THE CASE AGAINST ESTIMATES OF SOVIET VULNERABILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A003700020036-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2013
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: July 28, 1954
• Content Type: MISC

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A003700020036-2
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 5744
28 July 3.954
SUBJECT: The Case Against Estimates of Soviet Vulnerabilities
1. The desire has been expressed recurrently in the intelligence
coMMunity nd among some of our consumers for an estimate on Soviet
In tabilities. ,This desire ppeare motivated t least by partly
the 'belief that our Soviet estimates to date present top monolithic
pictUre of Soviet strength; in which we asses have not been sufficiently
pointed out. In addition? certain operational purposes could be served
by a Specialized vulnerability paper. However, for a number of reasons
we believe that a national estimate of Soviet vulnerabilities mould
be Methodologically unsound, and probably doceptive.
2. Our principal reason for this belief is the fact that
vulnerability connotes an operational rather than a factual condition.
It i not a weakness ner se.but an exploitable weakness, the expleitability
of Which changes with circumstances and with the capabilities of the
'expleiter. Thus a weakness may cease to be exploitable and another iay
boceMp xploitable or the degree -of exploitability may vary. Therefore,
it is almost impossible to est to a vulnerability with ,any confidence
unless detailed assumptions regarding Western exploit tiv capabilities
and obj ctives are given. Since each vulnerability problet. is unique,
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defined by its own peculiar circumstances, general assumptions can
hardly be employed as a basis for an estimate. Consequently,
vulnerability is a concept which is properly in the province of
operational people Who haven available to them not only the intelligence
studies of Soviet weaknesses but also knowledge of US capabilities
to exploit them.
30 While national intelligence estimates, which by their nature
are brief, generalized products designed for a high policy audiences
do not dontain detailed ;analyses of Communist weaknesses. Our numerous
estimates of Bloc capabilitis have not neglected to ,point out and analyse
them. NIE 11-4-54 for example, lists the following weaknesses: top
level instability, failures in economic planning, low productivity,
discontent in the USSR, low living standards, constant state control
and surveillance, peasant discontent, shortcomings in Bloc military
? establishments, Satellite disaffection, law morale0-housing and
? manpower problems, certain Bloc dependences on trade with the West,
Soviet-Chinese'divisive forces, and others. We have also discussed
the weaknesses of the v
rious Communist perties and, organizations
in appropriate regional and country studies.
4. Ilowevoine we believe it would be seriouslv misleading to discuss
such weaknesses in?a separate paper on vulnerabilities. In thefirst-
place4 by listing them separately we run the risk of magnifying them
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out of proportion. When they are discussed in our/regular'Bloc papers,
the compensating strength or checks in the Soviet system are Presented
simultaneously and?the reader is placed in a position to evaluate the
weaknesses more correctly. In the second place to discuss weaknesses
separately under the heading of vulnerabilities is to imply that we are
talking about exploitable weaknesses. The fact is that not all weaknesses
which might be listed would be exploitable by means available to the -
US and therefore could not properly be reiarded as vulnerabilities..
While there exist mny weaknesses within. the Soviet system which are
theoretically exploitable (e.g., low living standards, antiAlussian
sentiments of the Satellite. peoples, abuse of police-Power)?_the
authority of a totalitarian police state as firmly entrenched: in power
as the Kremlin is unlikely to be seriously impaired by psychologidal
pressures and inducements. or is the Soviet system conducive to
resistance by disaffected "citizens.
In view of these considerations, including the fact that the
- mass of technical details would have to be discussed in any useful
Bloc weakness analysis belong rather to the field of operational research
than to a national estimate, we believe that overall estimates. Of
Soviet vulnerabilities would not be a useful "exercise.
Prepared by BE Staff
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