WEEKLY SUMMARY NUMBER 38

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 18, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
1
I WEEKLY SUMMARY
38
Number
18 FEB 1949
Nelittnt No. MOP
NO CHANGE in Class. r-1
VECLASSIFIED
&ass. CHANGED TO: TS S
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
kith: DD,4 ETJ. 77/1763
bate: ?It By: 04,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
1. This publication contains current intelligence exclusively
and therefore has not been coordinated with the intelli-
gence organizations of the departments of State, Army,
Navy, and Air Force.
2. This copy may be either retained, or destroyed by burning
in accordance with?applicable security regulations, or
returned to the Central Intelligence Agency.
fP 510
4tz-ge
5--6, 4 17
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
SECRET
CONTENTS
HIGHLIGHTS...
Page
? ? ? ?*t. 0 OOOOO ? 0 e . I
WESTERN EUROPE 2
EASTERN EUROPE ...... 5
NEAR EAST-AFRICA 8
FAR EAST 10
WESTERN HEMISPHERE 14
ARTICLES
The Plight of the Arab Refugees 15
Soviet Plans for East German State 17
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
SECRET
HIGHLIGHTS
Developments concerning the Atlantic Pact reached
a new stage during the past week when western European
public opinion began to exhibit marked concern over the
?exact position of the US on the military provisions of the
Pact. Soviet propagandists were quick to seize upon these
uncertainties as they continued their aggressive campaign
against the Pact (see page 2). Meanwhile, the rumors which
continue to emanate from Finland concerning Soviet plans
for military action in the Scandinavian area are probably
a related phase of this propaganda campaign.
The Chinese situation is continuing its Fteady deterio-
ration as the consequence of the disintegration of Nationalist
political unity and the flat refusal of the Communists to com-
promise on their harsh peace terms (see page 10). The con-
fusion in Nationalist China, increased by Chiang Kai-shek's
behind-the-scenes activities, is giving impetus to the estab-
lishment of semi-autonomous regimes in non-Communist
areas.
The continuing Argentine economic-political crisis
will probably not result in President Peron's resignation,
but is likely to force some of his close political associates
out of office (see page 14). Although Peron apparently has
found a temporary political solution for the present crisis,
the basic economic and labor problems remain.
1
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
SECRET
WESTERN EUROPE
Atlantic Pact In continuing its aggressive propaganda attack
against the Atlantic Pact, the Kremlin has
asserted that French adherence would "trample on" the
Franco-Soviet Treaty of 1944. This approach suggests that
the USSR may be preparing to renounce its treaties with
France and the UK and possibly also bring the issue of the
Atlantic Pact before the UN as a threat to peace. During the
coming weeks, the USSR probably will intensify its efforts
both to divide and intimidate prospective Pact members, at
the same time attempting to prove the needlessness of any
such "aggressive" alliance against the USSR. In addition to
Norway, the USSR will probably concentrate its attacks on
such vulnerable countries as Denmark, Iceland, France, and
Italy. Soviet propaganda will point to delays in concluding
the Pact in an effort to contribute to the general anxiety con-
cerning US intentions to support militarily its western Euro-
pean allies.
FRANCE
German Policy Although prospects for tripartite agreement
on western Germany have improved some-
what as a result of Foreign Minister Schuraan's recent assur-
ances of increased French cooperation, settlement of the many
outstanding issues involved in establishing a west German
state will still be difficult Hypersensitive fear of a strong
Germany will continue to make the French reluctant to accept
the US and British position on such matters as the proposed
tripartite control mechanism,
the status of Berlin in the new
state, and the introduction of the western mark in Berlin.
Schuman's recent assurances therefore, although minimiz-
ing Communist and Gaullist chances to exploit the German
-2
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
SECRET
FRANCE
Issues, will not cause an immediate or substantial reduction
In French efforts at London to press for an acceptance of
French views. In the matter of voting procedure for the
tripartite military control authority, the French have appar-
ently agreed that the US shall have a predominant voice in
issues of foreign trade and finance; however, they are attempt-
ing to obtain a veto power for the French military governor
by insisting upon unanimous agreement in matters of "funda-
mental" occupation policy, such as security problems and
amendments to the German constitution. .The French also
desire the right of appeal to home governments on lesser
questions when the three occupation powers disagree. Further-
more, the French oppose the inclusion of the western zones
of Berlin in the new west German state; will only reluctantly
and as a last resort agree to the introduction of the western
mark as the sole currency for the western sectors of Berlin;
and will continue to press for a decentralized German govern-
ment
GERMANY
Cartel System Growing resistance by German politicians
and business men to attempts by AMG to
establish "free enterprise" may eventually lead to a revival
of the pre-war cartel system in Germany. Private business
Interests as well as political and economic leaders in the
Laender governments are effectively nullifying AMG policy
directives. The newly created "Functioning Economic
Agencies" have assumed control over imports, exports, and
distribution of raw materials, all hitherto administered by
the occupying powers. These German agencies are domi-
nated by the trade associations and possess almost unlimited
powers to restrict trade practices. Moreover, despite AMG
- 3 -
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
?1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
SECRET
GERMANY
directives abolishing all requirements for business licenses
except those necessary to protect public health and safety,
German legislators have thus far delayed amendbla laws
requiring anyone who desires to open a new business or to
enlarge an old one to prove his financial and personal relia-
bility and to demonstrate the economic need for such an
enterprise. Continuation of these German practices will
create conditions which would greatly facilitate the growth
of the pre-war cartel system.
ITALY
Government Weakness Although De Gasperi leadership
during the past twelve months has
enabled Italy to hold the line against inflation and to avoid
any worsening of the serious unemployment problem, the
Government has given no evidence of planning a bold, compre-
hensive program of legislative action to advance the general
public welfare. Some phases of agrarian reform have been
discussed in Parliament and the Cabinet has promised to
examine fundamental legislation on this subject; no early
action can be expected, however, because of disagreement
within the Christian Democratic Party and opposition to
this and other reform measures from both the extreme
Right and the extreme Left. No program appears to be in
preparation for reorganization of the tax system and of
state-subsidized industries. More generally, the Govern-
ment appears unable to view such individual problems in
their relationship to an integrated solution. Another
measure of Government inactivity is its failure to develop
a program for effective utilization of US aid to speed long-
range economic improvements.
-4
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
I
UN Activity Withdrawal of the USSR, the Ukraine, and
IByelorussia from the UN World Health Organi-
zation (WHO), rather than indicating a Soviet intent to leave
the UN, probably reflects a tightening of security measures
11 and a genuine Soviet doubt regarding the benefits of continued
participation. Although the USSR expressed dissatisfaction
with the heavy expenses of membership and asserted that the
Iorganization's aims had been altered, the Soviet decision to
withdraw was apparently prompted by: (1) fear that Soviet
I medical technicians and scientists attending WHO conferences
may be contaminated and defect to the west; (2) desire to avoid
further "deviations" by Soviet scientists within the USSR
Ifrom the doctrine of Soviet supremacy in biological and medical
science; and (3) reluctance to permit western WHO personnel
I to enter the Soviet Union. Although the other Satellite repre-
sentatives have not yet indicated whether they will follow the
Soviet lead, the Yugoslav president of WHO has demonstrated
I his readiness to work independently with the western repre-
sentatives and will probably remain at his post.
IChina Policy Soviet desire to keep the Chinese Commu-
nists "in their place" is indicated by the
I arrest on a charge of espionage of Anna Louise Strong, an
American journalist who is well-known for writings favor-
able to the USSR and the Chinese Communists. Although
I most of Miss Strong's recent writings on China have been
shunned by the Soviet-Satellite press, her articles have been
prominently featured in Yugoslavia, where there is some
Idisposition to regard Chinese Communist Leader Mao Tse-
twig as a potential dissident, similar to Tito. Miss Strong
I reportedly was refused an exit visa to travel to China via
Vladivostok, but expressed to US officials her determination
to proceed to Chinese Communist territory despite this Soviet
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
SECRET
EASTERN EUROPE
SOVIET UNION
- 5 -
II
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
SECRET
SOVIET UNION
opposition. Her arrest as an "intelligence agent" and her
deportation from the USSR seem calculated not only to dis-
credit her in Communist circles generally but also to dis-
courage Mao Tse-tung or Tito from welcoming her. Miss
Strong's attitude toward the Chinese Communists has appar-
ently negated some 25 years of propagandizing the Soviet
cause. Soviet leaders also probably consider her too closely
identified with the old Communist propaganda claim that the
Chinese Communists are independent of Moscow. This line,
In view of the vastly increased power and prestige of the
Chinese Communist Party, has become potentially unreward-
ing for the Kremlin and will probably be abandoned soon.
HUNGARY
Financial Crisis The USSR may be forced to grant a
foreign-exchange or gold loan to Hun-
gary, as has been done recently for Czechoslovakia, in
order to bolster the Hungarian financial position and to
forestall serious retardation of Hungary s industrial pro-
duction. Hungary's critical foreign exchange position has
been caused chiefly by: (1) increased orientation of ex-
ports to the USSR; (2) deliveries on account of reparations
to the USSR; and (3) use of hard currency reserves for
western imports.
GREECE
Military Situation The psychological effects of the dis-
missal of General Markos, as well as
local military developments are providing the Greek Army
with a unique opportunity for effective action against the
- 6 -
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
SECRET
GREECE
guerrillas. The signs of dissension within the Communist
ranks which marked the ousting of Markos seem to have
lowered guerrilla morale and improved that of the Greek
Army, which has been further heartened by the windup of
the prolonged anti-terrorist campaign in the Pelopomiesus.
Moreover, the larger guerrilla concentrations now being
led by Zachariades will provide the Greek Army with a
better opportunity for effective operations. Although
the army's slow action permitted the guerrillas who seized
Karpenision to withdraw with some 2,000 forced recruits,
the army has shown new spirit in its successful defenses of
Serrai and of Florina, from which some 4,000 guerrillas
are now in retreat. A newly effected revision of command
structure for northern and central Greece may facilitate
more rapid action against future guerrilla raids. These
army advantages, however--both psychological and.tactical--
will be only temporary unless the army can utilize them more
vigorously, without becoming overconfident.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
SECRET
NEAR EAST-AFRICA
Rhodes Deadlock As the Egyptian-Israeli armistice nego-
tiations at Rhodes enter the second month,
agreement appears to be as far aim as ever. The UN Acting
Mediator's proposals for a compromise were accepted with
minor changes by Egypt but were rejected by the Israelis, who
are outspoken in their determination to impose a "victor's
peace." Meanwhile, although several of the other Arab states
have tentatively agreed to initiate negotiations with Israel,
their full agreement is contingent upon successful conclusion
of the Egyptian talks. The UN Conciliation Commission con-
tinues to keep aloof from the current discussions, fearing
that if it should become identified with an unsuccessful out-
come, its subsequent efforts to reach a settlement would be
prejudiced. On the credit side of the ledger should be entered
the fact that hostilities in Palestine have not been resumed
during the talks and that neither Egypt nor Israel has taken
the decisive step of withdrawing from the parley. It appears
Increasingly unlikely, however, that the Rhodes conference
will provide any solid foundation for a permanent peace.
IRAN
Shah's Plans Following the recent attempt on his life, the
Shah appears determined to take action which
may have serious repercussions in Iran. Exasperated by the
chronic irresponsibility and inaction of the Majlis, he has
long advocated legislation and constitutional reform which
would allocate greater powers to him. Although the Shah has
thus far followed US-UK advice not to act precipitately, he
Is now apparently convinced that the recent attempt on his
life has brought about a national crisis and that strong meas-
ures are needed. He is reportedly planning to dissolve the
-8
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
SECRET
IRAN
Majlis and to summon a constituent assembly in the near
future. In thus attempting to gain greater powers, the Shah
Is probably motivated by a sincere desire to strengthen Iran
as well as by personal ambition. It seems likely, however,
that sudden and drastic action on his part would arouse the
anger of Iranian liberals and of those conservative elements
opposed to granting him more power. The resultant poli-
tical confusion might well facilitate Soviet exploitation and
infiltration, the very things from which the Shah is seeking
to protect Iran.
ISRAEL
Air-Sea Traffic Despite active Egyptian opposition, the
new Israeli state may succeed in retain-
ing Satellite-scheduled air service and in establishing ade-
quate surface transportation with the rest of the world.
Egypt's refusal to permit commercial air operations into
Cairo by air carriers serving Israel virtually bars all
scheduled western air carriers from Israel, and scheduled
service has thus far been restricted to the Czechoslovak
airline. Acquisition by Czechoslovakia of the new Soviet
IL-12 air transports, which are capable of non-stop flights
to Israel from points in either Yugoslavia or Bulgaria, may
enable the Czechoslovaks effectively to circumvent US-UK
efforts to prevent Satellite air operations in the Middle
East. Israel's attempts to establish surface transportation
under its own control are also progressing satisfactorily.
The new Israel-America line has already acquired 7 of the
10 vessels estimated to be necessary for hauling virtually
all US exports to Israel.
9 -
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
SECRET
FAR EAST
CHINA
Prospects for a negotiated peace in China continue to
deteriorate as a result of further disintegration of the National-
ist position and the Communists' refusal to compromise on their
harsh peace terms. Meanwhile, the struggle for power in non-
Communist China is growing more intense, and the increasing
confusion of authority within the National Government is giving
Impetus to the establishment of semi-autonomous non-Commu-
nist regimes.
Chiang's Role Chiang Kai-shek is still playing an important
role in the behind-the-scenes struggle for con-
trol of the remaining Nationalist resistance forces. Despite his
reported assurances to Acting President Li Tsung-jen that he
would not participate in Chinese politics for the next five years,
Chiang continues to exercise considerable influence in the opera-
tion of the National Government through his hold over many civil-
ian and military officials. He remains leader of the Kuomintang,
which dominates the Government, and is particularly influential
among military leaders in the Shanghai-Nanking area, Chinese
Air Force personnel, and Nationalist administrators in Taiwan.
The Chiang-appointed Cabinet now in Canton continues to ict
independently of Li who has remained in Nanking.
Kwangsi Clique A unified Nationalist resistance to the Commu-
nists is further threatened by the reported
plans of General Pal Chung-hsi. Pal supports Acting President
Li and commands the personal loyalty of the troops in the Hankow
area, one of the few remaining Nationalist troop concentrations.
Recent evidence indicates Pal does not intend to defend Hankow,
if the Communists strike for that area, but will probably move
far south to his native province of Kwangsi, where he may seek
to establish his own regime.
- 10 -
SECRET
?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
SECRET
CHINA
Northwest Autonomy Centralized Nationalist control
over the northwest provinces is
threatened by the recent activities of General Chang Chill-
chung, who was sent by Li to Sinkiang to negotiate a trade
agreement with the USSR. Chang conferred en route with
Moslem leaders of the ncrthwest provinces who reportedly
plan to resist the Chinese Communists and to establish a
northwest "anti-Communist" defense bloc. Realizing the
futility of his dealing with the Chinese Communists as a
representative of the impotent Li, Chang has resigned from
the official Nanking peace delegation and may be preparing
to sever all connection with the National Government. Chang
will presumably still proceed to Sinkiang, but he is expected
to negotiate in his own interests. Conclusion of a Sinkiang
agreement with the USSR would probably result in the
creation of autonomous regimes for Sinkiang and parts of
the other northwest provinces under the leadership of Chang
and local warlords.
Communist Regimes Completing the picture of the pro-
gressive fragmentation of China, the
Chinese Communists have announced that the 45 million
people of the recently "liberated" provinces between the
Yellow and Yangtze Rivers will soon have a "unified demo-
cratic government" elected by a "congress of people's
representatives." This Central Plains government would
be the third such regime in Communist China. The forma-
tion of this latest regional government and the fact that the
Chinese Communist armies have called a halt short of
objectives which they could easily seize suggest that Com-
munist military conquests have outrun preparations for ?
political consolidation. Because of this lack of consolidation,
it may take several months for the Chinese Communists to
create a national government for all of China which could
claim international recognition.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
SECRET
INDONESIA
Dutch Intentions The apparent intention of the Dutch
Cabinet to accept, with reservations,
the Security Council resolution on Indonesia may open the
way for renewed negotiations for an Indonesian settlement.
Fall of the Dutch Cabinet over Indonesian policy was
averted by the appointment of a more liberal Minister of
Overseas Territories. This selection indicates that For-
eign Minister Stikker plans to exercise greater leadership
In the effort to reach a sediment on Indonesia. Stikker may
also take a direct part in renewed negotiations with Indo-
nesian Republican leaders. Meanwhile, although inter-party
agreement has not been reached on the extent to which the
Dutch are willing to meet SC demands,the Cabinet, after
sharp parliamentary criticism, will probably receive the
support necessary for implementing a milder policy.
However, despite this milder policy and Stikker's excellent
chances of winning the confidence of Republicans in Indo-
nesia, Stikker's efforts to reach a speedy agreement will
probably be hindered by binding Instructions from both the
Cabinet and Parliament.
BURMA
British Policy The possibility that the full-scale civil
warfare in South Burma will lead to
anarchy and dissolution of the present Burmese Goverment
Is a cause of increasing concern to the UK. British interests
throughout Asia would be seriously affected by the further
reduction of Burmese rice exports. Such a reduction would
have severe repercussions in such areas as Malaya, India,
Pakistan, and Ceylon. In addition, if the Burmese Govern-
ment either disintegrates completely or falls under Commu-
nist domination, some 50 million pounds in British capital
- 12 -
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
SECRET
BURMA
Investments in Burma (already nationalised or threatened
with naticsalixation) would probably be liquidated without
compensation. The UK is thus considering some indirect
method of bolstering the present Burmese regime, possibly
by means of a Joint loan front the UK and other countries.
SIAM
Anti-Royalist Group A more stable Siamese Government
Is in prospect if recent moves by
Premier Phibul to join forces with other anti-Royalists
come to fruition. In a recent conciliatory broadcast pre-
sumably directed at Pridi, exiled former premier, Phibul
declared that he would support any action which would unite
Siam or prevent a national calamity. The developments
motivating this overture probably are an increase of
Royalist representation in the government, the Royalist
nature of the new constitution, and Phibul's diminishing
ability to exact the undisputed loyalty of army and police
elements. Phibul and Pridi are the most important figures
of the 1932 civilian-military clique which overthrew Siam's
absolute monarchy and established a constitutional monarchy.
Since 1932, governmental control has remained with one or
the other of the rival factions of the clique but, despite poll-
tical differences, they have always united to prevent the
Royalists from repining political control. If, however, the
two factions reach an agreement, Pridi may emerge the
dominant political figure and a Siamese government might
result which would favor increased cooperation with the
west and greater participation in Asian affairs.
- 13 -
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
SECRET
WE HEMISPZERE
ARGENTINA
Crisis Continues The continuing Argentine economic-poli-
tical crisis, although apt to force some
of Peroses close political associates out of office, is unlikely
to result in the resignation of Peron himself. In response to
Army pressure, Peron reportedly has agreed to dissociate
Senora Peron from the government and to renew his hitherto
futile efforts to deal with the country3s acute economic and
labor problems. Indicative of Peron's problems is the current
primers? strike, which has deprived Buenos Aires of news-
papers since 8 February. If the government persists in using
charges of Communism as a pretext for jailing the printers,
it will discredit this procedure as a means of resisting more
serious and widespread inflationary wage demands in the
future. On the other hand, if the government compels the
publishers to grant the printers' demands, it will compromise
its anti-inflationary stand against wage increases.
- 14 -
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
SECRET
THE PLIGHT OF THE ARAB REFUGEES
The future of the more than 700,000 Arab refugees
remains unsettled. Israel has no intention of permitting their
return in any substantial numbers, and the Arab states are
neither willing nor able to absorb them. Israel is preoccupied
with assimilating immigrants from other countries, and Israeli
spokesmen declare that Israel's economy cannot support the
return of the Arabs and that in any event their return would
endanger Israeli security. In taking over Arab property for
their own use, the Israelis assert that they are merely taking
advantage of a situation which they themselves did not create.
The countries neighboring Palestine have stretched
their resources as far as possible in extending temporary
aid to the refugees and would be unable to absorb the refugees
permanently without assistance from outside. Iraq with 5,000
refugees and Transjordan with over 80,000 have an additional
responsibility for 200,000 in central Arab Palestine--a constant
drain on almost non-existent resources. Syria with 100,000 is
weeks behind in its dole program. Lebanon is nearly bank-
rupt; furthermore, the 90,000 refugees now in the country
could not be integrated into its delicately balanced Christian-
Moslem grouping. The 8,000 refugees in Egypt are all that
the Egyptians can handle; the 250,000 in the coastal area of
Palestine occupied by the Egyptian Army endure the worst
conditions of all.
The danger exists that the refugees, once they are
fully aware of their plight, will be so embittered as to become
a source of permanent unrest in the Arab world. Scattered
riots have already occurred, and thievery is increasing. As
idle malcontents, the refugees could be readily exploited by
subversive elements. Employment would go far toward dissi-
pating this danger, but it is not available in the impoverished
- 15 -
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
SECRET
?
Arab states. Foreign financing would be necessary for
projects which would both provide a livelihood for the refu-
gees and promote permanent resettlement. Vast undeveloped
regions in Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Arab Pales-
tine could be utilized for such projects as irrigation, fisheries,
roads, and oil pipe lines. Administration would be difficult,
and the reward to investors might not be immediate, but the
refugees would face exile with less hostility if they could look
forward to permanent shelter and regular meals.
- 16 -
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
SECRET
SOVIET PLANS FOR AN EAST GERMAN STATE
Further Communist designs to integrate eastern
Germany into the political and economic system of the
Soviet bloc were apparent at the recent Socialist Unity Party
(SED) Congress in Berlin. Speeches by Satellite delegates
and Congress approval of the Oder-Neisse line as Germany's
eastern boundary laid renewed stress on Communist efforts
to reconcile the Satellite states to closer collaboration with
the Soviet Zone and to eventual inclusion of the area in the
Soviet orbit. Other action at the Congress indicates that the
USSR is still attempting to insure Communist control of
east Germany. By reviving advocacy of a "broad democratic
front,' the Communists are seeking the political support of
formerly uncooperative elements. The establishment of an
SED "Politburo was designed to discipline the SED in order
to make it a more effective instrument of Communist control.
The reversal of the SED stand for the incorporation
of Berlin into the Soviet Zone indicates that the Communists
believe the Berlin impasse will continue. In line with the
Soviet theme of a "unified Germany,' this tactical renunciation
of Communist claims that Berlin is an integral part of the
Soviet Zone may be designed to combat possible inclusion of
the three western sectors of the city in a west German govern-
ment. Moreover, by omitting Berlin from a future east German'
state, the USSR may feel that it can insure control over the
new state by maintaining Soviet troops there to guard com-
munication lines to a Soviet garrison in Berlin. Although the
Congress again stressed the theme of German unity, Com-
munist tactics at the Congress once more suggest that the
USSR intends to create an east German state which will claim
sovereignty over all Germany. The formation of such a
state would probably be timed to counter the formation of a
west German provisional government.
- 17 -
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
DISTRIBUTION
1
2
4
6.
8,70. 7 .
8,70, _
9,
10. .
11,69
12,13,14.
15,16,17.
18.
19. _
20,
21. .
22,23,24?
25,26,27,28,2,9,
30,31,32,33,
35,36,37,38,39,
40,41,42,43,
45,46,47,48,49,
50,
51,, ,
52,53,54,55,56
57.....
59,,. 58. ?
59,
60 ?
61.. . ?
62,63
64, .
65. ?
66,67, . ? ? ? .
SECRET
The President
Secretary of State
Chief of Staff to CoTnneender in Chief
Secretary of Defense ?
Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force
Chairman, National Security Resources .vioard
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air
Chief of Staff., U.S. Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff, /LS, Air Force
Director of Plans and Operations.; Cene.ral Staff ?U,S.Army
Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations) U.S? Air Force
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations)
Director of Plans and Operations? U.S.. Air Force
Special Assistant to Secretary of State for Research
and Intelligence
Director of Intelligence, General Staff, U,S. Army
34?
Chief of Naval Intelligence
44?
Director of Intelligence, U.S. Air Force
Director of Security and Intelligence,Atomic Energy Comm.:
Executive Secretary, Military Liaison Committee,
Atomic Energy Commission
Chief Acquisition & Distribution Division,01CD,Dept.Sate
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Secretary, joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief, Policy Planning Staff ,Department. of State
Secretary of State (Attention Chief, Policy Reports Staff)
Deputy Director, joint Intelligence Group, joint Staff
Secretary, joint Intelligence Group, joint Staff
Director, Joint Planning Group, Joint Chiefs of Staff
US Air Force Representative on joint Strategic
Survey Committee
Secretary, State-Army-Navy-Air Coordinating Committee
Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9
U. 8. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
2831-sne
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100170001-9