EGYPT: PARTY POLITICS AND THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Egypt: Party Politics
and the Parliamentary Election
An Intelligence Assessment
NESA 84-10185
May 1984
COPY 387
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Directorate of Secret
Egypt: Party Politics
and the Parliamentary Election
An Intelligence Assessment
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
This paper was prepared by Office
of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
Secret
NESA 84-10185
May 1984
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Egypt: Party Politics
and the Parliamentary Election
Key Judgments The election on 27 Ma f th P 1 ' >
or
,
,
information available promises to be a milestone in Egyptian politics. President Mubarak has
as oil May 1984
was used in this report. guaranteed that the election will be free and democratic, and the participa-
tion of at least four opposition ties makes it the most open contest ever,
y
e eop e s Assembly
Egypt s parliament
We expect the NDP to retain its majority in the Assembly, probably by a
healthy margin. Recent election legislation, traditional low voter turnout,
the tendency for Egyptians to vote for the government party, and the
limited time opposition parties have had to organize will all work in the
NDP's favor.
Egypt will have a true multiparty system for the first time if the New
Wafd Party-the NDP's strongest opponent-realizes its leadership's
somewhat optimistic prediction that it will receive 30 percent of the vote.
We believe the New Wafd will do almost this well and will make a strong
showing in major urban areas, in parts of the Nile delta, and among Coptic
Christians.
A strong minority opposition representation probably would not dramati-
cally change the functioning of the Assembly, because the NDP would
retain control of key committees. Such representation, however, might
force Mubarak to make some concessions to the minority parties to
forestall concerted opposition to his reelection as president in October
1987.
The election probably will not change US-Egyptian relations fundamental-
ly, although a significant opposition representation would encourage
Mubarak to increase the rhetoric of nonalignment. Mubarak almost
certainly will maintain Egypt's commitment to the Camp David accords
regardless of opposition pressure to drop them. Egyptian-Israeli relations,
in our judgment, are more likely to depend on Israel's parliamentary
election in July than on the composition of the Egyptian Assembly.
Secret
NESA 84-10185
May 1984
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Egypt: Party Politics
and the Parliamentary Election
Egypt's legislative body, will be a benchmark in the
evolution of the country's multiparty system. Five
opposition parties have gained legal status since 1978
and are eligible to field candidates in contests against
the government's National Democratic Party. It ap-
pears that at least four will participate in the election.
This will be the first test of a new election law,
enacted last summer over opposition objections. Ac-
cording to the new law, all candidates are required to
belong to a party-in the last election about a third of
the elected delegates ran as independents. In addition,
a party must get at least 8 percent of the vote
nationwide to win seats in the Assembly.
The election also will test President Mubarak's com-
mitment to political liberalization. His credentials
already have been tarnished by the new election law,
which will make it difficult for most of the opposition
parties to gain representation in the Assembly. They
doubt that the election will be fair, despite Mubarak's
guarantees.
The regime's difficult relations with the opposition
parties suggest increasing apprehension about the
challenge to the government party, particularly from
NDP: The Government Party
The National Democratic Party controls more than
three-quarters of the seats in the People's Assembly
and all of its key committees. Mubarak is the party's
stability.
chairman, although he generally leaves the role of
spokesman to Prime Minister Fuad Muhi al-Din, who
is the NDP's secretary general. Mubarak announced
in January 1984 his intention to stay on as NDP 25X1
chairman, despite opposition demands that he stand
above party politics. Mubarak has publicly stated that
a strong government party is vital to the country's
The NDP, which was formed by Sadat out of the
centrist elements of the Arab Socialist Union in 1978,
is the best organized Egyptian political party. Its
elaborate structure parallels that of the government,
with congresses, committees, and bureaus at the 25X1
district, governorate, and national levels. Neverthe-
less, the party is an elite organization and historically
has had difficulty fielding candidates for Assembly
seats that are constitutionally reserved for workers
and peasants.
The NDP has its own publication, Mayu, and indi-
rectly benefits from the government's influence over 25X1
such semiofficial publications as the mass daily Al-
Ahram. The NDP recently increased media exposure
by converting Mayu from a weekly to a daily.
Mubarak has privately predicted that the NDP will
have no trouble retaining its overwhelming majority
in the Assembly. He recently told a former US
official that the NDP will win, not because of any
unique virtue but because it is natural for the Egyp-
tian masses-especially those in the countryside-to
vote for the party that can deliver goods and services.
A well-informed NDP Assembly member, a former
independent, predicts that the NDP will garner 65 to
70 percent of the vote, while the Minister of State for
People's Assembly and Consultative Council Affairs
recently predicted that the government party will get
80 percent.
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The New Wafd: Off and Running
The New Wafd probably will be the NDP's strongest
opponent in the coming election, although the party
regained legal status only in January 1984. The New
Wafd's leaders are veteran politicians with broad
experience in government and party organization.
Before the party was legalized, Wafd leaders held
regular organization and strategy meetings,
By late last fall, the party was
campaigning in urban areas and throughout the Nile
delta
Many of the Wafd's leaders and members are wealthy
enough to help finance the party's activities. The high
quality of the first edition of its newspaper, Al-Wofd,
which was published in late March, indicates that the
party has solid financial backing.
Embassy reporting indicates that the New Wafd is
counting heavily on bases of support traditionally
enjoyed by the old Wafd. Neiman Gomaa, the Wafd's
deputy secretary general, asserted to Embassy offi-
cials that Christian Copts will vote for the Wafd
because the party stands for Muslim-Copt harmony.
Rumors of a Wafd-Muslim Brotherhood alliance-
denied by party leaders and played up in the govern-
ment-owned press-and the party's declaration that
shariah (Islamic law) should be the principal source of
legislation may have eroded the Wafd's support
among Copts, in our view. Gomaa also claimed
widespread sympathy for the Wafd among the elite,
academics, older Egyptians, and landowners. He told
Embassy officials that 80 percent of Cairo Universi-
ty's faculty had joined the party as of October 1983.
Party leader Fuad Siraj al-Din told Embassy officials
that in 1978 more than 70 percent of the Wafd's
members were young neonle born after the 1952
revolution.
We believe that most of the votes garnered by the
Wafd will be cast because of its history, not its
current policies. Some political observers question
whether the Wafd can become a mass party, for the
easily identifiable targets-especially British imperi-
alism-against which the old Wafd successfully ral-
lied Egyptians are gone. Moreover, the Wafd's call for
a return to free market principles would eliminate
many of the social welfare benefits that Egypt's poor
have received since Nasir.
In foreign affairs, the Wafd has backed away from its
earlier support of Mubarak's foreign policy. Its recent
manifesto terms the Camp David accords "basically
invalid" and declares that Israel has no right to ask
Egypt to honor its commitments under the peace
treaty, when Israel has violated the letter and spirit of
the accords. It also calls the liberation of Jerusalem
from Israeli occupation a holy cause. The manifesto,
however, stops short of rejecting the peace treaty with
NPUG: Solid but Limited Support on the Left
The leftist National Progressive Unionist Grouping
(NPUG), led by the Marxist Khalid Muhi al-Din, is
the Mubarak regime's most vociferous opponent. The
NPUG, legalized in 1978, is a mixed bag of most of
the leftist elements in Egypt, including Communists,
Nasirists, and a few Ba'thists.
The NPUG's weekly newspaper Al-Ahali routinely
publishes sharp criticisms of the government. It
charges that "Sadatists" still are in control and that
the government is soft on corruption and is overly
dependent on the United States. The NPUG's key
differences with the Mubarak regime's foreign policy
are its demands to drop the Camp David accords and
normalization of relations with Israel. Domestically,
the party calls for a return to comprehensive national
economic planning and the nationalization of whole-
sale trade and banking.
The US Embassy reports that the NPUG is the best
organized of the opposition parties but that its base of
support is limited and localized. Its strongest appeal is
among intellectuals and the working class, especially
urban industrial workers. Party leader Muhi al-Din
told Embassy officials that about 10 percent of the
party's following is committed to a specific ideology,
while the rest support the party because of its general
leftist orientation and image as the champion of the
poor and oppressed. According to Embassy reporting,
the NPUG is active in about half of Egypt's governor-
ates, including most of the larger and more populous
ones.
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The NPUG holds no seats in the Assembly. Party
leader Muhi al-Din, however, claims that NPUG won
280,000 of the more than 3 million votes cast nation-
wide in the 1979 election-even though it campaigned
in only 50 of 176 electoral districts and had no
newspaper. An NPUG official recently told Embassy
officers that NPUG is finding new support in the
Sinai and other areas, and party leaders contend that
the NPUG will have no difficulty in meeting the
8-percent requirement.
The Socialist Labor Party:
The Current Voice of the Opposition
The moderately leftist Socialist Labor Party (SLP)
holds 21 seats in the People's Assembly-more than
any other opposition party. The SLP's leader, Ibrahim
Shukri, thus is ostensibly the leader of the opposition.
The SLP has become increasingly critical of the
Mubarak regime on both foreign and domestic policy
issues. As outlined in Al-Shaab, the party's weekly
newspaper, the SLP demands a "reconsideration" of
Egypt's special relationship with the United States,
especially on aid issues. It calls for freezing the Camp
David accords and breaking diplomatic relations with
Tel Aviv unless the Israelis withdraw from Lebanon,
cease establishing settlements on the West Bank and
in Gaza, and return the disputed Sinai border area of
Taba. The party publicly supported Mubarak's meet-
ing in December 1983 with PLO Chairman Arafat.
Domestically, the SLP sharply criticizes the inequita-
ble distribution of income in Egypt. It proposes a
wage and price agency that would impose a ceiling on
salaries and bonuses-especially for corporate chair-
men and directors-and tie wages to both productivi-
ty and the cost of living.
The SLP's confrontation with the regime over policy
issues recently has been sharpened by SLP allegations
that Shukri has been the victim of unfair campaign
practices by the NDP. The party charges that at-
tempts by NDP members to prevent Shukri from
making a campaign speech late last summer resulted
in a physical attack on the Labor leader. The SLP
says that Shukri was attacked by NDP "hooligans" in
February of this year during an appearance at a
mosque in the Nile delta province of Daqahliyya.
The Socialist Liberal Party: Fading Fast
The Socialist Liberal Party, formed in 1978 out of
rightist elements in the Arab Socialist Union under
the leadership of Mustafa Kamal Murad (a Free
Officer and friend of Sadat), is generally regarded as
the weakest of the older opposition parties. In the past
the party has claimed support from the more conserv-
ative segments of Egyptian youth as well as the older
generation and some former ministers and deputies of
the old Wafd party. The legalization of the New
Wafd, in our view, has eroded some of this backing.
Recent internal dissension and defections of party 25X1
notables have further weakened the Liberals. The
party's vice chairman, Salah Rifa'i, resigned earlier
this year in protest over perquisites given to party
secretaries. According to Embassy reporting, Mu-
hammad Abd al-Shafei, the party's deputy chairman,
and Olfat Kamal, the last Liberal deputy in the
Assembly, both have defected to the Wafd.
The Liberals generally support the Mubarak govern-
ment's foreign policy. They support Camp David as
"the only possible course" toward peace in the Middle
East but place the burden for normalization of Egyp-
tian-Israeli relations on Tel Aviv. On domestic policy,
however, the party is highly critical of the "Muhi al-
Din government's" failure to curb corruption and the
growth of the public sector.
The Umma Party: A Fundamentalist Safety Valve?
The Umma Party is the most Islamic oriented of the
legal opposition parties. It was formally recognized in
June 1983 despite the Ministry of Interior's objections
that it was a religious party and therefore would
violate the 1977 parties law. The Supreme Adminis-
trative Court ruled that the party's platform-basi- 25X1
cally a call for stricter adherence to Islam-was a
legitimate basis for a party because it appealed to a
segment of Egyptian society that had no other legal
political outlet.
Although it has the same name as the first modern
Egyptian political party, founded in 1906, the new
Umma's platform bears no resemblance to its prede-
cessor's program of political and social reform on the
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European model. The party's initial declaration called
for the immediate application of Islamic law; veiling
and conservative dress for women; the closing of
nightclubs, coffee houses, and gambling casinos; pro-
hibition of pornography; and the flogging of black-
marketeers and corrupt businessmen. The party's
founder, Ahmad al-Sabahei, has taken the pen name
"Ahmad Khomeyni" to signify the Islamic revolution
that he seeks to bring about-not through violence
but through the Constitution and democratic process.
Al-Sabahei nevertheless maintains that the Umma
Party is not exclusively a religious one and that it
opposes Islamic radicalism and is open to any Egyp-
tian.
In our judgment, the government probably sees the
Umma as a convenient and relatively harmless means
of defusing opposition criticism about restrictions on
the formation of parties. The Umma has no experi-
enced leadership, no newspaper, no funds
system with independent candidates prohibited, as an
attempt to stifle the democratic process (see the inset).
Mubarak claims that the party list method strength-
ens the multiparty system (see the inset). NPUG
leader Muhi al-Din asserts that the real reason is that
the NDP could not break the family loyalties that in
the past have elected many independents to the
People's Assembly-102 in 1979-and could prevent
the government from obtaining a docile NDP major-
ity. Another aspect of the new law-the requirement
that a party receive at least 8 percent of the nation-
wide vote to win any seats-will eliminate the weaker
opposition parties from the Assembly.
Mubarak has shown increasing willingness to use, or
sanction the use of, legal instruments to control and
curtail the opposition's activity. The Wafd, in particu-
lar, has been the object of governmental harassment,
especially since the regime lost its court case to block
the party's legalization in Januar
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The Regime's Control of the Campaign
Mubarak has said repeatedly that the parliamentar
tions with US officials indicate that he believes the
NDP will win handily without the dirty tricks and
vote tampering that opposition politicians say charac-
terized parliamentary elections under Sadat.
Western and Egyptian political observers agree that
the new election law, passed last summer without
consultation with opposition leaders, already stacks
the deck heavily in the NDP's favor. Critics have
denounced the new law's establishment of a party list
n April the government tried to
impoun t e second issue of the Wafd's newspaper on
the grounds that an article in it jeopardized the
government's case in a trial of Islamic extremists.
This was the first time the Mubarak regime attempt-
ed to close an opposition newspaper-and the second
time it lost a case against the Wafd.
The government can influence the election in a num-
ber of ways short of direct intervention, especially
through its control of the mass media. We believe the
regime increasingly will seek legal pretexts to deny
the opposition access to the media as it becomes more
unsure about how the public will receive opposition
criticism. In mid-April, in a clear attempt to restrict
the opposition in an area critical to the NDP, Cairo
officials prohibited campaign posters from "walls,
electric power cubicles, tunnels, bridges, and historic
buildings" in the city. The government has yet to
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The May election will be the first held under Law
114, promulgated in August 1983. It establishes a
party list system, replacing the old constituency
system, and eliminates independent candidates.F-
The new election law increases the number of elected
deputies from 382 to 448. The president may still
appoint up to 10 additional delegates. Electoral
districts have been redrawn-there are now 48 dis-
tricts compared to 176 in the 1979 election-making
them much larger than the two- or three-member
districts from which the present deputies were elect-
At least 31 of the districts must have a female
candidate, and in all districts at least 50 ercent of
the seats must go to workers or peasants.
The principle of proportional representation, together
with the larger districts, theoretically gives opposi-
tion parties a greater chance to be represented in the
Assembly. Seats in the Assembly will be allocated by
party according to the share of the vote each party
gets in each district provided it gets at least 8
percent of the vote nationwide. Seats left over after
proportional distribution will go to the party with the
most votes nationwide.
The new law apparently abolishes byelections to fill
seats vacated during the term of the Assembly.
Instead, vacancies will be filled by persons next on
the original electoral lists or from standby lists if all
candidates from a party's election list already hold
seats.
announce whether opposition candidates will have
access to television and radio air time. According to
opposition press reports, the government already has
ruled out the use of television. We believe the regime
will not risk-without legal justification-the criti-
cism that denying air time to the opposition would
bring, but we expect the opposition's access to be
extremely limited.
The regime is effectively using the government-owned
press to exploit opposition vulnerabilities. For exam-
ple, NPUG's supposed link with Communist groups is
a constant theme. The regime also has publicized the
Wafd-Muslim Brotherhood dialogue in hopes of stim-
ulating a backlash among Copts against the Wafd. At
the same time, Mubarak was conducting a highly 25X1
publicized campaign to win Coptic support for the
NDP. 25X1
Opposition Maneuvering:
Confrontation With the Regime
Opposition politicians have focused on the issue of
political freedoms since the new election law was 25X1
passed, even though they had little hope that the
government would accede to their demands. Since last
summer, opposition parties have contested the new 25X1
election law, called for an interim government to
ensure fair elections, and demanded that Mubarak
step down as NDP leader. A short-lived Committee of
National Forces for the Defense of Democracy 25X1
(CDD), formed in fall 1983, presented the regime with
a list of extreme demands and did little to advance
opposition credibility.
Similarly, the opposition's boycott of the
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On the party list system:
All my concern has been that we should achieve
the system that would ensure the following points:
encouraging the good elements to participate in the
election and to enter the parliamentary councils;
providing the opposition with the opportunity to
express its views and to defend its stances; making
the candidates' party platforms-not fanaticism,
influence, or financial power-the basis for prefer-
ring some candidates to others; enlarging the scope
for the voters so that they will be able to choose
from several deputies instead of one deputy for a
constituency. I have found that these consider-
ations can be achieved to a larger degree through
elections by the list system.
Speech to NDP Youth Coherence
19 July 1983
On the NDP:
It is the nature of people in the developing coun-
tries-and Egypt is one of these countries-to
support the party that is led by the head of state. I
personally cannot prevent the people from joining
the party that I am leading, just as I cannot compel
them to join it.
Interview with Kuwait Al-Tadamun
3 November 1983
fall election to the Consultative Council, a body with
almost no power, had little effect because, by law, the
party that receives the most votes-which would have
been the NDP in any case-wins all seats in the
Council.'
' The Consultative Council, created by Sadat in 1980, is Egypt's
other parliamentary institution. It is an advisory body and has no
legislative powers. The Council has 140 elected members who serve
six-year terms, and 70 members appointed by the president.
Elections for half of the Council's seats are held every three years;
the party that gets a simple majority of the votes wins all the seats
On a multiparty system:
We have six parties.... Are these not enough to
practice the experiment? Let us first begin with
reforming what exists and setting solid party foun-
dations. Later we can amend the parties law and
open the door to several parties. It will be useful
that we move gradually along the road to
democracy.
Interview with Al-Watan al-Arabi
29 December 1983
On opposition parties:
We do not fear this or that party, so long as it
operates within the framework of legitimacy and
supremacy of the law; this is the best safeguard for
any freedom or democracy.... Why should we
fear it (the Wafd)? Is it not an Egyptian party? We
have accepted for ourselves the principle of opin-
ions, of the parties, of divergent trends.... As to
whether these (other) parties appeal to the ordinary
Egyptian citizens, my answer is no, since many
segments of the people are averse to joining parties,
are hesitant, or refrain.... At present we notice
that the parties in Egypt have no roots.
Interview with Kuwait Al-Tadamun
3 November 1983
No Combined Opposition List, After All
Rumors that the opposition parties would try to meet
the 8-percent threshold by submitting a combined list
of candidates began circulating after the new election
law was enacted, according to Embassy and press
reports. Key figures in several parties told Embassy
officials that, once the election was over, elected
delegates on a combined list would resume their
original party affiliation or independent status
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The opposition could not form such a list. Liberal
leader Kamal Murad was the leading proponent of the
scheme, but his party is held in low esteem by other
opposition politicians. Moreover, the New Wafd ap-
pears to be in such a strong position that it had no
incentive to throw in its lot with weaker parties. Even
Labor and NPUG decided not to unite under a single
Labor ticket, as an NDP official suggested to Embas-
sy officials, although Labor's moderate leftist stance
would have complemented NPUG's solid support. P
The NPUG and SLP parties will also have difficulty
meeting the 8-percent threshold. We believe, however,
that they have a fair chance of doing so and thereby
Instead, four of the five opposition parties have
submitted separate lists. According to press reports,
Labor will run in 46 of the 48 election districts; the
NPUG and New Wafd, in 44; and the Liberals, in
only 27. The weak Umma Party apparently could not
come up with any candidates and so will not compete
in the election.
Outlook: Election Prospects and Their Implications
We believe that the NDP will easily retain its major-
ity in the People's Assembly, largely because of its
superior resources and the Egyptian tradition of sup-
port for the government party.
We expect the New Wafd to make the strongest
showing of all the opposition parties, although in our
judgment Wafdist predictions of 25 to 30 percent of
the vote may be optimistic. The government's anti-
Wafd campaign, however, could backfire and rally
voters to the party's defense. We also believe the
Wafd will attract votes from sunnorters of other
opposition parties.
None of the other opposition parties will make an
impressive showing on its own, in our judgment. In
particular, the Socialist Liberal Party is unlikely to
get the required 8 percent of the vote. Without seats
in the Assembly, the Liberals and the Umma Party
will lose members to the stronger opposition parties
and may disappear from the political scene.
gaining a few seats in the Assembly.
The daily functioning of the People's Assembly proba-
bly will not be affected by any election result short of
a clear win by an opposition party-which we judge to
be the least likely outcome.
The NDP, however, will 25X1
control key committees-foreign affairs, legislative
affairs, national security, economic affairs, and bud-
get. The Assembly never has fully exercised its con-
siderable constitutional powers and under continued
NDP dominance probably will not begin doing so (see
the inset).
The representation of opposition parties in the Assem-
bly could, however, affect Mubarak's reelection.
Mubarak's six-year term will expire in October 1987, 25X6
during the term of the Assembly elected this year.
The Constitution provides that, before submitting his 25X6
nomination for a second term to a popular vote, his
candidacy must be approved by two-thirds of the
Assembly. United action b the opposition could block
Mubarak's candidac
We do not expect the parliamentary election to affect
appreciably US interests in Egypt and the Middle
East. Barring a very unlikely opposition victory, which
would force Mubarak to make basic policy changes,
Cairo still will have strong motivations for retaining
US-Egyptian ties-US financial and military aid and
the need for US leadership in securing a comprehen-
sive Middle East peace settlement. Mubarak's recent
allusions to improvement in Egyptian-Soviet relations
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The People's Assembly has important constitutional
powers, including nomination of the president. It
shares with the president the authority to propose
legislation and approves the government's general
policy and budget. Assembly deputies have the right
to question ministers, the prime minister, and even
the president. The Assembly also has the power to
pass a vote of no confidence in any cabinet member.
In practice, however, the People's Assembly has
exercisedfew, of its constitutional powers. It is pri-
marily a forum for public debate, channeling public
grievances to government agencies, and recommend-
ing solutions for areas of government failure. It
routinely ratifies decisions made by the president and
the government-a pattern set during the early part
of Nasir's rule, when Sadat was Speaker of the
Assembly. Only the Assembly's budget committee
has been active and fairly effective in recent years in
influencing budget policy.
Delegates serve five-year terms. Under the Constitu-
tion, the president can dissolve the Assembly at any
time, but this action must be approved by popular
referendum and a new election held within 60 days.
and his increased criticism of Israel are only partly
related to campaign politics. They have at least as
much to do with Egypt's participation in the Non-
aligned Movement and its increased cooperation with
other Arab and Islamic states.
Mubarak's nonaligned rhetoric and criticism of Israel
may persist if a larger opposition minority in the
Assembly makes him more sensitive to opposition
criticism. In our judgment, however, Mubarak will
resist opposition pressure to drop the Camp David
accords. We believe future Egyptian-Israeli relations
will depend more on the composition of the Israeli
Government than on the outcome of the Egyptian
election.
A fairly conducted parliamentary election will en-
hance Mubarak's image as a democrat and will
demonstrate that a key US friend in the region shares
a commitment to political liberty. Mubarak will be
tempted to exploit this good will by pressing harder
A fair election will not mean that Mubarak suddenly
has become a genuine democrat. We believe Mubarak
wants greater political liberalization for Egypt but
that his concept of democracy falls short of the US
model. Feedback from moderate opponents is an
important element of his leadership style
Mubarak is likely to continue his slow evolu-
tion toward democracy-particularly if he perceives
this as a way of leaving his mark on Egyptian
history-but an unruly Assembly could lead him to
withdraw some of the newly granted political free-
doms.
Egyptian leaders have repeatedly told US officials
that they will not try to reduce consumer subsidies or
enact other economic reforms until after the election.
Mubarak evidently is postponing unpopular measures
to avoid generating popular support for the opposition
parties. We believe that the government's concern
about the campaign is genuine, but we do not expect
major action even after the election. Egyptian leaders
have repeatedly found excuses to delay painful auster-
ity policies. The Tunisian and Moroccan food price
riots are fresh in their minds, and they will continue to
resist US urging to accelerate economic reform.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/06: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100110004-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/06: CIA-RDP85TOO314R000100110004-6
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/06: CIA-RDP85TOO314R000100110004-6