EVALUATION OF GERMAN AND SOVIET MISSILE RESEARCH PROGRAM AT KB NO. 3 IN KRASNOARMEYSK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-01030R000100410001-4
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• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 26, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
CONFIDENTIAL
This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title U. Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its We risnlieSion or reyclatlon of Its contents
to or receipt by an Unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
COUNTRY USSR (Moscow Oblast)
SUBJECT
DATE OF INFO.
PLACE ACQUIRED
Evaluation of German and Soviet Missile
Research Program at KB NO. 3 in
Krasnoarmeysk:
REPORT
DATE DISTR.
NO. OF PAGES
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26 April 1954
16 50X1-HUM
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
Comments.
Throughout this report, for Krasnoarmeyskiy read Krasnoarmeysk.
2, In paragraph 15, Professor Tshorniak is probably Professor Chernyak-
CONFIDENTIAL
STATE
x?-# ARMY
x#
NAVY
AIR gy
x#
FBI
AEC
OW SE
(Note: Washington Distribution Inrileatrd By "X"; Pahl nlitelhotion v "/11.
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COUNTRY
SUBIECT"
PLACE
ACQUIRED
DATE
ACOARRED
C 0 111I311TIAL
secuitint
elassecase.-
REPOT
USSR (Moscow Oblast)
a Ivaluation of German and Soviet Missile
Researoh rera at ZS No. 3 is
Krasnoarmsyskly-
DATE OF II
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
50X1-HUM
DATF. 5i:TR.6.114Ron
?NO. OF PAoES 15
NO. OF ENCLS.
041710 0110W)
SUPPLEMENT TO 50X1-HUM
REPORT TNO.
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INTRODUCTIOS
1. Isolation of the Soviet development programs has in the pest given rise
to mob false oonjecture on the Soviet Unionos capacity. Per example,
prior to the ear there were various conflicting theories An Germany
concerning the ssientifio development and particularly the applica-
tion of solemn to areament in the Soviet Union. On one brad it was
maintained that the USSR was extremely backward. On the other hand
for political er other reasons eke was pointed at with eve. In 1936
.as a result of the Spanish Civil Tar, Germs& scientific and armament
circles were able to penetrate the veil of secrecy guarding Soviet
development. At least they thought they had. German intelligence re-
ports based on Soviet equipment captured in Spain indicated that the
Soviet industrial capaelty was act capable of *retaining large scale
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Armament. This conclusion was based on the frequency with which
obvious makeshift oonatruotiens were encountered. There was only
one exception. Their?plaaes pointed to advances in design and
manufacture. The Germans Atettvered in the civil war that the
Soviets had developed a fighter plane (Rater) whioh way superior
to the average German plane used ever Spain and the Germans were
- forced to commit the?Masserschaidt fighter. But this limited,So-
viet success was quickly rationalized with:the 'comment that after
all this *as the product of foreign engineers whom the Soviets had
forYeare been assiduously enrolling in their development program.
? ? ?
- ? -
. .
2. ? Soviet building.of solid propellant missiles was not known in
? Germany.. After the outbreak of hostilities in 1941 the Germans
? entire consequently surprised to disnover that-the Soviets posseesed
.1 large number of please equipped .with launching devices for the
firing of airborne missiles indicating the Soviet 'capability to
Use the missile on &larger scale. Toto pure only a few mien/len
were aotually.ueed4 but the fact that iaunchtng devices had been
built into planes indicated a possiblelarGe scale niesile-threat.
. German scientific circles consoled themselves somewhat after the
? analysis of the first Soviet miesilee was made known. The tests
.showed that the Soviet miselles were net very effective since
their weight was high and their capacity low. The Germane obe
? served virtual triangular thrust time which could achieve only
about one-half of the acceleration obtainable with the use of a
more effective powder. Another oonsolatien wee the diecovery
that the Soviets were still using annealed material in their
combustion chambers. This apparently was because theAr .propel.
lents required a relatively high minimum pressure for full oom-
bUstion.
4. Another surprise of the wer was the "Stalin'Orgel" (multiple
rocket launcher) for use against ground troops. This Soviet
? "first" again arrived without the slightest warning from the
German intelligence services.
5. .On the Whole it was therefore possible to conclude a. The
Germans were repeatedly surprised by the Soviet capabilities in
the field ofapplied sotencee b. while the Soviets had not ad-
vanced technically beyond Germany.- it was nevertheless evident
that the Soviet military circles bad been more adaptive than the
German General Staff and had at a much earlier tine recognized
the utility of rockets and mieeilee. -For the issue under die-
(suasion, however the cardinal, point is the fact that the Germano
irepeatedly miscalculated Soviet ability in the field of armament
and scientific development, ?
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IMOSION AND PURPOSE OP GREW OFSCIALIATN Atoms IQ: 3
6. In the Soviet Union / was assigns* to KB No. 3, a newly organised
Soviet designing bureau. Upon the Germans' arrival the bureau was.
virtually bare of. *13. furnishing's required for. development work.
This did not improve very much over the six year period. /n view'
of the various surprises that the'Oermans.had.suffered, I expected
a reasonably veil equipped and staffed research installation. 2
had expected that they would at least.bewe,modern test stands, and
sensitive measuring methods. Instead I found netther. Repeatedly
the Germans learned that there things were far below German stand-'
ads'. FOrlhoeyhas the Germans worked side by side with Soviet en-
gineers within the KB Wo. 3. Avon during the period that the
himansworbetwith the Soviet engineers, they had. no opportunity
to obtain an insight into the General Soviet mission except for
the various assignments which were given to them. The Germans'
ability to-judge Soviet interest in military development became, of
course, still smaller when the separation between the Soviet and
German element within KS So. 3 vas effected in 1948. The Germans
in KB No. 3 then became a closely guarded unit which was separated
from their fellow Soviet engineers by bared doors and high fences,'
and fron.Ibe Soviet population in general by a form of xenophobia
and an official non-fraternisation policy.
7. The mission of the German engineers at NB No. 3 was to design in
the form of a "Skissen Projekt' weapons that satisfied given So-
viet tactical requirements. On the basis of these design studies,
the. Soviet engineers at ID No. 3 were charnel with making engineer-
ing improvement' to adapt the German design to Soviet industrial
capacity or specifications.
S. The Garnet engineers were required in some projects to design
certain parts in great detail and to perform comprehensive calcu-
lations on the ballistic characteristics of the designed missile.
This material, was often so complete that it was possible for
Soviet engineers of average caliber to complete the project. I
was in no position to tell to what extent this actually was done.
9. If this were the mission, the purpose of the Gorman engineers at
trasnoarmeyskiy was to train Soviet engineers in the methods of
technical development. Beyond this the'Soviettmight have hoped
that the German specialists would be able to offer new idea" on
missile development. I believe it possible that the Soil/eta
planned to use the Germans as a nucleus, for An additional and
new develoinent institute. Around this nucleus Soviet engineers
. would be collected, Who in ties were to absorb the functions of
the Germans until the Geran.nicleue,was.no longer required. In
this fashion an additional research and development institute
could be orgenised it arelitively small financial cost and with-
out diverting Soviet specialist" from other Soviet military proj-
ects. It must be. noted that this missionad apparent purpose
?
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sPPlied'specifioally to thelB NO. 3. Other Germans in the DiSR
were need for:Other .parposes.; nue, for example, a group of
Germans working inHa Soviet fine factory in Obranevka had.the
mission of reconstrUctiwa Gamin Tuse.ifuse No. 66),. going into
such detail As :AO Maktpossiblevthe actual pi-Station of the fuse
, ?
, ?
10. It X ai:oorriel at Io;theparpoee of the Germaa engineers at
KWIC. 3,thi:Ohief of KrEo.:3 was On the hOrns:of a dilemmut
It is .reasonabletite.aseuno that his superiors apt pressing for
news?that_the:Gormars had been repined, by. Wrists and that the
Sovietbiemeefef.10340. lima capable of datisfYing requirements
withoui_the did of:the-german specialistso toe this had been
achieved,. the' Germans ciould be separated from the Soviets and in
isolatiOnMould be given asoignments. ROW-9Tc.7 these two aims
can work. at cresteq)urposeb instead of complementing each other.
Por example, if,.tbe ohiet of?KB Noo 3, in order to show the ef-
ficienoy:of hip own Soviet engineers divorced tyrIS Germane from the
Soviets it an early periods the training of the.Soviste in German
,development methods was not fully realised0 xe,on the other hand,
too much time is spent in the training phase little contribution
can be expected from the Germans on raw designs.
11. ,There was another problem which faced the,direct.mx.A of ICB No. 3
and which probably faced every Institute Director in the Soviet
Union to Thom German specialists 40 been aseigned. In order to
accomplish the project requirements expeditiously and effectively, ?
' the Germans required 'Staten's data which the Soviets, however,
? withheldtroi them. Thus, for example, when working on the "Sokol"
project, the Germane required specifio.aerodynamte data, yet this
was not made available to them. Similar instances were repeated ,
frequently-during:the 'Germans, olx years in the Soviet Union. The
reason. for.' Soviet refusal was no doubt based on security consider-
ations. .This Soviet search for security constituted a great him-
drancejor;the !mans in their technical work and thus limphided,
one of,. the purpoees of thetr.stay in the USSR. -
SOVIET TECidadAi. PERSONNEL AT KB No.
12, There Wee aeliiith:ofequiPient at KS No. 3. The Soviet techni-
cal personnel. SOesign Bureau No. 3-came from Various quarters.
The skelettnietaff Of Soviete,whottogither with the German spec- .
lalisteeim:1946 orgnnited the KB No. 3, was obtained from the
nearbye,iringlange (841.2,F.Y0 later, the perecnnel consisted
predominately Of youthful' gradtatei coming direcly from engineer-
ing echoolea It S0 very possible that these young engineers
were sent to thflesign Bureau for. the purpose Of obtaining
praetidal experience in the various phases of missile develop-
ment and that. they were destined tp specialize in missile work
in the future.., : Theme young engineert are the Soviets who were
generally referred to as "inginieur" or "Inginieur-Teehniter" by
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the, German specialists. Their nuaber at the KB No. 5 tete 12-15.
These graduates had a nine ear education feat:Wed by a formal
technical education,lasting between three aid" four'yeare. Very
often thisiformal training period was interrupted by' aeperiod of
practical training ia an industry. The youneekkgineers at KR It0;3
were eonewhat older than what miehttba expected. Thitimay be due
to the interruptiowit studies. caused by vat service. Details, of
etheit formal training are not known/to me. While 1 have nflee
tails on the study program in the tethnioalschoolss the Germs;
specialists. were often sneezed by the elaboratepess.of.the oneerio;.
alum. For example, complex stress'relationships were taught on
a relatively low level and in great detail. The Germans. there-
fore concluded, that the present generation of graduates would be
in a position to do good work. However the Germans were often
dismayed to find that graduates with? this background were not in
a potation to apply in practice their theoretical knowledge,
13. While I believe that the young Soviet engineers received their
first specialized training for missile wee* at EB No. 39 the
Design Bureau was not organized as a "school' in the ordinary
meaning of the word. There were no reguLar classes, nor was
there, a periodic turnovers or a defined period that the engineers
had to serve at the KB No. 3. Some engineers remained there for
as long as five years. I did not know the policy which governed
the assignment of the graduate students to the Design Bureau.
The relatively low caliber of the young engineers makes it un-
likely that aptitude governed their selection tc missile devel-
opment.
14. In summary the Soviet graduate engineers that I encountered were
often theoretically well e4u4pped but seldom, if ever, capable
of applying this knowledge to the practical Problems that faced
them in design work.
15. Aside from a few ieolated cases, the Soviet engineers with whom
I worked in KB No. 3 did not seem to possess creative ability
and tried to compensate for this lack by increased meticulous-
nese. -Another characteristic which I observed among the Soviet
engineers was the frequency: of attempts to plagiarize the con-
tribution of,others and take credit for work which they had not
? performed themielves. Characteristic of the mediocre engineers
at the:Design Bureau (of the caliber of FRIEDMAN) was their con-
cern with.O4vancemente This desire for improvement was not so
much in connection with applied engineering or the obtaining of
knowledge through gradual experience9-but rather in the forth of
formal study. The fact that the Soviet /Chia' study places a.
disproportionate emphasis on such subjects as philosophy or
political theory does not. make the Soviet engineer any more cap-
able in engineering. It may be symptomatic of the Soviet Union
that engineers of average caliber will seek to advance not by
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way of technical profi?iency, but rather through the study of
Marxism. Even high caliber engineereusuch as Professor TSNORN-
ISE, specialist in kinematics in Moscow, found it necessary to
give a political testimonial as a preamble to their publications.
AO part of my estimate of the Soviet engineers and in view of the
'apparent purpose of the German reecialiets at KB No. 3 (i.e.,
training of Soviet engineers), it is interesting te mote the at-
titude.of.the mediocre and lower ranking Soviet engineers, tech-
nicians and workers to the Germane. There were same Soviets who
exhibited great interest in learning the German methods of de-
sign and their approach it solving engineering problems when ap-
pbed to missiles. On the other hand, there vas a very large
!Weber of Soviets who seemingly disregarded the Germane. As a
result of the official indoctrination, they felt that the Soviet
WAO an inventor and that the Soviet was superior to all other
nationals in technical matters. The German approava, this group
thought, was too complicated, while the Soviets could solve
technical problems' with greater simplicity. On the whole, it
'appeared to be beneath the dignity of this greiszo :;o approach the
German specialists with any requests for infereateon, This
rod') was found only among the mediocre technician.
16. At this point I made the interim conclusion that if all institutes
for the development and research in the Soviet Unice were equipped,
? staffed and operated as the KB No. 3 in Krasnoarmayskiye the last
we* would have been over before the first tank had left the draw-
ing boards. he fact is, however, that they did have tanks and
that they do have the atomic bomb. The obvione ooncineion there-
? fore' is that the personnel at the KB No. 3 were not representa-
tive of the research personnel available to the Seeelet Union. AL
iiipleexplanation for this contradiction is of aoaree, deception.
Another explanation might be obtained from the following parallel.
In the early thirties many steel mills were rapidly oonstruoted
inetie Soviet Union. Often this was (Woe with the aid of German
141_04:60sal ente4rieee that had sent their epeciallete to the
?/Whet Union. Upon their return they offered are their consensus
of technical opinion that it would be imposeible for the Soviet ,
Union to smell -high quality steel because the imperities of the
standard :steel were such as to make it unsuitable for farther
refinement. Thie:opinion, may have been eorrect for the timflhat
the pleats were commencing operation. After the foreign apeoial-
ieite:lefti the Soviets, however, did not mark time, but gradually
improved the quality as they gained experience. Similarly, if I
were to, base my evaluation of the Soviet development program on
my observations in Trasnoormeyekly, I would commit the same error
that the returning steel epociallete:committed in the early
thirties. Another mistake which is often made In regard to the
Soviet Union IS the belief that the Soviets for Lemons of pres-
tige-must-of necessity show the world that it is not backward. ;
? On the contrary, it would seem just as likely that the Soviet Union
thinks to profit more by deceiving the world into believing that
it Li technically backward. The historical parallel here, of
(mune,. it the Soviet-Finnish war.-
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GERMAN CONTRIBUTION TO SOVIET MISSILE DEVELOPMENT
1,
Calculation ?recess for the determination of various influences on
target dispersions
17. I thought that thie,process Plaice was developed by the German spe-
cialists, BACEMAMN, TAEUBERT-audemyself vac new to the Soviets
and had not been known in Germany.' I refer to the process by
which estimates are made on the hit probabilLtye taking into ac-
count the influences duo to inaccuracies such ae ?Monter thrust
of the jet, or the' off-center of air forces resulting from as-
eymietry in manufacture.
Multiple shock diffusion
18? The oblique compression shack at different pressure intervals is
very sensitive to variations in epeed. In Krasnoarmeyekly.
Dr. TROMMSDORP for a long while sought to find the shape at
which the compression wave'ves absorbed as parallel. ee possible.
This material on aerodynamic and"thermodynemic provedures at
supersonic speeds was c011eeted by TRONESDORF in the form of
tables so that for every ;sham he could graphteally find the
applicable relations and that in a relatively short tine obtain
the exact flow relationships around a body. This work was ad-
dressed of course to a specific requirement. However Dr. TROMMS-
DORP9e Study was of such a nature as to make it universally ap-
plicable.
19. It must be noted here that the only problems that remained an the
project 0Fluee" in Berlin during 1945 and 1946 was the qnestion;
of the drag of shaped bodies and how much air would flow through
the interior of such a bodye (The original design in Berlin had
been based on simplified mathematical formulas which gave the
performances of the propulelen unit at various altitudes and at
different Mach numbere. ?beim simplified formulae, however,
could 'give nothing more than' the appreximats dimensioee of the
overrel/ missile.) I as certain that with the aid of the TROMMS-
DORF material and using the design which tte Gernaee sepplied at
GEMA during 1945 and 1946, the Seviets ehoeld be capable of pro-
ducing the "Muse missile, i.e., independently eatiefying the
requirements that were given to the Germane shortly after the war
in Berlin. This is true in spite of the fact that the Soviets
obviously distrusted the validity of TROMMSDOICPs work.
Demote control missile
20. Iethought that the Soviets received a considerable most from
the Germans in the field of remote 'outvote through their work
on the "Rawl" Missile at KB Wo. 30 They evinced much interest
in the-msiseileteand I thoeght that they generally received valu-
able advice on questions of aeredynamiat and de-ign.
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POMO of current foreign technical litgature
-
29. .legaxding'tiohnical literatarei no written. reference material was
? ,a4eilabla upon the German.,:arrilal at ip ito. 3. the Germans'
were'requetted.to drai-up:11*ts qf eaterial needed ih a library.
,IA?tha.Courwof the sisuingleare,' many volumes arrived. The
librarrwi* by no sew oepplete Particularly' needed were text*
. on contour keasurepents at'slbsonic and supersonic speeds, end
.also aerodynamic measurementi for cylindrical and ogival?bedies.
? In *dation, the German specialists were required to carry 'out
ditail.designing work which could have been more. economically
? performed by assistants; also, there were few labor-saving de-
floes and an insufficient number :of aseistants.
SOCIAL'ATIOSPIOMI
50. the Soviets mild have Dade much more efficient use of the Ger-
man specialists if their method of treatment had been different.
:
As it was the Martens always felt like prisoners. There was, for
example., the interdiction against free movement. The Germans
. ? were.permitted to move without escort only in the radius of a
.short walk from their residence. All other travel, however re-
quired the presence of a Soviet from the AND section of littenoars
miyekly. In addition the Soviets apparently carried out i non-
fraternisation policy which gave the Germans the feeling of being
pariahs. This of course affected the Gomm bachelors who'reund
? that,eeeh time they had formed a liaison with.. Soviet girl, the
girl would soon disappear. It ia interesting to note that this
Soviet method in human relations had ht.iisel a tether bettering
.effect. The specialist, BOUM, for steeple, had arrived in the
:Soviet Union resolved to view the @yetis objectively and became
bitterly disappointed Strangely enough the Germans had all
one to: the Soviet Union prepared to look kindly on the loiiet
? Ireton as a result of the possible exaggerations of props- 50X1-HUM
?-.4adda and the fine ispreision'eade. by some Soviet frin-gieee-relin ?
merlin. 'The Germans,:diseppointaiet during the six years in the
? Seviet.Snion, however;, was such that they felt the Goebbel props-
? gateman not exaggerated.
31. .4;regard to social ataospherep.a very important point was the
uncertainty Which aurrounded the,44imans,' 'work relationship.. At
the tile Of my conscription in.Dorlin, /4as summoned to a? gram
of. Soviet generals who told me that a contract had been drawn up
.forte And other German specialists to work in the Soviet Union
for two to three years, or at the most, five yeare; at a'sslarY of
? moo' rubles per month, And that the salary would be changed at an?
? . **Rectally favorable rate.of'exchange. The contract contained
,olauses.on.special living-qUarters and the Germans' work relations
? Ship-was'eUtlined in. regard to social sedurify, etc. The Gerson
wire *Wier able to meke use of this contract while in thi Soviet
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Union. Upon our arrival in Putilovo the Germans proposed a new
contract because the Berlin document had not been sufficiently, de-
tailed and had not provided for emergency cases such as the death
of the provider9 etc. This the soviets rejected. When the Ger-
mane asked for contract Clarification, the%Soviets would evade
their queetions or become surly commenting that the Germane had
come to the USSR to work and not to:play. In some institutes the
treatment wai still more drastic, and this question was answered
With the:threat that the first echelon of Germans was being tried
in Rueriberg and would be hangedvend that the second echelon etas
in the .USSR -andhad to work.
32. StillYanother-nethod was used by theloviets to-foil our requests.
Shorn:rafter the Germans' arrival in Krasnoarmeyskiy, the So-
? viets announced the salaries of the German specialists. Accord-
ingly I was to receive 8,000 rubles per month. In view of this
? great increase over the contractual salary of Berlin, I wae AO
longer in a position to pursue the campaign for a special contraci
covering work conditions.
33. The conclusion therefore is that ths Soviets did not exploit the
Germans efficiently and had they worked six years in Germany,
they would have been able to perform 50 per cent more, although
the direction that their work took in tho Soviet Union was the
direction it would have takeassormally. Furthermore even the Ger-
man mission of training Soviet engineers was not carried out by
the Germans as an effective exchange of information between the
German specialists and. the inexperienced Soviet technicians 'Pere
prevented by Organizational policies.
DESIRABLE ABD UNDESIRABLE-FEATURES OF SOVIET DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
34. One technological aspect which the Germans found relatively far
progressed in the Soviet Union was the purely theoretical estima-
tion of the hit probabilityyand particularly the study of the
effect of manUfacture On target aocUrady. :FOr_example, menu-
faoturing wee/Sion wee strictlycodifiod into four or more
classes. Assuning clais III to be more Precise than class IV?
the Soviets Were in a position to pees the questions If in
place of category 1119 Ate precision category IV is used9 how
many.manhours will be economized and conversely; how much more
fire is required with the poorer performance in order to accom-
plish the effect of the higher grade manufacture?" This devel-
opment interested the Germane since they had not encountered
this in Germany where the industry was assigned a reasonable
tolerance and their calculations .simply assumed-this given tol
eranoe. If the tolerance did not offer outfit:lent accuracy,
the manufacturers tolerances were simply more circumscribed.
In the Soviet Union this experimentation-apparently has been
.discarded in favor of tne. codification of norms which make pos-
sible a theoretical treatment with' various different classes.
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? Such, a Mathematical treatment was required of the Germans on
every project they worked on.at EB No. 3. The category usually
required1er the German missile work was Grade III, which roughly
.compares with the German fine fit. Details are no longer known
tome.
35. An institution which I found widely distributed in the Soviet
Union and which I considered valuable Was? the technical soviet.
:An individual, group, enterprise or institute, wishing to en-
kgage in a new project must.first?preennt the basic ideas and?
?principles in front of a larger, gathering 6f technicians and
.other interested parties. To some extent, this prevents the
. misappropriation of funds of human resources on fantastic or,
;.unxealizable schemes. I felt that many of the numerous pro-
jects, which dispersed .and side-tracked German wartime acien-
: tine manpower and other. resources, would not have been par-
end had the proposals first been reviewed by such a panel of
. interested parties.
36. The Germans found upon their arrival in the Soviet Union in
1946 that large quantities of technical literature were in cir-
culation among the populace dealing with, missile development.
In-Germany this knowledge had not yet been distributed in the
form of text books or journalo. The Germans bad treated such
i
material either as military secrets or as industrial secrets of
the various plants engaged in missile develophent.
37. The latter, however, was not an unmixed blessing, especially in
the Soviet Union where the wide distribution of the publications
on elementary missile development seemed to lead to an unimagin-
ative.standardization. Insofar as publicized methods become ac-
, ; ()opted as, a.standard sine qua non, they lead to mediocre design.
Thie.tendency is especially strong in the Soviet Union where it
is feared that a failure in using a new approach can result in
the accusation of sabotage or at beet in a. reduction of salary.
Consequently this leads to an acceptance of the old tried and
proven,. althoughthe old_ney_rasult An relatively, poor perform-
ance.
38.1. This check ofinitiative gang of course, be compensated for by
the establishment of special institutes whose sole function is
the searoh.for innovations. That such institutions exist seems
to be borne out by the comments made by Soviets at KB No. 3 rho.
would at times block the German theoretical investigations with
the remark,, that "we (KB No. 3) are not a research institute.
Our'wOrk iito.supply:concrete development.". It is clear that
this meant for the Germans to apply the tried and proven in our
designing projects.
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39. Another detrimental .feature which I had alluded to earlier was
the present government indoctrination program. Accordingly all
discoveries are ultimately traced to the Soviet nation. This
leas to the delusion among many Soviets that they know every-
thing better than everyone else. Even the dullest will aCtxtru-.
ally resist studying the Mork-of others in the belief that the
Soviete can do better, This indoctrination is, of course, not
taken seriously by the. government which cynically organized a .
vast. translation staff in Mbeicow.for the sole purpose of trans-
lating western technical literature into Russian in order to ex-
tract and apply western discoveries in their own work.
PRIORITIES IN MISSILE DEVELOPMENT ASSIGNED BY SOVIETS
40. Judging from the assignments handled by the German specialists
at KB No. 3 and on the basis of the interest evinced by top
Soviet engineers and also on the basis of the relative urgency
with which the projects were treated, ,I would like to draw the
following conclusions regarding over-all Soviet interest in
missiles. Again I warn that "urgency" is a very poor criteria
for this purpose, since the Soviets emphasized urgency with
every assignment they issued to the Germans. This seems to have
been, however, only a device designed to speed up the work of
the Germans and not necessarily a criteria for the relative, im-
portance of the various projects.
41. Of highest priority was the "Sokol" missile. This missile was
remote controlled, and I believe a special oommittee with vir-
tually limitless funds exists in the Soviet Union for the devel-
opment of controlled missiles. I base this on the fact that
when the Germans began working on Rheintochtor in GEMA? Berlin,
they suddenly had at their disposal much greater financial and
human resources than earlier. At that time, I was told that
.this specific project (Rheintochter) was supervised by a "spec-
ial committee." I also learned at the time that even unskilled
workers assigned on the remote control missile projects received
higher wages for the same work thak did others working on non-
controlled, projects. I can give no further information on this
"special committee" except that this committee may have farmed
'out the preliminary work on "Sokol" to the Ministry of Agri-
cultural Machine Building; i.e., NB No. 3, and that the "Sokol"
project reverted back to the central commission after the com-
pletion of the Germans' work. This, however, is pure conjec-
ture. Of interest might be the comment of the chief of KB No. 3
in regard to "Sokol", Re stated that the German design was very
modern and that it mirrored the development stage of 1954a He
stated however, in characteristic Soviet manner that in the fu-
ture he expected designer from the Germans that would reflect the
world development level of 1956 and 1957. This comment was made
in 1948.
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42. Next in priority came the ABRS 220. I base ebte high proetty
partly on the fact that parallel - -k on,thie orOect was enducted
in another exclusively Soviet ito4AMak Sineu the 300 ea ang
Magazine tissue wee virtually a variation cf the SERB 220 I Cloveit.
that it itio had equally high priority. Next in'order were the
witolnya" and "Zenith" missiles.
43. A weapon-for.the effective combatting of planes from the air prob-
ably da not exist in the Soviet Union prior to.1946. ' Therefore
the great interest of the Soviets was-in the R-100-BS (reconstretoted -
in Berlin) and. its variants0.the SUES 220 and the 300 am Ring Maga-
tine mishits?. The Soviet interest and probable parallel work on
the 300 ma-magazine missile JO evidenced by the actual flight tests
of this missile which I accidentally Observed over Krasnoarmeyskiy
during the year 19490 FUrthermore the Soviet concentration on air-
to-air weapons is documented by the interest shown in the automatic ' ?
rocket.
44. The Soviets did not have an effective ground-to-air missile against
bombers, and generally speaking the development of controlled mis-
siles has not as yet found an effective solution in the USSR.
based this on the announcement the Soviets made to 14449 that the
Germans voi4d have to resume work on the ?Zenith" missile with some
changes in tactical requireeente. This announcement same one whole
year after the Germans Dad turned in their work on that missile dur-
ing which time I thought the report was pigeon-holed mnd not for-
warded hy the chief of KB No. 3. This intended revival of the
"Zenith! project (which was never realized) seems to reflect Soviet
weakness in ground-to-air missiles, especially since the German ver-
sion of "Zenith" incorporated rather expensive features in regard
to materiel expendituree. The German specialiste had always re-
garded the requirements of the !Zenith" as M tzar:elec.:Ty solution
until an effective remote-controlled weapon was available, since the
extreme altitudes of the latest planes make the hit probability of
a "Zenith" like missile relatively poor.
45. I believe that until 0. least 1948 the Soviets did not have an air-
born weapon against armored ground targets such'as tanks. I base
this on the belief that the Soviet element within EB No. 3 Worked
on the Kolnya Project until 1948. After the German specialists had
completed their work on the "Melnya", the Soviets in KB No. 3 con-
tinued to work on the project. independently of the German special-
ists. While the Germans had worked on the prsiect, they had des-
paired of finding a solution to the problem of picking up, tracking
and aiming at the target. The fact that the Soviets, tn spite of -
this blank in the design, continued to work on the project "Zenith"
may indicate that they did not have a satisfactory weapon for air-
to-ground? purposes.
46. Soviet interest in an anti-tank weapon with larger ranges is evi-
denced by their repeated assignments of "Panzerfaust" erojeotsle
the SCHAATT-BOERN Group at KB No. 3. I remember that C., weight re-
quirements of the Soviets gave the German Orsup great difficulties.
Concerning its tactical nature I can only remember that it was to
be used by infantry and that it was to be operated by one man. The
Soviets aiso insisted on the use of shaped charges for this weapon.
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47. The'verk of TROV883033/ on ramjets inter-
ested the Sovietej. and 'T cat, that parallel work. was performed'by-
thei alchObie 4!OetailsfthoweVer, are not known to me.
48. In.1943?ine'SoVietsserelforhedlo usi-tigh:tede material bi.;;2?t;
? cense they were still using very high no pressures in the ;tie*
%Of 300,03moiPheresqn their,00ebeetien chambers. Thus;tbd:coet'
of maeUfecture'prevented the Soviets trot making large numbers
of missiles..Itorevements isreleadli;:hOwevert and upon
rival _in the USSR in 1944,:we.Atere 4Ten'prope4int peider'etiele
that posiested-cOmbustion,,chamber preeeeree -in the range '.cit 1.00f,''
to 130 itmospheres.! . , . .,?.
Al. In spite'of these improvements the:stage of.lotiet.miesili'de4.'
yelopment at the end of the war was comparable to the earlr.' y
siteged.-0-silehemisikile,development.readhed In 1936 and 1937. I
am in no position to maio any eoikents" on?Soviet,missAle advances
after 1945, etoeptfor-the.fee liferences,thgt I have Made earlime,
? . /
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