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DAILY DIGEST MAY 21 1951

Document Type: 
CREST [1]
Collection: 
General CIA Records [2]
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T01146A000200220001-6
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
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15
Document Creation Date: 
December 23, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 17, 2012
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1
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Publication Date: 
May 21, 1951
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SUMMARY
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79T01146A000200220001-6 49190 COPY NO,__3 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DAILY DIGEST MAY 21 1951 Date: NOTE,. 1, This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence, 2, Comments represent the Preliminary views of the Office of Current Iriteli ge ,ce, 3, Mar ji~nal letter indications are defined as follows,. *AO - items indicating Soviet-Communist intentions or capabilities eBe important regional developments not necessariay related to Soviet/ Communist intentions or capabilities NCO other imformati_gn indicating trends and potential d~veloppments Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79T01146A000200220001-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79T01146A000200220001-6 ? 0 38th Parallel on 25 Tune, the anniversary of the outbreak of war. Johnson (D-Colo.) calling'for an armistice in the Korean War along the Soviet Press Highlights Johnson Peace Bid. Pravda and the other Soviet papers gave extensive publicity to the resolution of Senator 25X1 :COMMENT Moscow may exploit the proposal for an armistice licity of the Johnson proposal, denounced a 'US' Senatorial resolution affirming US friendship for the-Russian people as a "smoke screen" for US saggressive intentions" toward the USSR. Contrary to Pravdaas reasoning that the resolution showed that "even certain representatives of US ruling circles are beginning to realize that Wall Street?s gamble in Korea is hopeless", the Izvestia article pictured US Senators as "against a peace- ful settlement of the Korean question," It is noteworthy that the latest North Korean and Chinese Communist pronouncements regarding Korea follow the line taken by izvestia. On 16 May Radio Pyongyang reported the Kim I1 Sung, receiving a Chinese delegation on 21 April stated "we believe that victory flags will soon be planted on the soil of all Korea." Like- wise, Radio Peking, reporting the interview stated that the Chinese spokesmen assured that the "Chinese people resolutely demonstrate every effort to support you until the liberation of all Korea is achieved," and warned that Othe`Chinese Peoples Volunteer Corps and the Korean People's. Army will demonstrate dtill further the common effort in defeating American imperialist aggression...." to support the Soviet peace campaign, particularly in view of the fact 25X1 that the general Communist demand has been for the withdrawal of "foreign troops" from Korea. However, Izvestia, simultaneous with Pravda?s pub- US was delighted to see the UK ousted from Iran. were rapidly worsening., and continued the earlier Soviet theme that the Soviet Propaganda Renews Charges of US-UK Rivalry in Iran. Radio Moscow after a short lull in commenting on US-UK moves in the Iranian situ- ation, has now renewed efforts to stir up trouble by reiterating charges of US-UK rivalry in exploiting Iranian oil resources. A week-end radio 25X1 commentary seized on rumors of US oil company efforts to offer their services in running the nationalized industry, charged that US-UK relations -COMMENT.- Moscow, in noting recent events in Iran, has care- y ma n a ned its policy of avoiding direct criticism of the Iranian 25X1 Government, while giving little prominence to Iranian steps to implement nationalization and the impasse in relations with the UK. At the same time Moscow has strongly played up the situation in terms of US-UK rivalry, in an effort both to further incite Iranian xenophobia and to encourage mutual US-UK misunderstanding and suspicions. Soviet propaganda has now renewed its picture of the allegedly deteriorating US-UK relations and rivalry in regard to Iran, while still maintaining a non-committal attitude pending developments. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79T01146A000200220001-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000200220001-6 ? MATE EUBOPE. BULGARIA, Political Disaffection Spreads. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 claims, wi esprea popular disillusionment with Communism among the Bulgarian people. of the approximately 70,000 inhabitants of the- members, representing a decrease of 40% since 1948. Similarly, the number of members of BABU in Elhovo has decreased from 3,500 in-1948 to 1,280 in 1950. overall membership=:in the Agrarian Union has decreased to only 70,00,0, and explains the disin'te"c,.: Elhovo district, which adjoins Turkey, only 3,600 are Communist Party rationist leaders, who have sold themselves to the Commanists.11 gration as due-to. "disillusionment of the rank and file with their collabo- OMMME>lTT: The five party Fatherland. Front coa- 25X1 25X1 TOP SECRET 3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000200220001-6 lition by which the Communists effected seizure of power in Bulgaria had apparently outgrown its usefulness by 1948 when three of the component parties were either dissolved or-merged with the Communists. Since the Agrarian Party nominally represented the vast majori.ty of the 85% peasant population, it was allowed to continue as a Communist rubber stamp.Follow-- ing the deaths of Dimitrov and Kolarov,'the hanging of Kostov and the en- suing continuous purge of the Communist Party to weed out."nationalism", the Agrarian Union has been used as a propaganda weapon in the government's failing-attempt to shore up the internal disaffection resulting from the well-nigh universal opposition of the peasants to Communist measures., HtINGAAT Soviet Troop Activity Reported Normal. Iwho recently returned 2 from a field trip which included several localities in central Hungary- 25X1 south of Budapest, has r orted Soviet military activit which the-Attache describes as normal. Hun ian units e d in rainin &-t-hritles normal for the s-Drink season- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79T01146A000200220001-6 0 1 ? ? SECTION 2 (EASTERN) GREECE. More Greek Childdren,Start On Wa-- to Greece. US Embassy Belgrade res' that approximal. ely Greek children left Belgrade - on 17 May on the first stage of .'their 'repat riation to Greece The__children are ached- tiled to be repatriated by 27 M-'.. CONTs This-group'Of children is the third to be repatriated since November and their arrival _Lh Greece will bring the total.- number returned from Yugo- 25X1 slavia to 'approx .matey 275. Greek bureaucracy and--the Greek desire to accept -only those _chi.l:dren who have been- carefully screened -as non-Com= munists seem to accowat in" great part for the slowness in repatriation. However., the groundwork appears to have been laid for consid9rable progress in the next few months and Dr. Hoy bergs, head of the Swedish belegation in Yugoslavia., estimates that approximately 500 children should 'be repatriated by late sum er. "B" LEBANON. ti &Ircraft Guns and Crews ant. to 2Eria* 25X1 prove. anti-aircraft guns and 25X1 crews to Syria last week. The offer of Lebanese military assistance to Syria was apparently made even before Iraq indicated that it would 25X1 provide Syria with 1 the loan of an Ira i fighter squadron and Iraqi anti- aircraft equipmeant. -Accord- ing the Military ng Attache., there is a general feeling 'in Beirut that the Arab States should 'close their ranks and stand up 'to Jewish pressures even though the Lebanese-have expected little-to-result from. the Arab League meetings in Damascus. COMMENTS The token military assistance provided is by anon 25X1 along with the possibility of aid from Egypt too-offers concrete"-evi- dence that the Arab States have-felt during the past few weeks that they must act, however ineffectively' against what they consider to be Israeli aggression in Vas Syrian-Israeli, -border area, The favorable Arab read- tion to the 18 May UN Seci ritq Ca + ci l resolution has considerably les- sened the tension is Daiasoue, even ,though Arab officials are still con- cerned over Israel s' public aaznouiad ement that it *ill continue the Hule drainage project despite the UN request for a suspension of the scheme. "B" INDIA. No T?oors to' Kor. The Press Trust of India., quoting reliable souses in ?lea Delhi, reports that -India will ? not send troops to Korea as Indian forces are for-the defense of the country only 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79T01146A000200220001-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000200220001-6 S I,, r,~ a +? in r W , Par ~"7 s, ,r it ,c* eS', ,; ; reto Oa' 17 9 Adh 7a cf the 7(aom-mtV ~-~ sc d D ; orati? Front fi g , ' ~ r fw C T ; n e5:s P a r t ? y 9 r te , _ r e s ~ i iat1on from - the Con- ,r i , l ? saa "z:1, to I'm= 4 y' 1a to- Contest ` :. s f E h9~.,v f z ' s , 1, 4,t_?::s'l e ! 6}"_n ttioo zs o 4 mailer of other di aid n , Congress. ,,es a di' s te ,Oh 25X r aie of the Co ?eaa leadership the Part n 3 140, a 'o i, m. berg or Pa~?' 25X ,t c i a. a=-.' ' 'aEi- C? r g;'-; a 3 Pty ax ' per w sd to .follo'x &Paipslani in Subftitt1mg a 5rs' ~?s T^.i , ry `; '^ _ w,za ~" ..a?`-/y~~ ~U~(Lv~i,., s~;"~'? l_a~U 4.> gam.,"s~l~^ 2's Q~L~v ~~~. `w4 ~ea.. 2,1 c1 Tea and 7~'SJb " ig a r of "'the Nel-mv, s liberal aupport the Gov n t ~ g t'y has already been we~~erzed by previous With- " 1, , , e~,ral zroup's the qux:~Stioon ardses as Z Tzlj AE"2"'I'Vo, 1-1r) of q q to tt?%, ~'iJ~IY ~Y`'6~'~ei ']} 9` ?t '^ [v A d. wi . g enough s'uocessfca ly to contest the nation d -q be ab Is to weld. his LU. Inel ,a Pam to an ef- 1-7 in ;:; a mil sta,Et: s ]s 57 d. as he reporte ..y' has the ba' k? +~`s ?.i".k"".._>?-n'.^i~ ~?', ?,'''n ;'?? ~"~..::i,:u.. .`i's- ~ ~ `'i? "~~-'.~a~:?. ss' T.d`!iii -G,7,T.er sent ;groin`i o o`i,Y ca w {' ~~ Y' To '+b b x, ;3.~y P-arli at';' are z>,~ r'" t 1 ireotl the peop CPS k the I 1atonff s of the lt, ',-? 7 u d p paz' o I rep? es ut- .s,.>k,?a'-za 'nh;.s t, r,~v,~aw Pe :y 'vay f ,rt'd after ' he eotiom(s that it hasglohands st is fi.s' i~1k gh a (l 'n,' of d.efeata at the of the or a leftist united front in ch or lna6 i ..'y. 3 s }3' z. n, Xi ?t ex " P`.tD,ade shp Bo bay and Malras,. ? C Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000200220001-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79T01146A000200220001-6 r ? TOP SECRET "B" INDOCHINA. Vietnamese Security Force in Tonkin Shows Weakness. The chief of the French Surete in Indochina told the US Consul in Hanoi that he is concerned about the security situation in North Vietnam. Internal rivalries and incompetent leadership have weakened the Viet- namGovernment4a security service, US Consul notes that the two top men of the Vietnam security service in North Vietnam were picked c:. for their slavish pro-French orientation rather than for ability or experience, Meanwhile the recentl a pointed Vietnamese governor 25X6 of North Vietnam is re crtedl not on good terms with Premier TrD==n'Van Huua COMMENT: The weakening of the Vietnamese administration in North Vietnam is one 25X1 of the most important results of Tian Van Huuls successful, French- supported, struggle earlier this year to break the power of the Dai Viet Party. Under the control of the Dai Viet, the regional govern- ment of North Vietnam had developed a model administration, by Viet- namese standards. However, the political strength and vigorous nation- alism of the Dai Viet had elicited the hostility of the French authorities, "B" BUM. B mese Dead that all Chinese Nationalists have Returned to Yunnan, The Burmese Ambassador in Bangkok labeled as. untrue the report of the Ch-.nese Nationalist Charge that Chinese Nationalist troops had left Burma. He stated that he has bees informed by the COMMENT: The Chinese Nationalist Burmese reports are not wholly in conflict since the Chinese version indi? 25X1 cated that there was a "rear guard" element still on Burmese soil. "A" CHINA, ri ists "not interested" in Korean Settlement. A reliable source has informed the US Consul General at Hong Kong of a statement made privately a month ago, by a member of the Chinese Comma?iis't Central Goxmittee~ that the Communists (1) are not interested" in.a Korean settlement at this time, and (2) have "no fear" of an extension of hostilities to China !r the USSR during l9551p due to the existence of "conflicts within the imperialist c o ? CoMNENTs The reported 25X1 statement is credible. The Peiping regime has given no indication of a, willingness to modify its* terms for a Korean settlement-- inuding withdrawal of all forces from Korea, surrender of Taiwan to Peiping, and admission of Commm China to the UN-- and recent Peiping broadcasts have alleged that the US, while desirous of expanding hostilities, cannot obtain sufficient support for such a program. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79T01146A000200220001-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79T01146A000200220001-6 TOP SECRET "CM CHINA. Hone Korn Supreme Court Awards LO Civil Aircra~ftt to Chinese Communists. The Hong Kong Supreme Court dismissed the claim of the Chennault Willauer interests to 40 planes whose ownership is. Also claimed by the Chinese Communists. The ChennaultWillauer interests have the right to appeal the Judgment within the next two months. CCNT: 25X1 The planes., now immobilized at Hong Kong s Kaitak Airport, were originally the property of the Nationalist-owned Central Air Transport Corporation., whose employees defected to the Chinese Communists. The Nationalists transferred ownership of the planes to the Chennault-Willauer interests in the fall of 1949 before the UK recognized the Peiping regimes the 25X1 planes may no longer be airworthy. ey can., howeverp be salvaged for spare parts, and it is expected that litigation will continue in the effort to deny the aircraft to the Communists. "A" Q,. the US Far Eastern Command estimates the enemy now has a total of 900 operational aircraft and that this strength will possibly reach 1,000 by midyear. FECOM notes that a large percentage of this expansion has been in fighter aircraft, "in keeping with the enemyQs long continued defensive tactics..." FECOM points out, however,, that "the enemy could momentarily effect a complete change in tactics and sustain offensive operations..." FECOM justifies raising the estimate of enemy air strength (from 750 to 900) on the basis of increased operational and training fights in Manchuria during April and the first week of Maya "B" KOREA. communists May Attem to C ter UN Naval Action the Wonsar Area. The US Navy reporting on 18 May from the Wonsan area note t e cement of additional artillery pieces (20mm and 76mm guns) on t ? peninsulas protecting Wonsan Bay. It is believed that this artillery will be used to support an offensive to be launched on am unknown date by a North Korean Colonel Kim's unit against the HK-aaccwpied islands in Wonsan Bay. A mine-laying force TOP SECRET 7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79T01146A000200220001-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000200220001-6 NCR of two motorboats and 11 sailboats under a North Korean Namal Captain Res will also take part in this offensive. COMMENT-* UN naval craft report that moderate shore fire received for the second successive day from Wonsan suggests that an attempt is being made by the Communists to lift the UN naval Beige of Wonsan. While it is believed that Communist forces in the area may succeed, in a determined enough effort, in recapturing the UN-held islands in the Bay, the limited range of Communist artillery pieces reported as being in the area would render ineffective these pieces in an artillery duel with the UN Naval Forces in Wonsan Bay. Commani t Sea lan Observed i Nor w- et Korea.. A delayed report from the US Far East Air Force (FEAF states that on 6 May a US aircraft observed a_seaplane, with engines canning, 100 yards from the shore near Hack, northwest of Seoul in North Korea. There were six 20-foot boats close by the aircraft. FEAF comments that the Soviet Fleet is known to possess light flying boats of the US PBY-55Soviet GST, and MDR-6 types. CONT,. This is the first reported sighting o a non- riend y seaplane in the course of the Korean fighting,, FEAF further suggests that in view of recent enemy air activity at Onjong ni airfield- in the immediate vicinity of Haelt, this aircraft may have been delivering critically needed materiol. or personnel to the area., Race st Erisoners Report Major 1ni'sjcantified inc Be Gym A Z ~a1 t C4iraese Communist prisoners taken on 19 and 20 May, north- east of Seoul, reported (1) that they had heard on 20 April that the 68th Army was to their rear at an unknown location, and (2) that they had heard that an unidentified army group was located to the rear of the 19th Army Group on 12 May in northwestern Korea. FECOM comments that the Chinese Communist 68th Army, 20th Army Group was last reliably reported on the Sino-Korean bonder. The unit has previously been reported in Korea It these reports remain unconfirmed. The un . On ed army group, reported in the rear of the 19th Army Group, may be either the 20th Army Group or a composite army group similar to the Chinese Gcm unist 3rd on the central front. NT s The unidentified army group, in northwestern o?ea. may be a composite force from the Second Field Army, con- sieting of the Chinese Communist 4th and 8th Armies. These units, although tentatively accepted in Korea, remain mlocated0 JAPAN. Co st Income Sources Allegedly Drvin Hlg KY'ODO, conservative Japanese news agency, reports Japanese authorities have obtained information that local organs of the Japan Communist Party have been deprived of their financial support from Party 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000200220001-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79T01146A000200220001-6 questions of the &panese peace treaty. the feelings of the Japanese people in settling the territorial ? headquarters. A d tral headquarters directive last month allegedly instructed all loc. committees to make ends: meet.- ind pendeist o~f help from higher organs. The authorities believe the "fact" that such an order was issued reflects the financial distress of < the Party. In reviewing the previous principal, sources of revenue the authorities are quoted. as explaining that (a) Party dues have dropped with-a 40% loss in membership; (b) the banning of 1400 Comist publications has caused Party income from this source to drop drastically; (c) donations from sympathizers has fallen; (d) since the outbreak of Korean hostilities the increased watchfulness of the authorities has hampered smuggling activities, Meanwhile the need to build underp-round ations has increased the demand for funds,o CONJENT.- If KYOD02s report on the state of Communist finances proves to be true, it.is..a.very provocative thought. JCP reveflue,, however,, has always been a subject of considerable speculation. Periodically in the past, rumors have described the pitiful financial straits of the Party which neverthe- less appeared to have the requisite funds to carry on. YOSHIDA on the Return of the Ry1?yssPana" advises that Premier YOSHIDA told the Dietns Upper House on 19 May that Japan may expect the return of the Ryukyus and the Bonin Islands in the not far distant future," The Premier said the US would consider COMEOT: The basis for the remierus remarks regarding in view of Ambassador Dulles comments of some time ago that the territorial questions woul¬ be a subject of negotiation. Next to an early treaty,, the acquisition of former territory,, ' hicli .the Japanese consider an integral part of the nation,, is the one topic on which all Japanese are most nearly united, YOSHIDA may have been trying to bring pressure on the US again, e return of these islands is unknown and all the. :.u e__ nsxbl cable TOP SECRET 9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79T01146A000200220001-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000200220001-6 TOP SECRET SECTION 3 (WESTERN) "B" GERMMa Prospects for C6htiniiatidn of. Adenauer. Coalltion'St ll on erect o& o c s nn see that, despite co n ing trehd of losses by West German Chancellor ,.denaueres Christian'Demo~rats (CDU) in recent local elections., the outlook ..__. far.; the.succeseful.continuation of the present Government is easonably good. While the coalition partners have lost ground.. recentl ~ ground show thatanth th e Social Demo= low et. 9 elections crate SPD) the are no latest d at recent - ( g g and that recent SPD op- position to the Schuman Plan has not'been as profitable as earlier exploitation of the rearmament issue. The:0overnmentts successful continuation is still largely dependent on:the maintenance of its slim working majority (211 out of 1402) in; the federal parliament's ,lower house. IA spite of. the Ghancellor'ssomewhat dictatorial treatment of his coalition partners,.they,are not likely to desert the-Government. The possibility of the ddath of Adenauer, who at 75 is extremely .1d-working :, and no longer in the best health, would require a lower horse -:to elect. a suca ore It is t cArtaAn whether the. v resent coalition could awe on-oral CORNY o Recent, strains u t~h si th$ coali ;ion aver 'ques one o economic , policy such as :.the issue of aodpter~mina~tion in` the coal.. andJsteel`indistries, have resulted from A4enauer's concessions' to 1 Of. over the objections of-'his coalition partners:: A similar s cation is not expected to develop in'42 a near future. c?al3 ion parties are united i$.. suppprt of 'the Sohuman Pl , which is onll an.. issue with the Socialist 'oppos.i';tion. two delegates in the Parliament who, ;toting, Join with the 8conpmic Reconstruction Party (WAY). Thief dev .ce gives the WAY the mini~!u representation required toCiialify as a."fraction" (a designation the WAY certain procedural rights The. SRP>has exploited itian b.uenc the WAY leadership to 's ort the SRP tfiis. p Ps line on; occasion. The ' is ?also currently attempting to increase whi sh recently attain - promfhenae- trough' its "success ' in the La!rer Saxony state election, is improving its position in the west German federal parliament through political `aptianeuverings -The SRP now has nGw Leo=Nazi Party Atte^pts t~ ~o~e its Political Posit on. the size of its ..own.'represen'tation in Parliament, by. defecting` two another? ;extremi , pa 8~.... delegates from C.. ' Allielti' officials have expressed alarm possibility that the.party:light'spread. its `infl enee- to.the rest of western Germs a The SRP has already ann. wed that it will open _ the success of in the Lowe. S'aoconq' election. ,'and at' the TO]?.-SECRET 10 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000200220001-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79T01146A000200220001-6 TOP SECRET a propaganda campaign in early June in Hesse. Because of the Federal Governmentns announced plans to have the SRP banned. party leaders have adopted more moderate tactics for the present., and have refrained from many of their nationalistic utterances. "C" AUSTRIAAGERMAtt, Austria Acts to Restore German Trade, The Austrian overaamen is akin a serious view of west Germi s curtailment of imports from Austria, and is planning to send a trade mission 25X1 to Bonn the end of May to negotiate. 25X1 COMMENT.- Because 'of its exhaustion of EPU credits , Germany suspen e ?T s imports the end of March. This action has peace treaty restrictions against military production). ., The Italians may try to bargain for elimination of the most obnoxious peace treaty provisions; in exchange fcr ' a greater rearmament/ effort. The incon- gruity of being forced to honor peace treaty provisions for the delivery of strategic items to the Soviet bloc while at' the same time the US is trying to stop,the shipment of these same items will also be emphasized, COMMENT: Sfrr zags ; speech is part of the curren municipal electoral campaign and reflects Italyls desire to.reap greater benefits from Western European rearmament-for Italian industry (now hampered by imperialistic and-expansionistic policy, hit Austria hard as a very high 25X1 percentage of Austriaes exporte'.'went to Germany (28% last December, for example). Austria is also suffering from a.probably permanent shrinkage of its Eastern markets, and is therefore accenting the importance of the German trade, which presumably can be restored. "C" ITALY. Sforza Outlines Extent of .Italian Demands for Revision of ewe 3"x?eaty. In a speech ins Genoa calling for peace EreiaTy- revision, Forge~Mn Minister Sforza urged: (1) reaffirmation of the March 20, 1948 tripartite declaration even if it includes a statement of.western desires for a bilateral agreement; (2) abrogation of military clauses; () abrogation of economic clauses (apecifically those that represent a'victor-vanquished relationship and have unfavorable repercussions on,certain industriAl sectors); and (4) a decision by the West to implement the treaty promise of Italian UN membership, Sforza further indicated that the Italian Government would ask for more defense appropriations beyond the $400 million already appropriated., again justified the need for abrogating the military provisions of the peace treaty because of Soviet satellite rearmament., and concluded by reaffirming that although the West must convert potential strength into strength in being in the shortest, possible, time,, it ni t `also take the -psychological initiative - in making clear the - Soviets 9 25X1 "B" SPAIN. Intensive Government Propaganda Campaign to Forestall Madrid Vie, TRe or?o Madrid press h-a-s--appealed to the pop ace TOP SECRET. 11. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79T01146A000200220001-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79T01146A000200220001-6 TOP SECR;T not to participate: in the consumersO strike called for 22 May, calling it a crimp against the state and threatening participants with severe reprisals, such as loss of their jobs and possible - imprisonment. Falange youth organizations are circulating leaflets blaming agitation for the strike on a "Masonic, Communist conspiracy" 25X1 and urging the people to carry on their normal activities, COMMENT: The Government is making every effort to prevent an ef- e e ptrike in Madrid in the hope that failure in Madrid will discourage the spread of the strike movement. The prgbable extent or success of the strike cannot be gauged but Madrid, whose principal butiness is government,, is not as volatile as the industrial, separatist centers of Bilbao and Barcelona, Moreover$ there appears to have been virtually no organized,, non-Communist leftist participation in the agitation for the strike The non-Communist Left, which is not effectively organized in Madrid, is believed to regard the action of the Monarchists in calling the strike at this 25X1 time as too precipitate, The action of General Munoz Grandes would seem to. indicate that he,, and possibly the rest of the Army,, is taking a position of caution. UNITED KINGDOM* .Announcement of.-"Strengthening" of UK Mediterranean Feet IsUse Pu ci . The Admiralty has announced that seven z on war4'ps join the Mediterranean Fleet as reinforce- ments and replacements during the next three months. These include 25X1 one aircraft carrier, one cruiser, a minela r and various smaller vessels; COMMENT: These changes, consisting muc more., already planned re.p acements and rotation than of actual augmentation,, are not normally disclosed- by the Admiralty. .Public announcement at this. time parallels the- publicity given on 14 May to.the alerting of the 16th Parachute Brigade for overseas duty and 25X1 is probably intended likewise as a reminder both, to the Iranian Government aid to British public opinion that the UK. intends to protect its Middle Eastern interests. Various elements of the British public,, at least, may be expected to recap that a few weeks ago a cruiser was detached from the Mediterranean l.eet and ordered to the Persian Gulf, "Cn TOP SECRET 12 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79T01146A000200220001-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79T01146A000200220001-6 39' TOP SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DAILY DIGEST SUPPLEMENT MAY 21 : 49190 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79T01146A000200220001-6 J Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79T01146A000200220001-6 War TOP SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DAILY DIGEST 21 May 1951 SECTION 2 (EASTERN) "B" King Determined to Prevent Break in Anlo-E~vptian Talks US Ambassa- do C ff r in Cairo has been informed by Perim Tabet, the Royal Press Counselor that King Farouk is determined that no break occur in the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations at the present time., assuming that (a) the forthcoming British reply leaves the door open for future talks., and(b) Foreign Minister Salaheddin is invited at a reasonable early date to proceed to London for discussion. According to Tabet, Prime MinisterNahas Pasha has "promised to be good0" Tabet went on to say that if the Wafd government decided that it could not go along with thegingis "suggestions", the King would then dismiss Nahas but on other grounds than the Anglo-Egyptian defense problem, For, if the King dismissed Nahas on the treaty issue and appoi:ted Sirry as Prime 1Mlinister, for example,, the King would have the entire country against him and; would be compelled to remain "within the walls of big palace", CXIMMENT-a __ ',ffamg a,ro s opposition to any break-down at the present time in the Anglo-Egyptian defense negotiations has undoubtedly acted as a moderating influence upon the Wafd government's attitude on the question, While there is always the possibility that Egyptian public opinion may sudden-IZ become aroused over the Suez and Sudan issues and thereby force the government to act in an irresponsible manner, the prospects seen. fairly good now that the Anglo-Egyptian discussions will be allowed to continue through the suvaer at least, as it ~ s in Sumer when government officials leave Cairo for Alexandra and when students, who often play a prominent part in political disturbances, leave for their home towns ark,. illages upon the closing of the schools and universities, 13 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79T01146A000200220001-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000200220001-6 Iq Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000200220001-6

Source URL: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp79t01146a000200220001-6

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[2] https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/collection/general-cia-records
[3] https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T01146A000200220001-6.pdf