LONG-RANGE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FY 1962-66

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00268R000600040016-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: October 27, 1960
• Content Type: MEMO

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Declassified and Approved ForRelease2013/08/22 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000600040016-7
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27 October 1960
MEMORANDUM FOR: Gen. Cabell
SUBJECT : Long-Range Military Assistance Program
FY 1962-66
1. This first attempt at long-range MAP programming was
generated in response to a Draper Committee recommendation. It marks
a real step forward in this sense.
2. In essence: the program calls for MAP outlays of $11 billion
during the five years: FY 1962-66 (this should be contrasted with the
$25 billion which DOD estimates would be required to meet all of the
JCS strategic objectives during the period: or the $16 billion to which
the Draper Committee shaved this figure).
3. This $11 billion estimate assumes a maximum effort by the
recipient countries: indeed one same 43% higher by 1966 than it was
in 1959 (for a total $93 billion allied plus US effort):
a. About $5 billion would go to NATO0and would be complemented
by an expected 40% increase in European defense outlays to about
$18 billion annually by 1966.
b. About $3 billion to the Far East (Japan: Korea, GRC).
c. The SEA segment would be $635 million.
d. $640 million for Pakistan and Iran.
e. Latin America gets $400 million.
1177,
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f. About 5-10% of the $11 billion total will go for
bases, including NATO infra-structure.
g. An additional 5-10% would be allocated to precluding
Communist influence in such areas as Afghanistan, Ethiopia,
Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Cambodia, Indonesia, Burma, etc.
(i.e. for MAP aid to countries where we do not have military
objectives per se, but are using MAP for political reasons).
It also includes same MAP for internal security purposes to
Jordan, Lebanon, and Liberia.
4, Gordon Gray noted that the program reRlly calls for a basic
change in current MAP policy. We have been averaging only around
$1.5 billion annually over the last several years in new MAP
appropriations, but the pipeline is running dry, so the new program
calls for upping the ante to about $2.2 billion annually.
5. The biggest increment of new funds is primarily for modernization,
in the case of NAT4mostly for nuclear-capable weapons.
6. The report concludes that even with an $11 billion program:
(a) non-nuclear forces required for general war will still be
quantitatively and qualitatively incapable of the strategic defensive
contemplated; (b) limited war capabilities will still be inadequate in
the Middle East and Far East. Worse stilly anything less than the
$11 billion will make it impracticable to rely on Allied forces in
implementation of current JCS strategy.
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7. While we are in no position to judge whether the aid magnitudes
involved are reasonable or not, I would like to add my strong personal
conviction that the program itself seems based on outmoded estimates of the
likely enemy threat during FY 62-66. It is built essentially on the old
JCS force Objectives of several years ago, which have not reslly been
adjusted to the many striking changes in the Soviet military threat which
are now taking place. One obvious example - the MAP for NATO is based
squarely on MC-70, which is currently being revised, and is also called
seriously into question by the Bowie Report. As another example, the
Soviets are switching increasingly to ballistic missiles for tactical
as well as strategic use, and the I1-28 is rapidly disappearing. By
1962-66 this process will be very far along. Yet we are programming
large numbers of HAWK and NIKE units for NATO Europe. By the time we
get these installed they may be useless against the main threat. Thus
at a time when the US is planning to move away from active air defense,
we are still programming lots of it for our allies.
8. In other words, I feel there may be a serious cultural lag in
MAP programming. my other examples would be much more speculative, but
I for one would question the great emphasis on minesweepers, destroyers,
etc. for NATO at a time when the Soviet naval threat is probably Shifting
fram anti-shipping to sub-launched missile attack. I realize that this
is not enough ammunition to justify your criticizing the whole plan at
NSC, but I think I could sell you on raising a gentle eyebrow at same
of the archaisms in it.
R. W. IMAM
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