THE SOVIET FOREIGN PROPAGANDA APPARATUS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01116R000800900003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 11, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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JLVI\L
11 January 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: The Soviet Foreign Propaganda Apparatus
Executive Registry
1. There isn't much here that I didn't know but I think it is
a useful piece of work which should be finished and published. I
would like to see it supplemented by an effort to analyze the thrust
and content of Soviet propaganda which, as the Scope Note states, is
not addressed here.
2. The Scope Note also says that a discussion of Soviet active
measures is to be the topic of a separate research paper. Where does
that stand? What will it take to do a study of the thrust and content
of Soviet propaganda? I have a note on the first paragraph on page iii.
The first paragraph of the Summary says that Soviet propaganda evokes
in foreign audiences a positive sentiment toward the Soviet Union.
That seems to overlook the companion purpose of denigrating Western values
and purposes.
3. Much of this material could and should be made broadly
available. I would be inclined to publish this piece as it is but I
would like your opinion on how much would be lost in sanitizing it.
~~T
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The Soviet Foreign Propaganda Apparatus
A Research Paper
Information available as of 9 December 1985 was used
in the preparation of this paper.
SOVA/RIG/TWAD/FAB
4E12 HDQ
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SCOPE NOTE
This paper describes the instruments and techniques of
Soviet foreign propaganda and analyzes the bureaucratic apparatus
that formulates its themes and strategies. It assesses trends in
e management and tactics of Soviet external propaganda, but
\does not analyze its content. The paper is primarily concerned
with the Soviet message openly conveyed abroad, or "white"
propaganda. The role of clandestine radiobroadcasting, KGB
activities, and front organizations are discussed, however, in
the context of the overall foreign propaganda effort. A detailed
discussion of Soviet active measures--covertly orchestrated
activities that may include but go beyond propaganda--will be the
topic of a separate research paper.
Much of the information used in this paper--particularly
that on the process of formulating propaganda campaigns--comes
from working-
level positions in the Soviet media and KGB and consequently have
good knowledge of the instruments of the foreign propaganda
effort. Their experience, however, with Central Committee
propaganda organs has been less direct and thus their reporting
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on these organs is more speculative. Open-source Soviet
publications were valuable in providing information on the reach
and scope of the Soviet propaganda organs. The United States
Information Agency (USIA), provided information on Soviet
cultural and informational activities, as well as television and
radiobroadcasting.
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Summary
The Soviet Union devotes major resources to convey Soviet
views and disseminate anti-Western propaganda to an increasingly
large and diverse audience. Moscow's primary instruments for
attacking Western initiatives and promoting Soviet policies on a
day-to-day basis are its news agencies and radio broadcasting, as
well as reporting in the foreign media. Many other activities
that serve a propaganda function--cultural activities,
scholarships, and high-level visits, for example--are used in an
effort to evoke in foreign audiences a positive sentiment toward
the Soviet Union.
TASS, the Soviet Union's official news agency, has offices
in 126 countries. Its effectiveness has been hampered by the
Soviet failure to tailor its articles for specific foreign
countries, but we have reporting that indicates that TASS is
attempting to make its copy "more readable" for its audiences by
including more human interest stories.
The USSR's "unofficial" news agency, APN (Novosti),
distributes information to at least 5,000 press and information
organs in 110 countries. In contrast to TASS, APN places
emphasis on preparing propaganda tailored for individual
countries, particularly developing countries. This effort
includes using foreign nationals, introducing a new teletype
service, and relying more on photographic materials. APN also
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conducts a grant program that brings substantial numbers of
foreign journalists and public officials to the USSR.
the program is designed to get
recipients to speak and write favorably about their trip and the
Soviet Union upon their return. In 1983, the program had 2,000
recipients from around the world.
positions to the Soviet intelligence services.
that at least one-third of TASS personnel are staff
employees of the KGB or GRU, and some reporting indicates that
the number is even higher for APN.
The Soviets have the capacity to reach virtually every
corner of the globe with their radiobroadcasts. For the past 20
years the Soviets have gradually been increasing their
radiobroadcasts, and by the end of 1984 they were broadcasting
for 2,167 hours per week in over 80 languages. In addition to
their overt broadcasts, the Soviets run two "unofficial"
stations, which purport not to be run by the Soviet government,
and at least four clandestine radio stations that support pro-
Soviet views.
The Soviets have a number of outlets for their television
broadcasts but, for the near term, Soviet television is unlikely
to have a major propaganda impact. All direct broadcasts are
aimed primarily at the domestic audience and are conducted in
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Russian. They can be picked up outside the USSR, but not without
special, expensive, receiving equipment. The Soviets do,
however, place television programs abroad through official
agreements and by various Soviet representatives abroad providing
television materials, usually at low or no cost, to commercial
outlets.
The Soviet Union carries out an extensive cultural exchange
program worldwide. According to one Soviet official, as of this
year the USSR has intergovernmental agreements or formal programs
with 120 countries. For the Soviets, "cultural relations" is a
broad term that includes such activities as science, education,
literature, music, sports, and tourism. The breadth and
diversity of their cultural activities enable the Soviets to
appeal to a wide variety of foreign audiences. The Soviets also
provide numerous foreign scholarships, particularly to students
from the developing countries. In December 1984 over 57,000
students from less developed countries were studying in the
USSR.
International Communist front organizations, although only
covertly associated with the Soviet Union, are an integral part
of the foreign propaganda effort because they strive to rally
world opinion around Soviet causes. Among their numerous
activities, many of which get wide media coverage, are meetings,
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rallies, conferences, and demonstrations. Additionally, each of
the thirteen major front organizations issues a regular
publication as well as ad hoc writings which tout the Soviet
line.
The propaganda management apparatus is a large, highly
centralized organization. Propaganda policy is decided by
basically the same authorities that approve Soviet foreign
policy--the Politburo, with inputs from the CPSU International
Department and other party and government bodies. The
coordination of the propaganda effort with the Soviet media
organs is largely the job of the CPSU International Information
Department (IID), headed by Leonid Zamyatin. This centralization
of propaganda policy-making in basically the same organizations
that create Soviet foreign policy ensures that propaganda
supports policy and that propaganda can be flexible and changed
when policy may demand it.
We have no objective means for measuring the overall
effectiveness of Soviet propaganda in influencing public thinking
and policies abroad, but the huge investment the Soviet Union has
made in its propaganda effort--in radio broadcasting, news
agencies, publications, and cultural and information activities--
attests to Moscow's high regard for propaganda instruments as
political tools.
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In spite of this massive effort, Soviet leaders have
continually voiced concern about the quality and timeliness of
their foreign propaganda. Gorbachev is taking a more activist
role in the foreign propaganda area and has ordered changes that,
if implemented, will certainly increase the size of the effort,
and are also designed to improve its credibility, sophistication,
and timeliness.
The lack of credibility of their news and information is the
most serious problem for the Soviets. One of the ways that they
combat it is through repetition: they present their propaganda
on a particular theme through a number of outlets, both overt and
covert, hoping that each will add to the credibility of the other
to produce a convincing story. They also use the foreign media
as a vehicle for their propaganda, hoping that, by doing so,
their ideas will gain the Western media's credibility. Soviet
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commentators, particularly since Gorbachev became General
Secretary, have been appearing regularly on the foreign media to
present the Soviet version of issues and events.
Timeliness is also a problem that, on major issues, will not
be resolved easily by the Soviets. Various incidents have shown
that the propaganda effort breaks down quickly when instructions
from the top are not forthcoming or when bureaucratic equities
are conflicting. Close party controls and inflexible
bureaucratic procedures also contribute to inertia and delays--
delays that, as Soviet leaders have acknowledged, mean that their
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interpretation of events will not be the first one heard by
foreign audiences, thus reducing its impact. The presence of a
strong leader may reduce some of those delays. Additionally,
there have been rumors that Gorbachev plans to reorganize the
propaganda apparatus--apparently attempting to streamline the
process--most of which center around the IID being merged with
other Central Committee Departments. Even a reorganization of
the apparatus, though, unlikely to resolve the conflicting
bureaucratic interests that have caused problems in the past on
issues of major importance.
The Soviets are currently undertaking a "massive new effort"
to educate people around the world about Soviet proposals and
policies because they feel that their ideas are not being heard,
according to Other evidence also suggests
that they will be increasing their propaganda effort in the
future. According to the following
propaganda developments are likely:
--Soviet radio and television will be emphasized more in future
propaganda endeavors.
--The Soviets will introduce additional clandestine radio
stations targeted at Western Europe in the near future.
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--The Soviets will improve the supply of their publications--
books in particular. Most of this increase will probably go to
developing countries.
--The Soviets will double the equipment budget of propaganda
agencies for the purchase of more sophisticated computers, radio,
television, and other audiovisual equipment.
--The Soviets will attempt to differentiate their propaganda for
individual countries more in the future.
In addition, we believe that TASS and APN will almost
certainly continue to increase the number of subscribers to their
services, offering them at low or no cost, and that Soviet
commentators will increase their use of the foreign media as a
propaganda outlet.
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