THE BRITISH POSITION IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND ARABIAN PENINSULA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP98-00979R000400430001-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 31, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 19, 1957
• Content Type: NIE

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1 y .~ 4
-SfERfT-
NIE 3 0-57
19 February 1957
N? 266
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 30-57
THE BRITISH POSITION IN THE
PERSIAN GULF AND ARABIAN PENINSULA
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 19 February 1957. Concurring were the Special Assistant,
Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of
Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of
Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and
the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The
Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC, and the
Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained,
the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
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1. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy
is for the information and use of the recipient indicated on the front cover and of per-
sons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination
may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:
a. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department of
State
b. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, for the Department of the Army
c. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
e. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff
f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
g. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
h. Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA, for any other Department or
Agency
2. This copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with appli-
cable security regulations, or. returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrange-
ment with the Office of Central Reference, CIA.
3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain
it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the estimate should
either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be
requested of the forwarding agency to retain it- in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22
June 1953.
4. The title of this estimate, when used separately from the text, should be classified:
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
DISTRIBUTION:
White House
National Security Council
Department of State
Department of Defense
Operations Coordinating Board
Atomic Energy Commission
Federal Bureau of Investigation
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34 38 42 46 50
32 ARABIAN PENINSULA
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38 42 46 50 54 58
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THE BRITISH POSITION IN THE PERSIAN GULF
AND ARABIAN PENINSULA
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the extent and importance of UK assets and interests in the Persian
Gulf and Arabian Peninsula area, the main forces working in the area, and the will
and ability of the UK to maintain its present position in this region in the light of
recent developments.
CONCLUSIONS
1. The leaders of both major British po-
litical parties consider that continued and
assured access to the oil of the Persian
Gulf is vital to the UK. Accordingly, the
UK will almost certainly make very great
efforts to retain its special position in the
area, and would probably use force if nec-
essary to do so. (Paras. 13-14, 23, 35)
2. Strong pressures against the British po-
sition exist, arising from the local unrest
and agitation of nationalist-reformist
groups, from territorial claims by Saudi
Arabia and Yemen, and from the wide-
spread influence of Arab nationalism sup-
ported especially by Egypt and the USSR.
There is unlikely to be any major or last-
ing reduction in these pressures. (Paras.
16-22)
3. Over the next few years at least, the
British appear to have a reasonably se-
cure position in Muscat and the Trucial
Sheikhdoms. It also appears unlikely
that the British will be dislodged from
Aden, although the containment of Yem-
eni pressures against the Western Pro-
tectorate is likely to be troublesome.
(Para. 28-30)
4. The outlook is more troubled and. un-
certain in Kuwait, where Britain's mate-
rial stakes in the area are most heavily
concentrated, and in Bahrein and Qatar.
While the situation there may remain
stable for some time to come, the UK has
failed to achieve a relationship with local
elements which would enable it to make
an orderly adjustment to the economic,
social, and political pressures which are
bound to mount over the years. The Suez
crisis has strengthened ultranationalist
influences and has bound the UK more
closely to autocratic ruling families which
may themselves become more suscep-
tible to outside anti-British influences.
(Paras. 31-33)
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DISCUSSION
1. THE BRITISH STAKE IN THE AREA
5. With the progressive loss of the UK's one-
time predominance in Palestine, Egypt, Iran,
and Jordan, and the weakening of its priv-
ileged position in Iraq, the UK's position in
the Middle East now hinges primarily on its
special relationship with the small princi-
palities, sultanates, and colonial areas which
rim the Arabian- Peninsula from Kuwait to
Aden. Here, where some of the Middle East's
largest and most accessible oil reserves lie, the
UK still exercises control over foreign policy,
has a deciding voice in the selection of local
rulers, and helps to shape internal policies.
The special British position here is of vital
concern to the UK, primarily because of Brit-
ish dependence on the area's oil production
and the associated economic benefits. In re-
cent years, however, the British have been
challenged by the rise of local nationalist-
reformist groups and, directly or indirectly,
by the increased interest of Saudi Arabia,
Egypt, the Yemen, the USSR, and the US in
the area.
6. Except for the crown colony of Aden, which
comprises little more than the town and port,
none of the territories concerned is under di-
rect British rule. Nevertheless, the British
have established the area as an exclusive Brit-
ish preserve except in certain petroleum
matters. British control over the Eastern
and Western Aden Protectorate is exercised
through native rulers with whom the Brit-
ish concluded treaties during the past century.
These protectorate arrangements, under
which the rulers pledged themselves not to
enter into relations with any foreign govern-
ment without British consent or to dispose of
any part of their territory to any power other
than Great Britain, were supplemented begin-
ning in 1937 by advisory agreements with cer-
tain of the more important rulers of the Pro-
tectorate. Under these treaties the UK ap-
points resident advisers to the rulers, and the
rulers agree to accept advice in all matters
except those concerning Moslem religion or
custom.
7. Within the Persian Gulf, the UK has long-
standing treaties with the Sheikhs of Kuwait,
Bahrein, Qatar, and the seven small sheikh-
doms of Trucial Oman. These rulers have
pledged themselves not to enter into relations
with, or to cede territory to, third parties
without British consent and have authorized
the UK to act on their behalf in foreign affairs.
The UK has extraterritorial jurisdiction over
foreigners in the sheikhdoms. Although the
British recognize the right of the rulers to
grant oil concessions after prior consultation
with the UK, any firm obtaining such a con-
cession must also conclude a political agree-
ment with the UK acknowledging the special
British position in the Persian Gulf and Brit-
ish rights to the oil in event of emergency.
8. The UK's relationship with the Sultanate
of Muscat and Oman on the southeast coast
of Arabia is similar in most respects to its
relationship with the other Gulf principalities.
However, the Sultanate has a more independ-
ent position, and in the latest treaty between
it and the UK, concluded in 1951, the Brit-
ish agreed to several restrictions on their
extraterritorial jurisdiction. These restric-
tions, and the fact that it is not bound to
accept British advice on foreign policy, dis-
tinguishes the Sultanate from the Gulf prin-
cipalities. Its foreign minister and the com-
mander of its armed forces are both British
subjects under contract to the Sultan.
9. The UK today tends to consider its Persian
Gulf establishment as a territorial and admin-
istrative entity. From Bahrein Island, the
Political Resident for the Persian Gulf super-
vises Political Agents resident in the various
principalities and the British Consul in Mus-
cat. Some of the principalities also have Brit-
ish advisers in key administrative posts, but
in contrast to the Political Agents and their
staffs, who are British Foreign Office em--
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ployees, these advisers are hired by and are
responsible to the local ruler.
10. At present, Kuwait far outweighs the rest
of the area in economic importance. It has
about a quarter of the entire free world's
proved oil reserves,1 making it about equal to
Iraq and Iran combined and somewhat more
important than Saudi Arabia as a prospective
source of future oil supplies. Kuwait's oil
production averaged close to a million barrels
a day - about 30 percent of Middle East pro-
duction - in 1955. About 60 percent of Brit-
ain's imports of crude oil came from Kuwait
before the Suez crisis. Kuwait has a small
refinery, which is now being expanded to a
capacity of 170,000 barrels a day.
11. The other principalities are also important
as present or potential sources of petroleum,
though in substantially lesser degree. Qatar
and Bahrein produce oil, and the latter has
a refinery of 205,000 barrels a day capacity. 2
Although little oil development has taken
place thus far in Muscat and the Trucial
States, at least one oil strike has been made
in the territory of the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi.
Aden is the site of a British Petroleum Com-
pany refinery of 120,000 barrels a day capacity.
12. The UK has not been completely success-
ful in its efforts to reserve Persian Gulf oil
for exploitation by British firms, largely be-
cause of British failure to recognize in time
the importance of the opportunities available.
Also, there has been vigorous US competition,
backed by US. government insistence on the
open-door principle. The Gulf Oil Company
has an equal share with British Petroleum in
the rich Kuwait Oil Company concession, and
the Bahrein Petroleum Company is jointly
owned by two US firms, Standard Oil of Cal-
See table, Appendix I. For Kuwait, as for the
Middle East as a whole, figures on proved re-
serves are estimated by some experts to repre-
sent perhaps no more than half of the oil actual-
ly available.
2 About 70 percent of the Bahrein refinery's ca-
pacity is normally utilized in refining crude oil
brought from Saudi Arabia by undersea pipeline.
However, King Saud cut off Saudi supply of oil
following the Anglo-French invasion of the Suez
area, and the Bahrein refinery is now getting
crude oil of different and apparently unsatis-
factory quality from Iran and Sumatra.
ifornia and the Texas Company. Although
most other oil rights in the sheikhdoms are
held by subsidiaries of the internationally
owned but British-controlled Iraq Petroleum
Company, US firms have some additional con-
cessions. 3
13. Nevertheless, the Gulf area remains ex-
tremely important to the UK as a source of
low cost sterling oil. Moreover, British in-
vestments in oil and other activities in the
Persian Gulf principalities and Aden are very
substantial - probably amounting to more
than half of British investments in the Middle
East as a whole - and thus represent an im-
portant source of income for the UK. In
1956 the UK's net earnings from crude oil
production amounted to an estimated $150
million from Kuwait and $12 million from
Qatar, as against $89 million and $72 million
respectively from British oil investments in
Iraq and Iran. The transportation and dis-
tribution of Persian Gulf oil provide additional
important sources of income to the UK. Most
of the royalties received by local rulers - al-
most all of them in sterling - flow into Brit-
ish banks and investment markets and, be-
cause of British dominance of the currency,
banking, and commercial system of the area,
UK firms supply much of the area's imports.
Between 1938 and 1955 Persian Gulf imports
from the United Kingdom increased from
about $2,600,000, representing 12 percent of
British exports to the Middle East, to $58,800-
000, or about 35 percent of the total.
14. Britain's dependence on the principalities
of the Persian Gulf for oil will almost certainly
increase. Even on the assumption that con-
siderable electricity will be available from nu-
clear energy sources, the UK itself will prob-
ably need twice as much petroleum by 1975
as it does now. Western Europe as a whole,
which prior to the Suez crisis was obtaining
about 70 percent of its oil from the Middle
East, will probably triple its needs by then
and - despite recent reports of a rich strike
in Algeria and possible new discoveries else-
where - will almost certainly have to look
See map, Petroleum Concessions, Oil Fields, and
Installations in the Arabian Peninsula follow-
ing Appendix.
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primarily to the Middle East to meet them.
A considerable portion of this demand can
probably be met by increased production in
Iraq and Iran, where the UK has a sub-
stantial share in oil output, and in Saudi
Arabia. However, it is almost certain that
Kuwait will retain a major share of the mar-
ket, and that there will be pressure to ex-
pand production in Qatar and develop fields
in other portions of the British-protected area.
15. Apart from the importance of its oil re-
sources, the area has considerable strategic
value for the British and the Western powers
generally, particularly now that Suez can no
longer be used as a garrison and staging area.
British bases in the Persian Gulf serve as
links in the Commonwealth air route to India,
Southeast Asia, and Australia. Some 30,000
troops are annually flown through Bahrein in
routine troop lifts to Far East garrisons. The
naval facilities at Aden and Bahrein and the
air fields in the area are important to the
British in maintaining their position in the
Red Sea and Indian Ocean, as well as in the
Persian Gulf itself; the naval facilities at Aden
are probably increased in value because of the
impending withdrawal of the British from
their naval base at Trincomalee, in Ceylon.
British air, naval, and ground force facilities
in the area are also of potential value vis-a-vis
the USSR.
II. CHALLENGES TO THE BRITISH POSITION
16. Until fairly recently, the area under con-
sideration presented few difficulties for the
British. Their main concern was to fend off
US businessmen and other Western inter-
lopers. Following World War II, the British
took a series of steps to try to consolidate
their position in the Gulf and to deal with
emergent politico-economic issues. The cali-
ber of the personnel of the Persian Gulf estab-
lishment was improved and the number in-
creased. The Sheikh of Kuwait was per-
suaded to use his swelling oil revenues for
extensive health, education, housing, and
other improvements. In the Trucial States
area, the British have been moving toward a
federation which would promote the political
stability of the various sheikhdoms and pro-
vide a framework for economic development
should oil be discovered in that area. Similar
efforts, though less spectacular, were con-
tinued in Bahrein and initiated in Qatar.
Proposals for economic development and fed-
eration of the tribal states of the Western
Protectorate were advanced by British au-
thorities in Aden.
17. Despite these moves the British have in
the last few years been presented with grow-
ing challenges to their position. The most
serious of these lies in the growth of unrest
and agitation by nationalist-reformist groups
in Kuwait and Bahrein, where the vast in-
creases in oil production and revenues have
disrupted traditional patterns and relation-
ships and caused an increased receptivity to
nationalist, pan-Arab, and pan-Islamic in-
fluences from other parts of the Arab world.
Pressures for change have come not only from
extremist elements, but also from merchants
and other persons who have grown concerned
about the political and administrative inade-
quacies of their governments and about the
increasing concentration of wealth and power
in the hands of the ruling families. Arab na-
tionalist propaganda, particularly that from
Egyptian sources, has encouraged the belief
that as the protectors of the status quo the
British represent the chief obstacle to po-
litical change. Nationalist-reformist groups
have come increasingly to identify their cam-
paigns against the ruling authorities and the
British with "Arab unity and solidarity" and
the prestige of Nasser.
18. The UK is also confronted with growing
expansionist pressures by Saudi Arabia and
the Yemen against British-protected terri-
tories. Stimulated by Wahhabi religious fer-
vor, by Arab suspicion and resentment of the
British presence in Iraq and the Persian Gulf,
and by a belief that valuable oil deposits may
exist along its ill-defined borders, Saudi Arabia
has made persistent attempts to advance into
the Hadramaut (Eastern Aden Protectorate)
and Inner Oman. The most important dis-
pute is that over the oasis of Buraimi, a key
communications point and potential center
for inland oil exploration in southeast Arabia,
which is claimed both by Saudi Arabia and
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by the British on behalf of the Sheikhdom of
Abu Dhabi and the Sultanate of Muscat and
Oman. The case went into abitration in 1955,
but the British soon withdrew on grounds
that the Saudis were bribing some of the
witnesses and one of the arbitrators. Subse-
quent moves toward a settlement have made
little progress.
19. The Yemen, for its part, has long claimed
the entire Aden area, including Aden colony
itself, and has made repeated incursions in
support of more immediate claims to various
Aden border villages. The tempo of these
incursions has increased over the last two
years in response to British plans to federate
the Western Aden Protectorate and culmi-
nated in early 1957 in a new series of raids
which, though of small size, have forced the
British to commit some ground and air units.
The Yemen's new offensive along the ill-
defined Aden Protectorate border has been
accompanied by threats to bring the dispute
before the UN, renewed claims to the Aden-
controlled Kamaran Island off the Yemeni
coast, and increasingly open claims to all of
Aden as being part of the "Arab nation."
20. These attacks on the British position have
been vigorously supported by Egypt. The
Nasser regime is aware of the UK's increasing
dependence on its position in the Persian
Gulf and is making a major political war-
fare effort, involving some direct efforts at
subversion and sabotage, to make it unten-
able. Egypt has given strong support to the
Yemen in the latter's efforts to improve the
proficiency of its army and advance its claims
against Aden, and Egyptian propaganda has
also encouraged dissidence in Aden colony.
Saudi Arabia, which is linked with Egypt and
the Yemen in a mutual assistance pact of
April 1956, has furnished the Yemen with
perhaps as much as $10 million for military
equipment and has continued to smuggle
arms to dissident Aden Protectorate elements.
21. The USSR has recently made several
moves towards establishing a greater degree
of influence in the Yemen. This includes
visits of Yemeni notables to the USSR and
the European Satellites. Commercial and
military assistance agreements were con-
cluded in 1956, providing among other things
that the USSR should furnish the Yemen
with military aid to the value of more than
$10 million, with the Yemen paying one-third
of the cost. Substantial initial deliveries of
arms were made in October 1956. Some So-
viet Bloc military advisers and instructors
have also arrived in the Yemen. The USSR
has had far fewer opportunities to influence
the situation in the Persian Gulf, since there
are neither friendly governments nor as yet
significant Communist movements through
which it can work. However, a sizable ring
of Communists, largely outsiders, was uncov-
ered in Kuwait in early 1956. Communist
propaganda circulates in the area, and has
some influence on local extremist groups.
Communist individuals or groups have been
involved in strikes and other labor activities
in Aden, Kuwait, Bahrein, and Qatar, but the
extent of their influence is unknown.
22. There is unlikely to be any major or last-
ing reduction in the local pressures on the
British position. It is true that the removal
of Nasser would probably provide a tempo-
rary easing of the situation, and might give
the British opportunities to strengthen their
position, but the fundamental difficulties con-
fronting the British would not be solved. The
more advanced sheikhdoms of the Gulf will
continue to be characterized by internal
stresses and unrest, whether or not encour-
aged from outside sources. Although it is
conceivable that Saudi Arabia might be in-
duced to accept some sort of temporary ac-
commodation with Britain on border issues,
the Saudi attitude toward the UK will at
best be tinged with suspicion and latent ex-
pansionist urges so long as the British remain
in the area. The Yemen will probably wish
to avoid a military showdown with the UK,
but it will almost certainly continue its efforts
to exploit the opportunities provided by the
receipt of Soviet arms, strong backing from
Egypt and other Arab states, and the sharp
decline in British prestige in the Middle East.
Although the rulers of the Yemen and Saudi
Arabia are suspicious of Egypt's efforts to
build up its influence within their countries
or other parts of the Peninsula, the three pow-
ers will probably continue to cooperate against
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the UK position for the time being. Should
Egyptian-backed elements come to power in
the Yemen, the drive to expel the British from
Aden would be even more vigorously pursued.
III. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF
THE BRITISH POSITION
23. The leaders of both major British political
parties consider access to Middle Eastern oil
to be vital to the UK. Moreover, they believe
that assured access to this oil depends upon
maintenance of the special British political
and military position in the area. Hence the
British government is determined to make
very great efforts to retain this position.
24. In its efforts to preserve its position, the
UK still has certain advantages. In much of
the area, political life is still too rudimentary
for nationalist and other ideological themes
to have much impact, and the British ability
to appeal to the controlling tribal chieftains,
particularly through provision of support
against their local enemies, is still great.
Despite the growth of anti-British and re-
formist feeling in the more advanced oil
sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf, political
organization and activity is still at too rudi-
mentary a level of development to exercise
more than a sporadic influence on the local
ruling authorities. The impact of radical
and ultranational influences is blunted to
some extent by the continued predominance
of conservative elements among those seeking
constitutional reforms. It is also restrained
by the development of a staunch localism,
voiced through such slogans as "Kuwait
for the Kuwaitis" and "Bahrein for the Bah-
reinis," which reflect a preoccupation with
local affairs. The ruling sheikhs continue to be
drawn toward the British by: (a) their desire
to retain their personal control over the oil
revenues; (b) their recognition of their in-
ability to operate the oil installations them-
selves; (c) their desire for support in main-
taining their internal authority and in avoid-
ing domination by their Arab neighbors; and
(d) their suspicions of the ultimate aims of
the Arab nationalist leaders.
25. British forces stationed in the area are
small in size.4 However, supported by British-
led local levies and supplemented, if necessary,
by reinforcements from outside the area, these
forces are capable of handling any local dis-
turbances and maintaining internal security.
Although the Yemen's receipt of Soviet arms
increases its capability for harassing activity
along its boundary with the Aden Protector-
ate, it is highly unlikely that the Yemeni by
themselves could pose a serious military
threat because of the present low level of
proficiency of their forces,' and the logistical
difficulties involved.
26. On the other hand, the British must cope
with some serious handicaps, particularly in
the light of the severe reverses which British
prestige and influence have suffered through-
out the Middle East as a result of the Suez
crisis. Britain's ill-fated attempt to solve the
Suez question by force lent new impetus to
The British currently maintain one infantry bat-
talion (800 British regulars) and upwards of
5,000-6,000 local troops led by British officers in
the Persian Gulf area. In the Aden area the
present British strength is one regular rein-
forced infantry battalion (about 1,100 men) and
British-officered tribal levies numbering at least
2,400. Elements of the RAF (16 jet fighters, 4
patrol bombers, and 18 transports) with a per-
sonnel strength estimated at 2,400 are based in
the Aden area. Important air fields are shown
on the map opposite page 1.
The principal British naval strength in the Mid-
dle East is the Mediterranean fleet, with head-
quarters at Malta. The only British naval force
normally operating in the immediate area is
the small squadron attached to the East Indies
Station based at Trincomalee, Ceylon. The
squadron includes one light cruiser and four
escort vessels, several of which are almost con-
tinuously in the Persian Gulf. The recent action
against Egypt resulted in a temporary increase
in naval strength, and all ships of the East In-
dies squadron are now in the Persian Gulf oper-
ating out of Bahrein. In addition, one light
cruiser and two escort vessels are presently oper-
ating in the Red Sea under command of the
Mediterranean fleet. The Royal Navy has minor
facilities at Aden, Bahrein, and Mombasa in
East Africa.
The Yemeni army has a given strength of 24,000
in one artillery and three infantry brigades.
However, it is too primitive in organization,
equipment, and capabilities to field a fighting
force either in numbers or effectiveness related
to its given strength. At present Yemen has no
air force, although it may be in process of re-
ceiving Soviet MIGs.
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Nasser's appeals for Arab solidarity. At the
same time, by their failure to topple Nasser
and to prevent the sabotage of the Suez Canal
and IPC pipeline, the British disclosed that
their ability to defend their interests has
important limitations.
27. In the politically more developed sheikh-
doms of Kuwait and Bahrein the Suez inter-
vention has dealt a serious and perhaps fatal
blow to the somewhat disjointed British efforts
to direct social unrest into evolutionary chan-
nels. The British have for the present at
least lost the confidence of most segments of
articulate opinion. In the face of the local
anti-British demonstrations and acts of sabo-
tage which followed the attack on Suez, the
British have been forced into greater depend-
ence and support of the local rulers. These
rulers share the desire of the British to sup-
press popular outbreaks, but they are now
more conscious of popular nationalist pres-
sures and sentiments, which they probably
share to some extent. In any event, they will
almost certainly be less responsive than in
the past to British influence and probably
more prone to develop informal contacts with
other Arab leaders. Although the Sheikh of
Kuwait moved vigorously to suppress sabo-
tage and disorder following the Suez inter-
vention, he has made a point of being less
accessible to his British advisers. Meanwhile,
the nationalist-reformist elements have been
driven into closer identification with Nasser's
brand of Arab nationalism.
IV. THE OUTLOOK FOR THE BRITISH
POSITION
28. The British position in the Sultanate of
Muscat and Oman and in the Trucial Sheikh-
doms appears to be reasonably secure over the
next few years at least. There is no indica-
tion of significant support for Nasser or sig-
nificant opposition to the Sultan and his
British ties in Muscat. The UK will almost
certainly continue to support the Sultan in
resisting pressures against his territory from
Saudi Arabia and its local confederates, and
he will probably remain a reliable British ally.
For similar reasons, the leaders of the small
sheikhdoms of Trucial Oman are likely to
retain their British ties. However, both the
Sultan of Muscat and Oman and the Trucial
Sheikhs will probably continue to judge their
British connection by the extent of British
will and ability to help them locally.
29. British prospects in Aden are also gener-
ally favorable over the next few years. In
Aden Colony, Egyptian and Yemeni-encour-
aged nationalist agitation has achieved some
success, particularly in establishing a foot-
hold in the labor movement, but most reform
groups in the colony are still directing their
pressures primarily toward achievement of
more representative government rather than
independence. They will probably remain
content to continue under British rule so
long as the authorities continue their pres-
ent policy of gradually extending local par-
ticipation in the government. Development
of a unified nationalist movement in Aden is
further hampered by the existence of divisions
within the Arab Moslem majority and by the
presence of sizable Indian and Somali minori-
ties. The Eastern Aden Protectorate, whose
inhabitants have longstanding cultural and
economic ties with India and Southeast Asia,
will probably remain relatively apathetic to-
ward Arab nationalist agitation and compar-
atively unaffected by Saudi intrigues along the
border.
30. The situation is likely to remain trouble-
some for the British in the Western Protector-
ate, whose backward tribes - not all of them
formally aligned with the British - are likely
to be more susceptible to Yemeni propaganda
and offers of arms, money, and loot, and in-
creasingly exposed to Yemeni raids. However,
it is unlikely that the Yemen, despite its new
Soviet arms, will be able to make any sig-
nificant military inroads against determined
British resistance unless sizable numbers of
Egyptian or Bloc personnel are introduced
into the Yemeni armed forces. Moreover, all
of the Western Protectorate tribes are Sunni
Moslems of the Shafi'i rite who for sectarian
reasons have no wish to subject themselves
to the Zaydi Shiah of the Yemen or the Wah-
habi zealotry of Saudi Arabia. So long as
the British continue to supply arms, money,
and the relatively small amount of military
stiffening necessary to hold the line, the
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SECRET 8
chronic raiding and dissidence of the border
country is unlikely to present serious dangers.
31. The outlook for the British is more trou-
bled and uncertain in Kuwait, where Britain's
material stakes in the area are most heavily
concentrated, and in Bahrein and Qatar.
There is no present indication that the sta-
bility of the local governments or the ties
of these governments with the British are
in imminent danger. The fact remains, how-
ever, that the UK has failed to achieve a rela-
tionship with local elements which will en-
able .it to make an orderly adjustment to the
economic, social, and political pressures which
are bound to mount over the years. Also the
UK's Suez performance has gravely weak-
ened its prospects for doing so. In Kuwait,
there is growing unrest and political agita-
tion despite the Sheikh's British-encouraged
efforts to use major portions of his oil reve-
nues for welfare purposes. In Bahrein, the
British have long since lost contact with
emergent nationalist and reformist elements.
These groups will probably continue to capi-
talize on various local grievances and the
siren song of Cairo's "Voice of the Arabs."
Although developments in Qatar are more
obscure, it appears to be starting along the
same path as the other sheikhdoms.
32. The fortunes of the British in these three
Gulf sheikhdoms have become increasingly
linked with those of autocratic rulers who
are likely to move tardily or ineffectively in
meeting internal demands for reform. Sooner
or later these rulers will probably be threat-
ened with replacement by regimes in which
ultranationalist or leftist elements predomi-
nate. Moreover, the decline of British pres-
tige and influence in neighboring Arab states
has increased the possibility that the rulers
themselves may seek to adopt a more inde-
pendent attitude toward the British. The
danger of a move to oust the British from the
sheikhdoms would grow if Arab nationalists
elsewhere should score additional gains at
British expense. This danger would be espe-
cially great if Saudi Arabia or Iraq should
fall under ultranationalist influence.
33. Egypt and the Communists will probably
be able to develop their capacities for harass-
ing the British by organizing and influencing
labor in the oil industry. A further growth
of anti-Western and pro-Soviet influence in
the area may lead to a situation in which the
local rulers may feel compelled to go along
with other Arab states in economic measures
against the British. In any event, the British,
along with other Western participants in Mid-
dle East oil production, will almost certainly
be confronted with growing demands for in-
creased local participation in management
and profits.
34. British access to and investments in the
oil production of the sheikhdoms are not as
yet seriously threatened. However, the Brit-
ish are likely to be confronted with continu-
ing and probably increasingly effective Arab
efforts to use oil as a political weapon. Any
ultranationalist regimes which came to power
in the sheikhdoms would probably be under
strong pressures from their outside Arab
backers to emulate Syria and Egypt by im-
posing political conditions on the use of the
oil. In such circumstances the supply and
price of oil would be subject to the vagaries
of unstable Arab politics, although the West
would have some bargaining power because
of the desire of the Gulf states for oil profits
and their inability to run the oil industry
themselves.
35. In the event of a direct threat to the Brit-
ish position in any of the sheikhdoms, the UK
probably would use force if necessary to main-
tain itself. Such a course might be quickly
and easily successful, for the degree of force
required would probably not be great. On the
other hand, circumstances might be such that
British military action, even though slight in
itself, would produce grave international com-
plications involving charges of aggression in
the UN and perhaps action by Egypt to close
the Suez Canal to British ships. If the Brit-
ish foresaw such developments they might,
after their Suez experience, refrain from using
armed force.
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APPENDIX I
FREE WORLD OIL RESERVES AND PRODUCTION
Production Percent of Production Percent of
Reserves Percent of (1,000 bbls. Free (1,000 bbls. Free
(Proved Free day) World day) World
billion World 1956 Total 1955 Total
bbls.) Total average' (1956) average (1955)
U.S. 32.90 16.0 7,150.0 48.4 6,806.8 53.4
Total Western Hemisphere 53.80 26.1 10,775.3 73.0 8,964.0 70.4
Middle East
Persian Gulf Sheikdoms
Bahrein 0.21 0.1 30.0 0.2 30.1 0.2
Kuwait 50.00 24.3 987.0 6.7 1,091.8 8.6
Qatar 1.50 0.7 127.0 0.9 114.5 0.9
Subtotal' 51.71 25.1 1,144.0 7.8 1,236.4 9.7
Other
Iran 30.00 14.6 530.0 3.6 329.1 2.6
Iraq 22.00 10.7 633.0 4.3 675.3 5.3
Israel 0.05 insig 0.6 insig -- --
Neutral Zone 0.65 0.3 41.0 0.3 24.2 0.2
Saudi Arabia 40.00 19.4 1,000.0 6.7 965.0 7.6
Middle East Total 144.412 70.1 3,348.6 22.7 3,233.3 25.4
Other 7.80 3.8 641.8 4.3 542.5 4.2
Total Free World 206.01 100.0 14,765.7 100.0 12,739.8 100.0
'Does not include Neutral Zone, in which Kuwait and Saudi Arabia each have an undivided half interest.
2 These are generally accepted proven reserves; some experts estimate reserves at double those already
proven. An estimate of 230 billion barrels for the Middle East out of a world total of 306 billion barrels
of proven oil reserves has been made by a distinguished US geologist.
The daily 1956 average for the Western Hemisphere has been increased and that of the Middle East low-
ered as a result of the Suez crisis.
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