RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST REGIME AND THE USSR: THEIR PRESENT CHARACTER AND PROBABLE FUTURE COURSES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001800010001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 2, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 10, 1952
• Content Type: NIE

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COPY NOk 51
S ET ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,ONE
SECURITY INFORMATION 4.7
e
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST
REGIME AND THE USSR: THEIR PRESENT
CHARACTER AND PROBABLE FUTURE COURSES
NIE ? 58
Published 10 September 1952 "
The following member organizations of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelli-
gence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The
intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.
All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee con-
curred in this estimate on 4 September 1952. See, how-
ever, the reservation of the Special Assistant, Intelligence,
Department of State, to paragraphs 5 and 26.
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RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST REGIME AND
THE USSR: THEIR PRESENT CHARACTER AND PROBABLE
FUTURE COURSES
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the present nature and state of relations between Communist China
and the USSR and to estimate the probable courses of these relations over the next
two years.
CONCLUSIONS
1. The Peiping regime accepts Moscow
leadership in the world Communist move-
ment, and is becoming increasingly de-
pendent on the USSR economically and
militarily. However, we believe that the
Peiping regime retains some capability
for independent action, and is in a posi-
tion to influence the formulation of Com-
munist policy in the Far East.
2. We believe that Moscow will try to
extend and intensify its control over Com-
munist China. However, we believe it
unlikely that, at least during the period
of this estimate, the Kremlin will be able
by nonmilitary means to achieve a de-
gree of control over Communist China
comparable to that which it exercises over
the European Satellites. We believe it is
almost certain that the Kremlin will not
attempt to achieve such control by mili-
tary force.
3. Over the long run, Sino-Soviet soli-
darity might be weakened as a result of
efforts by the USSR to intensify and
extend its control over Communist China,
disputes over Soviet economic and mili-
tary assistance to Communist China,
divergent views concerning the border
areas, Communist Chinese efforts to con-
trol and direct Far Eastern "liberation
movements," or divergent views over the
priority of Far Eastern Communist objec-
tives in relation to other world Commu-
nist objectives.
4. We believe that during the period of
this estimate these factors will be far out-
weighed by close ideological ties and con-
tinuing mutual involvement in the
pursuit of common objectives, particu-
larly the elimination of Western influence
from the Far East.
5. Although the Peiping regime will un-
doubtedly continue to attempt to gain
legal recognition internationally, to
secure Formosa, and to resume trade and
commerce with the West, we do not
believe that the existing Sino-Soviet
solidarity can be weakened by non-Com-
munist concessions to Communist China.
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Moreover, as we have previously esti-
mated, we believe that Western pressures
against Communist China, while weaken-
ing her, would not disrupt Sino-Soviet
solidarity during the period of this
estimate.'
DISCUSSION
Introduction
6. Communist China and the USSR present
a united front to the world. Since the estab-
lishment of the Chinese Communist regime
in 1949 there has been no reliable indication
that either country has adopted any impor-
tant course of action of joint concern without
the consent of the other. In February 1950,
the Chinese Communists and the USSR signed
a 30-year treaty of friendship, alliance, and
mutual assistance, and this treaty provides
the formal basis for current relations between
the two states. 2
CURRENT STATUS OF SINO-SOVIET
RELATIONSHIP
Soviet Communism and the Chinese
Communist Party
7. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) , un-
like the Communist parties of the European
Satellites, gained power with little assistance
from the Soviet Army. The Chinese Commu-
nist claims of independent achievement which
allow the USSR credit only for ideological
and moral support until the formation of the
Peiping regime in October 1949, have some
basis in fact although they underestimate the
assistance given by the USSR during the
period from 1945 to 1949.
8. The high command of most Communist
parties in the world has undergone frequent
and violent changes, which are believed to
1 The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department
of State, believes that the difficult and complex
problem of the possible effect of Western actions
on Sino-Soviet solidarity requires more thorough
study than has been possible in the course of
preparing this or earlier national intelligence
estimates. He therefore reserves judgment on
the validity of paragraph five, preferring to
state simply that a significant weakening of
Sino-Soviet solidarity is unlikely during the
period of this estimate.
have been dictated from Moscow. In con-
trast, the CCP has exhibited unique stability
and continuity in its leadership. This leader-
ship undoubtedly takes pritie in its independ-
ent rise to power and recognizes that it pos-
sesses a capacity for independent action.
9. The Chinese Communists claim for Mao
Tse-tung authority in his own right as a Com-
munist theoretician. This claim has been
accepted in part by Moscow, and the prestige
accorded Mao in this respect goes far beyond
that accorded any other contemporary non-
Soviet Communist. However, even those Chi-
nese who would place Mao near Stalin in
authority profess allegiance to the Marxist-
Leninist-Stalinist doctrine held by the rulers
in Moscow. The CCP leaders have repeatedly
and emphatically proclaimed their adherence
to Stalinism, their rejection of the "national
selfishness" of Titoism, and their debt to the
inspiration and example of the Russian lead-
ers and the October Revolution. Common
ideology is thus a strong force binding to-
gether the Chinese and Soviet regimes. Pei-
ping and Moscow both aim at expelling all
Western influence from Asia and at extending
Communist control over the entire area. Both
desire to spread the Communist world revolu-
tion.
2 The published text of the treaty is appended as
Annex "A." The more important clauses of this
brief and general treaty provide that: (a) in the
event one party is attacked by Japan or any
state allied with it and thus is involved in a
state of war, the other will immediately render
military and other assistance by all means at its
disposal; (b) the two parties will consult with
each other in regard to all important interna-
tional problems affecting their common inter-
ests; and (c) each party undertakes, in con-
formity with the principles of equality, mutual
benefit, and mutual respect for the national sov-
ereignty and territorial integrity and noninter-
ference in the internal affairs of the other, to
develop and consolidate economic and cultural
ties.
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Other Soviet Influences in Communist China
10. Soviet political and economic "advisors"
are stationed in China at various governmen-
tal and party levels. We do not believe that
these advisors issue direct orders, but the
Chinese have been receptive to their advice,
which seems to be given through Chinese
intermediaries. Soviet advisors are not only
attached to the government and the party and
to certain economic and security organs, but
are also assigned to specific engineering, in-
dustrial, and cultural projects. Neither these
advisors nor the Kremlin has criticized, at
least publicly, the internal policies of Com-
munist China or the implementation of these
policies.
11. The Korean war greatly increased Com-
munist China's economic dependence on the
USSR. The adoption of more severe Western
trade controls in July 1951 has accelerated
the orientation of Communist China's trade
to the Soviet Bloc. Although Communist
Chinese economic dependence on the Bloc in-
creases Soviet influence in Communist China,
the USSR does not directly control the Chi-
nese economy or operate any of the industry
of mainland China (outside of Manchuria and
Sinkiang) .
12. The Korean war appears to be directed
from joint Sino-Soviet military headquarters.
The Chinese Communists are undoubtedly
strongly influenced by Soviet military ad-
visors, and it is probable that no major de-
cisions are made in the Korean war without
Soviet approval.
13. Except for captured equipment, the Chi-
nese Communist forces are wholly dependent
on the USSR for heavy items of military equip-
ment, and the large scale of Soviet logistic
support has presumably further increased
Moscow's influence with the Chinese military.
The Chinese Communist Air Force is largely
a Soviet creation and is wholly dependent
upon the USSR for equipment and supply.
Situation in the Border Areas
14. In Manchuria, the influence of Chinese
Communist political and military leaders ap-
pears to outweigh that of the Soviet personnel
in the area. Economic policies also reflect the
central planning and directives of Peiping.
Nevertheless, the USSR exerts great influence
over economic and strategic developments in
the area through its military and economic
advisors, its intelligence activities, its super-
vision of rail lines, and its control of the Port
Arthur naval base area. According to the
Sino-Soviet agreements,3 Soviet control over
Port Arthur and participation in the adminis-
tration of Manchurian rail lines is scheduled
to be terminated in 1952; however, it is prob-
able that such termination would not greatly
lessen Soviet influence in Manchuria.
15. Soviet advisors and commercial enter-
prises in Inner Mongolia have economic and
political influence, particularly in Eastern
Inner Mongolia which borders on the USSR.
However, Peiping has at least administrative
control, and the strength of Chinese influence
appears to be growing.
16. In Sinkiang, Peiping has stationed 70,000
troops and appears to exercise effective admin-
istrative control. For geographic reasons,
however, Sinkiang's trade is chiefly with the
USSR, and the Chinese need Soviet assistance
to develop the resources of the area. The USSR
exerts great influence through three Sino-
Soviet companies and through Soviet citizens
in the service of the provincial government.
17. Soviet influence in the border areas, politi-
cal as well as economic, is extensive. At the
same time, Chinese Communist political and
territorial interests have apparently not been
sacrificed in the interest of Soviet expansion.
The trend since 1950 appears to be towards an
increase in Chinese Communist administrative
control.
The Character of Current Sino-Soviet
Relations
18. From a consideration of the available evi-
dence, we conclude that the Peiping regime ?
unlike the European Satellites ? is not direct-
ly and completely controlled by the Kremlin.
Sino-Soviet cooperation is based upon Chinese
Communist acceptance of Moscow leadership
See Annex "B" for the published text of the
agreement between Communist China and the
USSR on the Chinese-Changchun Railway, Port
Arthur, and Dairen.
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in the world Communist movement, a corn-
mon ideology, and the common objective of
eliminating Western influence from the Far
East. This relationship is further solidified
by common hostility to a resurgent and non-
Communist Japan and to US power in the
western Pacific. It is greatly reinforced by
the Kremlin's need for an ally in the Far East,
and by Communist China's need for Soviet
assistance in training and equipping its
armed forces and in developing its economy.
19. We believe also that the size and potential
of China, the strength and cohesion of the
Chinese Communist Party, the traditional
Chinese xenophobia, and the inherent diffi-
culties encountered by foreigners in exercising
control in China, have permitted the Chinese
Communists to retain some capability for in-
dependent action and a capability to exert
an influence upon the shaping of Communist
policy in the Far East.
20. The Chinese Communist regime appears
willing to subordinate, at least temporarily,
those Chinese national interests which are in-
compatible with the interests of the USSR,
to submerge any fears it may have of Soviet
expansion at China's expense, and to sub-
stitute for China's traditional unilateral poli-
cy of playing foreign powers against one
another, a joint Sino-Soviet policy of endeav-
oring to eliminate Western influence from
Asis. Chinese Communist leaders probably
estimate that close Sino-Soviet collaboration
will ensure Chinese security from Western
counteraction, and ensure Soviet economic
and military aid without ending China's in-
dependence.
21. The Kremlin appears to recognize that
Communist China now possesses the determi-
nation and some capacity to pursue its own
interests. Moreover, the Kremlin almost cer-
tainly sees in the present relationship the
opportunity to use Communist China to
weaken the Western position in Asia. On the
other hand, the Kremlin probably views the
relationship also as an opportunity to extend
Soviet domination over Communist China by
subversion, by making Communist China
economically and militarily dependent upon
the USSR, and by Soviet pressure upon the
4
borderlands. Furthermore, a friendly Com-
munist China provides the USSR with a de-
fense in depth, constitutes a valuable poten-
tial source of manpower and other resources,
and is an important political and psychologi-
cal asset.
Future Course of Sino-Soviet Relations
22. We believe that the following factors will
tend to ensure the continuation of Sino-Soviet
solidarity during the period of this estimate:
a. The cohesive force of common ideology
will probably continue to bind the two regimes
together.
b. The military and economic dependence
of Communist China upon the USSR will in-
crease, at least for as long as the Korean war
continues without settlement.
c. Continued US assistance to the Nation-
alist Government on Taiwan, the US-Japan
Security Pact, and the ever-present apprehen-
sion of US action against Communist China
itself will tend to draw Communist China and
the USSR together.
d. Neither the USSR nor Communist China
now appears capable of altering the current
relationship to its advantage without jeopard-
izing the attainment of its own objectives. A
Chinese Communist effort unilaterally to re-
vise the relationship or to leave the Bloc would
result in the cessation of Soviet economic and
military aid and support and in serious dis-
sension within the Chinese Communist Party
and the armed forces. It might lead to armed
conflict with the USSR. Similarly, a Kremlin
effort to reduce Communist China to the
status of the European Satellites might lead
to armed conflict with Communist China and
would divide and confuse the international
Communist movement.
23. On the other hand, the following factors
may, sooner or later, weaken Sino-Soviet soli-
darity:
a. The history of Sino-Russian relations is
full of conflicts over Sinkiang, Mongolia, and
Manchuria. During the last century there
has been almost continuous Russian encroach-
ment on Chinese interests in those areas.
The Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950 temporarily
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ended such border disputes. It is difficult to
believe, however, that such longstanding dis-
putes have been permanently settled. We
think that they are likely to recur, in one
form or another, and that they must be con-
sidered in assessing the probable course of
Sino-Soviet relations in the future.
b. Having provided assistance and advice to
the "liberation" movements of other coun-
tries in the Far East, Peiping may attempt to
extend its own sphere of influence. China
has traditional aspirations to primacy in the
Far East, and there is evidence that the Chi-
nese Communist role in other Far Eastern
"liberation" movements has been increasing
but has not been permanently defined.
c. At present, the interests of China are for
the most part confined to the Far East; those
of the Kremlin are world-wide. Hence, the
Chinese Communists may view the accom-
plishment of Far Eastern objectives with more
urgency and impatience than do the Soviets,
who might postpone action in the Far East
because of situations elsewhere in the world.
The Chinese Communists might make de-
mands upon the USSR, or even take action,
incompatible with long-range Soviet global
interests. This is applicable to the Korean
conflict which is a potential source of friction
to the two regimes.
d. The Chinese Communist program of in-
dustrialization and military modernization in-
creasingly depends on Soviet material and
technical assistance. Frictions might arise
because of Soviet inability or disinclination to
supply capital equipment. Soviet conditions
for such supply might be offensive to Chinese
national pride.
e. We have estimated that the ultimate
objective of the Kremlin is the establishment
of a Communist world dominated from Mos-
cow. We do not believe, however, that the
leaders of Communist China would accept
complete Soviet domination of China.
Whether future leaders of China will do so is
a question; if they do not, a serious clash of
interests is certain.
24. We believe that Moscow will try to ex-
tend and intensify its control over Communist
China. However, we believe it unlikely that,
at least during the period of this estimate,
the Kremlin will be able by nonmilitary
means to achieve a degree of control over
Communist China comparable to that which
it exercises over the European Satellites. We
believe it is almost certain that the Kremlin
will not attempt to achieve such control by
military force. The military conquest of China
would be a long, difficult, and expensive proc-
ess.
25. We believe that for the period of this
estimate the factors tending to divide the
USSR and Communist China will be far out-
weighed by close ideological ties and continu-
ing mutual involvement in the pursuit of
common objectives, particularly the elimina-
tion of Western influence from the Far East.
26. Although the Peiping regime will un-
doubtedly continue to attempt to gain legal
recognition internationally, to secure For-
mosa, and to resume trade and commerce with
the West, we do not believe that the existing
Sino-Soviet solidarity can be weakened by
non-Communist concessions to Communist
China. Moreover, as we have previously esti-
mated, we believe that Western pressures
against Communist China, while weakening
her, would not disrupt Sino-Soviet solidarity
during the period of this estimate. 4
4 The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department
of State, believes that the difficult and complex
problem of the possible effect of Western actions
on Sino-Soviet solidarity requires more thorough
study than has been possible in the course of
preparing this or earlier national intelligence
estimates. He therefore reserves judgment on
the validity of paragraph twenty-six, preferring
to state simply that a significant weakening of
Sino-Soviet solidarity is unlikely during the
period of this estimate.
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ANNEX "A"
THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, ALLIANCE, AND MUTUAL
ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION
The Central People's Government of the
People's Republic of China and the Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, fully determined to pre-
vent jointly, by strengthening friendship and
cooperation between the People's Republic of
China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics, the rebirth of Japanese imperialism
and the resumption of aggression on the part
of Japan or any other state that may collab-
orate in any way with Japan in acts of aggres-
sion; imbued with the desire to consolidate
lasting peace and universal security in the Far
East and throughout the world in conformity
with the aims and principles of the United
Nations; profoundly convinced that the con-
solidation of good neighbourly relations and
friendship between the People's Republic of
China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics meets the vital interests of the peo-
ples of China and the Soviet Union, have
towards this end decided to conclude the
present treaty and have appointed as their
plenipotentiary representatives: Chou En-lai,
Premier of the Government Administration
Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs, act-
ing for the Central People's Government of
the People's Republic of China; and Andrei
Yanuarjevich Vyshinsky, Minister of Foreign
Affairs, acting for the Presidium of the Su-
preme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics. Both plenipotentiary representa-
tives upon exchanging their credentials, found
to be in good and due form, have agreed upon
the following:
Article 1
Both contracting parties undertake jointly
to adopt all necessary measures at their dis-
posal for the purpose of preventing the
resumption of aggression and violation of
peace on the part of Japan or any other state
that may collaborate with Japan directly or
indirectly in acts of aggression. In the event
of one of the contracting parties being at-
tacked by Japan or any state allied with it and
thus being involved in a state of war, the other
contracting party shall immediately render
military and other assistance by all means at
its disposal.
The contracting parties also declare their
readiness to participate in a spirit of sincere
cooperation in all international actions aimed
at ensuring peace and security throughout the
world and to contribute their full share to the
earliest implementation of these tasks.
Article 2
Both contracting parties undertake in the
spirit of mutual agreement to bring about the
earliest conclusion of the peace treaty with
Japan jointly with other powers which were
Allies during the Second World War.
Article 3
Each contracting party undertakes not to
conclude any alliance directed against the
other contracting party and not to take part
in any coalition or in any actions or measures
directed against the other contracting party.
Article 4
Both contracting parties, in the interests of
consolidating peace and universal security,
will consult with each other in regard to all
important international problems affecting
the common interests of China and the Soviet
Union.
Article 5
Each contracting party undertakes, in the
spirit of friendship and cooperation and in
conformity with the principles of equality,
mutual benefit and mutual respect for the
national sovereignty and territorial integrity
and non-interference in the internal affairs
of the other contracting party, to develop and
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consolidate economic and cultural ties be-
tween China and the Soviet Union, to render
the other all possible economic assistance and
to carry out necessary economic cooperation.
Article 6
The present treaty comes into force imme-
diately upon its ratification; the exchange of
instruments of ratification will take place in
Peking.
The present treaty will be valid for thirty
years. If neither of the contracting parties
gives notice one year before the expiration
of this term of its intention to renounce the
treaty, it shall remain in force for another five
years and will be further extended in com-
pliance with this rule.
Done in Moscow on February 14, 1950, in
two copies, each in the Chinese and Russian
languages, both texts being equally valid.
On the authorization of the Central
People's Government of the People's
Republic of China
CHOU EN-LAI
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On the authorization of the Pre-
sidium of the Supreme Soviet of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
A. Y. VYSHINSKY
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ANNEX "B"
THE AGREEMENT ON CHINESE CHANGCHUN RAILWAY, PORT ARTHUR,
AND DAIREN BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC
The Central People's Government of the
People's Republic of China and the Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics declare that since 1945,
fundamental changes have occurred in the
situation in the Far East, namely: imperial-
ist Japan has suffered defeat; the reactionary
Kuomintang Government has been over-
thrown; China became a People's Democratic
Republic; a new people's government has
been formed in China which has united the
whole of China and has carried out a policy
of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet
Union and has proved its ability to defend
the national independence and territorial in-
tegrity of China and the national honour
and dignity of the Chinese people.
The Central People's Government of the
People's Republic of China and the Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics declare that this new sit-
uation permits a new approach to the ques-
tion of the Chinese Changchun Railway, Port
Arthur, and Dairen.
In conformity with these new circumstances
the Central People's Government of the
People's Republic of China and the Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics have decided to conclude
the present agreement on the Chinese Chang-
chun Railway, Port Arthur, and Dairen:
Article 1
Both contracting parties agree that the So-
viet Government transfer without compensa-
tion to the Government of the People's Re-
public of China all its rights in the joint
administration of the Chinese Changchun
Railway with all the property belonging to
the Railway. The transfer will be effected
immediately on the conclusion of the peace
treaty with Japan, but not later than the
end of 1952.
Pending the transfer, the existing Sino-So-
viet joint administration of the Chinese
Changchun Railway shall remain unchanged.
After this engagement becomes effective, posts
(such as manager of the Railway, chairman
of the Central Board, etc.) will be periodically
alternated between representatives of China
and the U.S.S.R.
As regards concrete methods of effecting
the transfer, these will be agreed upon and
determined by the Governments of both con-
tracting parties.
Article 2
Both contracting parties agree that Soviet
troops be withdrawn from the jointly-utilized
naval base Port Arthur, and that the installa-
tions in this area be handed over to the Gov-
ernment of the People's Republic of China
immediately on the conclusion of the peace
treaty with Japan, but not later than the end
of 1952. The Government of the People's
Republic of China will compensate the Soviet
Union for expenses which it has incurred in
restoring and constructing installations since
1945.
For the period pending the withdrawal of
Soviet troops and the transfer of the above-
mentioned installations, the Governments of
China and the Soviet Union will each appoint
an equal number of military representatives
to form a joint Chinese-Soviet military com-
mission which will be alternately presided over
by each side and which will be in charge of
military affairs in the area of Port Arthur;
concrete measures in this sphere will be drawn
up by the joint Chinese-Soviet military com-
mission within three months after the present
agreement becomes effective and shall be put
into force upon approval of these measures by
the Governments of both countries.
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SECRET
The civil administration in the aforemen-
tioned area shall be under the direct authority
of the Government of the People's Republic
of China. Pending the withdrawal of Soviet
troops, the zone for billetting Soviet troops in
the area of Port Arthur will remain unaltered
in conformity with existing frontiers.
In the event of either of the contracting
parties becoming the object of aggression on
the part of Japan or any state that may
collaborate with Japan, and as a result thereof
becoming involved in hostilities, China and
the Soviet Union may, on the proposal of the
Government of the People's Republic of China
and with the agreement of the Government of
the U.S.S.R., jointly use the naval base Port
Arthur for the purpose of conducting joint
military operations against the aggressor.
Article 3
Both contracting parties agree that the
question of Dairen harbour be further consid-
ered on the conclusion of the peace treaty with
Japan. As regards the administration of
Dairen, it fully belongs to the Government of
the People's Republic of China. All the prop-
erty in Dairen now provisionally administered
by or leased to the Soviet Union, shall be taken
over by the Government of the People's Re-
public of China. To carry out the transfer of
9
the aforementioned property, the Govern-
ments of China and the Soviet Union will
appoint three representatives each to form a
joint commission which, within three months
after the present agreement comes into effect,
shall draw up concrete measures for the trans-
fer of the property; and these measures shall
be fully carried out in the course of 1950 after
their approval by the Governments of both
countries upon the proposal of the joint com-
mission.
Article 4
The present agreement comes into force
on the day of its ratification. The exchange
of instruments of ratification will take place
in Peking.
Done in Moscow on February 14, 1950, in
two copies, each in the Chinese and Russian
languages, both texts being equally valid.
On the authorization of the Central
People's Government of the People's
Republic of China
CHOU EN-LAI
SECRET
On the authorization of the Presid-
ium of the Supreme Soviet of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
A. Y. VYSHINSKY
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SECRET
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