SOVIET FORCES AND CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CONFLICT THROUGH THE MID-1990S

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00155R000400070002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 1, 1986
• Content Type: NIE

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Soviet Forces and Capabilities for
Strategic Nuclear Conflict
Through the Mid-1990s
National Intelligence Estimate
Key Judgments and Executive Summary
NIE l I -3/8-86/S
Apri! 1986
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NIE 11-3/8-86/S
SOVIET FORCES AND CAPABILITIES FOR
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CONFLICT
THROUGH THE MID-1990s
KEY JUDGMENTS
AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Information available as of 24 April 1986 was used in
the preparation of this Estimate.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
By the mid-1990s, nearly all of the Soviets' currently deployed
intercontinental nuclear attack forces-land- and sea-based ballistic
missiles and heavy bombers-will be replaced by new and improved
systems. Most of these are already in production or in flight-testing.
Improved Soviet heavy ICBMs will increase the already formidable
Soviet counterforce capabilities; mobile ICBMs and quieter SSBNs with
long-range missiles will enhance force survivability and endurance; new
bombers and cruise missiles will add diversity to the aerodynamic
threat. An increasing proportion of Soviet intercontinental attack
warheads will be deployed on SSBNs and mobile ICBMs, with a lower
proportion in fixed silos. The number of deployed intercontinental
nuclear warheads will increase by a couple of thousand by 1990, with
the potential for greater expansion in the 1990s. We are especially
concerned about the Soviets' longstanding commitment to strategic
defense, including their extensive program to protect the leadership,
their potential to deploy widespread defenses against ballistic missiles,
and their extensive efforts in directed-energy weapons technologies,
particularly high-energy lasers. The vigorous Soviet effort in strategic
force research, development, and deployment is not new, but is the
result of an unswerving commitment for the past two decades to build
up and improve strategic capabilities.
The Soviets do not endorse mutual vulnerability-nor, for that
matter, mutual survivability-as a desirable basis for establishing or
preserving strategic stability. The USSR, no less than the United States,
appreciates the tremendous destruction a strategic nuclear war would
entail and thus strongly seeks to avoid such a conflict. The Soviets want
to deter their adversaries from attacking the USSR, and from interfering
with Soviet political and military initiatives. They are convinced that
the best means to do this, and to provide for the contingency that
strategic nuclear conflict could nevertheless occur, is to build forces that
offer the greatest prospect of limiting damage to their society and
prevailing over their adversaries in a nuclear war. The Soviets have
persistently tried to alter the strategic balance in their favor.
The Soviets' appreciation of the persistent risk of all-out nuclear
war sustains a commitment to meet requirements for effectively
fighting it. They take a sober view of their prospective adversaries'
capabilities and programs, but do not simply try to tailor their programs
closely to specific future threats that may be variable and uncertain.
They seek to deploy, as technology and resources permit, a wide array
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of systems to meet broad, standing requirements that they deem
militarily prudent for the complex task of waging nuclear var. Thus, in
the past decade they have expended much effort to improve the
countermilitary capabilities of their offensive forces, especially ballistic
missiles, and the survivability and endurance of their forces, leadership,
and command and control.
We believe the Soviets are determined to increase their strength
relative to the United States or, at a minimum, to prevent any
significant erosion of the military gains the USSR has made over the
past decade. They recognize that new US strategic systems being
deployed or under development will increase the vulnerability of their
silo-based ICBM force, complicate their antisubmarine warfare (ASW)
efforts, and present their air defense forces with increasingly complex
problems. By their actions and propaganda, the Soviets have demon-
strated that they are very concerned about the US Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI). Soviet leaders view arms control policy as an important
factor in preserving past strategic gains and achieving further strategic
advantages. They will try to use the arms control arena as a means of
delaying or undercutting the US SDI program and slowing other US
programs
We have considered the question of whether their economic and
technological difficulties may force the Soviets to slacken their strategic
force efforts and reduce their long-term competitiveness in this field.
Despite serious economic problems since the mid-1970s, the Soviets
have continued to procure large quantities of new strategic weapons.
Strategic forces, more than any other single element of power, are the
foundation of Soviet superpower status. While the Soviets are attempt-
ing a maior restructuring of their industrial production capability, we
do not believe that economic considerations alone would lead them to
abandon maior strategic weapon programs, to forsake force moderniza-
tion goals, or to make substantial concessions in arms control.
The evidence shows clearly that Soviet leaders are preparing their
military forces for the possibility that they will actually have to fight a
nuclear war. We fudge that the Soviets would plan to conduct a military
campaign that would seek to end a nuclear war on their terms-by
neutralizing the ability of US intercontinental and theater nuclear
forces to interfere with Soviet capabilities to defeat adversary forces in
Eurasia and dominate that area, while preserving the ability of the
Soviet state to survive and recover
The Soviets place demanding requirements on the capabilities of
their strategic forces to wage war effectively. They are likely to rate
their capabilities as lower in some areas than we would assess them to
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be, and they are probably pessimistic about the implications of ongoing
US strategic modernization programs. For example, significant im-
provements in US strategic offensive forces and in command, control,
and communications capabilities will occur over the next 10 years, and
sizable US, as well as Soviet, forces would survive large-scale nuclear
strikes. Although we do not have specific evidence on how the Soviets
assess their prospects in a global nuclear conflict, we fudge that they
would not have high confidence in the capability of their strategic
offensive and defensive forces to accomplish their wartime missions,
particularly limiting the extent of damage to the Soviet homeland
The Soviets' lack of high confidence and their appreciation of the
destructiveness inherent in nuclear conflict would probably inhibit
them in peacetime from deliberately risking a direct clash with the
United States or its NATO Allies. Avoiding further escalation, however,
would not be their sole concern, should they get involved in a maior
conventional war with the United States and its Allies. In these
circumstances-where they would expect the risks of nuclear war to be
high-the Soviets would also consider that, by failing to seize the
initiative should all-out nuclear war appear imminent and unavoidable,
the USSR could suffer both greater damage and a reduction in its
chances for eventual combat success. The likelihood of the Soviets'
initiation of nuclear strikes would increase if they Buff ered a maior
strategic reversal on the battlefield. If they possessed convincing
evidence that NATO or the United States was about to launch alarge-
scale nuclear strike, they would attempt to preempt. For reasons such as
lack of convincing evidence, they might not mount a preemptive attack.
They are improving their capabilities for riding out an attack and
retaliating, and they have the capability to launch forces quickly, upon
receipt of warning that an ICBM attack is under way.
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MAJOR CHANGES IN THIS YEAR'S ESTIMATE
There have been a number of new developments and some changes
in our assessments since the last Estimate. Major highlights f ollow:
- Deployment of the road-mobile SS-25 ICBM began in 1985.
additional Delta- and
Typhoon-type ballistic missile submarines are under construc-
tion. Some will carry follow-on missile systems
- Deployment of the SS-20 has leveled off.
- A new silo-based heavy ICBM, to replace the SS-18, with
improved capabilities against hardened targets, is beginning its
flight test program
- There are new insights into potential constraints on the number
of Soviet nuclear warheads,
- This year our projection of the force levels the Soviets could
achieve in the absence of arms control is a few thousand
warheads lower than last year's, reflecting further analysis of
Soviet requirements, programs, production capabilities, and
nuclear materials constraint
We have reexamined our estimates of the likelihood that the
Soviets would conduct a widespread ABM deployment begin-
ning in the 1980s and we now conclude it is unlikely that they
will.
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- We now estimate that over the past 35 years the Soviets have
been constructing an enormous system of deep underground
facilities beneath the Moscow urban area, interconnected by
subway system
a_nd ~L_ least so
me exurban relocation facilities
- We have some new insights into the Soviets' views of their
capabilities and the problems they would face in a nuclear
conflict
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Strategic Offensive Forces
1. All elements of Soviet strategic offensive forces
will be extensively modernized by the mid-1990s.
While the Soviets will continue to rely on fixed, silo-
based ICBMs, mobile ICBMs will be deployed in large
numbers (see figure 1), and maior improvements will
be made to the sea-based and bomber forces. The
maior changes in the force will include:
- An improved capability against hardened targets
through further improvements to the heavy
ICBM force.
-Significantly better survivability from improve-
ments in the submarine-launched ballistic missile
(SLBM) force-through quieter submarines and
longer range missiles-and deployment of mo-
bile ICBMs. Mobile ICBMs will also improve the
Soviets' capabilities to use reserve missiles for
reload and refire.
- An increase in the number of deliverable war-
heads for the bomber force and in its diversity, as
a result of the deployment of new bombers with
long-range, land-attack cruise missiles.
- Deployment of a variety of new long-range,
land-attack cruise missiles.
2. The ICBM force, as shown in figure 2, will have
been almost entirely replaced with new systems by the
mid-1990s:
o I We expect SS-X-24-class
ICBMs equipped with 10 multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) to replace
the MIRVed SS-17 and SS-19 silo-based ICBMs,
- Within the last year, the Soviets deployed
500 launchers by the early 1990s. A follow-on,
which we fudge will have single- and three-RV
payload options, will probably be flight-tested in
1987. Soviet commitment to mobile ICBMs rep-
resents amaior resource decision; such systems
require substantially more support infrastructure
than do silo-based systems, and thus are much
more costly to operate and maintain.
The Soviets have retired older silo-based single-
RV SS-lls as they have deployed the single-RV
road-mobile SS-25.
A new silo-based heavy ICBM, to replace the
SS-18, with improved capabilities against hard-
ened targets, is beginning its flight test program.
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Figure 1
Soviet Intercontinental Attack Forces,
Warhead Mix
and 1990; and a new missile in the SS-N-23 class
will probably be tested later in the 1980s.
- With long-range missiles, Typhoon and Delta
SSBNs can operate under the Arctic ice or close
to Soviet shores, where the Soviet Navy can
better protect them. Soviet capabilities for more
extensive operations in the Arctic are increasing.
Heavy Bombers
4. The Soviet heavy bomber force is undergoing its
first major modernization since the 1960s; by the mid-
1990s, as shown in figure 4, most of the older bombers
will have been replaced. The heavy bomber force will
have a somewhat greater role in intercontinental
attack and greater diversity will have been added:
- Production continues for Bear H aircraft and
AS-15 air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs).
- We project the Blackjack will be operational in
1988, carrying both ALCMs and bombs. This
aircraft will soon enter serial production.
Size of Intercontinental Attack Forces
5. The projected growth in the number of deployed
warheads on Soviet intercontinental attack forces is
shown in figure 5, page 12:
- The force currently consists of about 10,000
warheads on some 2,500 deployed ballistic mis-
sile launchers and heavy bombers. Most war-
heads are in the ICBM force.
- Warheads are increasing. Systems now being
deployed-new Typhoon and Delta-IV subma-
rines, Bear H bombers, and, soon, SS-X-24
ICBMs-carry many more warheads than the
systems they are replacing.
- Force diversity is increasing. A growing propor-
tion of Soviet intercontinental attack warheads
will be deployed on SSBNs and mobile ICBMs,
with a lower proportion in fixed silos.
- If the Soviets continue to have about 2,500 ballis-
tic missile launchers and heavy bombers and
remain within the quantitative sublimity of SALT
II, by 1990 the deployed warheads will grow to
about 12,000; by 1995 probably over 14,000.
-While in the absence of an arms control process,
the Soviets would not necessarily expand their
intercontinental attack forces beyond these
SALT II figures, they clearly have the capability
for significant further expansion, to between
16,000 and 19,000 deployed warheads by 1995.
The projection is lower by a few thousand war-
heads than last year's, and reflects further analy-
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Figure 2
Modernization of Soviet ICBMs
SS-17,
SS-19
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New heavy
ICBM
New heavy
ICBM
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Figure 3
Modernization of Soviet SLBMs
Typhoon
Delta-I,
Delta-Q
New
Delta type
Delta-I,
Delta-II
Delta-IV
Note: Color change for Delta-III and Typhoon in the mid-1990s
indicates new missiles deployed in existing submarine classes.
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New
Delta type
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Figure 4
Modernization of Soviet Heavy Bombers
Heavy Bombers
Older
Bears
Weapons
1986 Mid-1990s
Bison Older Bears
Older
Bears
Bear H
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Figure 5
Projected Total Number of ?eployed Soviet
Warheads--CBN-s, SLBIVIs, and --leavy Bombers
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Expanded
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we assess that the
Soviets have deployed, and will continue to deploy,
some missiles with more reentry vehicles (RVs) than
the maximum number released in flight tests, and
even more than the total of RVs actually released plus
those simulated. With computer modeling and the
experience of many years of flight-testing, in many
cases it is no longer necessary for the Soviets to test a
ballistic missile with the full complement of RVs for
m~USSTART
~`~Accountable
Soviet START
iiiiiliiiili
0 1985 87 89 91 93 95
which it was designed.
heads actually deployed could be significantly greater
sis of Soviet requirements, programs, production
capabilities, and nuclear materials constraints.
Although we have significant uncertainties about
the numbers and characteristics of Soviet nuclear
warheads, our nearly completed analysis of the
Soviet nuclear weapons materials industry indi-
cates that 19,000 such warheads by 1995 is about
the maximum number achievable using the exist-
ing military production facilities. Some increase
in the number of weapons beyond that figure is
possible, primarily as a result of some reductions
in projected tactical nuclear weapons or supple-
mental production of nuclear materials from
other than existing military production facilities.
- Both the US and Soviet proposals at the strategic
arms reduction talks (START) would result in a
significant reduction from .the current force size
'and have a major effect on the current and
'planhesd programs. These proposals, however,
differ in major 'ways. We judge that the Soviets
would be slow to drastically reduce the number
of their heavy ICBMs, given the importance they
attach to them and the unique counterforce
capabilities of these weapons. Any willingness to
make such reductions would depend on major US
concessions, including concessions on the Strate-
gic Defense Initiative (SDI), and a lar a reduc-
lion in US silo-based ICBMs.
7. An alternative view believes it unlikely that the
Soviets would risk uncertainties of performance in
deploying a missile with more RVs than had been
released plus simulated in flight tests. Another alterna-
tive view holds that the Soviets would not deploy a
missile system with more RVs than the maximum
number released in flight-testing because they would
not have'operational confidence-particularly vital for
their strategic nuclear forces-in such a configuration;
in this view, the evidence suggests that the Soviets
have not done this.
8. The Soviets will face important decisions in' the
next few years as they proceed with flight-testing for
ballistic missiles scheduled for deployment beginning
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Specifically, they
will have to decide whether to test new ICBMs and
SLBMs in such a way as to conform, or appear close to
conforming, with limitations on characteristics and
improvements from the unratified SALT [I Treaty.
They appear to have technical options for some of
their ,new systems that will allow them to go either
way
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Cruise Missiles
9. Over the next 10 years, we expect the Soviets to
deploy large numbers of nuclear-armed ALCMs, sea-
]aunched cruise missiles (SLCMs), and ground-
launched cruise missiles (GLCMs); some of these will
be supersonic. The deployment of cruise missiles
provides the Soviets with new multidirectional, low-
and high-altitude capabilities against US and Allied
targets. Estimated numbers are highly uncertain, but
a new mobile version, are deploying new aircraft
with much better capabilities against low-flying
targets, and will begin deploying the Mainstay
airborne warning and control system (AWACS)
aircraft during 1986.
The mobile SA-X-12 system, to be deployed in the
next few years, can engage conventional aircraft,
cruise missiles, and tactical ballistic missiles.
we proiect an aggregate total of about 2,000 to 3,000.
SS-20s
10. In the absence of negotiated reductions, we
expect the number of deployed SS-20-class missiles to
change only slightly, if at all, from the current level.
Strategic Defensive Forces
11. The Soviets will significantly improve the capa-
bilities of their active and passive strategic defenses
over the next 10 years, as a number of new types of
weapons are introduced and many of the older systems
retired. Significant developments in active strategic
defenses include the following:
-The new Moscow antiballistic missile (ABM) de-
fenses, which will be fully operational in 1988,
will have 100 silo-based interceptors, providing
an improved intercept capability against small-
scale attacks on key targets around Moscow.
-The new large phased-array radar network,
when fully operational at the end of the decade,
will provide a much improved capability for
ballistic missile early warning, attack assessment,
and accurate target tracking. These radars will be
technically capable of providing battle mana~e-
ment support to a widespread ABM system,
- Deployment of new low-altitude-capable strate-
gic air defense systems will increase. The Soviets
are continuing to deploy the SA-10 all-altitude
surface-to-air missile (SAM), have begun fielding
bring to the forefront the problem that improving
technology is blurring the distinction between air
defense and ABM systems. This problem will be
further complicated as newer, more complex air
defense missile systems are developed. ~
12. The Soviets are developing all the maior compo-
nents for an ABM system that could be used for
widespread ABM defenses well in excess of ABM
Treaty limits. The system consists of radars, an above-
ground launcher, and the Gazelle missile that will be
deployed at Moscow. The potential exists for the
production lines associated with the upgrade of the
Moscow ABM system to be used to support a wide-
spread deployment. We fudge the Soviets are capable
of undertaking rapidly paced ABM deployments to
strengthen the defenses at Moscow and cover key
targets in the western USSR, and to extend protection
to key targets east of the Urals by the late 1980s or
early 1990s, assuming they have already begun mak-
13. We have reexamined our estimates of the likeli-
hood that the Soviets would conduct such a wide-
spread ABM deployment beginning in the 1980s, and
we now conclude that it is unlikely that they will.
(Roughly a 10-percent chance, as compared .vith a
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previously estimated 10- to 30-percent chance.) The
Soviets probably perceive the near-term military bene-
fits as outweighed by the long-term implications of US
and Allied responses, particularly the prospects of a
unified commitment to SDI. If the Soviets choose to
deploy a widespread ABM system, we fudge it is more
likely that they will deploy, beginning in the early-to-
middle 1990s, defenses based on a new generation of
ABM equipment, than that they will soon begin to
deploy defenses based on their current equipment. An
alternative view holds that the probability of Soviet
abrogation may be understated. According to this
view, Soviet doctrinal requirements for damage-limit-
ing capability have always provided a motivation to
deploy ABMs both at Moscow and elsewhere. This
view also holds that the likelihood of deployment is
not contingent on the development of a new ABM
system
pursue vigorously all ASW technologies as potential
solutions to the problems of countering US SSBNs and
defending their own SSBNs against US attack subma-
rines. They have an energetic effort to develop a
capability to remotely sense submarine-generated ef-
15. We do not believe there is a realistic possibility
that the Soviets will be able to deploy in the 1990s a
system that could reliably monitor US SSBNs operat-
ing in the open ocean. There is aloes-to-moderate
probability that the Soviets could deploy in the mid-
1990s an ASW remote detection system that would
operate with some effectiveness if enemy nuclear-
powered attack submarines (SSNs) approached ASW
barriers near Soviet SSBN bastions.
Directed-Energy Weapons
would cost roughly
$1 billion per year if carried out in the United
States.
- There is a large Soviet program to develop
ground-based laser weapons for terminal defense
against reentry vehicles.
tional system could not be deployed until many
years later, probably not until after the year
2000, although a few such systems could conceiv-
ably be operationa] in the 1990s.
The Soviets appear to be developing two high-
energy laser weapons with potential strategic air
defense applications-ground-based and naval
point defense.
The Soviets are continuing to develop an air-
borne laser.
Soviet research includes a proiect to develop
high-energy laser weapons for use in space. We
estimate there is an even chance that a prototype
high-energy, space-based laser ASAT weapon
will be tested in low orbit in the early 1990s.
Even if testing were successful, such a system
probably could not be operational before the
Zooo.
17. The Soviets are also conducting research under
military sponsorship for the purpose of acquiring the
ability to develop particle beam weapons (PBWs), but
the size and scope of this effort are unknown. We
believe the Soviets will eventually attempt to build a
space-based PBW, but we estimate there is only a low
probability they will test a prototype before the year
18.
program to develop radiofrequency (RF) weapons to
destroy the electronics of a target. The Soviets are
strong in the appropriate technologies, however, and
we fudge they are capable of developing a prototype
RF weapon system.
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Resources and Arms Control
20. While the Soviets are attempting a major re-
structuring of their industrial production capability,
we do not believe that economic considerations alone
would lead them to abandon major strategic weapon
programs, to forsake force modernization goals, or to
make substantial concessions in arms control. In recent
years they made major resource commitments to
emerging new systems, particularly costly mobile mis-
sile systems. Soviet force decisions and arms control
decisions are likely to continue to be driven primarily
by calculations of political-strategic benefits and the
dynamism of weapons technology. We believe, how-
ever, that, as a result of the stark economic realities,
decisions involving the rate of strategic force modern-
ization probably will be influenced by economic fac-
tors more now than in the past and some deployment
programs could be stretched out. Major new initiatives
would involve difficult trade-offs; in particular, if the
Soviets decided to expand their ABM defenses far
beyond the 100-launcher treaty limit, they might be
compelled to alter some of their other nonstrategic
military modernization efforts, or to stretch out the
ABM deployments somewhat. We fudge, however,
that strategic forces will continue to command the
highest resource priorities and therefore would be
affected less by economic problems than any other
element of the Soviet military, although there are
indications of an increased Soviet emphasis on conven-
tional forces, using more advanced technology.
21. Soviet leaders view arms control policy as an
important factor in preserving past strategic gains and
achieving further strategic advantages. Moscow has
long believed that arms control must first and foremost
protect the capabilities of Soviet military forces rela-
tive to their opponents. The Soviets seek to limit US
force modernization through both the arms control
process and any resulting agreements. They will try to
use the arms control arena as a means of slowing
various US strategic programs and delaying or under-
cutting the US SDI program. In their view, SDI could
force them to redirect their offensive ballistic missile
development programs to reduce vulnerabilities and
could stimulate a costly, open-ended high-technology
competition in which, they apparently believe, the
United States could outpace their own ongoing efforts.
Soviet Scenarios for Nuclear War
22. Soviet military planning is guided by funda-
mental wartime objectives: to decisively defeat enemy
conventional and nuclear forces, occupy enemy terri-
tory in the theater, and defend the homeland against
enemy attack. To meet these objectives, the Soviets
train their forces for a global nuclear conflict. This
training has diversified in scope and become increas-
ingly complex in the operational factors with which it
deals
23. The Soviets apparently believe that a major
nuclear conflict, if it occurred, would be likely to arise
out of aNATO-Warsaw Pact conventional conflict
preceded by a political crisis period that could last
several weeks or longer. They perceive a conventional
phase as lasting from a few days to as long as several
weeks. The Soviets see little likelihood that the United
States would initiate a surprise nuclear attack from a
normal peacetime posture; we fudge it is unlikely that
they would mount such an attack themselves. Their
key objectives in the conventional phase would be to
weaken the enemy's theater-based and sea-based nu-
clear forces with attacks by conventional weapons,
while protecting their own nuclear forces. We esti-
mate there is a high likelihood that the Soviets would
attempt to interfere with selected US space systems
that provide important wartime support, using both
destructive and nondestructive means. (However, the
Soviets' growing reliance on space assets for the con-
duct of military operations is likely to pose a dilemma
if better US antisatellite capabilities emerge.) They
believe elements of their strategic forces would suffer
losses during conventional conflict
24. The Soviets are unlikely to initiate nuclear use
in a theater conflict unless they perceived that NATO
was about to use nuclear weapons, because they would
probably see it as being to their advantage instead to
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keep the conflict at the conventional level. The Soviets
would probably see an initial localized use of nuclear
weapons as still leaving an opportunity to avoid large-
scale nuclear war. However, once large-scale use of
nuclear weapons in the theater occurred, imminent
Soviet escalation to intercontinental nuclear war
would be likely.
25. As the likelihood of large-scale nuclear conflict
increased, Soviet leaders would face the difficult
decision of whether to seize the initiative and strike, as
would be consistent with their general military doc-
trine, or to be more cautious in the hope of averting
large-scale nuclear strikes on the Soviet homeland.
There are no easy prescriptions for what the Soviets
would actually do under a particular set of circum-
stances, despite the apparent doctrinal imperative to
mount large-scale preemptive nuclear attacks.
26. In intercontinental strikes the Soviets would
seek to neutralize US and Allied military operations
and capabilities-to destroy US-based nuclear forces,
to disrupt and destroy the supporting infrastructure
and control systems for these forces as well as the
I~Tational Command Authority, and to attempt to
isolate the United States from the theater campaign by
attacking its power projection capabilities. They prob-
ably would also attempt to reduce US military power
in the long term by attacking other nonnuclear forces,
US military-industrial capacity, and governmental
control facilities, although the extent of the attack on
these targets in the initial strikes could vary, depend-
ing on the circumstances. It is highly unlikely that the
Soviets would limit initial intercontinental strikes only
to a "decapitation" attack against command, control,
and communications targets, or only to a portion of US
strategic forces, such as ICBM silos
27. The Soviets, following the initial large-scale
nuclear strikes, plan to reconstitute some surviving
general purpose and strategic forces and to occupy
substantial areas of Western Europe, while neutraliz-
ing the ability of US and Allied nuclear forces to
interfere with these objectives. The Soviets would
clearly prefer to accomplish their objectives quickly,
but recognize that the later phases could be protracted,
given the size and power of the contending coalitions,
as well as the difficulty and complexity of conducting
operations following large-scale nuclear strikes. They
prepare for combat operations that could extend
weeks beyond an initial nuclear phase
28. As force modernization proceeds, the Soviets
will continue to rely primarily on silo-based ICBMs for
use in initial strikes, while withholding many of their
SLBMs and presumably most of their dispersed mobile
ICBMs for subsequent strikes during later phases of
nuclear conflict. They also would attempt to reload
and refire some ICBMs, many SS-20s, and probably
some SLBMs, using reserve missiles and equipment.
Taking into account the problems the Soviets are likely
to face in a postattack environment and the apparently
limited extent of preparations they have undertaken to
cope with these difficulties, we estimate they probably
would be able to reload and refire from silos over a
period of weeks or months only a small portion of the
reserve ICBMs they maintain in peacetime. The de-
ployment of mobile ICBMs will lead to improved
capabilities for ICBM reload
29. There is an alternative view that the main text
overstates the difficulties the Soviets would have in
reconstituting their current silo-based ICBM force in
nuclear conflict, given the extensive preparations this
view holds they have made, and that consequently
they would be able to refire a large portion of their
reserve ICBMs. According to another alternative view,
the Soviets do not include ICBM, SLBM, and
SS-20 reload and refire in their war plans. However,
the Soviets probably would, in this view, attempt to
reload a few launchers on a contingency basis, if any
reserve missiles not required to maintain the online
force were available. According to this view, a Soviet
requirement for additional warheads would be better
met by deployment of additional missiles on launch-
ers. Furthermore, in this view, it is by no means clear
that reload and refire operations during nuclear war
would be less problematic for mobile launchers than
for silos.
Capabilities of Strategic Forces
30. The Soviets have enough hard-target-capable
ICBM RVs today to attack all US missile silos and
launch control centers with at least two warheads
each.
The projected
accuracy improvements for the new heavy ICBM we
expect the Soviets to deploy in the late 1980s would
result in a substantial increase in damage capability,
with a best estimate around 85 to 90 percent. Our
analysis suggests that the Soviets, although they have
views different from those of the United States about
the pertinent nuclear effects and best attack modes
against silos, probably have a similar perception of
their effectiveness in attacking a Minuteman silo.
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will not be able to reliably target and destroy patroling
US SSBNs, alert aircraft, aircraft in flight, or dispersed
land-mobile missiles, particularly those beyond the
range of tactical reconnaissance systems. We believe
that, in a crisis or conflict, the Soviets would credit
undegraded US warning and control systems with the
ability to launch ICBMs on tactical warning.
32. Dispersed Soviet mobile missiles, many SSBNs
patrolling in waters near the USSR, and a large part of
the silo-based ICBM force would survive an attack by
current US forces. The Soviets, however, probably
perceive their ICBM silos to be somewhat more
vulnerable to a US attack than we would assess, given
their differing views of nuclear effects and likely
attack modes, although we have considerable uncer-
tainty in replicating the Soviet assessment. With the
increasing vulnerability of Soviet ICBM silos during
the period of this Estimate if more accurate US
missiles are deployed, the Soviets will be faced with
more difficult problems in assuring adequate retalia-
tory capabilities in their critical planning scenario in
which they are struck first. The Soviets will continue
to rely on silo-based ICBMs for the bulk of their
preemptive attack capabilities. We have seen no evi-
dence of a program to significantly increase the
hardness of their missile silos; our analysis suggests the
Soviets are unlikely to see much advantage in super-
hardening. They will increasingly depend on their
mobile ICBM and SLBM forces for their retaliatory
capabilities. We also fudge that the Soviets can launch
ICBMs on tactical warning, assuming their warning
and command and control systems were undegraded.
34. Because of recent analysis, we have a somewhat
different picture of Soviet leadership protection than
was shown in last year's Estimate. We now estimate
the total number of exurban facilities supporting the
Soviet wartime leadership to be over 1,000, somewhat
lower than last year's figure. Of this number, we assess
about 300 as being vital to supporting Soviet w~ar-
fiahtinu ooerations:l
35. The Soviets' commitment to their deep under-
ground program is greater than we previously estimat-
ed. We now have a better understanding of the fact
that, over the last 35 years, they have constructed an
enormous system of deep underground facilities, per-
haps several hundred meters beneath the Moscow
urban area, interconnected both by the public metro
system and dedicated VIP metro lines leading tom
de n r s,
Access tot e
Moscow underground complex is available from each
of the maior state and party institutional headquarters,
including the Kremlin, KGB Headquarters, and the
facilities of the Central Committee. Similar subway-
related deep underground facilities have been con-
firmed in Leningrad, Kiev, and Baku,
lics.
36. Sufficient warning to implement relocation
plans would allow survival of a large percentage of the
Soviet leadership, mostly at lower territorial levels.
However, the Soviet wartime management system
would be seriously disrupted, with maior degradation
or denial of many national-level leadership functions
associated with the Moscow area. Damage would also
be pronounced at the intermediate level, affecting
military districts (and regional military high com-
mands) as well as the leadership of the Soviet repub-
37. Any iudgment about the overall effectiveness of
the future Soviet air defenses against an attack by
bombers and cruise missiles is subiect to considerable
uncertainty. Penetration of improved Soviet air de-
fenses by currently deployed bombers would be more
difficult. These defenses, however, would be consider-
ably less effective against US cruise missiles and future
bombers. Our iudgment is that, against a combined
attack of penetrating bombers, short-range attack mis-
siles (SRAMs), and cruise missiles, Soviet air defenses
during the next 10 years probably would not be
capable of inflicting sufficient losses to prevent consid-
erable penetration of Soviet air defenses. These judg-
ments, however, are highly dependent on the ~effec-
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tiveness of US electronic countermeasures and the
penetration altitudes of US bombers and cruise mis-
five advantages may also be very different from our
own:
siles.
38. There is an alternative view that this Estimate
substantially understates the capability of the Soviet
air defense system to defend key target areas against
low-altitude penetrators. The holder of this view be-
lieves that the effectiveness in such areas would be
significantly higher against a combined attack of
penetrating bombers, SRAMs, and cruise missiles than
the Estimate suggests.
39. While significant improvements in the capabili-
ties of both Soviet and US strategic offensive forces
will occur throughout the next 10 years, sizable forces
on both sides would survive large-scale nuclear strikes.
It seems highly likely that the Soviets could maintain
overall continuity of command and control, although
it would probably be degraded. The Soviets could
experience difficulty in maintaining endurance and
effectiveness for weeks of continuing operations, par-
ticularly if subjected to US strikes. Soviet long-range
reconnaissance capabilities could be particularly af-
fected. We believe the Soviets would launch continu-
ing attacks on US and Allied strategic command,
control, and communications to prevent or impair the
coordination of retaliatory strikes, thereby easing the
burden on Soviet strategic defenses, and impairing US
and Allied abilities to marshal military and civilian
resources to reconstitute forces.
Concluding Observations
40. The evidence shows clearly that Soviet leaders
are preparing their military forces for the possibility
that they will actually have to fight a nuclear war.
They have seriously addressed many of the problems
of conducting military operations in a nuclear war,
and are training for increasingly complex conflict
situations, thereby improving their ability to deal with
the many contingencies of such a conflict. We judge
that the Soviets would plan to conduct a military
campaign that would seek to end a nuclear war on
their terms-by neutralizing the ability of US inter-
continental and theater nuclear forces to interfere
with Soviet capabilities to defeat adversary forces in
Eurasia and dominate that area, while preserving the
ability of the Soviet state to survive and recover. We
do not have specific evidence on how the Soviets
would assess their prospects for prevailing in a global
nuclear conflict, but, because their perspective is
different from ours, their conclusions as to compara-
- Their persistence in enhancing their strategic
offensive and defensive capabilities is pursued
not with the expectation that they would avert
widespread disaster in all circumstances, but
rather in a belief that, if nuclear strikes took
place, sizable forces would be likely to survive on
both sides, the war might well continue, and they
should be prepared to pursue an outcome as
favorable as possible.
- The Soviet view of nuclear strategy holds that
challenges to Soviet interests become less likely as
the Soviet Union is better prepared to fight in
various contingencies. This approach is designed
to realize Soviet geopolitical objectives through
coercion, if possible, and to emerge as the domi-
nant power should war nevertheless occur,
- While the Soviets emphasize the military value
of preemption as a means of reducing damage,
they also evaluate the capabilities of strategic
forces to accomplish missions under unfavorable
conditions, such as having to launch from under
attack or after absorbing an attack. Soviet plan-
ning also has emphasized the adequacy of strate-
gic forces to fulfill missions after a phase of
nonnuclear theater war during which strategic
assets might have suffered losses.
41. A Soviet planner's judgments are likely to be
strongly shaped both by his appreciation of the persis-
tent possibility of nuclear war and by his sensitivity to
the stringent requirements for waging it effectively-
by limiting damage to the homeland and pursuing
wide-ranging combat objectives against the United
States and in continental theaters on the periphery of
the USSR. Thus he operates in a planning environment
which typically has placed a high priority on such
capabilities as:
- Passive defenses, as well as active defenses and
massive initial strikes on enemy ICBMs, to limit
damage.
- Highly redundant command, control, communi-
cations, and intelligence capabilities and exten-
sive leadership protection measures to assure
continuity of control of the war effort.
- Various command, control, communications, and
intelligence capabilities and other measures to
assure the integration and coordination of the
disparate strategic and other force elements that
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would prosecute the war both at the interconti-
nental level and in Eurasian theaters.
ations beyond the initial nuclear strikes.
42. As a result of such different and, in some ways,
more demanding requirements, as compared with
traditional US requirements, the Soviets are likely to
rate their capabilities as lower in some areas than we
would assess them to be. They clearly are concerned
about;
- The vulnerability of their submarines to US
ASW, particularly in view of the reserve mission
they assign to a part of their SSBN force.
- The impact of ongoing and potential US strategic
programs.
- The increased probability that US improvements
in command, control, communications, and intel-
ligence will enable the United States to retaliate
more effectively and to manage forces more
efficiently in at least the initial stage of a nuclear
war.
- Their own ability to maintain effective com-
mand, control, communications, and intelligence
connectivity throughout key phases of crisis or
war.
-Their inability to prevent the United States from
launching a counterstrike. We fudge that the
Soviets would anticipate that a large force of US
and Allied weapons-alert bombers, patrolling
SSBNs, and at least a small number of ICBMs-
could survive a maior massed strike. Moreover,
the Soviets could not be confident that the
United States would not be capable of launching
the ICBM force on tactical warning or under
attack. The Soviets are also well aware of their
inability to prevent massive damage to the USSR
with their strategic defenses even with the im-
provements taking place in these forces. They
also recognize that US strategic defenses cannot
prevent massive damage.
43. We conclude that the Soviets' calculations of
their chances for success in any nuclear conflict would
occur against a backdrop of fundamental uncertainty.
They recognize the uncertainties inherent in many of
the factors upon which their success in nuclear war
would depend. They do not know some factors with
precision and others are unknowable in advance of
war itself. We fudge, therefore, that the Soviets would
not have high confidence in the capability of their
strategic offensive and defensive forces to accomplish
their wartime missions, particularly limiting the extent
of damage to the Soviet homeland. The Soviets' lack of
high confidence and their appreciation of the destruc-
tiveness inherent in nuclear conflict would probably
inhibit them in peacetime from deliberately risking a
direct clash with the United States or its NATO Allies.
Avoiding further escalation, however, would not be
their sole concern should they get involved in a maior
conventional war with the United States and its Allies.
In these circumstances-where they would expect the
risks of nuclear war to be high-they would also
consider that, by failing to seize the initiative should
all-out nuclear war appear imminent and unavoidable,
the Soviets could suffer both greater damage and a
reduction in their chances for eventual combat success.
The likelihood of their initiation of nuclear strikes
would increase if they suffered a maior strategic
reversal on the battlefield. If the Soviets possessed
convincing evidence that NATO or the United States
was about to launch alarge-scale nuclear strike, they
would attempt to preempt.
44. We cannot fully determine the operational con-
siderations that would sway the Soviets' judgments on
whether to risk nuclear war in the various circum-
stances where they might face such a decision over the
next decade. We note, in general, that, despite exten-
sive deployments of mobile ICBMs and other protect-
ed measures to enhance the survivability of their
forces, we expect them to deploy new silo-based heavy
ICBMs that probably will be both more capable
against US hard targets and more vulnerable them-
selves to a US countersilo attack in the 1990s. The
Soviets' strategic programs suggest that, while improv-
ing their prospects for riding out an attack, they still
will have incentives to rely on the employment options
of preemption and launching on tactical ~varning-
options that are consistent with their longstanding
strategic outlook. Their willingness to rely on these
options, in short, attests to their continued concern to
maximize their combat advantages-or at least mini-
mize those of the United States-in the event of
nuclear war
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