DEVELOPMENTS IN CUBA SINCE MID-NOVEMBER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000400030003-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 16, 1958
• Content Type: MEMO

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE I3F NATIONAL ESTIMATES
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Developments in Cuba Since Mid-November
16 December 1958
1. The position of the Batista regime has deteriorated more rapidly
than was anticipated in SNIE 85-58, "The Situation in Cuba," 24 November
1958. The rebels now dominate Oriente Province outside the city of
Santiago and a few other beleaguered towns, and are increasingly active
in the provinces of Camaguey, Las Villas, and Pinar del Rio. Dr. Manuel
Urrutia Lleo, Fidel Castro's choice for provisional president, is now
present in Oriente, apparently for the purpose of setting up a provisions:,
government and claiming recognition of the rebel's belligerent rights.
The Cuban Government's armed forces show increasing signs of demorali-
zation. In commercial circles there is mounting apprehension that
Castro may soon come to power with bloody and disastrous consequences
for Cuba because of the anarchic conditions then deemed likely to
prevail.
2. On 27 November considerable numbers of Cuban army officers
were arrested for complicity in a military conspiracy against the
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government or for cowardice in refusing to continue the fight against
the Castro rebellion. The respected General Martin Diaz Tamayo has
been retired for suspected involvement in this plot. General Eulogio
Cantillo Porras is still in nominal command of the Santiago military
district, but is under suspicion and close surveillance. It is
likely that there was such a conspiracy to depose the regime and
establish a military junta. Although it has been checked, it is
symptomatic of the existence of dissatisfaction and disaffection
within the armed forces. The possibly intended appointment of General
Francisco Tabernilla to replace General Diaz Tamayo would have a
further demoralizing effect upon the Cuban Army.
3. The rebel drive is endangering Cuba?s hitherto prosperous
economy and will probably hinder the sugar harvest, due to commence
in January. At the same time, the heavy government expenditures
necessary to support antirebel operations constitute a drain on the
economy, and prZionged political instability is having an adverse
effect on business activity.
4. To meet this situation, the Batista government has newly ex-
tended the suspension of constitutional guarantees and, in addition,
has declared a state of national emergency. Plans are proceeding to
inaugurate President-elect Rivero Aguero on 24 February. The latter,
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although a Batista man, has given evidence that he will at least con-
sider some compromise to return peace to Cuba. He has stated that he
does not rule out the possibility of a constitutional assembly as a
means of reaching a national solution to the Cuban problem. Never-
theless, neither Rivero Aguero nor Batista have shown any sign of
taking positive steps to alter the present chaotic internal situation.
5. In these circumstances, there is considerable sentiment in
Cuba, especially in business circlesa for the establishment of a
military junta to dispose of Batista and to head off Castro. The
armed forces are probably in the mood to support such a move, but, with
the retirement of Diaz Tamayo and the close check kept on Cantillo
Porras, it is not apparent where the requisite leadership would come
from.
6. As was estimated in SNIE 85-58, a military junta would be the
most effective means of breaking the existing political impasse, but
would not of itself restore peace and stability, in that it would
still have to cope with the 26 of July Movement. If the personnel
and program of the junta were such as to inspire confidence in its
intention and ability to restore democratic government, the 26 of July
Movement would be deprived of its raison d?etre and might lose some of
its momentum, although the time is growing late for that. To suppress
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the Castro movement by force, the junta would require, on a large
scale, military aid such as has been denied to Batista, and the
issue would remain for some time in doubt. To accomplish a quick
pacification of Cuba, the junta would have to offer a political
solution satisfactory to Fidel Castro.
7. On the other hand., should high political or military leader-
ship fail to take some drastic action to stem the momentum of the
Castro operation, such as the removal of Batista, the civil war would
be likely to spread at an ever increasing rate. In-this situation,
the possibility cannot be excluded that the army in the field., tired
of the civil war, might turn against the government., either piecemeal
by going over to the rebels., or in an organized way. In either case,
the strength of Castro's political position would be enhanced.
SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
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