AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000100470001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 29, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence MISTER FILE UPY
DO NIT CIYE OUT
OR MARE OH
Africa Review
-seerec-
d7
ALA AR 85-026
29 November 1985
copy 3 5 6
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Africa Review
Articles Zimbabwe: Dissidence Spreading Despite Unity Talks
The Mugabe government is sending more troops to Matabeleland, is
trying to improve the effectiveness of forces already there, and has
intensified efforts to prevent infiltration of dissidents and resupply
operations across Zimbabwe's borders with South Africa and
Botswana. F__~
South Africa: Conservative Gainsl 5
The rightwing parties posted significant gains in the parliamentary
byelections last month, but, in our view, the results overstate
conservative strength because of their limited scope and differing
local conditions in each district. F__1
South Africa: Debt Talks Postponed I 13
South Africa's first meeting with bank creditors last month was
brief and inconclusive, and the second session reportedly has been
postponed until early next year. The delay ensures that Pretoria will
extend its debt repayment beyond the self-imposed yearend
deadline.
MPC: A Profile of Namibia's Interim Government I 15
Since taking over the administration of Namibia on 18 June, the
South African-backed Multi-Party Conference has assumed the
trappings of an operating government by adopting a budget,
initiating the process to draft a new constitution, and starting debate
on steps to dismantle apartheid.
Cuba-Southern Africa: Castro Pressing the Attack) 21
President Castro, apparently encouraged by recent developments in
southern Africa and buoyed by visits to Havana of leaders of
African Frontline States, believes the time is right for reasserting a
hardline stance on a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola and for
pursuing a more vigorous offensive against Pretoria.
Secret
ALA AR 85-026
29 November 1985
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Frontline States: Zambia's Kaunda as New Chairman 23
President Kaunda, who succeeds former Tanzanian President
Nyerere as leader of the loosely organized caucus of states
Sierra Leone: Prospects for New President Momoh 27
Gen. Joseph Momoh, who succeeded Siaka Stevens as President on
28 November, may find his term in office shortened drastically by
the military if he fails to address serious economic problems, move
against corruption, and distance himself from Stevens and his
cronies.
Ghana: The Military Under RawlingsF__-] 31
The military is likely to remain loyal to Head of State Rawlings in
the near term, but some officers and enlisted men probably have
political ambitions and would be willing to intervene should an
opportunity arise.
Guinea-Bissau: Military Pressures on VieiraF---] 35
The recent arrests of the First Vice President and some 300 Army
personnel for coup plotting underscore President Vieira's difficulties
in maintaining control over the Army, which is the main political
force in the country.
Briefs South Africa: Black and White Views on the Future
Horn of Africa: Summit Meeting Planned
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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief
Production Staff Office of African and Latin American Analysis
Secret ii
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Zimbabwe: Dissidence Spreading
Despite Unity Talks
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Africa and Botswana.
Antigovernment activity by dissidents in western
Zimbabwe has become more widespread since
August, but still does not-in our judgment-pose a
direct threat to the stability of Prime Minister
Mugabe's administration. The dissidents are Ndebele
tribesmen disgruntled with Mugabe's Shona-
dominated government and the heavyhanded tactics
used by his ruling Zimbabwe African National Union
(ZANU) against the opposition Zimbabwe African
People's Union (ZAPU) led by Mugabe's archrival
Joshua Nkomo. Harare is sending more troops to
Matabeleland, is trying to improve the effectiveness of
forces already there, and has intensified efforts to
prevent infiltration of dissidents and resupply
operations across Zimbabwe's borders with South
Spreading Dissidence
attacks by Ndebele dissidents have increased
Activity was heaviest in
Matabeleland,) where the country's Ndebele
tribal minority is concentrated
US Embassy sources in
Matabeleland report that the dissidents now appear to
be mature men rather than youths, and that they
travel in larger groups than before and carry new-
looking automatic weapons. Most attacks involve
killings of black civilians accused of cooperating with
the authorities and sabotage of small economic
targets, primarily farms and construction equipment.
White commercial farmers in Matabeleland-a group
that is essential to continued strong and balanced
performance by the Zimbabwean economy-feel
vulnerable and are frustrated over the government's
inability to curb the violence, according to the US
Embassy. .
have begun to carry firearms, even while indoors,
according to the Embassy.
Weak Government Forces.
recently concluded that government forces were
making contact with the dissidents less frequently
than before, despite the increase in dissident activity.
]believed the government had too few
forces in Matabeleland because it had sent 9,000
troops to Mozambique to guard vital transportation
links to landlocked Zimbabwe and to combat
Mozambican insurgents threatening Maputo.
Secret
ALA AR 85-026
29 November 1985
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presentation is
rite sotherllatae.
MATA8ELE'~ Np ttupane
NORTH
International boundary
Province boundary
National capital
Railroad
Road
SOUTH/ (AFRICA
Gwanda
tee West Nicholson
Fra isiown MATABELELANII
SOUTH
chiphoyi
MASHONALANt7
NiASHONALAND
hang~ra CENTRAL Mount
asutrtga
(Fart Victoria}
Song
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The Zimbabwean contingent spearheaded an
offensive in Mozambique from August to October
that overran several guerrilla bases and dislodged the
insurgents' headquarters, but the onset of the rainy
season in November brought an end to large sweeps
until next April. Only about 5,000 Zimbabwean
troops are likely to remain in Mozambique until then
to protect key transportation routes, and Harare may
replace some of the troops with militia in order to use
more capable forces against the dissidents at home.
Blaming South Africa. Zimbabwean officials strongly
suspect South Africa of supporting the rebels.
Minister of State for Security Munangagwa publicly
claimed last month that Pretoria was infiltrating
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Personal and bureaucratic rivalries are other obstacles
to effective antidissident operations. Minister of
Home Affairs Enos Nkala-one of the few senior
Ndebeles in the Shona-dominated government-is an
advocate of using more force against the dissidents
and their Ndebele sympathizers
Antidissident operations could become somewhat
more effective if Harare reenforces government forces
in Matabeleland and can improve their coordination.
recent Zimbabwean delegation to Botswana
demanded that Gaborone screen refugees located
there to identify dissidents hiding among them.
Minister of Home Affairs Nkala, who headed the
Zimbabwean team, threatened to send troops into the
refugee camp in Botswana if Gaborone did not take
immediate action. An indignant Botswana official
later described Nkala as pugnacious and rude,
according to US Embassy reporting. We doubt that
Mugabe and Army Commander Nhongo would
support an incursion that would risk South African
retaliation.
South Africa may have resumed limited aid to the
dissidents in retaliation for Zimbabwe's recently
increased support of the Pan-Africanist Congress
(PAC).
accused Harare of doing so.
Pretoria clearly is aware that
Zimbabwe is supporting the PAC, because a South
African-backed propaganda radio station this month
Unity Talks
Mugabe has been moving since independence in 1980
to transform Zimbabwe into a one-party state. He
seeks a merger of the ruling ZANU with Nkomo's
opposition ZAPU, whose followers in Matabeleland
rejected ZANU candidates in the country's first
postindependence elections in July. Mugabe
apparently sees party unity as a key to ending
Ndebele dissidence. Immediately following the
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Secret
elections, however, relations with ZAPU worsened
when Minister of Home Affairs Nkala ordered police
to raid Nkomo's residences in Harare and Bulawayo
and to detain senior ZAPU officials for allegedly
plotting against the government. Conciliatory moves
began in August and have led to merger talks between
ZANU and ZAPU officials.
Mugabe and Nkomo emerged from a meeting in early
October optimistic that a unity agreement could be
worked out, but
Mugabe later hardened his position and both men
have had difficulty persuading lesser officials in their
parties to agree. Mugabe told ZANU's Central
Committee in November that ZAPU must make
greater concessions than it appeared willing to make,
according to US Embassy reporting.
Opponents of unity include ZANU officials who fear
that it will precipitate new tribal alliances and
create two splinter groups of hardliners that refuse to
join the new combined party.
Prospects
ZANU and ZAPU may announce a merger next
year, but we doubt that it will end Ndebele dissidence.
Major obstacles, such as agreement on a leadership
post for Nkomo and a name for the new party, make
unity unlikely for some time. Nkomo cannot control
the dissidence because many of the rebels are loyal to
other imprisoned Ndebele leaders rather than to him,
and because an agreement on party unity would not
satisfy the tribal grievances that fuel the violence.
Committing more government troops probably will
slow dissident activity over the near term. Even so,
Harare no doubt will have to send more troops to
Mozambique again next year after the rains cease to
combat a resurgent guerrilla threat there. Ndebele
dissidence in Zimbabwe probably will wax and wane
as Zimbabwe increases and reduces its troops in
Mozambique. Mugabe cannot lessen support for the
current friendly government in Maputo because
transportation routes through Mozambique are
essential to achieving his longer term goal of lessening
Zimbabwe's economic dependence on South Africa.
South Africa probably will increase its support to
Zimbabwean dissidents somewhat, if it has not
already done so, particularly if Mugabe continues to
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undermine their personal status.
Opponents of unity who fear a
Karanga-Ndebele coalition include Nkala, Minister
of Information Shamuyarira, and Minister of State
for Political Affairs Nyagumbo-an Ndebele,
Zezuru, and Manyika respectively. Other party
officials want to know what leadership post Nkomo
will receive, what rank-and-file party members want,
and what effect unity will have on the dissident
problem. Nyagumbo and others now are demanding
that an end to the dissident activity be made a
precondition to unity, according to the US Embassy.
become more involved with PAC guerrillas.
some Zimbabwean dissidents are digging up
arms caches left over from the Rhodesian war suggest
to us that they so far lack widespread South African
support. Pretoria probably is in touch only with
factions among the disorganized dissidents. Unless
Harare assumes an unlikely leading role in supporting
anti-South African guerrillas or actually
implementing economic sanctions against Pretoria,
Pretoria probably will not make a major effort to
destabilize Zimbabwe because it has enough problems
at home and with Angola and Mozambique.
unity might
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South Africa:
Conservative Gains
The strong showing by rightwing parties in the five
parliamentary byelections in October raises the
specter of a conservative white backlash in South
Africa. We believe, however, that the results reflect
an emerging trend of conservative gains only in
selected areas, not a rapid, nationwide shift to the
right. Furthermore, the poor performance of the
moderate and liberal parties leaves their future in
doubt.
The Elections by District
The rightwing parties posted significant gains in each
of the five districts, but, in our view, the results
overstate rightwing strength because of their limited
scope and differing local conditions in each district.
The ruling National Party (NP) won in four of the five
districts, but the total rightwing vote was three times
higher than in the 1981 general elections in those
districts. Moreover, byelections often are poor
indicators of voting trends, according to press
analyses. F_~
Sasolburg. The narrow victory of the extreme
rightwing Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) in
Sasolburg-the first since it split from the NP in 1969
and the first NP loss in Orange Free State Province in
more than 30 years-followed a boldly racist
campaign that exploited the racial fears of the
community's conservative constituents, according to
US Embassy reporting. The party made an all-out
effort-running its Chief Secretary, exploiting local
economic conditions, and capitalizing on a local
uproar over the exposure of a racially mixed couple.
Moreover, torrential rains kept the voter turnout
low-to the disadvantage of the incumbent National
Party, according to press reports.
Sasolburg is considered the most rightwing district in
Orange Free State Province, according to Embassy
reporting. The HNP made its strongest showing in
Sasolburg during the 1981 general election, taking
almost 34 percent of the vote.
Springs. The Conservative Party (CP), which split
from the National Party in 1982 over racial reform,
posted a strong performance in Springs. The
Conservatives' showing was the first rightwing
challenge ever to the NP in a parliamentary contest in
Springs, which has been hit hard by recession, high
unemployment, and antiapartheid unrest. The
Conservative candidate was elected mayor of Springs
last year.
The voting pattern shows that the NP attracted a
large number of liberal votes, but this only partially
compensated for deep cuts into its traditional
rightwing majority. If liberal voters had remained
loyal to the official opposition Progressive Federal
Party (PFP), the NP probably would have lost the
election.
Bethlehem and Vryburg. The NP won in Bethlehem
and Vryburg-both rural farming communities and
predominantly conservative Afrikaner districts-but
its lead over the right wing in the 1981 general
elections was cut more than 18 percent in Bethlehem
and more than 15 percent in Vryburg. F_~
The NP has controlled the Vryburg seat since the
party came to power in 1948. Vryburg is considered
one of the most conservative districts in northern
Cape Province, according to US Embassy reporting.
The NP took the seat by more than 53 percent despite
press predictions that it would fail to poll a majority
of the votes in the three-way race between the NP and
the two rightwing parties.
Secret
ALA AR 85-026
29 November 1985
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South African Parliamentary Byelections
1981 National 1985 Byelection
Bethlehem
6,008
2,182
6,623
Durban
4,885
-
4,307
Sasolburg
5,329
2,710
6,239
Springs
5,690
-
5,288
Vryburg
4,362
2,007
4,605
Totals
26,274
6,899
27,062
a 1981 Herstigte Nasionale Party
n 1985 Conservative Party and Herstigte Nasionale Party
5,435
1,914
6,606
4,539
4,053
22,547
Orange
Province
Area under state
of emergency
0 200
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? National Party
? Rightwing
IZ] Moderates'
ID Progressive Federal Party
SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTIONS
PERCENTAGE OF VOTE PER YEAR
IN BETHLEHEM. PORT NATAL, SASOLBURG. SPRINGS. AND VRYBURG DISTRICTS
New Republic Party. Progressive Party. Independents, and United Party
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SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTION TRENDS
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOTES IN RACES
BETWEEN NATIONAL PARTY AND RIGHT WING ONLY
October 1985
By.I.ction
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SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTIONS
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOTE NATIONWIDE
FOR GENERAL ELECTIONS AND BYELECTIONS
? National Party
? Righiwing
CZ) Moderates'
m Progressive Federal Party
1982 1983 1984 MAY 1985 OCTOBER 1985
BYELECTION BYELECTION BYELECTION BYELECTION BYELECTION
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In our judgment, the rightwing performance in
Bethlehem-one of the most conservative districts in
Orange Free State, according to Embassy reporting-
reflects a preference among conservative Afrikaners
for the CP over the ultraconservative HNP. The CP
vote was more than 19 percent higher than the HNP
vote in the 1981 general election.F__-]
Port Natal. The National Party's strongest victory
was in Port Natal, an urban, industrial area relatively
unaffected by economic decline or unrest. The NP
candidate-the current Minister of Home Affairs and
a former Natal Administrator-ran against a field of
lesser known candidates
A Conservative Party challenge and a split among
centrist, English-speaking voters between the New
Republic Party and an independent candidate, as well
as a bid by the PFP for moderate votes, however,
dramatically cut the National Party majority. The
New Republic Party finished dismally, fueling
expectations that eventually it will merge with the
NP, according to Embassy reporting.
National Party Strength
At present, the National Party is not in danger of
losing control of parliament. It holds an overwhelming
127 seats in a 178-member house. General elections
are not scheduled until 1989. If nationwide elections
were held today, local press analysis suggests that, at
most, the party might lose 33 seats to the rightwing
parties. F__1
We believe the election results probably understate
NP strength. Recent national opinion polls indicate
that most whites approve limited racial reform and
more than 70 percent still think Botha is doing a good
job. Moreover, we believe, in general elections the
well-oiled machinery of the National Party
undoubtedly would overpower the limited resources of
the smaller rightwing parties.
The National Party's more moderate position on
racial reform in recent years has caused a partial
displacement of voters from the moderate and liberal
parties. This has, however, only marginally
compensated for conservative gains. F_~
The NP also stands to gain from continued infighting
in the right wing. The two rightwing parties agreed
not to oppose each other in four of the five races,
including Sasolburg. The HNP's newfound
confidence, however, may make it less willing to stay
out of elections to help the Conservatives F--]
Outlook
We believe the results reflect the impact of politically
sensitive racial reform, compounded by 14 months of
major black unrest and the worst economic conditions
since the Great Depression. Of the five seats
contested, Sasolburg was the only district currently
under Botha's state of emergency regulations. In our
view, the right wing capitalized on white racial fears
and benefited from voter confusion over the extent
and pace of Botha's reform program. Blue-collar
workers in industrial areas-hit hard by recession and
high unemployment-voted for the conservative
parties in larger numbers than in past elections.
We believe the mixed results of the elections are
unlikely to alter the course of the Botha government,
which will remain committed to reform even as it
assures whites that some aspects of apartheid-such
as segregated neighborhoods-will not be affected.
Botha, however, will attempt to deflect international
criticism of his government by pointing to the danger
of additional conservative gains in parliament.
Although the right wing does not pose an immediate
threat to National Party control of parliament, the
emerging trend of conservative gains in selected areas
is likely to continue because of endemic nonwhite
violence and a stagnating economy. We believe a
prolonged slump in the economy would benefit
conservatives and make whites less willing to accept
aspects of race reform that affect the job market.
With inflation currently running at 16 percent and
economic growth expected to remain at a rate of 2 to
3 percent, South Africa's economic outlook is bleak.
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A rapid deterioration of the unrest, in our view, would
further shake voter confidence in the National Party
and draw more whites toward the right. Growing
black militancy and nonwhite demands for more far-
reaching reform will increase the number of whites
who fear that limited reform inevitably will lead to
black majority rule.
We believe the rightwing parties probably have
replaced the PFP as the Botha government's principal
adversary in the contest for white support. Moreover,
continued dissension within the ranks of the NP over
reform might enable the rightwing parties to persuade
more NP parliamentarians to defect in coming years.
The threat of defections, in our view, may cause the
NP to modify its position on reform and adopt harsher
measures against nonwhite unrest.F-~
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South Africa: Debt
Talks Postponed
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South Africa's first meeting with bank creditors last
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month was brief and inconclusive
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Although both sides agreed to
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meet again on 26 November, press reports
say the debt mediator-Swiss banker
Fritz Leutwiler-has postponed the second meeting
until early next year. Pretoria has not yet made an
official announcement, but we believe the delay
ensures that South Africa will extend its debt
repayment moratorium beyond the self-imposed
yearend deadline-perhaps by as long as six months,
according to S Embassy
reporting.
Although most bankers probably recognized that the
moratorium would have to be extended,
Leutwiler acted without
consulting creditors. Leutwiler may have postponed
talks in the hope that a decline in black unrest or
possible progress on reform after the South African
parliament convenes in January would improve
Pretoria's standing with the international financial
community.F--]
we believe an exp icit
linkage between a bilateral debt agreement and
progress on reform would complicate debt talks by
further polarizing Pretoria and bankers. In our
judgment, bank creditors probably are overestimating
their leverage since Pretoria is likely to respond
stubbornly to such a move by retreating into a more
autarkic economy, not by accelerating reform.
At the same time, US Embassy and press reports say
South African commerce is feeling the pinch of
curtailed trade credits and tighter credit terms.
Finance Director General Stals recently told the
business community to resist demands for cash
payment for imports by shopping around among
competing foreign sellers. If forced to handle most
trade on a cash basis, South Africa's current account
surplus, its cash source for debt repayment, might
dwindle. Some bankers reportedly believe compulsory
new trade credits by foreign banks are essential to any
successful debt rescheduling for the country.F_~
Secret
ALA AR 85-026
29 November 1985
2bAl
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Secret
MPC: A Profile of Namibia's
Interim Government
Since taking over the administration of Namibia on
18 June, the South African-backed Multi-Party
Conference (MPC) has assumed the trappings of an
operating government by adopting a budget, initiating
the process to draft a new constitution, and starting
debate on steps to dismantle apartheid. The MPC also
has received Pretoria's approval to choose
proportional representation for future UN-sponsored
elections, a decision that ostensibly removes the last
legal obstacle to implementation of UN Security
Council Resolution 435.
The MPC, however, seems unable to mount a
coalition capable of competing effectively with
SWAPO in a UN election. The interim government
has been plagued from the outset by internal
dissension, particularly over how to alter Namibia's
apartheid structure. Moreover, the Conference so far
has received no international recognition. F__1
The Multi-Party Conference, a South
African-backed coalition of six Namibian political
parties, forms the interim government that took office
in June 1985 and is charged with drafting plans for
Namibia's eventual independence. South Africa
retains control over the foreign and defense policies,
and its Administrator General retains veto power
over MPC decisions. The interim government consists
of an eight-man Cabinet, 61-member National
Assembly, and a 16-member Constitutional Council
(two from each of the five MPC parties, six from the
DTA). The chairmanship of the Cabinet rotates every
nine months. The composition of the Cabinet is as
follows:
Cracks in the Coalition
The interim government has set up a 16-member
Constitutional Council to draft a new constitution in
18 months and present it to the South African
Government and Namibian electorate for approval.
The Constitutional Council, in which all MPC parties
are represented, was to have convened in late October
but is deadlocked over the appointment as Chairman
of Piet Van der Byl, a former adviser to the South
African Department of Justice. Although a majority
of the MPC Cabinet members support Van der Byl,
he is opposed by the Windhoek Bar Council and
Cabinet Ministers Andreas Shipenga (SWAPO-
Democrats) and Moses Katjiuongua (South-West
African National Union).' They argue that the
chairman, who rules on questions of constitutionality,
should be nonpolitical and have filed a suit demanding
' The Constitutional Council Bill requires that the chairman be a
judge or former judge of the Supreme Court of South-West Africa,
"or any superior court outside the territory." Van der Byl was
appointed to the Supreme Court to fulfill this requirement. In an
effort to expedite the process of selecting a new chairman, the
Council may amend this legislation. 1
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Minister of Finance
Dirk Mudge
DTA
Minister of Mines
Andreas Shipanga
SWAPO-D
Minister of Agriculture
Eben van Zij(
SWANP
Minister of Justice
Jiriretundu
DTA
Kozonguizi
Minister of Education
Andrew Matjila
DTA
Minister of Health
Moses Katjiuongua
SWANU
Minister of Local
Hans Diergaardt
RFDP
Government (Acting
Chairman)
Minister of Transportation
that the appointment be set aside, according to
Windhoek press reports. Controversy over Van der
Byl has been described by press observers as "the
most serious crisis to confront the Transitional
Government." Recent comments to the press by
Cabinet Chairman Diergaardt suggest that the case
will be settled out of court in favor of the opposition.
Secret
ALA AR 85-026
29 November 1985
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Secret
Porto`
Alexandre
IrHEREROLAND
`
"..
WES f.!
.,?
OKAHANDJA
f./
Jr, _r
'~WtNDHOFK'L
} MARIENTAL
"._. (MALTAHOHEI'
Namibia
~^^-?~ International boundary
* Capital
^^'- Administrative boundary
0 100 200 Kilometers
1 'r
0 100 200 Miles
mot,,.
`, GOBABiS
Lamberts.
Bay
Upington
SOUTH AFRICA .ooAar
Kimberley
Gaborone?
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In our estimation, the conflict has done serious
damage to an already shaky MPC coalition, creating
discord within the Cabinet and weakening
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) leader Dirk
Mudge. According to press reports, Mudge's
moderate DTA colleagues have accused him of
maneuvering behind the scenes to push through Van
der Byl's appointment. Mudge has denied these
allegations and said he would resign if it were proved
he had engineered the appointment.
The process of reforming apartheid will provoke
heated debate among MPC members, in our opinion.
The central issue, whether to preserve or dismantle
the second-tier, ethnically based governments,
established in 1980 under Proclamation AG8, has
divided MPC members.' During the National
Assembly vote in August on the Constitutional
Council Bill, SWANU and SWAPO-D ardently
opposed a clause stipulating that legislation on
changes to Proclamation AG8 could not be referred to
the Constitutional Council without the unanimous
approval of the Cabinet. The bill passed, but only
after it was amended to give the Constitutional
Council the power to consider all constitutional issues.
Andreas Shipanga, SWAPO-D leader, is hoping
Mudge's attempts to protect white interests will split
the DTA, forcing Colored members-including the
Justice and Education Ministers-to vote against
him, according to the US Embassy in Pretoria.
Shipanga told Embassy officials that the Rehobeth
and Labor parties are already voting with SWANU
and SWAPO-D, creating an alliance capable of
blocking unfavorable legislation. F_~
Opposition Activity
Opponents of the MPC are already organizing to vote
down the constitution in a likely referendum. Damara
Council leader Justus Gareob, one of the founders of
the MPC, claims he left the interim government when
he realized South Africa was controlling it through
Z Namibia's three-tier government structure consists of: a first-tier
National Assembly, Cabinet, and Constitutional Council
responsible for national-level development projects; second-tier
ethnic authorities; and a third tier responsible for local government
services. The white ethnic minority under the second-tier structure
controls its own segregated schools and hospitals. More important,
the white second tier has the authority to claim its own income
taxes, nearly 90 percent of the income tax base.
Dirk Mudge, according to the US Embassy in
Pretoria. Garoeb said he had been in contact with
SWAPO and other opposition groups in an effort to
show the international community that the MPC does
not have the support of most Namibians. F_~
SWAPO remains the MPC's principal adversary.
Most observers believe SWAPO would win a free
election in Namibia. According to press reports,
SWAPO has refused Administrator-General
Pienaar's offer to join the Constitutional Council or to
negotiate a settlement with the internal political
parties. Anton Lubowski, a SWAPO internal wing
representative and, according to press reports, the
first white Namibian to announce SWAPO
membership, stated that SWAPO would not
participate in a government set up "by the South
African colonial regime." F_~
MPC Promotion Efforts
The MPC will have a difficult time establishing
credibility in the eyes of the international community,
which is predominately committed to independence
based on UN Resolution 435. Moreover, we believe
that the splits within the DTA over white privileges
also undermine the legitimacy of the MPC for many
black Namibians. However, if the government
succeeds in dismantling some aspects of apartheid,
particularly racial classifications and segregated
schools, its legitimacy could be enhanced.
In an effort to gain international recognition, the
interim government has established an office
responsible for coordinating all official contacts with
foreign states. According to press reports, the MPC
Cabinet has also appointed a Windhoek-based
company to spearhead a public relations campaign
promoting MPC interests abroad. The company,
slated to open offices in London, Washington, Bonn,
and Paris, already has a budget of more than $1
million. As part of the public relations effort, Sean
Cleary, a South African and former Deputy
Administrator-General of Namibia, recently
attempted to address the United Nations Security
Council, according to State Department reporting,
but was denied permission.F__-]
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Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA)
Political alliance of Namibian parties formed in
1977; dominated the last interim government; led by
Dirk Mudge and Herero Chief Kuaima Riruako.
South-West African National Union Group
(SWANU)
Largely Herero-backed party, formed in 1959; was
more radical than SWAPO, now moderate but still
socialist; led by Moses Katjiuongua.
SWAPO-Democrats (SWAPO-D)
Formed in 1976; has been unable to attract
significant following; leader Andreas Shipanga, who
broke with SWAPO in 1976.
South-West African National Party (SWANP)
Primarily Afrikaner party with close ties to
conservative politicians in South Africa; most
popular white party; wants to preserve second-tier
authority; led by Koise Pretorius and Eben van Zijl.
Colored Labor Party (CP)
Major political group among Coloreds; split from
DTA March 1982.
Rehobeth Free Democratic Party (RFDP)
Conservative party whose support rests with
Rehobeth Basters, a mixed race.
United Democratic Party (UDP)
Joined DTA in October 1985; formed September
1985 from merger of Caprivi African National Union
(CANU) and DTA-affiliated Caprivi Alliance; led by
Mishake Muyongo (CANU) and Patrick Limbo
(Caprivi Alliance).
Damara Council
Left MPC in March 1984; controls Damara second
tier, which represents approximately 7.6 percent of
Namibia's population; leader, Justus Gareob, critic
of DTA leader Mudge.
Namibian Independence Party (NIP)
Small, mainly Coloreds and Basters; led by Albert
Krohne, and Kenneth and Ottilie Abrahams.
Christian Democratic Action (CDA)
Ruling party in Ovambo ethnic authority; leader
Peter Kalangula refuses to join MPC.
Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP)
Ultraright, white, supported by about 10 percent of
whites; led by Sarel Becker.
Federal Party
Largely white, English-speaking, liberal.
Mbanderu Council
Represents a subtribe of Hereros, seeking separate
status from dominant Herero tribe; led by Chief
Munjuku Nguvauva H.
SWANU (Left)
Broke from SWANU in November 1984 over
SWANU leader Katjiuongua's support of MPC; led
by Vekuii Rukoro, Kuzeeko Kangueehi, and Nora
Chase.
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The interim government probably hoped to win praise
for the release on 14 November of 22 SWAPO
prisoners held in South African jails. Justice Minister
Kozonguizi told the press the decision was made in a
"spirit of national reconciliation," but the US
Embassy believes that the release was probably
intended to influence UN Security Council debate on
Namibia.
Prospects
The MPC will have a difficult task keeping its
alliance together, in our view. The battle facing the
Constitutional Council over minority rights is sure to
divide MPC members further. If the MPC fails to
withstand these internal pressures, nonwhite
Namibians will continue to identify the MPC with
South Africa and apartheid. It is likely, however, that
Pretoria would step in to ensure the MPC's survival in
order to maintain South Africa's two-track policy on
Namibia-preparing the multiracial coalition for a
possible UN-sponsored election while at the same
time demonstrating Pretoria's ability to declare
unilateral independence if international negotiations
fail.
' The Ovambo comprise over half of Namibia's population and are
SWAPO's biggest supporters. Within SWAPO, the Ovambos hold
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Cuba-Southern Africa:
Castro Pressing the Attack
Cuban President Castro, apparently encouraged by
recent developments in southern Africa and buoyed
by the visits to Havana by leaders of African
Frontline States, believes the time is right for
reasserting a hardline stance on a Cuban troop
withdrawal from Angola and for pursuing a more
vigorous offensive against Pretoria. The Cuban leader
has used South Africa's internal turmoil and Angola's
recent military successes against UNITA insurgents
to increase his rhetoric against South Africa and the
United States during the current stall in the US-
mediated regional negotiations.
Upcoming Nonaligned Movement Chairman
Mugabe's visit to Havana added further fuel to
Castro's fire, with tough talk denouncing South
Africa. Castro's hosting of Indian President Gandhi
and Sri Lankan President Jayewardene was no doubt
motivated by the UN General Assembly session and
the upcoming Nonaligned summit in Harare, where
Cuban delegations will push their views on South
Africa and the Third World debt. Although Embassy
reporting suggests little effort was expended on
courting Jayewardene, Havana pulled out all the stops
for Gandhi. Castro spent an unusual amount of time
personally escorting the Indian leader around the
island and ensuring that he received the red-carpet
treatment.
Visit Diplomacy
A parade of visiting leaders from the Frontline States
and other Third World countries last month allowed
Castro to capitalize further on the heightened
international interest in South Africa and the
Namibian issue to push Cuban views. During a visit to
Havana, Tanzanian President Nyerere publicly
thanked Castro for his contribution to the survival of
Support for Insurgents
Castro is backing his tough diplomatic stance on
South Africa with increased support for the
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the Luanda regime and requested that Havana
In October, Castro also hosted Zimbabwean President
Mugabe, President Kaunda of Zambia, and Angolan
leader dos Santos. Following the Angolan President's
visit, Castro publicly reiterated that the new strength
of Angolan and Cuban forces coincided with the
"irreversible" and doomed crisis of apartheid in South
The US Interests Section reports that Cuba recently
demonstrated its support for the ANC by burying an
ANC official in Havana, until he can rest in a "free
and democratic" Namibia. The high-level Cuban
attendance and considerable media attention given
the funeral symbolically underscored Havana's
solidarity with the insurgents and served to draw
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attention to the situation in southern Africa.
Havana's assessment of SWAPO's capabilities was
less optimistic than its estimate of ANC capabilities.
Secret
ALA AR 85-026
29 November 1985
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Secret
Nevertheless, Havana reportedly hopes that the
increased guerrilla activity inside South Africa will
force Pretoria to divert military forces from Namibia
and allow SWAPO fighters to operate more freely in
their homeland.
Outlook
Castro probably will have considerable success in his
efforts to take advantage of the surge of antipathy
toward South Africa among African countries and
other nations, and he will undoubtedly intensify his
propaganda campaign in the months leading to the
Nonaligned summit in Zimbabwe next year. We
believe Castro will back up his hardline rhetoric by
urging dos Santos not to resume negotiations with
South Africa and to consider carefully the regional
implications of a Cuban troop withdrawal from
Angola for Namibia and for the eradication of
apartheid.
The Cuban leader probably will be less successful in
instigating greater insurgent pressure against Pretoria
because of the problems plaguing insurgent groups
that are opposing South African security forces.
Despite Havana's low regard for SWAPO's
capabilities, however, Castro probably will provide
more help for the insurgents to regroup and encourage
them to prepare for increased operations.
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Secret
Frontline States: Zambia's
Kaunda as New Chairman
Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda was chosen as
the new chairman of the Frontline States (FLS)
during the group's meeting in September in Maputo,
Mozambique. Kaunda succeeds former Tanzanian
President Nyerere as leader of the loosely organized
caucus of states (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique,
Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) that have
considered themselves since the mid-1970s to be on
the frontline in the struggle for independent black
majority rule in southern Africa.
Kaunda will act as chief spokesman for the FLS and a
point of contact for Western diplomacy that is seeking
to achieve a peaceful settlement to the problems of
Namibia and South Africa. Being leader of the FLS
will increase Kaunda's international exposure, and
may slightly enhance his popularity at home. We
believe, however, that Kaunda's handling of Zambia's
severe economic problems will be more important to
most Zambians than his international performance.
Kaunda's Attitudes
Nonaligned Zambia, led since independence in 1964
by President Kaunda, traditionally has been active in
trying to promote peaceful political change and
economic development in southern Africa. Though
lacking a strong military or economic hand to play,
Kaunda enjoys considerable respect as an elder
statesman and as the head of a relatively stable
country in the strife-torn region. Ideally, Kaunda
would like to see southern Africa free of big power
rivalry. Even so, the US Embassy in Lusaka reports
Kaunda believes only the West, particularly the
United States, can exert sufficient leverage on
Pretoria to end apartheid, bring Namibia to
independence, and stop what he views as South
African destabilization efforts in the region. Last
year, Kaunda generally supported US diplomacy in
southern Africa. But, as momentum toward a regional
settlement has slowed, Zambian criticism of the
United States and perceived South African
obstructionism has become more frequent.
Despite increased frustration with the West, Kaunda
realizes that the USSR lacks the political and
economic clout to solve regional problems, and he is
distrustful of Soviet goals-both regionally and
toward Zambia. Lusaka's ties to the Soviet Bloc have
become cooler in recent years as Zambia has turned
increasingly to the West and Western-backed
international financial institutions for desperately
needed economic assistance. The Soviets, however,
remain the principal supplier of key types of military
equipment to Zambia. Cross-border raids by
Rhodesia's Government caused Lusaka to turn to
Moscow between 1979 and 1982 for more than $200
million worth of Soviet aircraft, tanks, and other
equipment.
Zimbabwe-The FLS' Heyday
The Frontline States today play a considerably less
influential role in the region than they did in the late
1970s during negotiations that led to independence for
Zimbabwe in 1980 under black majority rule. By
aiding Zimbabwean nationalist movements and
allowing them to operate out of their countries, the
FLS were able to put considerable pressure on both
the white minority Government of Rhodesia and the
nationalist movements themselves. With this leverage,
they were able to bring the nationalist movements
together under a common front and force them and
the Rhodesian Government into talks. The
breakthrough came at a Commonwealth Conference
in Lusaka in 1979 when Britain-the former colonial
power in Rhodesia-decided to back an all-parties
settlement favored by the FLS and agreed to convene
Secret
ALA AR 85-026
29 November 1985
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Secret
a constitutional conference as a prelude to elections
and an internationally acceptable independence.
Present-day Zimbabwe is the result of that
conference.F__~
While the FLS presented to the world a united front
on the overall goals of an independent, black-ruled
Zimbabwe, each country felt free to take whatever
action it saw as necessary to reach these goals, often
with little or no coordination among them. For
instance, Zambia and Mozambique backed rival
liberation groups and allowed them to run cross-
border operations into Rhodesia and thus had a direct
influence on the fighting there. Zambia, Tanzania,
and Botswana, as members of the British
Commonwealth, had some influence with Britain
through that body. Economic sanctions-costly to the
FLS as well as Rhodesia-were also an effective
weapon in their fight.
South Africa-A Formidable Foe
After Zimbabwean independence in 1980, the
Frontline States focused their efforts on Namibia, but
with much less effectiveness and cohesion. The
individual members were preoccupied with domestic
problems and lacked leverage in dealing with South
Africa, the administering power for Namibia.
Moreover, the Namibian negotiations had essentially
become a three-way affair with the United States
trying to mediate a regional settlement between
Angola and South Africa, and the frequency of FLS
meetings diminished.
Negotiations stalled this year against the backdrop of
more belligerent South African policies in the region
and Pretoria's unilateral establishment of an interim
government in Namibia. Angola suspended further
talks last May following its interception of a South
African sabotage team near the Gulf oil refinery in
Cabinda. In 1984, South Africa and Angola signed an
agreement on border security problems in Lusaka,
and, in compliance with this agreement, South Africa
withdrew its regular troops from Angola's southern
border. The two sides, however, failed to agree on a
joint monitoring commission, and South Africa
continued to mount cross-border strikes against
SWAPO and in support of UNITA.
Meanwhile, the struggle for an independent
Zimbabwe had contributed to dislocated economies in
both Zambia and Mozambique, and years of
economic mismanagement began to take their toll.
Mozambique, seriously threatened by South
African-backed insurgents, signed with Pretoria in
1984 the Nkomati accord that calls for each country
to stop aiding the other's insurgent groups. Pretoria
also subjected Angola and Botswana to saber rattling
by mounting operations against anti-South African
insurgents located within their borders.F___1
More recently, the FLS have tried to turn greater
attention to South Africa and apartheid. The methods
used against Rhodesia theoretically are still open to
Kaunda and the FLS, but are too costly to be used
against South Africa. Fear of reprisals by South
Africa's large and effective military has caused FLS
members to limit operations out of their countries by
the African National Congress (ANC), SWAPO, and
the Pan African Congress.
The FLS are also unlikely to take the lead in imposing
sanctions against South Africa without significant
support from the international community, especially
the West. South Africa is the major economic force in
the region, and most FLS members-some with
economies already on the critical list-can ill afford
to levy sanctions against Pretoria. Recent US
Embassy reporting from Botswana, for instance,
states that 80 to 90 percent of all imports come either
from or through South Africa, including all of its oil,
most food needs, and almost all of the machinery and
vehicles needed for production inputs: In Zimbabwe,
according to our Embassy, one Cabinet member
believes that, if sanctions were imposed, there would
be an immediate and disastrous effect on the country.
Zimbabwe is extremely dependent on South Africa
because about 90 percent of Zimbabwe's exports go to
or through South Africa. Mozambique's economic
infrastructure is a primary target for insurgents that
Maputo strongly suspects are still benefiting from
clandestine support from'Pretoria despite the
Nkomati agreement.
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Outlook
In the past, Kaunda has been more willing to
negotiate with South Africa than other FLS
members, but he has no authority to impose his will
on them. Moreover, he may face increasing rivalry on
the regional scene from Zimbabwean President
Mugabe. Mugabe is more outspoken against South
Africa and is disappointed that he was not chosen as
the next FLS chairman. He plans to use his
chairmanship of the Nonaligned Movement that
begins in 1986 to focus Third World criticism against
Pretoria.)
South African intransigence, the vulnerability of the
FLS to reprisal by Pretoria, their lessened cohesion,
and leadership competition from Mugabe will
complicate Kaunda's tenure as FLS chairman and his
ability to support Western diplomacy in the region. If
South Africa attacks ANC or SWAPO targets in
Zambia, Kaunda may become more strident in his
calls for sanctions. He could also be compelled to ask
for more military assistance, and might turn to the
Soviets again if none were forthcoming from the
West.
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Secret
Sierra Leone: Prospects for
New President Momoh
Gen. Joseph Momoh, who succeeded 86-year-old
Siaka Stevens as Sierra Leone's President on 28
November, is promising gradual economic reform and
an improvement in the standard of living. We believe
popular support for Momoh is likely to diminish
rapidly, however, and the military may try to oust him
by midyear if Momoh fails to address serious
economic problems, move against the corrupt
Lebanese traders, and distance himself from Stevens
and his cronies.
The Public Mood
Most Sierra Leoneans believe Momoh, who was
approved in a nationwide referendum in October, is a
sincere leader who will do his best to bring a measure
of responsibility and accountability to government,
the US Embassy reports. Many people nonetheless
are skeptical that he can cope with the country's
massive financial problems and the declining standard
of living. If significant economic improvement is not
forthcoming, public patience may evaporate and
support for a coup by junior officers may grow.
Although Momoh has been Army Commander since
1973 and has at least some knowledge of massive
government corruption and malfeasance, according to
the Embassy, the public's dislike of Stevens has not
rubbed off on Momoh. According to the Embassy and
press reports, Momoh assures people that he is not
beholden to Stevens and that he will steer independent
economic and political courses.
Economic Disintegration
Momoh inherits an economy that Stevens and his
cronies have helped to bankrupt, according to the US
Embassy. Inflation is nearly 70 percent, the economic
growth rate has been a marginal 0.5 percent since
1981, the foreign debt is nearly $500 million, and food
production cannot keep pace with population growth,
according to US Embassy reporting.
Although Momoh has pledged to reform the economy,
we doubt he has the economic and leadership skills
necessary to effect politically sensitive measures.
Gen. Joseph Momoh
48 years old ... articulate, soft
spoken, and intelligent ... said
to be open and friendly to the
West ... well liked and respect-
ed by enlisted ranks, but does
not mix well with junior offi-
cers ... critics say he avoids
tough decisions, does not have
a good grasp of economics, and
Momoh says he will reduce the swollen bureaucracy,
enforce price controls, and reduce smuggling, but
he probably will not
implement the tough changes necessary to reach a
new accord with the IMF-such as an end to oil
subsidies and further currency devaluations. Momoh
probably will make only token gestures at reducin
the massive smuggling of commodities
According to the US
Embassy, some $50 million a year in government
revenue is lost from diamond smuggling.
The agriculture sector-which employs some 65
percent of the work force-is also likely to remain in
the doldrums. The Embassy reports that Freetown
now is a major food importer. According to the
Embassy, substantial amounts of rice-the main
crop-are smuggled into neighboring Liberia and
Guinea because of inadequate government incentives.
Rice imports have increased fourfold in the last
decade; domestic production of rice is mainly for
subsistence. According to international economists, 65
percent of the rural dwellers live in absolute poverty.
Secret
ALA AR 85-026
29 November 1985
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0 R T H E R N
Pendembu
Sierra Leone
-=-~ Interna'ional boundary
---"--- Province boundary
National capital
O Province capital
--~--~- Railroad
Road
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them.
The Lebanese Community
Momoh's greatest dilemma may be how to handle the
powerful Lebanese community-which numbers
about 17,000-to which he is indebted but that has
engendered resentment among other Sierra Leoneans.
Lebanese merchants and businessmen control the
economy and have benefited from Stevens's
corruption. While Momoh has pledged to lessen their
dominance of the economy, he has also promised not
to punish them for past activities, nor attempt to expel
We agree with the US Ambassador that the influence
of the ruling party, the All People's Congress, will be
reduced under Momoh's rule. Although his aides have
advised him to abolish the party next year, Momoh
reportedly believes he can remold it to his own liking,
according to US Embassy and press reports. While
some military officers fear Momoh may be vulnerable
to party pressures, we doubt the party will exert
considerable influence. In the near term, however, the
entrenched party stalwarts-such as First Vice
President Minah-could hamper Momoh's reform
efforts and work behind the scenes to embarrass him
The public and junior military officers will carefully
monitor Momoh's policy toward Jamil Muhammed, a
Lebanese businessman and Stevens confidant who has
partial ownership of most government-owned
enterprises-including the lucrative fishing and
25X1 diamond industries. Muhammed funded Momoh's
if he endangers their spoils of office.
senior officers
expect to exert considerable influence over Momoh's
presidency.
presidential campaign and they are close friends,
according to the US Embassy
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The Embassy reports Momoh will not arrest
Muhammed, but will attempt to reduce his influence.
Brigadier
General Tarawallie-the newly appointed Army
Commander
may attempt to pressure Momoh to establish martial
law so that the military can move quickly against
corrupt officials. Other senior officers believe that
Momoh will eventually turn to the Army to maintain
himself in power or that he must declare martial law
Stevens and the Old Guard
In our view, although Stevens's influence over Momoh
will diminish gradually, the former President
probably will remain an active behind-the-scenes
player. According to US Embassy sources, Stevens
claims he no longer is interested in politics,
According to the Embassy
his personal security and promised not to persecute
Stevens believes that Momoh guaranteed
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wrongdoing in exchange for the presidency
to deal effectively with the economic morass
Junior Officers
In our view, although junior officers will initially
pursue a wait-and-see attitude, they will act as a
constant pressure on Momoh.
the junior othcers regard
Momoh as a good leader, but they plan to overthrow
him if they judge he has failed to arrest the economic
decline.
report that junior officers are dissatisfied with the
status quo and believe the nation's resources are being
squandered by a few privileged politicians and
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unions-passive since a two-month strike in 1981- 25X1
may challenge the government. Moreover, any
indecision by Momoh is likely to lead to coup plotting
among senior or junior officers who will probably try
to topple him and try their hand at governing.F_~ 25X1
US Interests
We agree with the US Embassy that Momoh will
pursue a generally pro-Western course.
Freetown expects greater
US security assistance and an expanded military
training program.
We believe Momoh-in pursuit of
a financial windfall-may offer
(conclude that junior
officers and enlisted personnel also are generally pro-
Western
Libya's Potential Challenge
While Libyan influence is minimal at this time, we
believe Tripoli may attempt to take advantage of any
ensuing instability during the transition to new
According to the US Embassy, some militant students
may be sympathetic to Libyan overtures, and a
"Green Book" study group operates at Fourah Bay
College. While we have no evidence of a revival of
Islamic fundamentalism-some 30 percent of the
population is Muslim-we believe Libyan-backed
Islamic radicalism could appeal to disaffected youth
in both the university and the lower ranks of the
military.
Outlook
In our view, Momoh will have a relatively short
honeymoon period-three to six months-in which he
must convince the military and the public that he is
not Stevens's puppet and that he can initiate
substantial economic reform. Should he fail to assert
his political independence, or fail to halt the economic
slide and not improve living conditions, however, we
believe students will take to the streets, and labor
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Ghana: The Militar
Under Rawlings
Since 1981 the Ghanaian Army has been transformed
from a hodgepodge of competing factions into a
relatively professional and disciplined force. Although
probably loyal to Head of State Rawlings in the near
term, the military is likely to become a self-appointed
political arbiter, willing to intervene should an
opportunity arise. Rawlings is wary of the military
and is likely to arrest suspected coup plotters while co-
opting key officers. We believe Rawlings will rely on
the Force Reserve Unit, an elite detachment located
in Accra, to act as a counterweight to military
ambitions and to protect the Castle, the seat of
government.
Following his overthrow of the Limann administration
in December 1981, Rawlings maintained a tenuous
hold over the military. According to US Embassy and
ndiscipline, military
harassment civilians, and friction between officers
and enlisted men marked the disintegration of the
command structure. Rawlings survived five coup
attempts in his first two years as both more moderate
and radical military factions sought to topple him.
Gen. Arnold Quainoo, a tough, "no nonsense" soldier
who was appointed Army Commander in January
1982 and Armed Forces Commander in November
1982, gradually restored a semblance of discipline and
order, according to US Embassy and
He appointed loyal officers to key military
units and distributed new uniforms and equipment to
help pacify rank-and-file grumblings.F_~
Present State of the Military
Under the command of General Quainoo, the 12,685-
man military has become a relatively cohesive and
Ihas used field exercises to ensure
discipline and has put enlisted men into the military's
agricultural program to absorb their free time.
enlisted men also
appear to receive adequate clothing and food=
is well respected
by NCOs and enlisted men, but some senior officers
resent his autocratic and overbearing style. F_~
Army Commander Quainoo
46 years old ... commanded
5th battalion in Accra at time
of Rawlings's 1981 coup, and
believed to have played an im-
portant but passive role in over-
throw of Limann regime ...
strongly anti-Soviet, he re-
ceived advanced military train-
ing in the United States in the
1970s. F__1
Quainoo has worked behind the scenes to undermine
radical influence,
Last December, Quainoo abolished the
Armed Forces Defense Committees and forcibly
retired their radical leader. The Committees, created
in 1982 to disseminate the regime's ideas and to
ensure military adherence to the "revolution,"
consisted of junior officers and enlisted men who often
undermined the chain of command and ignored
military authority. In their place, Quainoo created the
Committees for the Defense of the Revolution under
the command of a handpicked moderate who supports
the traditional military structure,
Rawlings has sought to cultivate the military by
placing officers on the ruling Provisional National
Defense Council (PNDC) and by paying enlisted men
with regularity. Commander Quainoo and Brigadier
Mensah-Wood's appointments to the PNDC in
September probably stem from Rawlings's desire to
mollify Western-leaning officers, since they followed
the elevation to the Council in July of the Marxist
security adviser Kojo Tsikata. F_~
Nevertheless, Rawlings deliberately keeps the
military in a "semianemic" condition to prevent a
successful coup attempt, according to
Secret
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29 November 1985
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Major Quashigah, 38-year-old Commander of the
Force Reserve Unit, is an ambitious officer who may
hold the most important Army position in Ghana.
Quashigah received advanced military training in the
United States in the early 1970s and also attended
Sandhurst.
charismatic ana self -assure e p aye a Key role in
defeating the last two serious coup attempts (June
1983 and March 1984).
I he has political ambitions
According to unconfirmed US Embassy
reports, he views the West favorably.F---]
Most Army units are kept under strength and
are poorly equipped. For example, the key 5th
battalion-based in Accra and probably essential for
a successful coup-is a "hollow unit," understaffed
and undermanned.
The Force Reserve Unit
We agree withF_
His the most
important military unit in Ghana. It is designed as a
counterstrike force and was responsible for quashing a
dissident incursion from Togo in March 1984 and
foiling the assassination attempt on Rawlings in
February 1985, according to US Embassy and
Since April, the FRU has
been under the command of Major Quashigah, who is
is not subordinate to Commander Quainoo.
the FRU is well armed
Grievances
Lagging morale, the continued deterioration of
military equipment, and ideological differences may
undermine the military's support for Rawlings, in our
view. deterioration
of Air Force planes and Navy ships is a continuing
source of frustration. For example, none of the 46
planes in the Air Force is operational because of a
lack of spare parts. The regime appears unwilling to
acquire new hardware, and argues that expensive new
aircraft and patrol boats would be a drain on limited
government resources, according to US Embassy
reporting. We have little information on the political
attitudes of the officers corps. Opinion is probably
divided: some would be sympathetic toward a more
Western-leaning government, while others may see
the regime's cooperation with international donor
countries and the pursuit of good ties to the West as a
betrayal of Rawlings's original revolutionary goals.
and US Embassy
reporting, most key senior officers are Western
leaning. Moreover, officers in key posts-such as
PNDC members Quainoo and Mensah-Wood, and
FRU Commander Quashigah-have received
military training in the United States, which provides
training to some 40 Ghanaian military students
annually. Small numbers of Ghanaian soldiers also
are trained in the United Kingdom and Nigeria.
Foreign military presence is limited to four British
officers. No Soviet Bloc country currently provides
military training or advisers.
Libya has sought unsucccessfully to establish a close
military relationship as part of its longstanding effort
to cultivate Rawlings. According to US Embassy
reporting, Tripoli in 1982 provided small arms,
armored cars, and mortars.
one a ess, ccra as
refused to ratify a 1983 mutual defense agreement
that would provide Libya with military bases in
Ghana. In our view, Ghana may be vulnerable to
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Libyan overtures-especially if the political and
economic costs are low-but is unlikely to give
permanent basing rights to Libya because this would
alienate key Western aid donors.
Outlook
In the near term, Rawlings probably will retain the
military's loyalty, although he will rely heavily on
Quainoo to maintain discipline and the support of
Army moderates. So long as economic conditions
continue to improve and salaries are paid on time,
most troops will probably remain contented, despite
low-level grumbling over poor equipment. Some
officers and enlisted men probably have their own
political ambitions, however, and could decide to
move if the opportunity arises-especially if Rawlings
is out of the country or serious intraregime squabbling
erupts. Rightwing officers, disgruntled with
Rawlings's flirtations with radical states, may attempt
to assassinate him. On the other hand, angry, young
junior officers, who believe Rawlings has betrayed the
original, more radical goals of the "revolution," may
plot his ouster.
We believe Rawlings will remain suspicious of the
military's intentions, and from time to time he will
arrest small numbers of soldiers suspected of stirring
unrest. He will rely on Tsikata's intelligence service to
monitor potential coup plotters. In our view, a coup
attempt is likely to fail unless it has the support of the
key Force Reserve Unit. Moreover, a coup attempt by
the FRU cannot be ruled out because it has easy
access to Rawlings and the necessary arms to oust
him. l
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Guinea-Bissau: Military
Pressures on Vieira
The arrests in early November of First Vice President
Correia, the second most powerful official in the
government, and some 300 Army personnel for coup
plotting underscore President Vieira's difficulties in
maintaining control over the 6,000-man Army-the
main political force in the country. Although Vieira
appears secure for now, he faces mounting pressures
from military factions over tribal differences,
economic reform, the restructuring of the military,
and foreign policy, according to US Embassy and
press reports. F_~
The coup plot and the arrests probably stem from
demands by Correia, for promotions for his Balante
tribesmen, according to Embassy reporting. The
Balante-who represent about a third of the
population-carried the brunt of fighting during the
independence struggle but believe they have been
slighted under postindependence rule. Balantes
dominate the military's enlisted ranks but are
underrepresented in the officer corps as well as in the
ruling party. According to Embassy reporting,
Balante soldiers provoked a short-lived uprising in
1982 over the slow rate of promotions. F_~
Vieira's Position
We agree with the US Embassy that Vieira probably
faces no immediate challenges to his rule, and that, as
one of the ruling party's guerrilla heroes during the
liberation struggle, he enjoys popular support. The
Embassy reports that he is a masterful politician who
has an extensive network of personal contacts and who
is usually able to achieve consensus on most issues.
Sketchy Embassy reporting indicates that, despite the
recent coup plot, he still has the backing of the Army,
which dominates the ruling council. The Embassy also
reports that the military as a whole is a "privileged
class," receiving regular pay and food allotments.
Vieira's position, nevertheless, could erode if he loses
the support of Defense Minister Camara, who helped
Vieira seize power in 1980 and is strongly supported
by the military. Although Camara and Vieira have
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believes his position is seriously threatened, and he
would stand a better-than-even chance of toppling
him.
Soviet Influence
For the near to medium term, the Soviets and Cubans
will have considerable influence in the armed forces,
and may try to use this power to undermine Vieira's
modest Westward shift. According to the Embassy,
the Army is grateful to the Soviets for their aid during
the independence struggle and has allowed them to
play an influential role. The Embassy notes that every
officer is Soviet or Cuban trained. Moreover, Soviet
advisers are placed throughout the high command,
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ALA AR 85-026
29 November 1985
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Western Influences
In the past two years, Vieira has sought to reduce the
complete dependence on Eastern Bloc military
training and equipment, according to the Embassy. A
small number of Guinea-Bissauan officers are being
trained in the United States, but the Vieira regime
fears any increase in the program would provoke a
radical backlash from pro-Soviet factions, according
to the Embassy. Nonetheless, Bissau continues to
pursue low-key and comparatively modest military
ties to the.West. The Embassy reports that Guinea-
Bissau is expanding its military supply and training
relationship with Portugal and France. Paris has
provided light trucks, radio equipment, and an
Alouette II helicopter in recent years, while Lisbon is
training a small number of soldiers.
Restructuring the Military
Vieira faces pressures as he attempts to transform the
revolutionary wartime Army into a smaller and more
professional force. According to academic studies and
press reports, Vieira has sought unsuccessfully since
1981 to reduce military spending-now some 20
percent of the budget-and demobilize unneeded
troops, as part of an austerity program. Moreover,
Vieira may also face challenges by younger, educated
officers who often are passed over for promotion
because the Army tends to favor those who
participated in the independence struggle.
Outlook
Vieira appears to have survived this latest challenge,
but we believe his room to maneuver will continue to
shrink as a result of Guinea-Bissau's continued
economic deterioration and the tribal and ideological
factionalization of the armed forces. Moreover, he
will have to contend increasingly with a looming
generational conflict as the "old guard" participants
of the liberation struggle who still retain key
government posts try to preserve their positions and
attempt to fend off challenges by younger, better
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Africa
Briefs
Both white and black South Africans expect to see substantial changes in the
country over the next 10 years, according to a recent survey of 500 whites and 400
blacks conducted by a prominent polling organization. Whites and blacks are in
close agreement on the future of apartheid-only 22 percent of whites and 29
percent of blacks believe that apartheid will exist in 10 years. Opinion is divided
along racial lines on how these changes would come about. The majority of whites
(59 percent) believe that South Africa's problems will be resolved peacefully, while
most blacks (69 percent) say they expect resolution to come through civil war.
Blacks overwhelmingly disapprove of individual blacks who choose to work within
the present South African system by accepting positions on black township
councils and in homeland governments. The survey also reveals contradictory
results. For example, although most whites (63 percent) expect apartheid to
disappear over the next 10 years, only 22 percent feel that the passed laws for
nonwhites should be abolished and only 51 percent believe that joint black-white
rule is possible. F_~
The recently created East African Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and
Development plans to hold its first summit in January, according to reporting from
the US Embassy in Djibouti. The group aspires to be a regional forum to develop
and coordinate drought, famine, and refugee recovery programs. It held a
preparatory conference in Djibouti in mid-November with Djibouti, Ethiopia,
Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda in attendance, All six members are expected
to attend the January summit, although the Soviets are pressing Ethiopia not to
Ethiopia is participating apparently in hopes of deriving any benefits the group
may be able to deliver, but the Soviets probably wish to discourage extensive
dialogue between the group and Western aid donors. The attendance of Chairman
Mengistu and Somali President Siad at the summit could present a rare
opportunity for the two leaders to discuss bilateral problems, although it is
doubtful that either will seize the initiative. Prospects for the future of the group
are poor because of a lack of funding and the probable inability of the members to
agree on a unified regional policy on famine and refugee problems.
Secret
ALA AR 85-026
29 November 1985
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