NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE LECTURE 14 JANUARY 1955 THE SOVIET STRATEGIC CONCEPT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01009A001402410001-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 29, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 14, 1955
• Content Type: MISC

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NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE LECTURE
14 January 1955
THE SOVIET STRATEGIC CONCEPT
1. The Communist leaders of the USSR consider their basic objectives
to be the consolidation and expansion of Soviet power. Their goal is the
ultimate elimination of any power centers capable of competing with or
threatening the USSR.
This objective is based, in large part, upon their interpretation of
history, derived from the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism; doctrines which
they use as a broad guide to their actions.
The basic elements of this interpretation are: (1) the belief that
significant social developments result only from forces in conflict, and
(2) the belief that the final conflict will occur between capitalism and
Communism and will result in the worldwide collapse of capitalism and
its replacement by Communism.
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2. The key factor here is continuous conflict between opposing social
systems. It has been made clear by their spokesmen that while this may
eventually take the. form of open military war, there will be long periods
between military wars. These periods Lenin called "partial war," This
is no less war to them -- but involves using means other than full-scale
military force.
Here is the area of operations to which they have devoted most
of their attention since 1917 because, in their own view, they have at
no time possessed adequate military strength to invite open conflict
with a world power, such as the U. S, is today and Germany was in .1940.
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The German 1935-40 precedent is most instructive:-
The USSR, in August, 1939, concluded a treaty of non-aggression with
Nazi Germany to buy additional time to strengthen their armed forces and,
through its Secret Protocols, established certain territorial spheres of interest
in the Baltics, Poland, and Southeastern Europe. While the Soviets looked upon
Germany as the extreme capitalist, or Fascist state with which war would
ultimately be unavoidable, they felt that by establishing a modus vivendi
between the USSR and Germany they were, in effect, taking advantage of the
possibility that Germany would be seriously weakened in a war with the other
western, capitalist powers. Here the USSR has shown itself willing to enter
into "spheres of interest" agreements in order to avoid the risk of open
military conflict.
In a recent statement (N. Y. Times, 10 January 1955, page 2)
Otto Kunsinen, a high-ranking member of the CPSU, likened the present policy
of the U.S. to that of Hitler Germany, i. e . , we were anti-communist,
building up armaments, seeking world domination, and hated the Soviet Union.
This is a significant treatment of the U.S. position and it may
contain a clue to the present Soviet attitude to the U.S. It reflects the belief
of the Soviet leaders that the US will become involved in capitalist wars
or at least capitalist depressions, and that by establishing a modus vivendi
with the US for the short run the USSR will be able to legitimize its control
over the Satellites and take further advantage of wars and depressions
of capitalist states to increase its area of expansion.
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3. When the Soviet speaks of "peaceful coexistence, " to them this is
synonymous with "partial war." Despite their recent protestations, there
is no reason to believe that they actually accept a concept of permanent
or even continuing coexistence. They regard coexistence only as a situation
of equilibrium forced upon them by the international power balance which
must eventually be replaced by another situation in which they have developed
a more favorable power position.
2, Para 31 Following passage from Stalin's 1927 speech at
15th Party Congress, often quoted since, gives good insight into
what Soviets mean when they speak of coexistence:
"We can not forget the saying of Lenin to the effect that a
great deal in the matter of our construction depends on whether
we succeed in delaying war with the capitalist countries,
which is inevitable but which may be delayed either until the
proletarian revolution ripens in Europe, or until colonial
revolutions come fully to a head, or finally, until the
capitalist countries fight among themselves over the division
1 . r
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4. In addition, while they have couched their program in the military
terminology of "strategy" and "tactics, " they have always thought in
much broader terms than their use of this terminology might seem to indicate.
"Strategy" has represented for them the general program of a long-range
development of Communist power. Their study of "tactics" has provided
them with the means for extending their power. Among these, direct
military action has been only one among many tactics, and evidently a less
desirable one as long as a formidable opposing power center exists.
This is as true today as it was under Stalin - despite the many surface
changes in the USSR since the Malenkov regime.
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6.
5. Neither their view of "'strategy" or of "tactics" provide the
Soviet leaders with any detailed blue-print for immediate policy decisions.
They have to improvise on details just as everyone does, and they have
had their reverses -- Korea, Tito, Iran, Greece.
But they do have guide lines to influence the shaping of general
Soviet strategic planning and are ready to change their tactics as the
power situation or the -risks of war dictate. / viz. Korea, Tito, Iran and Greece/
Events in Korea resulted in persuading the Kremlin we would
fight aggression there and elsewhere. This required modification in
Soviet tactics since their present policy is based on avoidance of war
with USA.
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6. By and large, the broad aims of consolidation and expansion
of Soviet power dictate at present a policy of perpetual probing to find
weak spots in the non-Communist world, and to exploit, tactically, but
by means short of general war, any weaknesses discovered. This policy
includes as indicated above a willingness, when they meet with stiff opposition,
to engage in tactical retreats!
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7. As indicated, Soviet policy is tempered by the view that
they are not yet ready to take on the US and its allies in general war.
They recognize our nuclear superiority as well as the fact that we have
more effective means of delivering an atomic attack. They have a healthy
respect for our industrial capacity. They are unwilling to initiate
any ventures which might jeopardize their control over their own and
the Satellites' government apparatus.
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8. Since the death of Stalin the day-by-day details of Soviet
within this general framework are influenced
additionally by internal factors:
a. the development of the new "collective" leadership, the need
for bringing to focus of more than one point of view in policy decisions
and the possibility that a struggle for power within the oligarchy
might break out over some major issue of economic or foreign policy.
M,.a~.. t ic -
b. the necessity for a "new look" economic policy, ith more
recognition of consumer demand, emphasis upon the need for
development of a better agricultural program, and possible
reflection of the "new look" economic policy upon the military program
(limiting of defense expenditures to present levels). The problems
of developing a "new look" economic policy (e. g. consumer goods vs.
heavy industry) might create significant strains within the oligarchy,
even though heavy industry currently retains the primacy which it has
always had in economic planning.
he se reset developments within the Soviet Union are
additional deterrents to the adoption of an aggressive military policy.
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9. However, the Soviet leaders will continue to emphasize all other
means of conducting what they regard as the inevitable conflict with the
non-Communist world. These other means may perhaps be broadly labelled
subversive activities (although many of them are carried out in overt rather
than clandestine fashions), an area of activity in which they have numerous
tactical directions from Lenin and Stalin, long experience, and considerable
success. Their past successes in this area may, in fact, further support
a decision on their part to make this the continuing key instrument
of Soviet expansion, always firmly backstopped, of course, by the threat
inherent in a strong military posture.
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Weapons in Their Arsenal to Carry Out This Strategic Concept
10. The deterrent power of a strong defense.
a. Army, air-force, navy, nuclear air and ground defense
against air attacks.
L
b. Adequate air and nuclear striking force.
c. Importance of military strength in awing the neutralists
of Europe, and the uneasy Satellites.
(It has become commonplace to hear people say that USSR
could over-run Western Europe in a few weeks . -- Wonder
when people will stop saying that.)
These are the weapons they don't propose to use now, but which are the backdrop
against which to stage their subversive campaign. (Mao said: "Political power
grows out of the barrel of a gun. ") It fits in with their emphasis on easing
the home front before starting any foreign adventures.
They have not necessarily abandoned forever the idea of military conquest
but realize that open use of military power (or even of satellite power) risks
general war.
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11. Offensive weapons for use in the cold war.
a. Well coordinated propaganda machine (Illustration - BW campaign).
This machine directed to divide our allies, preach neutralism and
coexistence. Denounce US as "warmonger" and their allies, Britain,
France, Belgium, etc. , as "colonialist.
(Cite example of Paris treaties. We kept quiet. They threatened
to denounce treaties, cut off conversations, etc. , etc. , and yet
accused us of immoral pressure on French.)
Our press open to them; theirs is closed to us.
b. Satellites (China not included). Use in UN - to support
subversive apparatus in Free World - to do any job where USSR
wants to keep its hands clean.
(Examples of "volunteer armies" - Korea, Viet-Nam.)
c. Overseas Communist Parties (Cite France, Italy, Indonesia,
Japan, Syria.)
d. Communist Trade Unions (WFTU).
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e. Communist underground apparatus.
f. Front organizations - World Peace Movement, Youth, Women,
Free Lawyers.
(We are building effective counter -apparatus, but Soviets
have lead here as yet.)
g. The central control and training apparatus in the USSR
(describe briefly). E W
h. The position of China -- not Satellite, but not wholly free
as long as militarily and economically dependent on USSR
Can be used for Soviet ends in SEA because of common objectives,
but by agreement rather than on order.
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12. Where will covert apparatus be used?
Have described the general strategic goals -- the power mechanism
to reach those goals - - Final question -- where to be utilized?
a. Where are weakest areas -- we have already said would probe there --
Here is my analysis -- experts may differ
(1) S.E.A. (Indo-China
(Indonesia
(Burma
But here important to cut in agreement with China -- They
can 't dictate .
(2) Japan - Vital upcoming elections
(Joint USSR-China objectives)
(3) Middle East - based around keeping Arab-Israeli feud hot
and Syria's growing chaos.
(4) Africa -- this deserves watching from South Africa to Algeria.
(5) South America.
(6) Europe -- will try to hold its own - and intrigue to block
beginning of German rearmament.
(Don't put Europe last to minimize importance -- but here if we are
alert we can check their gains and make some ourselves.)
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l
13. Conclusions
We are not losing subversive war -- ups and downs --
Up - Iran, Egypt, Guatemala, Trieste
Down - North Viet Nam
In balance - Indonesia, Japan, and much else.
We are just developing our techniques. (Once felt money alone -?
would do it -- i. e. , economic recovery -- this not enough. )
Must debunk their philosophy, uncover their subversive techniques,
effectively counter them.
It can be done.
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