THE PHILIPPINES: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE AQUINO GOVERNMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92T00306R000300140003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 1, 1988
• Content Type: SNIE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/28: CIA-RDP92T00306R000300140003-3
Director of Central Intelligence
Special National National Intelligence Estimate
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The Philippines:
Problems and Prospects
for the Aquino Government
Key Judgments
SI
-Secret-
SNIE 56-88W
March 1988
Copy. 44
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/28: CIA-RDP92T00306R000300140003-3
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/28: CIA-RDP92T00306R000300140003-3
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and the
Treasury.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force ,
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/28: CIA-RDP92T00306R000300140003-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/28: CIA-RDP92T00306R000300140003-3
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SNIE 56-88W
THE PHILIPPINES:
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
FOR THE AQUINO GOVERNMENT
KEY JUDGMENTS
SECRET
The full text of this Estimate
is being published separately
with regular distribution.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/28: CIA-RDP92T00306R000300140003-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/28: CIA-RDP92T00306R000300140003-3
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KEY JUDGMENTS 1
? As the Aquino government enters its third year, there have been
important positive developments. Foremost are the return of
democratic institutions to the Philippines and the improvement
in the economy. In addition, the threat posed by rebel military
officers has receded. The Communist Party of the Philippines,
for its part, bas experienced some setbacks and internal discord
and is seeking ways to maintain its momentum in the face of a
highly popular President. (Opinion polls show that most Filipi-
nos remain committed to Aquino, believing that the President
and her Cabinet are trying to make the system work.)
? Nevertheless, the threats to stability?a restive officer corps, a
persistent Communist insurgency, and widespread poverty?
remain very serious, and the government has yet to address fully
and effectively the country's deep-seated problems. As we move
closer to 1992 and the end of Aquino's term in office, continu-
ing government inertia will exacerbate these problems.
? Most Filipinos are hoping for real progress on goals Aquino and
others have articulated?namely, a democratic political process,
a loyal and effective military and police that can provide peace
and order, and an economic system and government that can
work toward alleviating poverty and promoting equity and
social justice.
? Given the complexity of the problems and the human and
material barriers to success confronting the Aquino government,
our best estimate is that the government's implementation of
planned military, political, and economic reform will fall short
of performance levels needed to contain the threats to stability.2
In these circumstances, the Communist insurgency and the
' The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, Department of State, Morton I.
Abramowitz, believes that the Philippine Government is making reasonable progress in recovering from
the Marcos era, recognizes the dangers it faces, and, assuming adequate external assistance, is capable of
carrying out the reforms and actions necessary to enhance stability. INR recognizes that significant
problems will persist, but the substantial accomplishments of the Aquino administration, the reforms it
has begun to implement, and positive developments such as the recent arrests of Communist leaders all
point to likely continued improvement. The Communist insurgency is likely to remain potent, but
government efforts hold the prospect of containing it.
The Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury for National Security is optimistic about the
ability of the Aquino government to undertake economic reforms and believes the prospects are good for a
high level of performance in the Philippine economy
1
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/28: CIA-RDP92T00306R000300140003-3
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prospects for military intervention will become increasingly
worrisome over the next several years.3
? Moreover, if the Aquino government is content to just muddle
through, there is a strong probability that the situation will get
worse even before Aquino leaves office.
? Our assessment, however, could be altered significantly by
stronger political leadership, a more responsive local govern-
ment, continued economic growth in the range of the 5 percent
achieved in 1987, improved military effectiveness, or greater
internal problems for the insurgents.
a The Director of the National Security Agency, while strongly supportive of the Estimate, believes
two 'factors should have received more emphasis because their importance for the future of the
Philippines' political system is greater than generally recognized. -First, progress in land reform is
essential for any successful strategy against the insurgency. Yet the record of parliamentary democracies
in carrying through on land reform is poor. Historically, land reform has been implemented more
successfully by authoritarian regimes. Second, a major index of regime success against the insurgency will
be its ability to control the country's tax base and to deny it to the insurgents. Unfortunately, it appears
that the government's tax base has already been reduced somewhat by insurgent gains. If the government
attempts to compensate for the shortfall by relying on foreign assistance rather than regaining the
initiative in the countryside, its chances of eventually defeating the Communists are reduced. The dan er
of becoming too dependent on foreign assistance is not adequately recognized in the Estimate
2
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/28: CIA-RDP92T00306R000300140003-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/28: CIA-RDP92T00306R000300140003-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/28: CIA-RDP92T00306R000300140003-3
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