YUGOSLAVIA'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A007500010001-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 24, 1956
• Content Type: NIE

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CONFIDENTIA
-SECRET
NIE 31-56
24 July 1956
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 31-56
(Supersedes NIE 31-2-55)
YUGOSLAVIA'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION
1
POCLIMEIT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. t
11.1 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE: /991
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: REVIEWER: ig 16'0
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 24 July 1956. Concurring were the Special Assistant,
Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of
Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of
Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and
the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The
Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC, and the
Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained,
the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
268
COPY NO.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, ONE
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YUGOSLAVIA'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION
THE PROBLEM
To reassess Yugoslavia's present and future international position and to
estimate the probable effects of possible US courses of action with respect to
Yugoslavia.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Evidence available so far indicates that
Yugoslavia has preserved its independent
status. We consider it unlikely that Tito
has as yet decided that his interests can
best be served from a position within
rather than outside the Communist orbit
or that he has made a covert agreement
with Moscow to join the Bloc.' (Paras.
7-8)
2. Despite increased cooperation and the
likelihood of even closer ties between Yu-
goslavia and the USSR, it is unlikely at
least for some time to come that Tito will
associate himself formally with the Bloc.
However, he will almost certainly seek to
develop closer ties with the Satellites and
will almost certainly side with the USSR
on m6st major international issues. In
The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff, believes that this paragraph fails to give
sufficient weight to the possibility that a covert
arrangement with Moscow for partnership in the
Soviet Bloc may have been made. He believes,
therefore, that the second sentence should be
deleted and the following substituted:
"We consider it unlikely that Tito has come to
a decision for overt acknowledgment of a
partnership in the Soviet Bloc. However, the
existence of a covert arrangement to this end
cannot be discounted."
particular, he will almost certainly be a
willing and active exponent of policies
designed to promote popular fronts, to
woo the neutralist nations, to spread the
concept of coexistence, and to gain con-
verts for the Soviet stand on disarma-
ment and European security. (Paras.
18-20)
3. US ability to influence Yugoslav policy
? never decisive at its strongest ? has
sharply declined and will probably con-
tinue to do so. It is unlikely that either
a continuation of US aid or a threat to
cut it off would restrain Tito from con-
tinuing to build up his ties with the Com-
munist world. Nevertheless, Tito con-
tinues to look to the US for aid (notably
substantial amounts of wheat and spare
parts for US military equipment) and
probably believes that the US will feel
compelled to meet these requests in some
degree to keep him from moving even
closer to the Bloc. If he considered that
the loss of US aid were imminent, he
might make gestures to mollify the West
but would probably not fundamentally
alter his policy. (Paras. 25-26)
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DISCUSSION
I. PRESENT SITUATION
4. Tito's visit to the USSR in June and the
resulting joint declarations put the formal
seal of approval on the relationship that had
been developing slowly between the two coun-
tries during the last two years. Tito's cooper-
ation with the West, always cautious, began
to wane after mid-1954. Yugoslavia gradu-
ally showed less interest in military coopera-
tion with its Balkan Pact allies and with the
West and at the same time became more
receptive to the new Soviet leadership's prot-
estations that it had abandoned Stalin's ag-
gressive and autocratic ways.
5. The Khrushchev-Bulganin pilgrimage to
Belgrade in May 1955 probably marked the
turning point in the Soviet wooing of Yugo-
slavia. The Soviet leaders went further than
ever before in taking steps to convince Tito
that they had abandoned Stalin's policies and
that there was no longer any threat to his po-
sition. They officially acknowledged the error
of Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform
and gave formal recognition to Yugoslavia's
status as an independent and genuinely so-
cialist state. In the ensuing year scheduled
Yugoslav trade with the Bloc increased to
about 33 percent of total Yugoslav foreign
trade. The Bloc granted Yugoslavia long
term credits totalling about $289 million and
Hungary agreed to settle Yugoslav claims to-
talling $85 million. There was a steady in-
crease in cultural and official contacts be-
tween Yugoslavia and all the Bloc regimes
except that of Albania. Finally, Yugoslavia
continued to take a position on most major
foreign policy questions parallel to that of
the USSR.
6. During the Moscow visit, several further
steps were taken. The most important of
these was the agreement to re-establish for-
mal party-to-party relations. In addition,
Tito publicly espoused Moscow's view that
general disarmament should not be depend-
ent on prior settlement of political issues and
seconded the Soviet call for direct negotia-
tions between the two parts of Germany. In
sum, the Moscow visit not only confirmed the
virtual identity of the Yugoslav and Soviet
positions on most important international
questions, but created a political atmosphere
which will facilitate increasingly close coop-
eration between the two countries.
7. Nevertheless, evidence available so far in-
dicates that Yugoslavia has preserved its in-
dependent status. Tito's association with the
USSR has been voluntary, and in his view the
Kremlin made the major concessions and
moved materially toward the Yugoslav posi-
tion. The agreement to re-establish party
relations met Tito's terms that the two par-
ties were to be recognized as equal, that there
would be bilateral contacts (rather than in-
stitutional ties such as a successor to the
Cominform) , and that both parties would
retain full freedom of action. Yugoslavia has
reasserted its opposition to the continuation
of rival power blocs, and has re-emphasized
its right and intention to negotiate independ-
ently with all nations. Although some Soviet
leaders sought to give the impression that the
two countries would be allied in the event
of war, there is no evidence that any military
agreement was reached.
8. We have carefully considered the possibil-
ity that Tito may have decided that his in-
terests can best be served from a position
within rather than outside the Communist
orbit, and that he has made a covert agree-
ment with Moscow to join the Bloc. We con-
sider it unlikely, however, that Tito has come
to this decision or has made such an agree-
ment with Moscow. Even if he were fully
convinced that the USSR was prepared to
take Yugoslavia back, not as a Satellite but
as a partner, a position in the Bloc would still
curtail Tito's freedom of action. He would
lose the bargaining position vis-a-vis the
USSR which he now has and the world-wide
influence and prestige which his independent
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policies have won for him. Under present
circumstances, joining the Bloc would be un-
likely to offer any great advantage to com-
pensate for these losses.2
II. YUGOSLAV OBJECTIVES AND
MOTIVATIONS
9. We believe that Tito looks with satisfac-
tion upon the developments of the past few
years and regards them as a convincing vin-
dication of his own postwar policies. Tito
probably estimates that conditions are now
propitious for the attainment of many of his
own goals and aspirations. We believe that
these are: (a) the preservation of his regime
in Yugoslavia free of foreign domination;
(b) the establishment of close relations with
Communist states and parties and an in-
crease in Yugoslav influence upon them while
retaining cordial relations with the West; and
(c) the enhancement of his influence and
prestige in world affairs as a leader of neu-
tralist and "progressive" forces.
10. Tito almost certainly estimates that events
since the death of Stalin have been generally
favorable to these objectives. For one thing,
Tito is almost certainly convinced that there
has been a substantial decrease in the like-
lihood of general war ? avoidance of which
has always been a prime Yugoslav objective
because of Tito's fears that his regime would
not survive it. Secondly, Tito now appears to
be reasonably confident that he is no longer
in personal danger at the hands of the new
Soviet regime as long as present trends con-
tinue. As a consequence of his belief in
acceptance by Moscow of the principle of
"different roads to socialism," Tito probably
2 The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff, believes that this paragraph fails to give
sufficient weight to the possibility that a covert
arrangement with Moscow for partnership in the
Soviet Bloc may have been made. He believes,
therefore, that the second sentence should be
deleted and the following substituted:
"We consider it unlikely that Tito has come to
a decision for overt acknowledgment of a
partnership in the Soviet Bloc. However, the
existence of a covert arrangement to this end
cannot be discounted."
He further believes the word "overt" should be
inserted between "a" and "position" in the third
sentence.
anticipates a gradual growth of nationalist
strength and autonomy among the Satellite
Communist parties. In this developing situ-
ation, Tito almost certainly sees opportuni-
ties for increasing Yugoslav influence and
prestige in Eastern Europe, particularly the
Balkan area. Moreover, he might feel that
his Communist regime would be in a funda-
mentally better position to retain control
over the non-Communist majority in Yugo-
slavia itself if he re-establishes strong ties
with the other Communist countries.
11. Finally, he believes he has succeeded in
regaining entree into Communist circles
without sacrifice of the principles of Yugo-
slav independence and equality. He there-
fore hopes to remain in a strong position to
strengthen his ties with Socialist (as well as
Communist) parties outside the Bloc, and to
develop special ties with such neutralist lead-
ers as Nehru and Nasr.
12. We do not believe that Tito has lost all
his fears of Soviet domination. He probably
believes that a revival of Stalinism remains
a possibility and that despite his ability to
get along with the present Kremlin leaders
they will be difficult to deal with on certain
issues. He probably considers that he will
be better able to protect his individual and
national interests and maintain greater free-
dom to maneuver if he does not enter into a
formal alliance with the Bloc.
13. He probably believes that the evolution
of Soviet-Satellite relationships under the non-
Stalinist policies now being followed by the
Kremlin will take a considerable period of
time and that the ultimate form of such rela-
tionships is not yet clear. He has manifested
some fear that developments in the Satellites
may get out of hand, forcing a reversion to
Stalinist policies of control. Thus by avoid-
ing formal ties with the Bloc during what
he probably believes will be a period of re-
definition in Soviet-Satellite relations, Tito
probably estimates that: (a) he will have a
freer hand to influence developments to his
own advantage; and (b) he will have left the
door to the West at least partly open in the
event of a reversion in the Bloc to Stalinist
policies and practices.
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III. SOVIET OBJECTIVES
14. A rapprochement with Yugoslavia has
been an important feature of the USSR's post-
Stalin policy in Europe. The Soviet leaders
probably still have as their maximum objec-
tive Yugoslavia's reintegration into the Bloc,
but they find that even the present relation-
ship is advantageous to the USSR in many
ways. The development of Yugoslav ties with
the Western Powers has been arrested, the
military usefulness of Yugoslavia's pact with
Greece and Turkey has been virtually elimi-
nated, and opportunities for increasing Soviet
influence over the Yugoslav regime have been
gained. At the same time, the USSR can
make effective use of an independent Yugo-
slavia in its efforts to encourage neutralist
tendencies and to increase useful contacts
with socialist circles in the Free World.
15. The Soviet leaders will probably continue
their efforts to woo Yugoslavia by a favorable
trade and credit policy, by causing the Satel-
lites to adopt policies more friendly to Yugo-
slavia, and by periodic reaffirmation of Yugo-
slavia's independence and equality. They will
almost certainly seek to increase further their
share of Yugoslav trade, and will probably
attempt to draw Tito into military aid ar-
rangements. Moscow's recognition of Tito's
special position will contribute to the dissatis-
faction felt by some Communist leaders in
the Satellites. However, the Soviet leaders
are almost certainly confident of their ability
to retain control of the Satellites and in
any case would not relinquish such control
merely to lure Tito into complete realignment
with the Bloc.
16. We believe that the Kremlin views the
revival of party-to-party, relationships as an
opportunity to increase Kremlin influence at
all levels of the Yugoslav Communist Party.
There is almost certainly a doctrinaire ele-
ment among Yugoslav Communists which has
strong leanings toward the "first land of
socialism," though we are uncertain as to
its leadership and extent. The Soviets are
probably convinced that their reversal of
Stalin's vindictive policies toward Yugoslavia
and the willingness of Tito to resume party-
to-party relationships will encourage pro-
Soviet elements and increase their appeal at
all levels of the regime and party.
IV. PROBABLE TRENDS IN YUGOSLAVIA'S
ORIENTATION
Yugoslav Relations with the Bloc
17. During the last year, the gravitational
attraction of the Communist world for Yugo-
slavia has greatly increased. Tito's growing
confidence that the Kremlin has genuinely
changed its policies will lead him further
along the road of collaboration with Moscow.
By publicly and formally opting for a course
of closer collaboration with Moscow, he has
weakened his ability to withstand increasing
Soviet influence.
18. As long as the USSR continues its pres-
ent policies, Tito will almost certainly side
with the USSR on most major international
issues. By endorsing the USSR's "two Ger-
manys" approach, he has taken a major
step toward eventual recognition of the East
German regime. He will almost certainly be
a willing and active exponent of international
policies coinciding with those of the USSR
and designed to promote popular fronts, to
woo the neutralist nations, to spread the con-
cept of coexistence, and to gain converts for
the Soviet stand on disarmament and Euro-
pean security.
19. Meanwhile, Tito will continue his efforts
to establish closer relations with the USSR
and the Satellite regimes. Trade with the
Bloc will almost certainly increase, although
Tito will probably seek to maintain substan-
tial trade with the West. On the political
level, Yugoslavia will probably continue to
press for more rapid de-Stalinization and
greater autonomy for the Satellite regimes;
this latter issue could be a source of friction
with the USSR. However, Tito will not wish
these developments to go too fast or too far
lest dissident elements within the Satellites
be so strengthened as to threaten the Com-
munist regimes or lest the USSR be com-
pelled to revert to Stalinist controls. For ex-
ample, Yugoslavia was quick to adopt the
official Soviet and Polish line that the Poznan
riots in June were instigated by Western
reactionary elements.
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20. Despite the likelihood of increased cooper-
ation and closer ties between the USSR and
Yugoslavia, it is unlikely, at least for some
time to come, that Tito will associate himself
formally with the Bloc through such arrange-
ments as adherence to the Warsaw Pact, full
membership in the Bloc's Council for Eco-
nomic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) ,3 or mutual
assistance pacts. Any such steps would seri-
ously undermine his claims to independence
from all blocs, his potential influence with
neutral nations, his access to Western aid and
friendship, and his bargaining power with the
USSR. There is a possibility, however, that
Yugoslavia might accept some military equip-
ment from the Bloc if made available on
liberal terms.
21. Although there are almost certainly some
pro-Soviet elements in the Yugoslav Com-
munist Party, we believe Tito is in firm
control. However these elements will be
strengthened by more extensive party-to-
party relations and Tito in the long run may
have difficulty in controlling them. In the
event of Tito's death or incapacitation, pro-
Soviet elements in the Yugoslav Communist
Party might be able to exert a dominant in-
fluence, especially if Tito's leadership were
replaced' initially by a weak individual or
group, or if a confused scramble for power
ensued. In any event, we believe that the
immediate successor regime to Tito would be
Communist and would be less able to main-
tain a position of independence.4 We are
unable to estimate the ultimate stability and
duration of such a regime.
Yugoslav Relations with the West
22. Yugoslavia will probably continue its
policy of maintaining cordial relations with
8 Yugoslavia sent an observer to the CEMA meet-
ing in May 1956.
4 The most prominent candidate for the succes-
sion is Vice-President Kardelj, a distinguished
Marxist theorist who is the real architect of
Yugoslavia's so-called new socialist democracy,
has taken an active role in Yugoslav foreign
policy, and has been a sort of alter ego to Tito.
Other potential candidates are Rankovic, head
of the secret police; Gosnjak, who heads the de-
fense establishment; and Vukmanovic-Tempo,
the economic czar of the country.
all countries outside the Soviet Bloc. In fact,
Tito is now making a special display of friend-
ship toward the West in order to counteract
any impression that his Moscow visit had
resulted in his realignment with the Soviet
Bloc. We do not believe that Tito wishes to
burn all his bridges behind him. Moreover,
he probably feels that without Western friend-
ship he would be less capable of withstanding
Soviet overtures and pressures. Consequently,
the Yugoslays will almost certainly continue
to insist that they wish to cooperate with the
West, and with the US in particular.
23. Tito will probably remain in the Balkan
Pact for political and economic reasons, but
he will continue to play down its military
aspects. In fact, as pointed out above, the
Balkan Pact has virtually no military signifi-
cance at present. Tito will seek to maintain
close ties with Greece, including some in the
military field, but his relations with Turkey
will remain cool particularly as long as the
Cyprus issue is unresolved.
24. Yugoslavia's tentative steps toward mili-
tary alignment with the West were motivated
almost entirely by fears of a Soviet-Satellite
attack. These fears have now greatly declined,
and will probably continue to do so. However,
Tito almost certainly continues to believe that
participation in general war would be dis-
astrous for his regime. In the event of general
war, Yugoslavia would probably seek to remain
neutral at least in the early stages.
25. US ability to influence Yugoslav policy ?
never decisive even at , its strongest ? has
sharply declined in the last two years and will
probably continue to do so. The Yugoslays
have clearly not been deterred from establish-
ing closer ties with the Bloc by fear of incur-
ring US displeasure. Yugoslav conduct during
Tito's recent Soviet visit indicated greater will-
ingness than at any time since the rapproche-
ment with Moscow began to take chances on
alienating the US. Tito's sense of need of
US military aid has steadily lessened as he has
become more convinced of the easing of inter-
national tension. Moreover, on the economic
side, Yugoslavia's exclusive dependence on
Western aid has been overcome as the Bloc
reappeared as an important alternate source
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of trade and financial help. The Yugoslays
are aware that the declining general level- of
US foreign aid and the increasing US opposi-
tion to the present direction of Yugoslav
policy will lead to a decline in the level of US
aid, especially, military. Nevertheless, Tito
continues to look to the US for aid (notably
substantial amounts of wheat and spare parts
for US military equipment) and probably
believes that the US will feel compelled to
meet these requests in some degree to keep
him from moving even closer to the Bloc.
26. It is unlikely that either continuation of
US aid or a threat to cut it off would restrain
Tito from continuing to build up his ties with
6
the Communist world. However, we believe
that if the prospect of losing US aid were con-
sidered imminent by the Yugoslays, they
might be expected to make gestures and tacti-
cal maneuvers to mollify the West, without
fundamentally altering their policy. If US aid
were wholly discontinued the ability of Yu-
goslavia to establish close ties of cooperation
with the USSR, without losing its essential
independence and coming under Soviet dom-
ination, would be impaired. If the aid were
cut off abruptly, in an atmosphere of mutual
recrimination, it would encourage the growth
of pro-Bloc sentiment and intensify anti-
Western attitudes among the members of the
Yugoslav Communist hierarchy.
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