SHATT-EL-ARAB DISPUTE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000600010055-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 11, 2012
• Sequence Number: 55
• Publication Date: January 5, 1960
• Content Type: MEMO

A C ,
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/25: CIA-RDP08001297R000600010055-7 _5 (-
^ImasuTisutimousersgid
, 3
SUBJECT:
PARTICIPANTS:
COPIES TO:
. 'DEPARTMENT ?OF':STATE
Memorandum of Conversation
Shatt-el-Arab Dispute For BACKGROUND only.
OCR rceu:rcd for
DATE: January 59 1960
usE
Prior clearance Owu
any
use outside CIA
Mr. Brice Clagett, Attorney withCovington & Burling
.(1y144
Mr. A. L. Atherton, Iraqi Desk, NE
Mr. Grant E. Mouser,- 'Officer in Charge, Iranian Affairs, GTI
S/S-2
INR
IRC-r
REA
GT.1.4 (3-cc)
NZ
EUR
BNA
Amembassies, ANKARA, BAGHDAD, LONDON,
TEHRAN
Amconeule BASRA, KHORRAMSHAHR
Mr. Clagett said that in view of the fact that Mr.. John Laylin of Covington
& Burling has been retained by the Iranian government to advise it on the legal
aspects of the Shatt-el-Arab dispute with iraq? he would like to get background
information on the dispute and any ideas the Department might have as to pos-
sible solutions. Before discussing -this matter with Mr. Clagett, Messrs. Mouser
and Atherton told Mr. Clagett that any ideas they might present were their own
and did not represent the position of the Department or of the United States
government. The official United States position was that this WRS a controversy
between two friendly nations and that a ablution Should be found through bilateral
talks between those two countries.
The ensuing discussion ranged over all of the Shatt ditpute, in-
cluding the origins and history-of the dispute and -the background to the present
flare-up. It was generally agreed that the goals of the two countries were is--
reconcilable and mould remain so into the foreseeable Mare; a solution, there-
fore, lay in attempting to find: some modus vivendi. Mi?4 Clagett said that it
was the tactics leading to and the nature of the modus vivendi which interested
his -firm particularly. He pointed to the compulsory conciliation clause con-
tained in Article VI of the Treaty for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes-Between
Iraq and Iran Which was signed at Tehran July 249 1937. Mr. Clagett said that he
-thought that if either country could be persuaded to invoke this clause of their
treaty, this might afford a means by which negotiations could begin without loss
of face on either side. Mr. Atherton and Mr. Mouser agreed that this seemed
promising.-
COIMMF MAL-
INFORMATION COPY
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/25: CIA-RDP08001297R000600010055-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/25: CIA-RDP08001297R000600010055-7
cONFIDENTIAL
? Personally speaking, Mi. Mouser said that Iran had now officially announced
its intention to claim the thoweg as the boundary. In view of this public stand
in conflict with the 1937 Shatt-el4rab treaty, it would be difficult for Iran
to accept anything Short of concessions; apparent or real, by Iraq on the pro-
bleMs of Khosroabad and Joint administrative control. While it was doubtful that
Iran mould renounce the thalweg as a goal, it might be persuaded in this way to
put its claim on the shelf in the interests of achieving a modus vivendi. Mr?
Atherton agreed that such an approach within the framework of the 1937 treaty
might offer the best hope of reaching a modus vivendi. Iraq had an existing .
treaty advantage, however, and its attitude towards negotiations would. undoubtedly
be influenced by this circumstance. In this connection, Mi. Atherton pointed out
that, contgary to Mi. Clagett ,s impression (gained in part from conversations
with the Iranian Ambassador in Washington), the Iraqis were basing their position
on the 1937 treaty and did not desire to see the treaty.abrogated.. Mi. Atherton
also discussed the inherent instability of "the present Iraqi situation and the
difficulties that this created for a moderate man such as the present Iraqi
Foreign Minister. There was general agreement that both Foreign Ministers were
moderate and reasonable men and that if the. matter were left to them, some
solution could probably be found.
Mi. Mouser promised to provide Mi. Clagett with a copy of the latest Iranian
government statement on the dispute and Mi. Atherton agreed to send to him the
most recent Iraqi official statement. Mi. Clagett thanked Messrs. Mouser and
Atherton for their assistance and he reiterated his understanding that the dis-
cussion was of an off-the-record; background natures
COMMENT=
INFORMATION COPY
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/25: CIA-RDP08001297R000600010055-7