in February. More arrests followed in March
and April.
The government has tried a few of those arrested for
producing seditious literature and is preparing
charges against several others
Moi delayed the trials of most of those
arrested, however, to permit the security services to
press ahead quietly with their investigation without
alerting Mwakenya members to the full scope of the
government's knowledge of the organization's
activities and membership. Mwakenya has since
stepped up its production and circulation of
propaganda tracts, I and
now calls for "total war" against the Moi government.
Moi's Views
Although the group's activities have increased
somewhat despite the investigation, Moi appears to be
Citing Kenya's increasing political repression, denial
of basic human rights, and the one-party dictatorship
of the dominant Kenya African National Union,
Mwakenya went underground with its Marxist line
shortly after its founding, and some of its members
reportedly went into exile. Most individuals linked to
Mwakenya are university students or teachers, and
the majority are Kikuyu.
Mwakenya's publications list the assassination of
Kariuki, the coup attempt in August 1982, and
student unrest as opportunities for the group to begin
its revolution. Blaming its missed chances on poor
organization, Mwakenya now believes commitment,
discipline, and quality in cadre are essential for
success.
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Moi has demonstrated since his presidency began in
1978 that he can manipulate and play upon divisions
among the Kikuyu, and he appears capable of
handling the Kikuyu-dominated Mwakenya. Recent
Embassy reporting has indicated that Moi
orchestrated a campaign this spring by his
parliamentary and party supporters to limit the
influence of Vice President Mwai Kibaki, Kenya's
senior Kikuyu politician. Moi, a member of a small
Kalenjin tribe, also probably is concerned that the
Luos-Kenya's second most powerful ethnic group-
might ally with the Kikuyu and threaten his position.
So far, however, only two Luos have been arrested as
suspected Mwakenya members
Moi is most upset over the university intellectuals at
the hub of the group,
and the Embassy reports that Moi warned
local leaders about bearded intellectuals directed by
"foreign masters." Moi's distrust of intellectuals, in
our view, almost certainly stems from his own limited
education.
the discovery of overseas
dissidents in the ranks of Mwakenya probablv
concerns Moi as well.
Outlook
Despite Mwakenya's activity, we believe that Moi is
not seriously threatened and that his security forces
are capable of containing the dissidents but not
eliminating them. Mwakenya is unlikely to expand its
influence to other groups such as the politicians and
the armed forces, because its Marxist-Leninist line
lacks broad appeal in Kenya. The dissidents will
probably not gain much sustenance from the
expatriates, although Kenya's relations with those
various countries harboring dissidents may become
strained.
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Africa
Briefs
Zimbabwe Air Force Problems
The Zimbabwean Air Force is suffering from a severe shortage of skilled pilots
that has left it heavily dependent on the few whites remaining on active duty,
only white
helicopter pilots were involved in recent military operations in Mozambique
because only they were considered skilled enough to handle close-support combat
missions. Morale among black pilots has declined and several have feigned illness
to avoid operational assignments in Mozambique. believes
many black pilots were drafted solely on the basis of their academic background
and do not enjoy flying.
Nearly all of the estimated 20 remaining white pilots have said they intend to leave
the Air Force within the next five years. Although more than 100 Zimbabweans
are being trained as pilots in China and Libya, we believe-in view of the low
morale and unhappiness with the government's recruitment policies-that these
new pilots will be unable to compensate for the loss of skilled whites and that the
Air Force's operational capability will continue to decline.
Zimbabwe-Malawi Mugabe Pays a Call
Zimbabwe Prime Minister Mugabe's four-day official trip to Malawi in early May
was his first visit to that country since Zimbabwe's independence in 1980. If
Mugabe had hoped to persuade President Banda to join the Frontline States in
condemning South Africa's domestic and regional policies-as suggested in=
the Zimbabwean leader was probably disappointed.
Banda, at a dinner in honor of Mugabe, failed to echo Mugabe's criticism of
Pretoria and instead noted recent moves by South African President Botha toward
granting limited recognition to blacks and coloreds and indicated his willingness to
do whatever he could to further such initiatives. Malawi, under Banda's rule, is the
only Organization of African Unity (OAU) state that maintains diplomatic
relations with South Africa.
These divergent points of view did not prevent the two countries from concluding
agreements on trade, air services, and general cooperation. Nor did Malawi's
diplomatic ties to Pretoria deter it from issuing a joint communique that called for
the immediate implementation in Namibia of UN Security Council Resolution
435 and the abolition of apartheid. The communique also expressed concern over
the destructive economic consequences for both nations of "armed bandits in
Mozambique," a reference to the insurgents that have disrupted Malawi's rail
links through Mozambique and led Zimbabwe to station several thousand troops in
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Mozambique to guard its vital oil pipeline and railway links to the port of Beira.
The inclusion of Zimbabwean Gen. Rex Nhongo in the delegation to Malawi
suggests to us that another reason Mugabe traveled to Malawi was probably to
discuss the Mozambican insurgency and perhaps options these countries might
pursue to assist beleaguered Mozambican President Machel in dealing with it.
Mozambique suspects that South Africa continues to provide limited military aid
to the insurgents in violation of the 1984 Nkomati Accord. In addition, Maputo
and Harare believe that some South African aid is funneled through Malawi via
sympathetic local officials, and that Banda turns a blind eye.
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