ON TUESDAY, CONGRESS RAISES CURTAIN ON IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000605090015-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 21, 2013
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: May 3, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

I~ Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/21 :CIA-RDP90-009658000605090015-9
WHJIi l IVIa I UN F'U51 ~
ARTICLE APP REO 3 May 1987
0~ PAS
Ort Tuesday, Congress Raises Curtain on Iran- ontra Affair
By Dan Morgan and 1~alter_Pincus
WaxhingGa~ Part 5tef(Wntcro
NEWS
aNa~rsls
When Sen. Daniel K. Inouye (D-Hawaii pounds his gavel in
the historic Senate Caucus Room Tuesday morning to open
what could be the most significant three months of televised
congressional hearings since Watergate, a new test will begin
for President Reagan, his administration and Congress, too.
As in the Watergate hearings 14 years ago involving the
Nixon administration, the most publicized questions center
~ on the president's knowledge and his actions. Did
Reagan know about the diversion of funds from
the secret sales of arms to Iran to aid .the Ni-
caraguan contras? And did he know about White House coor-
dination of possibly illegal military aid to those Nicaraguan reb-
el groups after Congress prohibited such assistance in 1984?
The stakes for the president are enormous. Wounded by the
loss of the Republican Senate majority in the 1986 elections,
his political standing could collapse if it turns out, after his
many denials, that he knew of or approved illegal actions by his
aides. On the other hand, his administration could be revived if
the congressional hearings only repeat what already is known.
Congress also is on trial. For four months, the House and
Senate select committees on the Iran-contra scandal have
been investigating the affair, which, unlike Watergate, involves
the nation's key national security institutions and some of the
most sensitive foreign policy operations.
Revelations already have affected relations with important
allies, such as Israel, broken a trust between Congress and the
president, and suggested misuse of the National Security
Council, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation.
Senior administration officials misled Congress about White
House support for the contras, Chairman Lee H. Hamilton (D-
Ind.) of the House select committee said last week. And the
president did not inform Congress for nine months of his au-
thorization of secret arms sales to Iran.
Therefore, some congressional investigators have said, it
now falls to them to examine questions less obvious than
where the money went-less obvious, but perhaps more pro-
found in what they reveal about the Reagan government.
Was what happened just a matter of bad judgment, sloppi-
Hess and bad communication? Or did the president and a few
trusted advisers operate in a calculated manner outside the
law and their own regulations to carry out policies that circum-
vented Congress and critics with the administration?
And, once the arms sales to Iran became public, did the
president or his aides attempt to cover up their past activities?
How the committees handle the first two witnesses could
set the tone for much of what follows, investigators said.
Committee investigators want their surprise first witness,
retired Air Force major general Richard V. Secord, to describe
for the first time the infrastucture of the clandestine private
network that carried arms to the contras during the two years
in which direct U.S. government military aid was prohibited by
Congress.
They also expect him to provide new
details on the sale of U.S. arms to Iran, in-
cluding how the money was handled.
Secord, however, may have a different
agenda, according to an informed source.
He may insist that he acted as a private
businessman who was convinced that both
the contra and Iran operations were pri-
vately run commercial ventures that did
not use U.S. government funds.
Secord may claim that "the weapons
component of the (Iranian] arms deal was
handled as a commercial transaction, not
government to government;' the source
said.
That is not how congressional investi-
gators see it. Privately, they argue that Se-
cord was only the facilitator of White
House-directed programs in Nicaragua and
Iran. The selling of U.S. arms to Iran, com-
mittee sources have said, was agovern-
ment-to-government program in which the
funds generated were the U.S. govern-
ment's.
Former national security adviser Robert
C. McFarlane, who is to address policy is-
sues after Secord has provided the initial
chronology, has appeared before several
congressional committees and the Tower
commission and at times has given differ-
ing versions of the same event.
On Oct. 7, 1985, McFarlane wrote Ham-
ilton, "There is no official or unofficial re-
lationship with any member of the NSC
staff regarding fund-raising for the Ni-
caraguan democratic opposition." But it
was revealed last week in court that less
than a month before McFarlane wrote that
letter, Lt. Col. Oliver L. North, then on the
National Security Council staff, and fund-
raiser Carl R. (Spitz) Channel) met in Dal-
las with three potential contributors to a
foundation that raised money to :help the
contras who are fighting the government of
Nicaragua.
As the House-Senate hearings progress
in June and July, the committee will be fur-
ther challenged when former national se-
curity adviser John IUI. Poindexter and
North, who was fired from the NSC staff
last November, testify. A third individual
who investigators believe could have first-
hand knowledge of these events and par-
~I16110M
STAT
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o~.
ticularly the president's role-former Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency director William J.
Casey-is reportedly too ill to appear.
Evolution of a Scandal
The Iran-contra affair surrounded the
Reagan administration gradually.
ft began to surface with -the shooting
down of a C1'L3K cargo plane delivering
arms over Nicaragua last Oct. 5 and the
capture of one of the Americans on board.
The White Elouse distanced itself from this
"private" operation.
The affair took a new turn Nov. 3, when
AI Shirrs, a small Beirut weekly, disclosed
that there had been a secret delivery of
U.S. arms as part of a clandestine visit to
Tehran by Mc(=arlane. Reagan said the re-
port had "no foundation."
[t finally burst into afull-fledged scandal
Nod. 25, when the president announced
the resignation of Poindexter, McFarlarie's
successor as national security adviser, and
the firing of North from the NSC staff, and
Attorney General Edwin Meese III dis-
closed that funds had been diverted from
the sale of U.S. arms to Iran to aid the con-
tras.
Since then there have been congression-
al hearings by four committees, a report by
the Senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence, amore detailed report by a pres-
idential commission headed by former sen-
ator John G. Tower (R-Tex.), two General
Accounting Office studies, a continuing in-
vestigation by independent counsel Law-
rence E. Walsh that has already produced
one guilty plea, and four months of inquiry
by Elouse and Senate investigators setting
the stage for the public hearings that will
begin Tuesday.
Many government officials and legisla-
tors have said that most of the significant
facts about the Iran-contra affair have been
disclosed and that all that remains is to
trace the money, decide who hroke the Jaw
and-make a final determination of what the
president knew.
But -the guilty plea last week of fund-
raiser Channell suggests that may not be
the case.
Channell named North and public rela-
tions man Richard R. Miller as coconspir-
ators. Walsh's bill of particulars alluded to
other coconspirators "unknown" to him.
Among Miller's employes is David Fischer,
a former special assistant to then-White
House chief of staff Donald T. Regan, who
arranged White House meetings with the.
president for Channell and his donors, ac-
cording to White House sources.
Driving the investigation is a built-in
competition-among investigators.
The Senate and House select commit- seldom follows a script, and whether the
tees eliminated the potential for friction by hearings will once the stories start pouring
deciding to work together. Most witnesses out is an open question.
have been interviewed by House and Sen-
ate staff members together and the f~rth-
coming joint hearings will alternate be-
tween the two chambers.
However, competitive tensions do exist
between Walsh, charged with investigating
possible criminal misconduct, and the con-
gressional committees, which are man-
dated to disclose as much as possible to the
public and recommend changes in policy or
law if needed.
But Congress is in a special position be-
cause its past failure to exercise vigorous
oversight means it shares some responsi-
bility for what happened.
In the coming weeks, the investigators
will attempt to show just how much was
going on without congressional or public
knowledge.
Members of a secret interagency group
on counterterrorism policy, cochaired by
North, knew about the Iran arms-for-hos-
tages operation activities but could not get
their bosses to try to persuade the pres-
ident to call a halt to the deal.
Their bosses included Secretary of State
George P. Shultz, Defense Secretary Cas-
par W. Weinberger and FBI Director Wil-
liam H. Webster, all of whom publicly were
promoting the administration's declared
policy of inveterate opposition to any ne-
gotiationsfor hostages or any arms sales to
Iran.
Secret Communications Devices
Several witnesses also are expected to
testify that North used a separate, oper-
ational counterterrorism unit set up at the
NSC in 1986 as cover for possibly unau-
thorized coordination of contra military re-
supply operations.
The Tower commission reported that
North obtained 15 special communications
devices from the top-secret National Se-
curity Agency and distributed the highly
classified devices to a few members of the
secret group helping the contras.
Investigators also want to pursue -ques-
tions about North's relationship with then-
CIA Director Casey and certain of Casey's
close lieutenants, such as Ben B. Wickham
Jr., who told associates in 19 5 t at he was
resigning to raise money for the private
network that was helping the contras. His
whereabouts since then are not known.
The investigators, working with care-
fully prepared witnesses in a unique hear-
ing format, have indicated that they want
to stay close to their script. But Congress
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r~r~
Sen. Oanlel K. Inouye
(D?Hawall)
Chairman, Senate Select
Committee
Elected to the Senate in
1962, he gained nation-
al prominence in 1973
as member of the Sen?
ate committee investi?
gating Watergate. In
1976, he became the
first chairman of the
Senate Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence.
In 1981, he at-
tempted to persuade his
Senate colleagues not to
expel Sen. Harrison A.
Williams Jr. (D?N.J.) be-
cause of his involvement
in the Abscam scandal.
Williams was expelled
anyway, but colleagues
said Inouye's willingness
to take on a thankless
and unpopular cause
was an example of his
character and consisten-
cy.
As chairman of the
Iran?contra inquiry he
has stressed bipartisan-
ship and discipline.
Inouye has warned that
leakers will be dealt with
harshly. And he has set
up a .unique format for
the hearings that will
balance Democrats and
Republicans in every
phase of the question-
ing.
Sen. Warren B.
Rudman (R?N.H.)
Vice chairman, Senate
Select Committee
A former prosecuting
attorney in his home
state, Rudman first won
election to the Senate in
1980, and was easily
reelected last year.
He became almost a
household name be-
cause of his cosponsor-
ship of the Gramm?
Rudman-Hollings law
that mandated annual
steps to reduce the bud?
get deficit.
An alter ego for the
more reserved, serious.
Inouye, Rudman has
been outspoken in his
criticism of the White
House in the Iran-contra
matter and of the slow
pace of the independent
counsel in his criminal
investigation
HEARINGS SCHEDULE
The Senate and House select committees on the Iran-contra affair
will meet for the first time in public session on Tuesday.
TV coverage: Cable News Network is the only network that plans
gavel-to?gavel coverage. ABC, CBS, NBC plan to break into regular
programming whenever they deem necessary to report significant
events or to carry the live testimony of important witnesses.
Where: Hearings will alternate, on a weekly basis, between a
Senate meeting room and a House meeting room, beginning the first
week in the Senate.
When: The committee will meet generally from 10 a.m. to noon
and from 2 p.m, to 5 p.m. for the first phase of the hearings, which
will focus on the contras, scheduled to last until early June. The
committees have released the following schedule for the first two
weeks:
Week 1: May 5, 6, 7, 8. Senate Caucus Room.
Week 2: May 11, 12, 13, 14. House Judiciary Committee, 2141
Rayburn House Office Building.
Rep. Lee H. Hamilton
(D-Ind.)
Chairman, House Select
Committee
An 11?term Democrat,
he was selected to chair
the Iran?contra investi-
gation because of his
reputation and long ser-
vice in the House.
Has served as chair
man of the House For?
eign Affairs subcommit?
tee on Europe and the
Middle East, which has
oversight of Iranian is-
sues. Just completed a
two-year term as chair-
man of the House Per?
manent Select Commit?
tee on Intelligence,
which monitored the
Reagan administration's
adherence to legislation
barring military assist~
once to the contras.
Rep. Dick Cheney (R?
Wyo.)
Vice Chairman, House
Seiect Committee
Was elected to the
House in November
1978, two years after
leaving the White House,
where he was chief of
staff during the final
years of the Ford admin?
istration. With his exec-
utive branch back-
ground, is more of an
issues spokesman than a
legislator on Capitol Hill,
and as such chairs the
House Republican Policy
Committee.
A member of the
House Intelligence Com-
mittee, he has been a
firm supporter of the
administration in its Cen-
tral America policy and
worked on Capitol Hill to
restore military aid to
the contras after the
1984 cutoff.
Arthur L llman
Chief Counsel, Senate
Select Committee
One of the top litigators
in the nation, Liman's
private clients have in-
cluded corporate raider
Carl C. Icahn, fugitive
financier Robert L.
Vesco, and (more re?
Gently) Dennis Levine,
whose Watl Street activ-
ities led to his indict-
ment for insider training.
Weeks ago, Liman
promised he would get
Swiss bank records when
that seemed all but im-
possible. He did. He has
a reputation for thor-
oughness. The hearings
will show whether his
investigation ranged
widely enough.
John W. Nlelds Jr.
Chief Counsel, House
Select Committee
Served as chief counsel
to the House ethics com-
mittee for its investiga?
lion of South Korean
influence-buying. Later
became the special pros-
ecutor in the Carter ad?
ministration's prosecu?
tion of two former high-
ranking FBI officials.
Reagan later pardoned
the two officials, a step
Nields criticized.
Continued
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Prasldant Reagan
Israeli ship~
Amertt of U.S. arms to
bars in 1985. Authorized
U.S. arms sales to Iran
in January 1986. Argued
that shipments to Iran
should continue. despite
grave misgivings of his
senror advisers in late
1985.
Approved the mission
to Tehran in May 1986.
led by former natronal
securrty adviser Robert
C. McFarlane, in an ~re~
successful attempt to
swap arms fa U.S. ties~
loges held by pro?Iranian
extremists in Lebanon.
Has consistently, said he
knew nothing about the
diversion of money from
the Iran sales to the Ni?
caraguan contras.
Will not be a witness.
Two paramount issues
throughout the hearings
will be whether the pres-
ident was informed of
the diversion of funds
and whether he was
aware that White House
aides were supervising a
secret war in Nicaragua,
contrary to uxigressbnal
edicts.
ponald T. Regan
WhRe Rouse chief
of staff: 1985.87
Participated in key
I985-86 meetings on
the Iran arms inriahve
and managed White
House response after
the deal became public
Iasi November.
If he is a witness, he
will be questioned oahis?
earlier sworn testimony
that Reagan did not give
prior approval for the
transfer of arms to Iran
by Israel in September
1985.
Vla Ptrosldent Bush
Sat in on marry meetings
associated with the Iran
arms sales and, although
he wpported the inih?
alive, has said he raised
some doubts about it.
Bush also has been a
vocal supporter of the
contra program.
Unlikely to testify.
Donald P. Gregg
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Securely Affairs
A former CIA employe
who had ckue ties not
only to agenq personnel
involved in the contra
program but also to Lt.
Col. North.
Expected to be asked
about his relationship
with Felix Rodriguez, a
former CtA operative in?
volved in the contra re-
supply operation who
called Gregg immediate-
ly after the C123K air
transport carrying Eu?
gene Hasenfus was shot
down over Nicaragua
fast Oct. 5.
Peter J. Walllson
Former White House
counsel
Learned of the Iran arms
seal after it became
public and was assigned
by Reagan to conduct
initial White House in?
gwry.
7o be asked about
preparation of Reagan
for his controversial
news conferences and
appearances before the
Tower' iav`i~.t tidlard:`
Questions likely to focus
on the president's
changed testimony
about what he remem?
tiered about granting
original authority for Is?
raeli shipments to Iran.
George P. Shultz
Secretary of State
Finn supporter of the
contra operators who
agreed to have his dep?
lilies solicR $!0 milkon
in funds for Nicaraguan
contras horn the wltan
of Brunei. Did,not fdlow
up on how money was
used after deposit in
Swiss bank account.
Twice opposed arms
sales to Iran at White
House meetings but did
not pursue matter pri?
vately with Reagan. CrR?
icized by Tower board for
not pressing harder to
have operation reviewed
and terminated.
Expected to be ques?
boned about Brunei
funds and repeated fail-
ure to raise questions
about Iran arms program
with Reagan.
Elliott Abrams
Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter?American
Affairs
Served as the State De?
partment's print man on
managing the contra
program since July
1985, working closely
with Lt. Col. Oliver L.
North of the National
Security Council.
To be questioned
about his knowledge of
North's private network
and his role in soliciting
$10 million from the
sultan of Brunei on be?
half of the contras.
levels Tombs
Former U.S. ambassador
to Costa Rica
Told the Tower special
review board that, on
assuming his ambassor-
snip m July 1985, he
received instructions to
help the contras set up a
"southern front" from an
interagency group that
included Abrams and
North. Twice asked the
Costa Rican government
to allow a private contra
resupply operation 'td
use a Costa Rican air?
port near the Nicaraguan
border, according to
sources.
Not expected to tes?
bfy.
Edwle Meow III
Attorney General
Sat in on White House
discussions of presiden-
tial intelkgence autha?
ization fa arms sales to
Iran: provided opinions
that the operation was
krgal and that Congress
did not have to be in?
formed. At the request
of Pandexter, had the
F81 and Customs Service.
delay inquiries into
Southern Air Transport
Inc., which were part of
investigations into the
contra resupply system.
t.ater, im advance of
congressiotml floorings
into the ken operation,
Meese tlegen inquiry to
determine what hsd hap-
pened. During that in?
quiry, Meesa'S staff ~re~
covered memo at the
White House describing
plan to divert funds to
the contras from sales to
Iran. He subsequently
questioned North on the
matter.
Expected to be ques?
tinned about his inter-
vention in the FBI contra
inquiry and why he did
not bring the FBI in ear?
tier on his own investi?
gallon.
Wllgam H. Webster
Directoc,.Federat Bureau
of Investigation
At the request of Attor-
ney General Edwin
Meese III, Webster or-
dered adelay m an FBI
investigation of Southern
Air Transport's role in
the contra resupply op?
oration. Meese told Web?
ster that the investiga-
tion could endanger
"some sensitive hostage
negotiations now under
way."
Unlikely to be called
as a witness.
Wllllam J. (:asey
Oirecta of central intel?
ligence, 1981.87
Introduced a new activ
ism in CIA covert activ
ides to wpport the Rea?
gars doctrine of aiding
anticommunist faces in
the Third World. Encour?
aged development and
arming- of the Ni?
caraguan rebels to op?
pose the Sandinista re?
gime. CFA mirwmg of Nic-
aregua'e harbors. how.
ever, led to a tonQres-
sional cutoff of U.S. ndF?
nary assistance and the
beginning of a White
House-supp0r4ed prfveQa
network supplying the
contras.
Casey also permitted
his agency to become
involved m the Iran arras
initiative, after recagniz?
ing the president's ob?
sessan with freeing U.S.
hostages. Shortly before
the first public disclo?
suns last November,
Casey was informed by a
former business associ?
ate and CIA officials that
individuals financing the
arms sales believed they
had been cheated and
might make the issue
public.
He was accused bV
members of Congress of
misleading them on de-
tails of the Iran?contra
affair and hiding his
knowledge that funds
may have been diverted.
Removal of a cancerous
brain tumor in Oecember
and subsequent hospi?
tahzabon for compUca-
tions makes ~t almost
certain he will not be
able to testify.
Tomas Castllb (pseud-
onym)
Former CIA station chief
m Costa Rica
Assisted North in super-
vising arms drops to the
contras at a time when
Coggpali.?- pad,,,
any CIA info ih-pioJi in '
military aid to the cnn?
tras. Was reprimanded
after the Iran?contra af?
fair became pubkc.
Not expected to tes?
tify.
Robert M. tastes
Acting CIA Director
served under Casey last
year during the Iran op-
eration and received the
first indication from a
CIA analyst that funds
may have been diverted
from the arms sales to
the contras. With Casey.
he took this inforniatron
to the White House but
did not pursue it. Oirec?
led the preparation of
Casey's frcs~ testiomony
an Capitol Hill. which
was eatsidersd kicom-
pfete.
Not expMCted to tes-
tify:
Owns Clarldgs
CFA offiaal
Helped otgsntae the ~o~~
has wt 1981 and super-
vised theN activities
through 1984. Was
forced out of the contra
operation after Congress
reacted to the mining of
Nicaraguan harbors. In
December 1985, at the
request of the White
House, he arranged CIA
assistance for Israeli
shipment of Hawk an-
tiaircraft missiles to Iran.
Later, worked with North
on the secret NSC coun-
terterrorism panel.
If he appears as a
witness, wdl be ques?
honed about the contra
operation and his assist-
ance to the Israeli arms
shipment without re-
quired authorization.
Stanley Sporkln
former CIA general
counsel
Drafted the belated Iran
'finding" of January
1986, which included a
provision that the CIA
not inform Congress as
regwred. The finding
gave the CIA retroactive
legal authorry to assist
the NSC in the Iran
arms-for-hostages deals.
N~hecome a fed?
If he testifies, Sporkln
would be asked about
legal advice he gavk on
Iran and on the contras.
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Robert C. McFarlane
National security
adviser, 1983.85
Central figure in the Iran .
arms sales and U.S. as?
sistance to the contras.
Continued to provide
guidance for both oper?
ations after he left the
White House in Decem-
ber 1985, and made a
secret trip to Tehran in
May 1986 to exchange
arms for hostages.
Received reports dur-
ing 1985 from Lt. Col.
Oliver L North of the
National Security Coun-
cil staff on the soppy of
arms to the contras, ac?
cording to the Tower
report, but reassured
Congress that year that
North was' not violating
laws prohibiting U.S.
government from sup?
plying weapons. After
the Iran arms operation
was publicized, McFar-
lane initially tried to limit
disclosure of Reagan's
involvement, then tes?
tified before Congress
giving additional details
on the president's role.
Will be questioned on
details of contra oper? .
ation, including alleged
contribution from Saudi
Arabians. Will also be
asked for further expla?
nation of how the Iran
operations began and
continued.
Rear Adm. John M.
Poindexter
National security
adviser, 1985.86
Assumed management
of both the contra and
Iran arms operations af-
ter succeeding McFar-
lane in December 1985.
Came to the NSC staff
originally in 1981 as mil?
itary adviser and became
McFariane's deputy,
handling coordination of
covert operations and
serving as the note?taker
in meetings with the
president.
Took over manage-
ment of the Man arms
initiative alter McFarlane
resigned and assigned
prime responsibility to
North, who chaired the
NSC's counterterrorism
panel. Kept Secretary? of
State George P. Shultz
out of final drafting of
intelligence finding that
authorized arms sales to
Iran.
Was aware of the di?
version of funds from
the arms sales to the
contras. When McFar?
lane's trip was pubkcy
discktsed last November,
tried to keep Irari arms
program secret in hopes
of getting other hostages
heed.
To be questioned un?
der a granted of limited
immunity about whether
the president knew of
fund diversions, and how
much direction Reagan
gave in the Iran and
contra operations.
Oliver L North
lieutenant Colonel, U.S.,
Marine Corps
His title for most of his
more than four years on
the Natanal Security
Council staff hardly sug?
Bested power: "deputy
director, political-military
affairs." But he eventu?
ally became the point
maxi at the NSC for the
contra war in Nicaragua
and counterterrorism
initiatives.
As eery as September
1984. North was gearing
up ,to help the contras
ride out the loss of direct
U.S. military aid, which
became effective Oct. 1.
1984. His involverent
in private fund-raising
and operational support
for the contras deepened
steadily at the same
time that he was inti-
matey involved in plan-
ning the Iran arms sales.
The committees have
extensive documentation
of North's effort, which
will be used to question
him.
As yet, he has not
received immunity, al-
though the committees
plan to vote on the issue
in June. Under a deal
worked out with the in-
dependent counsel, who
was seeking as much
time as possible to de?
vebp his investigation,
North will not testify in
public before June 23.
Michael A. ledeen
National Security Coun-
cil consultant
Robert 1. Earl
Lieutenant Colonel, U S.
Marine Corps.
A veteran of Marine in?
telligence, he joined
North's counterterrorism
unit at the National Se-
curity Council in early
1986. Previously he
worked for Vice Presi?
Key liaison between the dent Bush's Task Force
NSC staff and the Is? on Combating Terrorism.
W n e 1 Met Expected to testify
4;`~IQ~ii5..4RFi51l~''~.'Ai~",~` #tlptrd
Minister Shimon Peres immunity. May. Piave the
m May I989, and re? most detailed knowledge
ported back to MCFar? of anyone at 'the NSC
lane on Israel's interest about North's activities
in selling arms to Iran as
away of improving re-
lations. later became a
contact with the arms
merchants who set up
the arms?for?hostages
deal with Iran.
likey to testify. To be
asked about his role in
establishing the initial
U.S.?Israeli contacts with
Iran.
in 1986, especially
North's possible use of
the counterterrorism unit
as a `cover" for Iran-
contra operations.
Fawn Hall
Secretary
As Oliver North's secre-
tary aL ~l'.5e?
curity Council, she as-
s~sted in the shredding
of key documents on the
night of Nov. Z1, 1986.
the day before North
was questioned about
the alk~ed diversion of
funds to the contras.
She has received lim-
ited immunity to testrfy
about the shredding.
May be questioned
about North's commu-
nications with the pres?
ident.
Continued
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6,
Arturo Gvs
Former contra loader
Resigned from the con?
tras' chief umbrella or?
ganization, United Ni-
caraguan Opposition
(UNO) after ttw scandal
broke, saying Calerp and
his wpportars refused to
share cOnt-ol over fi?
nances arks other mat-
ters. His invehrement in
the contra k~adership
was seen as crucial to
gaining. support from
congressmen who dis?
trusted the more conser-
vative Cakxo. Received a
37.000 montlty stipend
last year, which North
arranged.
Robert Owen
ConservatN@ activist
Acted as an emissary for
North in establishing a
private aid network for
the contras, particularly
m developing a second
front along the Ni-
caraguan?Costa Rican
border.
Expected to be ques-
tioned on how North se?
wetly directed the
contra program.
Rk,:hard R. MlNer
Public relations execu?
five
Directed a company, In?
temational Business
Commurncations (IBC),
that was hired by con?
servative fund-raiser Carl
R. (Spitr) Channell's
foundation to work on
Central American issues.
Through IBC, $1.7 mil-
lion in tax-deductible
contributions were fun?
neled to a Swiss bank
account used to buy mil-
itary equipment for the
contras.
If he testifies, he will
be asked about his deal-
ings with North and the
White. House, which as-
sisted Channell's fund-
raising efforts.
Formel- for gen.
eral
Played a prominent pub-
lic rate in raising money
for the contras. Arranged
a 35 million arms deal
for the contras in 19851
Met frequently with
North and CIA Director
Willian J. Casey.
To be questioned an
his contacts with North
and Casey and what
kind of direction, if any,
he received from them.
AdoMo Celaro
Contra leader
Civilian head of the con?
tras' largest military unit,
the Nicaraguan Demo-
cratic Force (FON). One
of three main contra
leaders. Oversaw the
contras' financial net-
work and arms pur?
chases during the two?
year ban on U.S. aid.
To be questioned on
the contras' finances,
his repeated claims that
the rebels received no
diverted funds and his
contacts with White
House officials.
Alfonso Robeb
Contra leader
Played a key role by de-
veloping, along with Ar?
turn Cruz, a moderate
faction within the contra
leadership. Received
$100,000, in a series of
payments arranged by
North, to use in political
activities in Central
America.
Not expected to tes?
tify.
Adrian Khaehoggl
Saudi Arabian financier
and awns dealer
Became involved in Iran
arms deals with Iran fol?
lowing May 1985 intro-
duction to Iranian mid-
dleman Manucher Ghor-
banifar. Says he put up
and lost millions of dol-
lars in the arms?for?hos?
tage deals that followed.
Says he had been hoping
to improve relations be?
tween the United States
and Iran and ultimately
his own business inter-
ests as well.
Unlikely to be called
as a witness.
Shlmort Peres
Prime minister and later
foreign minister of Israel
Met -with Michael Le-
deen in May 1985 in the
first known U,S.?Israeli
contact on Iran preced-
ing the arms deal. Re-
ferred Ledeen to several
associates who became
involved in brokering two
arms shipments to Iran
in August and November
1985.
Not expected to tes?
tify.
Manueher ~ihorbardfar
Iranian middk~rnan
Main contact between
Iranian and U.S. offi?
cials. He and Saudi busi?
nessman Adrian Kha?
shpt arranged financ?
ing -for several of the
arms deals, Continued to
serve as main U.S. con?
tact even after failing a
polygraph test.
Not expected to tes?
tify. Imrestigators have
interviewed him at
length in Europe about
his middeman role.
Oavld Klmebe
Israeli foreign ministry
official
Gkose contact in ~id~
1985 with national se?
curity adviser Robert
McFarlane. Recom?
mended the use of Iran?
ian middleman Manu?
char Ghorbanifar and
urged McFarlane to get
U.S. approval for the
sale of weapons to Iran
by Israel in hopes of
freeing U.S. hostages in
Lebanon.
Not expected to tes-
tify. ~
Amhara Nlr
Counterterrorism adviser
to Israel's prime minister
Chief contact between
the United States and
Israel on Iran arms sales
in 1986. Briefed Vice
President Bush in July
about the deals with
Iranian radicals. North
claims it was Nw's idea
to dhrert profits from the
Iran arms sales to the
Nicaraguan contras.
Not expected to tes?
tify. The Israeli govern-
ment has prepared a
report for the commit-.
tees on the involvement
of its citizens.
Ysaoov Nlmrodl and Al
SChlNlfnfrlef
Israeli arms dealers
Nimrodi served as a de?
fence attache in Iran and
Schwimmer is a top Is?
raeli aircraft company
official and close friend
of former Israeli prime
minister Shimon Peres.
Both dealt with Iranian
middleman Manucher
Ghorbanifar' in trying to
sell arms to Iran as early
as 1984. They were key
figures in the first two
sales of awns to Iran m
the fall of 1985, deals in
which millions of dollars
have not (peen traced.
Continue0
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Carl R. (Spits) Cbanrtell
Lobbyist, fund-raiser
Worked closely with
North in raising money
from private corrtntw?
tors, some of whom met
with President Reagan.
Used a taxexempt foun?
dation, the National En-
dowment for the Pre-
servation of Liberty, to
collect the money, at
koast $2.12 million of
which. went to bank ac-
counts used by the con-
tras to buy military
equipment. Became the
first person to tie con?
victed in the Irantontra
scandal, pleading guilty
Wednesday to conspiring
to defraud the U.S. gov
emment by depriving it
of tax revenues. If called
as a witness, will be
asked about White
House involvement m his
fund-raising activities.
Rkhsrd V. Seoord
Retired major general,
U.S. Air Force
Acted ss North's princi-
pal prnrete sector oper-
ator inboth. the contra
resupply effort and the
U.S.?Iran arms sales.
Working with his busi?
ness partner, Iranian-
American businessman
Albert A. Flakim, Second
established an extensive
prorate neMrork that
helped deliver arms to
Iran and arranged for
the purchase. and trans-
portation of weapons to
the contras. A Second
company received 59.5
miNion from a contra
bank account, part of
$33 million in payments
that investigators believe
was provided by .King
Fahd of Saudi Arabia.
He put two associ?
ales, Richard B. Gadd
and Robert C. Dutton,
in charge of the contra
rewpply effort that op?
snorted from bases in EI
Salvador and Honduras.
They were in charge of
hiring and maintaining
air crews, setting up
communications. leasing
and purchasing planes.
Second is expected to
be the leadoff witness,
having agreed to testify
voluntarily after previ?
otuly invoking his con?
stitutional right against
setf?incnmination. To be
questioned about the
origins of the private net?
work and possibly the
circumstances of -the
large Saudi payments to
the contras in 1984.85.
Both Dutton and
Gadd have received lim?
iced immunity and are
expected to testify.
Albert A. Hakim
Financier, deal?maker
The man who- knows
about the money. As
Second's business part-
ner, he served as finan-
cier, interpreter, and ne-
gotiator in many phases
of the U.S.-Iran arms-for-
hostages initiative. He
also helped set up, or
had access to,-key bank
accounts in Switaarland
from which arms sales
funds were diverted to
the contras.
Hakim, in Paris,
fumed over records of
Swiss bank accounts to
investigators and has
received limited immu-
nity. If he tesCrfies, ques?
lions are expected to fo-
cus on his knowledge of
the money trail.
Continue
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Sen. Orrin G. Hatch
(R?Utah)
SEATING IN THE SENATE CAUCUS. ROOM
Rep. Edward P.
Boland (D?Mass.)
Rep. Bill McCollum
(R-Fla.)
ORep. William S.
Broomfield (R?Mich.)
Rep. Thomas S.
Foley (D?Wash.)
Committee memt~ers have been assigned to \~ V Rep. Peter W.
.question specific witnesses. When theK Rodino Jr. (D-N.J.)
witnesses appear, members will move to
seats opposite the witness table.
Sen. William S.
Cohen (R-Maine)
O _ Sen. Paul S.
(bnti~ued
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CHRONOLOGY
Separate foreign
policy initiatives
eventually became
intertwined and led
to President
Reagan's greatest
crisis.
IRAN
March 1981
Reagan administration decides to
back anti?Sandinista rebels, also
called contras.
Dec. 8, 1982
Congress passes first Boland
Amendment, prohibiting use of U.S.
funds to overthrow the Sandinista
government
Nov. 18, 1983
Congress limits
contra aid to $24
million.
/?
Nov. 23, 1981
CONTRA CIA formally given control over aiding contras.
Jan. 23, 1984 '
Reagan administration places Iran
on.a list of countries subject,to
strict export controls, accusing
Iran of supporting international
terrorism.
Oct. 12, 1984
Congress passes second Boland
Amendment, banning direct or
indirect U.S. military assistance to
the contras.
August-September 1985
Folk~nrlitg secret discussions tk3hNeen U.S. and
15raelG offiCfels, first two planeloads of
Israeli-arranged arms are sent talran: National
security adviser Robert C. McFarlane tells Israel
tit the United States will replenish Israeli stocks.
June 12, 1985
Congress approves $27 million in
tiumamtanan aril for contras.
March 16, 1984 '
William Buckley, CIA station chief in Beirut,
is kidnaped and held hostage by Islamic
Jihad, pro?Iran Wloslem extremists. Efforts to
free Buckley become a top priority in the CIA.
May 8, _1984 The Rev. Benjamin Weir is kidnaped in Beirut.
Jan. 8, 1985
The Rev. Lawrence M. Jenco is kidnaped in
Lebanon, where he was director of Catholic
Relief Services, followed within a few months
by kidnaping of Terry Anderson, David P.
Jacobsen and Thomas Sutherland.
January 1985
Using money from private sources.
reportedly Saudi King Fahd, the contras
arrange to buy weapons through North
associate Richard V. Secord.
Jan. 17, 1986
Reagan signs a secret intelligence
finding authorizing arms shipments to
Iran and orders that it be kept secret
from Congress. First direct U.S. shipment
takes place the following month.
January 1986
Secord begins to put together an air
resupply operation to drop weapons to the
Contras.
ap-ll 1986
North writes a memo outlining plans
to use $12 million in profits from the
Iran arms sales on behalf of the
contras-the first clear link between
the Iran arms deal and the contras.
May 2S, 1986
Fortner national security adviser
Robert McFarlane flies to Tehran
with a shipment of spare parts,
hoping to negotiate release of
hostages. Mission fails.
June 26, 1986
Reversing the Boland Amenclrnent, Congress
approves $100 million in military and
humarntanan aril, to begin Oct. 1.
July 26, 1986
Nov. 3, 1986
Jenco is freed.
AI Shirra, a Beirut weekly, pubkshed
'
Aug. 3. 1986
Oct. 26.29. 1986
a story about MCFarlane
s visit to Tehran.
Shipment of
Shipment of arms to Iran.
weapons to Iran.
Jacobsen is released three days later.
Oct. 5, 1986 Nov. 25, 1986
C123K cargo plane, part of the resupply Meese disck>ses d+versron of funds. Reagan
operation set up by Secord, is shot down announces resignation of Poindexter, firing
over Nicaragua with cargo of weapons. Two of North.
American pilots killed; Eugene Hasenfus.
captured.
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