REDUCING BUREAUCRACY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B01356R000100120001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 8, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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0 8 JUN 19987
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Assistant
Deputy Director for Administration
Executive Officer
Office of Security
STAT
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SUBJECT: Reducing Bureaucracy
REFERENCE: Note from EXA/DDA dated 12 May 87; same subject
DDA 87-1011
Thank you for the opportunity to review the suggestions
for "reducing bureaucracy." If the four suggestions which
pertain to the office of Security are typical, this will have
been a worthwhile exercise for the Agency; each contained, at
its core, a past or present bureaucratic stumbling block. The
Office of Security's response to each suggestion is as follows:
Regarding the "Vaulted Area
On 28 May 1987, the installation
was completed althou
activated until OL completes work on physical security
construction requirements per memoranda from Physical
Security Division to OL/RE&CD dated 28 October 1986 and
18 May 1987.
Be this as it may, the suggestion accurately points
out a problem which our own personnel have noted namely,
that all too often time is wasted between construction or
inspection by one component and subsequent construction or
inspection by another. The offices most often involved are
OS/Security Equipment Services Division, OL/Real Estate and
Construction Division, DDA/Safety Staff and the requesting
component.
One "old hand" recalls a time when the office of
Logistics had an officer assigned to each building or group
of buildings who acted like a general contractor; the
officer would monitor the construction and make sure that
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the work of each "subcontractor" or inspector followed
closely upon completion of the previous phase. It appears
that this practice is no longer followed. While the Office
of Logistics seems in the best position to assume this
function, the Office of Security is willing to be
cooperative and responsive to the direction and
coordination of such a focal point officer. We recognize
that it is difficult for inexperienced component personnel
to try to act in this capacity; there is too much room for
confusion and delay.
Regarding the reporting of gifts -
The Office of Security strongly opposes the use of the
reinvestigation polygraph test as a routine means of
detecting misfeasance, malfeasance or similar misconduct.
I believe an administrative solution would be more
appropriate.
Regarding procedures for admitting visitors to Headquarters -
Unfortunately, we do not have the personnel to handle
the telephone calls required each day to process the
hundreds of visitors to the headquarters compound. In
addition to preregi steri ng visitors in person at the
Security Duty Office, Headquarters personnel can
preregister visitors by using electronic mail (a menu is
available on the Automated Information Management System -
AIM). The availability of the AIM method of visitor
registration has been previously published in Headquarters
Notices and will again be cited in an upcoming Notice
regarding the opening of the Headquarters Visitor Control
Center.
Regarding the operational naivety of young OS officers -
The Office of Security must rely on its cadre of young
(inexperienced) officers for many vital tasks. While there
is no instant cure for inexperience, we recognize the
problem and have taken the following steps:
All new Security Officers are provided with a DO
orientation as part of their initial training. They
are also schooled in surveillance and
countersurveillance techniques and terminology.
S i r R F T
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? We are considering continuation of a program,
developed in 1986, in which OS polygraph and
technical officers attended a workshop with DO
officers to discuss mutual problems and concerns.
These after-hours session were found to be very
beneficial even if occasionally heated.
? We sympathize with past limitations on non-DO
attendees at operational courses. The DO Senior
Training officer has been extremely cooperative in
recent discussion toward enrolling OS Special
Activities Division personnel in various CI courses.
We would welcome the opportunity to enroll additional
stude.its in operations-related courses.
:OS/EO/PP$
(5 June 87) :
:Distribution::
Orig - Adse:
1 - EO Chrono:
1 - OS/Registry:
1 - PPS Chrono:
3
S E C R E T
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EXA/
Deputy Director
for Administration
NOTE FOR: Executive officer
Office of Security
DDA 87-1011
12 May 1987
1. As you know, Bill Donnelly sent a memo
to all Agency Office/Division Directors and
asked them to identify any "bureaucratic
stumbling blocks" which he could help solve.
Attached are two responses.
2. The first response identifies a problem
in getting vault alarms for a room in Ames
Building. The second response discusses
security-related issues in paragraphs 2, 3,
and 5.
3. Could you have someone look into these
and get back to me with additional background
information or status? Bill would like to
respond to, or solve, as many of these items as
is feasible.
4. Thanks for your help.
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22 April 1987
STAT
Information Control Officer
STAT
STAT
STAT
1. The review process in the Historical Review Branch (HRB) involves
handling many boxes of documents over a long period of time. The
Classification Review Division (CRD) has to retain possession of these boxes
of documents throughout the period that they are undergoing review and
coordination. Since HRB began operations in the Summer of 1985 they have made
do without a security approved storage vault. This has meant removing the
documents to store them in safes and storing boxes wherever we could borrow
safe storage space in Ames Building.
2. Last Fall, because of the obvious security hazard that this situation
represented, approval was given for construction of a vault within the HRB
area, 0 This construction was begun in late January 1987 and
completed at the end of February. Following completion of the vault
construction and after passing inspection, OS/DSB informed CRD that the
completed room was ready for installation of security controls and that we
should notify OS/SEB to make the installations. We notified SEB of this after
20 March 1987. We have held at least 10-12 conversations with members of the
SEB staff, both afHeadquarters and the 0 Building. HRB has reached
the absolute limits of the available safe storage areas and we must have this
new vaulted area for better security and to make our operation more efficient.
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20 April 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: EXA/DDA
THRU: CEA/SS
FROM: CEA/PLNS
SUBJECT: Thoughts on Reducing Bureaucracy
REF: DDA 87-0700, 1 April 1987
We circulated Mr. Donnelly's memorandum (reference) and asked
all East Asia Division employees for their ideas on reducing
bureaucracy. Following are some of their comments and suggestions.
1. Many expressed concern with the length of time it takes
to procure new equipment. For instance, the Division began the
process in October 1986 of procuring new computer and word
processing equipment for one of our branches. Only last week, more
than five months later, did the order reach the vendor. To
alleviate some of the delays and possibly some of the expenses
involved in ordering WANG equipment, one of our
Logistics officers, suggested that, like the WANG maintenance
contract, an overall Agency contract be written and specific orders
placed under it. This would require that OIT consolidate
information on annual requirements for WANG equipment and come up
with a minimum and maximum quantity for the contract. This
information should be available from previously submitted budget
requests. With some coordination between OIT, the Comptroller, and
Procurement Division a contract could be written to fairly specific
parameters which, probably, would result in significant savings as
the consolidated WANG maintenance contract did.
2. Another suggestion concerned "gifts" . Currently stations
submit a monthly report concerning gifts received by station
personnel. We suggest that this reporting requirment be abolished.
In its stead require all employees to sign a statement that they
have read and understood the regulations concerning gifts. All
gifts would be reported to an employee's immediate supervisor and
handled on a "local" level. The question of "unreported gifts"
would then become part of the re-polygraph process.
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3. It was also suggested that the procedure for the admittance
of visitors to the Headquarter's compound be streamlined. Currently
one must route or hand-carry a form to the first floor Security
office. A simple phone call on the secure phone would be more
efficient, particularly since the form does not require a signature
and therefore carries no more authority than a phone call.
4. The TDY check-out procedure could also be more flexible.
Currently, Central Processing will not issue airline tickets and
provide advance funds until all appropriate blocks on the check-out
card are initialed. All too often this results in the TDY'er
spending his last day(s) trying to acquire signatures of people who
frequently are not in their office and occasionally not even in
Headquarters. In such cases, branch chiefs should be authorized to
waiver those check out requirements considered non-essential to the
TDY in question. It, of course, would be the branch chief's
personal responsibility. An example of the current inflexibility is
the absolute requirement that a TDY'er has attended the "Audio
Awareness" briefing, held only on Friday mornings. Recently one
officer had to travel 150 miles and miss a day of his assigned
duties just to fulfill this requirment. The officer in question has
been engaged in CI work for over three years and is well aware of
the audio threat.
5. Finally, our Chief of Counter- Intelligence for China
Operations made the following comment, which, although it does not
concern "bureaucratic stumbling blocks" may be of interest to the
Office of Security: "About a year ago I had the opportunity to work
with several young Security officers from the Washington Field
Office. I was favorably impressed with the quality of the
individuals but dismayed at their ignorance of operational
considerations. I strongly recommend that junior Security officers
he required to attend the Clandestine Operations Familiarization
Course and encouraged to enroll in other oprational courses such as
the SE Ops Course, China Ops Course, Counter-Intelligence
Familarization Course, etc."
CEA/PLNS
C O N F I D E N T I A L
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cony,
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
Actin? Executive Officer
TO: (OIR .
building)
ILLEGIB
1 12.
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13.
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~/oA]
C/SESD/PTS
C/IG/PS
C HSD
CSES
20;4,8
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
'L?v~ IrU
14 May 1987
COMMENTS (Number soch comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a lino across column after each comment.)
Please respond to the paragraph as
indicated below by 22 May.
- Doc #1, par
- Doc #2, para 2.
- Doc #2, para 3.
- Doc #2, para 5.
07
tel. F-
FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS a U.S. Government Printing Offlan: 1985-4944U/49166
1-79 EDITIONS
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Policy Branch
Chief, Security Education Staff
SUBJECT: SES Response to "Thoughts in Reducing
Bureaucracy" Memo dated 20 April 87.
1. With respect to Document #2, paragraph 5, the Security
Education Staff (SES) understands the writers concern. We
would also like to see OS officers receive more training in
these disciplines, though the demands for the courses described
are such that only personnel preparing for overseas assignment
are normally accepted.
2. To help overcome this situation, OS has several ongoing
initiatives to provide its personnel with basic DO background
information.
? All new Security officers are provided with a DO
orientation as part of their initial training. This
orientation provides officers with an overview of the
interactions between OS and DO. New officers are also
schooled in surveillance and countersurveillance
techniques and terminology.
? One running of a program, developed in 1986, has
been conducted in which OS Polygraph and Technical
Officers attended a workshop with DO officers to
discuss mutual concerns and problems. The sessions,
which were held after-hours were considered
informative, occassionally heated and mutually
benefical as both offices gained an understanding of
the others objectives.
?C/SES and the Senior DO/Training Officer (DO/STO)
recently discussed the need for OS/Special Activities
Division personnel to receive courses such as COFC and
other CI courses. The DO/STO has been extremely
cooperative in this endeavor and is enrolling several
officers in upcoming COFC sessions.
All Protions Of This Document
Are Classfied "CONFIDENTIAL"
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3. Although our current training curriculum does not
produce experts in the DO, it does provide OS Domestic Field
Agents with the basic tools necessary for supporting DO
domestic operations (usually surveillances and
countersurveillances). OS personnel scheduled for overseas
assignment are scheduled for and do receive both operational
and Counterintelligence training before departure. If
additional slots in DO courses could be made available to OS,
that would be considered an additional plus.
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Reducing Bureaucracy
FRO
EXTENSION
1
NO.
Chief, Headquarters Division
1E-24 Hqs
~
DATE
19 May 1987
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
IVE~
RE
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1 ACtln Executive Officer
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
L
1 FO79 M 61 0 u EDI SOUS
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T C 0 N F I D E N T
~ L
19 May 1987
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Executive Officer
Chief, Headquarters Security Division
SUBJECT: Reducing Bureaucracy
REFERENCE: DDA 87-0700 dtd 1 A ril 1987; Memo for
EXA/DDA fm CEA/PLNS dtd 20 April 1987
1. This memorandum is in response to the suggestion that admittance of
visitors to the Headquarters compound be streamlined by allowing Agency
personnel to telephone the Security Duty Office/Access Control to inform them
of an expected visitor.
2. The volume of requests processed daily does not allow for the
registration of visitors via telephone. There are approximately 1200 visitors
listed on the Visitor's Gate Access List which is published each day. Access
Control processes an additional 300 to 400 requests daily. Of this number,
approximately 125 requests are received with short deadlines. This requires
Access Control personnel to maintain almost constant contact with the Security
Protective Officers at the gates in order to supply them with updated
information on last minute visitor registrations. Additionally, Access
Control personnel must locate the Agency int of contact for unregistered
visitors who arrive at the gates.
3. Now that the Personnel Access Security System (PASS) is operational,
employees should be reminded that they may pre-register visitors via the
Automated Information Management (AIM) system . One should pre-register a
visitor at least 24 hours in advance. The advantage of pre-registration to
the sponsor/contact is that the visitor can be handled quickly, thus
minimizing their having to wait a period of time in order to be registered by
a receptionist. Pre-registration would also minimize the lity of the
visitor being denied access to the Headquarters compound.
4. As you can see, the present system discourages last minute visitor
registration and cannot accommodate standard telephone requests. However, in
an emergency, Access Control will accept visitor registration information over
a secure line. If you are in need of additional information on this subject,
please feel free to contact , Chief, Security Duty Office, on
extension
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CONFIDENTIAL j'
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LJ/\ I
FORM 610 CONFIDENTIAL * w. ??.?....t Pi$.t.Of t.? t?,-+?.W.I.,$S
I-?
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
sJCT: (op"ens"
FROM:
Reducing Bu
reaucracy
EXTENSION No.
ctin xecutive i
cer D"T
14 &y 1987
TO:
buiking)
or, am
OAT! OY KER'S COMMENTS (Number .och comment to shoe from whom
INITIALS to wham. Draw o lime orou column ofer eoch comment.)
RECEIVED PORWM"
1.
Please respond to the par aph as
indicated below by 22 May.:
2.
Thanks-
3.
4.
C/SESD/PTS
- Doc #1
para 2
5.
.
,
C/IG/PS
- Doc #2
para 2
6.
,
.
C/HSD
- Doc #2
para 3
7.
,
.
C/SES
- Doc #2
para 5
a.
,
.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
1s.
 STAT
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CONFIDENTIAL
25X1
)FY-1
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (ov?wal)
Reducing Bureaucracy?
FROM: EXTENSION N0.
Actin Executive Officer DATE
4
TO: DATE
building) OfpKER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to shorn from whom
tMTIAIS to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
REaIVED -ORWARDED
1.
Please respond to the paragraph as
indicated below by 22 May.'
2.
Thanks
3.
4.
C/SESD/PTS
- Doc #1, para 2.
5.
AC/IG/PS
- Doc #2, para 2.
6.
C/HSD
- Doc #2, para 3.
7.
C/SES
- Doc #2, para S.
8.
9.
5-9
Acting Executive Officer
iQ
L/1
Polygraph Division is prohibited
10.
from getting into criminal malfea-
sance during routine reinvestiga-
tion polygraphs. They already
11.
cover a number of more important
fI
issues and to increase the number
would be counterproductive to the
12.
program.
13.
14.
13.
ea.n II A .its //11Tf.TTnrtflT AT
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SUBJECT: (Optional)
Ames Building Vault-type
FROM:
COS/PTS/PASG/SESD
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
0/os
d (rt) eej
F,.ORM7g E 610 USE DITI PREVIONSOUS
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
q
CONFIDENTIAL
DATE
1 June 1987
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
F'4
C)L
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C O N F I D E N T I A L
a. Domestic Security Branch (DSB) had not certified the
area for classified storage (see Attachment B).
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Executive Officer/OS
REFERENCE: MFR from ICO/HRB/CRD, dtd 22 Apr 87, same subject
DATE: 1 June 1987
SUBJECT: Ames Building Vault-type
1. On 18 May 1987 Chief of the Security Equipment Support
Division (C/SESD) initiated an investigation of the accusations
made in the referenced MFR. The following facts were found:
b. SESD had only received two (2) telephone calls from
Classification Review Division (CRD) individuals.
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On 28 May 1987, SESD personnel completed
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2bAl
installation inl (Ames Building. IDS was
not activated, pending completion of DSB's requirements outlined
B. DSB Inspection Report (dtd 5/18/87)
C. DSB Survey w/Attachment A
Attachments:
A. Reference Document
cc: C/HSD
C/SES
C/DSB
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 STAT
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C 0 N F I f) 1: N T I A L
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, External Buildings Operations Branch
Real Estate F, Construction Division
Office of Logistics
Chief, Physical Security Division
Office of Security
SUBJECT: Final Inspection of Proposed Vault-Type Room,
25X1 ]Ames Building
REFERENCE: Memo to C/EBOB from OS/DSB, dtd. 21 Oct 86,
same subject, W.O. 86-0448
1. As a result of reference, representatives of the
Physical Security Division conducted a security survey of the
cited area to determine what modifications had been completed
to convert the area into a Vault-Type Room (VTR).
2. It is requ ted that you notify the Domestic Security
25X1 Branch on extension when all recommended modifications-
or alterations have been completed.
3. Refer any questions concerning alarms to the Security
25XlEquipment Branch on extension 0 All other questions
should be referred to the Domestic Security Branch.
4. Please note that compliance with these recommendations
does not automatically imply that the area is accredited for
storage of SCI material. Before the area can be accredited, a
request for accreditation must be forwarded to the Special
25X1 Security Center, Office of Security,
Building.
Attachments
Reference
C O N F I D E N T I A L
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 STAT
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C O N F I D E NT i A 1.
2 8 OCT 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, External Buildings Operations Branch
Real Estate f, Construction Division
Office of Logistics
25X1 FROM:
Domestic ecuri y ranch
Office of Security
SUBJECT: Security Survey of Drnned Vault-Type Room
..Ames Building
REFERENCE: Memo to C/PSD/OS from DSO/OIS, dated 29 Aug
86, Subject: Survey for Vault-Type Room
1. As a result of reference, a representative of the
Domestic Security Branch conducted a security survey of the
cited area to determine what modifications would be nece sary
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to convert the area into a Vault-Type Room (VTR).
2. It is requested that you notify the Domestic Security
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Branch on extension when all recommended modifications
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or alterations have been completed.
3. Refer any questions concerning alarms to the Security
E ui ment Branch on extension 0 All other que`r
q p
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should be referred to the Domestic Security Branch.
4. Please note that compliance with these recommendations
does not automatically imply that the area is accredited for
storage of SCI material. Before the area can be accredited, a
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C O N F I D E N T I A L
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C 0 N F 1 1) Ii N '1' i A L
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request for accreditation must be fo ded to the Special
Security Center, Office of Security
Building.
Attachments-
A. Requirements
B. Floor Plan
C. Reference
cc: DSO/OIS
C 00 N F I D E N T I A L
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