MILITARY THOUGHT: "SOME QUESTION ON THE THEORY OF MILITARY ART", BY COLONEL-GENERAL I. GUSAKOVSKIY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029400610001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 17, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 8, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP80T00246A029400610001-8
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
8 MAR 1962
MEMORANDUM 'FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Some Questions on the
Theory of Military Art", by Colonel-
General I. Gusakovskiy
1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which
appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the
Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mys1") published by the
Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of
Army Commander.
2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material
should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office.
Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of
any part of this document in any other form should be addressed
to the originating office.
Enclosure
Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
_ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/17 : CIA-RDP80T00246A029400610001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP80T00246A029400610001-8
.Criginal: The Director of Central Intelligence
cc: Military Representative of the President
Special Assistant to .the President for
National Security Affairs
The Director of Intelligence and Research,
,Department Of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
--A5epartment of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of .Staff, Intelligence
U.S. Air Force
The Director, National Security Agency
Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission
National Indications Center
Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee
? The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Assistant Director for National Estimates
Assistant Director for Current Intelligence
Assistant Director for Research and Reports
.Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence.
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/17 : CIA-RDP80T00246A029400610001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP80T00246A029400610001-8 A
.-/l/" I -I ILJIVI
?
COUNTRY:
SUBJECT:
USSR
MILITARY THOUGHT: "Some Questions
on the Theory of Military Art", by Colonel-
General I. Gusakovskiy
DATE OF INFO: October 1960
APPRAISAL OF
CONTENT: Documentary
SOURCE: A reliable source (B).
Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "Some
Questions on the Theory of Military Art", by Colonel-General
I. Gusakovskiy.
This article appeared in the 1960 Third Issue of a special
version of Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) which is classified
TOP SECRET by the Soviets and is issued irregularly. It is
distributed within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of
Army Commander. The 1960 Third Issue was sent for typesetting
on 17 October 1960.
Headquarters Comment: The article referred to on page 2 was
disseminated as and the article referred to on
page 6 was disseminated as The first article
referred to on page 9 was disseminated as and
the second article referred to on page 9 was disseminated as
-1-
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/17 : CIA-RDP80T00246A029400610001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/17 CIA-RDP80T00246A029400610001:8 .A
? Some Questions on the Theory of Military Art
by
Colonel-General I. Gusakovskiy
In the pages 9f the first and second issues of the Special Col-
lection, a sharp and fundamental controversy has developed con-
cerning the most important questions of strategy, operational art,
and tactics. Of particular interest are the contributions of those
authors who raise new problems relating to the nature of modern
warfare, the methods of conducting armed combat, the use in it of
the various types of armed forces, etc. As a matter for discussion,
we consider it necessary to express our opinion on a number of
questions raised in the article of Colonel-General A. Gastilovich.1
The first question concerns the length of a future war. As is
known, General A. Ga.stilovich advocates the idea of a "blitzkrieg",
determining the direction of our military development in accordance
with this. In his opinion we have "no need to fear the term 'blitz-
krieg' just because this concept was compromised by the experience
of past world wars. Under the conditions of nuclear war only 'blitz'
op erations can promise victory." With this basic argument in de-
fense of the theory of "blitzkrieg", General A. Gastilovich cites the
availability in the armament of modern armies of nuclear/missile
weapons, by means of which entire countries can be put out of a war
in its first days. This situation, as the article indicates,"will
hardly evoke enthusiasm in the remaining countries for its prolonga-
tion," Therefore, the author concludes, "he who has withstood the
first strikes, must and can conclude the war rapidly if he prepares
his armed forces properly in peacetime."
1
Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought",
/First Issue, 1960/
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
..50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP80T00246A029400610001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP80T00246A029400610001-8
l.)1\ I -11UIVI
Proceeding from the considerations cited above, General A.
Gastilovich suggests a rather simple "Concept of conducting initial
operations under conditions of the Eurafigean Theater". According to
this concept a powerful retaliatory nuclat strike with weapons of
megaton yield is launched at the beginning with the aim of putting
two or three NATO countries out of the war. Following this, ground
troop operations are developed which mop up the remaining enemy
forces and occupy enemy countries. To conduct such operations, in
the opinion of the author, not more than 30 to 40 divisions will be
required. The concept indicated,"to the same degree, with certain
corrections for geographical conditions, can also be applied in other
theaters". In short, the substance of war in the concept of General A.
,Gastilovich boils down to border engagements of the opposing sides
with a subsequent unimpeded advance of our troops onto the territory
of the enemy.
In our opinion, such a point of view on the nature of armed
combat does not conform to modern reality. We realize perfectly
clearly that a future war unleashed by an aggressor against the
Soviet Union will inevitably become a world war between the two
contending social systems of the world. The basic means of waging
the war will_undoubtedly be nuclear/missile weapons, and the theater
of military operations will be the entire globe. Therefore, it would
be naive to think that such a war between coalitPons of. countries
possessing tremendous military-economic power can be concluded by
a "blitzkrieg", with one strike. It will be, without doubt, an intense,
hard, and exceptionally fierce war with decisive political and military
objectives. This is the kind of war for which we must prepare our
armed forces in order to ensure the security of our Homeland.
One may ask, is it correct under these conditions to orient the
military leadership toward a "blitzkrieg"? In our opinion, it is not
correct. The theory of a "blitzkrieg" is calculated for a weak enemy;
incapable of withstanding nuclear/missile strikes and continuing the
war after huge materiel losses and human casualties. One cannot
approach the evaluation of our probable enemy with such a yardstick.
We must proceed, first of all, from the fact that in a future world war,
if it is unleashed by the imperialists, we will have to fight against the
coalition of a strong enemy who has at his disposal all the modern means
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP80T00246A029400610001-8_____
. I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP80T00246A029400610001-8
50X1-HUM
? of combat and who is capable of recovering after the first nuclear/
missile strikes are inflicted on him. To count on victory over such
an enemy by a "blitzkrieg" is not to take intoiat_count the real relative
strengths and potentialities of the opposing sides, but is to under-
estimate the aggressor. This is very dangerous. The stern lessons
of history oblige us to prepare in the most serious manner for a hard
and long war against a strong and crafty enemy. This, of course,
does not mean that the third world war will necessarily assume a pro-
tracted character. Modern means of combat permit gaining victory
over the aggressor in relatively short periods of time, for which we
will strive. It may be that this war will in fact assume a fast-moving
"blitz" character. However, this is improbable. The interests of
assuring the security of our Homeland demand from us that in
building the Soviet Armed Forces, we do not go to extremes and do
not nourish the illusion of victory by "blitzkrieg" operations, but
that we prepare in earnest for a protracted and hard war.
As is known, the theory of "blitzkrieg" is not new. It failed
completely in the Second World War. Today it is advocated by
various Western military figures who threaten to destroy the Soviet
Union and other Socialist countries in a few hours. In this, these
theoreticians rely basically on a sudden strike by nuclear/missile
weapons. However, they do not allow for the fact that the Socialist
Camp cannot only withstand the initial nuclear strikes of the ag-
gressor, but can also give him the necessary reply. N. S.
Khrushchev stated this well in his speech at the IVth Session of the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR:
"Let us assume, however, that some country or group of
countries could successfully prepare and execute a surprise attack
on a power possessing nuclear and missile weapons. But, even
supposing for a minute that the attacking side could successfully
execute a surprise strike, could it really immediately put out of
action all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and all missile equipment
Installations of the power suffering the attack? Of course not. The
country suffering the surprise attack, if it is understood that the dis-
cussion concerns a sufficiently large country, will always have the
potential to duly repulse the aggressor".
-4-
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM,
i Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP80T00246A029400610001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP80T00246A029400610001-8
It is perfectly clear to us which countries N. S. Khrushchev
had in mind. Apparently our enemies are also taking this situation
into account, since in their camp voices are heard more and more
persistently denouncing 'blitzkrieg", demanding a renunciation of
the strategy of so-called "massive retaliation" and a switch to the
creation and preparation of reserves of all types for the possible
conduct of a long and protracted war.
On what basis must we glorify the idea of "blitzkrieg", which
has been condemned by history, and elevate it to the rank of a
theory which points the way of further development of the armed
forces? In our opinion, the presence in armament of strategic
nuclear/missile weapons still does not give us a sufficient basis to
assert that the third world war will have the character of a "blit z-
krieg. " To propagate the idea of "blitzkrieg" under our conditions
is not only dangerous but is also harmful, insofar as it disorients the
military leadership in the building of the armed forces and in securing
the defensive capability of our Homeland.
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
The second question concerns the numerical strength of the armed
forces. The thought runs through the article of General A. Gastilovich
that "for direct combat operations at the front neither in the beginning
of the war nor during its 'course will such numerous ground armed
forces be needed as was the case in previous wars?" The author
believes that in a future war engagements of multimillion-man armed
forces are excluded, and that victorious war can be waged with the forces
of small, technically highly equipped armies.
To support his statements, the author advances the following
arguments: 1) In modern war "nothing will arrive from the depth of
the country in time", so it is impossible to build up forces in initial
operations with fully mobilized large units. 2) The forces of the
enemy remaining after the first nuclear strikes are inflicted cannot
be numerous, and a numerically large army is not needed to crush
them. Proceeding from these considerations, General A. Gastilovich
proposes, for the conduct of initial operations in the European
theater of military operations, to have a small number of various
divisions (within the bounds of 30 to 40), organizationally represented
by two fronts of 15 to 20 divisions each.
-5.-
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP80T00246A029400610001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP80T00246A029400610001-8
50X1-HUM
We cannot agree with such conclusions of the 'author on the
numerical strength of armed forces in modern war. Their unsound-
ness is convincingly, shown by Colonel-General G7-petagurov in his
articletecial Collection of Articles of the Journal. "Military Thought"
ifiecond sue,..196040ith which we are in complete agreement on this
question. It seems to us that the judgments of General A. Gastilovich
on the numerical strength of armed forces are an attempt to revive the
well-known theory of waging war by the forces of small armies. Similar
ideas have often been expressed in the foreign press, but they have not
found practical application in the past, and do not find it today. Our
enemies, as is known, are preparing for the deployment of rather
significant ground, air, and naval forces in a future war and it would
be a grave error for us to orient ourselves on waging war with small
armies.
- A future war, as we have already emphasized, is a world war
between two powerful coalitions of states hostile to each other because
of their social structures, it is a war of multi-million-man armies
with numerous and complex combat equipment. As opposed to previous
wars, a nuclear/missile war will be characterized by a still greater
spatial scope, when in the literal sense of the word there will be no
difference between the front and rear of a country, when the territory
of countries will be turned into theaters of military operations. For
conducting such a war, massive armed forces will be required, still
larger than was the case in past wars. And this is completely natural,
because the involvement in war of a large number of countries, the
hugh spatial scope of armed combat, and also the necessity for re-
covering from heavy losses will inescapably lead to the quantitative
growth of the warring armies, to a still greater degree than was the
case in the past.
In our opinion, we should prepare our armed forces for just
such a war. This, of course, does not mean that we must increase
our army in peacetime. The defensive power of our country, N. S.
Xhrushchev indicated,is determined not by how many soldiers we
have under arms or by how many people wear soldiers' overcoats,
but by the firepower of our armed forces. At present, the Soviet
Army possesses such combat means as to permit not only withstanding
the probable enemy in case of attack, but also to strike back as
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP80T00246A029400610001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/1 : CIA-RDP80T00246A029400610001-8
5UX1-HUM
necessary. Under these conditions, .a .reduction.. in--the numerical
strength of the army will not prevent us from maintaining the
defensive capability of our Homeland at the necessary level.
Therefore, guided by the policy of peaceful coexistence, the Soviet
Union is significantly reducing its armed forces on a unilateral
basis, paving the way for an easing of the international situation
and the strengthening of peace in the entire world. N. S. Khrushchev
spoke of the reasons for the further reductions in our armed forces
sufficiently convincingly at the Wth Session of the Supreme Soviet
of the USSR. However, in reducing the numerical strength of the
army, we do not at all count on waging war with small armies in
the event that we are attacked. For conducting a victorious war,
a significant increase in the armed forces and the deployment of
a multimillion-man army will undoubtedly be needed. From these
positions it is necessary to decide the questions of our further military
development.
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
The third question concerns the methods of conducting military
operations. The high degree to which troops are technically equipped,
and the appearance in the armament of armies of nuclear/missile
weapons undoubtedly introduces much that is new into the methods
of conducting war. First of all, the role and assignment of various
types of armed forces and arms of troops in wartime is substantially
changed. A decisive role in modern war will be played by the missile
troops, especially those armed with strategic missiles, and also by
missile weapons of the other types Of armed forces. At the same time,
conventional types of armament will find wide application in war. Only
by the combined efforts of all types of armed forces and means of
combat can the assigned goals of a war be attained.
It is perfectly obvious that nuclear/missile weapons dictate a
new approach to the conduct of both offense and defense. However,
in the investigation of this question, one should not go to extremes
for the sake of trying to find something new in military affairs. Thus,
General A. Gastilovich asserts that "in the training of troops, it is
necessary to reject decisively the cultivation of the principle of break-
through of the enemy's prepared defenses" insofar as this "has ceased?
-7-
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP80T00246A029400610001-8
L
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP80T00246A029400610001-8
5UX1-HUM
?
to be the primary form of offensive actions, having yielded to meeting
engagements and envelopment." We cannot agree with this assertion
of the author.
In our view, breakthrough of the enemy's defenses remains as
a type of offensive action under conditions of a nuclear/missile war,
although it will not be executed in the same manner as in World War
II. While in the past it was essential to concentrate a large number
of forces and weapons to execute the breakthrough from a position of
direct contact, and to conduct the offensive itself on the entire front
and in close formations, in order to effect a breakthrough of prepared
defenses under modern conditions this question will be solved
differently. The primary means of breakthrough is now nuclear/
missile weapons, with which the enemy's defenses can be broken to
the entire depth in short periods of time and by subsequent swift
operations of troops from the rear they can be broken through with
a rush and the rout of the opposing grouping completed. In our
opinion, the swift breakthrough of defense subsequent to nuclear
strikes will be the basic content of offensive operations. Moreover,
the offensive itself, as opposed to past wars, will be conducted in
separate areas, at high tempos and with wide use of airborne troops
and transport of troops by air.
It is quite clear that under conditions of a war of maneuver,
meeting battles (engagements) with the enemy's reserves will occur
very often, and also the execution of enveloping maneuver of troops with
the aim of emerging at a considerable depth in the enemy's positions
and capturing his most important areas (installations). Therefore,
in training troops in peacetime it is essenti 1 to prepare them both
for the precipitous breakthrough of the enemy's prepared defenses
and for meeting engagements. To reject the mastering of the methods
of breakthrough of the enemy's prepared defenses in the training of
troops, as General A. Gastilovich proposes, means to consciously
ruin the field training of troops and to lower their combat readiness.
Advancing the thesis that meeting engagements are the basic
form of offensive operations, the author proceeds from the considera-
tions that modern defense must be based "on the same methods of
-8-
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP80T00246A029400610001-8
_
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP80T00246A029400610001-8
operation as offensive operations, i. e.., an heated meeting battles
and.e,ngagements." mother.words, in the opinion of General A.
Gastilovich, the operational methods of troops In both defensive and
offensive operations will be identical. _Lieutenant-General V. Baskakov
arrives at approximately the same contausion, declaring that under
conditions of nuclear/missile warfare the distinctions between an
operational offensive and operational defense are obliterated. 1
Consequently, says General A. Gastilovich, in the formation of
operational defense one must reject the creation of defensive zones
"because they do not justify their designation" and relegate the very
term "stable defense" to the archives.
We cannot agree with such a definition of operational defense
and operational offense. On this question we completely share the
opinion of General of the Army P. Kurochkin, as stated in his article. 2
Without doubt, linear defense along entire fronts has departed
to the realm of the past. Its place will be taken, apparently, by
highly maneuvered, swift defensive battles and engagements of a
heated nature. The decisive role in defense will be played by nuclear/
missile weapons which permit the defenders to disrupt completely the
enemy's offensive and to assume the offensive quickly in their turn
with the aim of completely routing the enemy. In this case, troop
operations will most closely resemble an offensive against an enemy
who has hastily turned to the defense, and in some cases also meet-
ing battles (engagements).
The rejection of positional forms of combat in defense does
not at all signify a denial of the firm retention of important areas
and installations in the direction in which the enemy's offensive is
'Special Collection of Articles
-?First Issue,. 1960;
2Special Collection of Articles
Second Issue, HBO.
Of the Journal "Military Thought",
of the Journal 'Military Thought"
-9L
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP80T00246A029400610001-8
I
? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP80T00246A029400610001-8
50X1-H UM
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
expected. It appears to us th t under the conditions of nuclear/missile
war, also, the structure of the defense, and accordingly, of groupings
of troops, must answer the problem of retaining the basic areas of
terrain in the probable directions of the enemy's offensive. In the
interests of fulfilling this mission, nuclear strikes, troop maneuver
and counterattacks and counterstrikes must be planned. We apply this
proposition to tactical as well as to operational defense. Therefore,
it seems to us that it is still too early to relegate the term "stable
defense" to the archives. On the contrary, nuclear/missile weapons
give it a new content, directed at attaining important results in
defense that neither artillery nor aviation could give in the past. In
this connection, neither is it possible to equate defense and offense.
These two types of combat operations of troops differ in principle from
one another not by the amount of nuclear weapons, as General A.
Gastilovich st ted, but by their goals nd methods.
A few words about the planning of missile operations. General A.
Gastilovich proposes the conduct of two types of missile operations
by the missile formations of the VGK (Supreme High Command):
operations with the aim of completely destroying the enemy's country
and putting it out of the war, and operations in support of the ground
troops. Missile operations of the first type must precede operations
of the second type and subsequently be conducted parallel. to them.
In accordance with this, in the opinion of the author, among the
missile formations of the VGK it is essential to have missile forma-
tions to carry out the mission of putting entire countries out of the
war, and formations designated for operations in support of several
fronts conducting operations in one strategic axis.
It appears to us that there is no necessity to plan the above-named
two types of missile operations and, by the same token, there is no
need to create corresponding missile formations for this. In our
opinion, one missile operation must already be planned and prepared
in peacetime with the mission of destroying the enemy's nuclear
weapons, darilaghig his economic potential, disrupting the various
types- of transportation, and crushing his grouping of ground troops
in the theater of impending operations of our troops. This mission
-10-
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP80T00246A029400610001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP80T00246A029400610001-8
I 41/4 50X1-HUM
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
can be fulfilled simultaneously by one and the same missile formations
of the VGK, together with the missile means of the fronts conducting
operations on a given strategic axis. It is possible that under certain
conditions it will be necessary to conduct an independent missile opera-
tion with the aim of completely destroying the economic potential of
one of the enemy countries and putting it out of the war. But for this,
the same VGK missile formations which will subsequently conduct
operations in support of ground troops can be used. It is therefore
inadvisable to separate the missile formations of the VGK artificially
into two groups.
In conclusion, we wish to note that we welcome with great interest
the publication of the Special Collection and the participation in it of
authors who express their thoughts and proposals freely on extremely
important problems of military theory. There is no doubt that the
creation of this Collection will promote the further develop ment of
Soviet military art.
-11-
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP80T00246A029400610001-8