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INTERDAMONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP
OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
coma, IrrmucEncE AGENCY
VIOREING PAPM
NOTICE: This document is a working paper, NOT an
official CIA iosuance, and has not necessarily been
coordinated with other ORE producing components.
It represents current thinking by one group of
specialists in CIA, and is designed for use by
others engaged on similar or overlapping studies.
The opinions expressed herein may be revised before
final and official pUblication. It is intended
solely for the information- of the addressee rind not
for further dissemination.
Copy for:
Document No. 040
NO CHANGE in Class. 0 4
eDECLASSIFIND -my!
Class. CANGED TO: TS S 0
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA EEG. 7711763
Date: 1 7 FEB 1978 By: 0_2 j;
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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP
TIMELY SUMMARY NO. 3
YOT week ending 18 January 1949
Wayne II
Spurred by Asiatic concern over the Indonesian inbroglio, the Security
Council is contemplating further action to force the Dutch toward a reason-
able settlement. Meanwhile progress in the UN-sponsored Rhodes armistice
talks between Egypt and Israel have given rise to cautious optimism. The
break-up of the WFTU into eastern and western blocs appears at hand as the
WFTU Executive Bureau meets in Paris.
air 0 *a
OFFC_Etmagthelgag_ipLprompA. With the US Congress about to cast a
critical eye upon European economic cooperation and progress towards re-
covery, the ERP countries will probably scon take reasures to strengthen the
OEEC on a high political level. The British, previously the chief holdouts,
have reportedly agreed to such a need and are thinking of establishing a
five-man working committee of key ministers from the UK, France, Malys,
Benelux and a Scandinavian country, which 'would meet frequently to deal with
such vital problems as reconciling the conflicting UK and continental re-
covery views. Belgium Premier Speak has expressed concern over bringing
the UK to understand the continental view that the FRP is concerned with
the needs of Europe as a whole, which, according to Speak, basically differs
from the British view, seemingly concerned only with UK economic recovery.
There is indeed a basic difference between the UK view that recovery planning
?should be on a severe austerity basis in order to achieve a balance of pay-
ments by 1952, and the French view that it should aim at a reasonably good
living standard based on expanded imports and exports. The UK four-year
plan, based on continued austerity, envisages limiting imports from the
continent, while the French rely on increased exports, largely to the UK,
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Palestine joelsmeng. Last weeks tension in the Middle East fol-
loving the Israeli attack on RAF planes has been somewhat relieved. Civility,
if not warmth, appears to prevail at Rhodes and progress of the tall'a between
Egypt and Israel, including release of the Faluja garrison, justifies some
optimism respecting the outcome of the conversations. The conference, how-
ever, has not yet come to grips with the problem of drawing permanent armistice
linee? which will inevitably exercise a practical effect upon the ultimate
0
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territorial settlement. The British are still backing the Arabs in seeking
a corridor across the southern Negeb to connect Egypt with Tranajordan and
Iraq. Israel still desires an outlet to the Red Sea at the head of the Gulf
of Aqaba. If, however, the Jews can obtain a peace which will pervit the
rest/option of much-needed normal economic activity, there is some chance
that they nay ultimately make some conceosion in the Negeb.
Reparations Prnblems with UK and France. US plans for building up the
Western German economy as an integral pert of the ERP may be impeded by dis-
agreerent between the US, UK and France o'er two aspects of German reparations:
(1) dismantling of industrial plants and (2) use of rolling stock in Germany.
Current intergovernmental negotiations concerning the Humphrey Committee
report reveal stiffened rosistence to US proposals for retaining in Germany,
to aid general European recovery, a number of industrial plants originally
scheduled for dismantling. The British refuse to agree to the retention
of forty-eight of the one hundred sixty-seven plants on the Committee's list.
Furthermore, they have expressed unwillingness to postpone any longer the
dismantling of certain plants on the reparations list on the grounds that
further delays in the face of open German resistence will seriously endanger
Britain's prestige as an occupying power.
In the matter of rolling stock, the French are causing the difficulty.
The July 1948 agreement for exchange of 23,000 of the 70,000 German freight
cars held by France has been only partially implemented. The French rain-
tam n that the German cars are German external assets and, as such, belong
to France and now seek to divert new EGA cars from Bisons to France as the
price for returning the German cars. Since the US considers this unaccept-
able, the Frenclemay present the issue to the Inter-Allied Reparations
Agency (TARA) where they believe their claims to the German cars will be
upheld. Permanent retention by France of the disputed freight cars, coupled
with the possible return of French rolling stock now being used in Bisons,
would put a considerable strain on the transportation facilities of Western
Germany and hamper its economic recovery.
e 0 e
Soviet propaganda in UN technical bodies. No international body, how-
ever technical its functions, appears sufficiently remote from the ideological
battlefield to be overlooked as a vantage point for Soviet propaganda. For
example, Soviet Chairman Cherryshev's remarks in recent discussions of the
UN Fiscal Commission on the fiscal aspects of the Trusteeship Council's
Provisional Questionnaire for Trust Territories sounded the opening gun in
another local skirmish of the Soviet propaganda war on the "colonialn powers.
Chernyshev followed this up by denouncing a project for eliminating inter-
national double taxation as a scheme to protect investors who exploit under-
developed countries.
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UK opposition _dels1R0rAyn-'Palestingico_niation.a_. The
International Refugee Organization, which in Lay l948 relinquished respon-
sibility for the movement of Jewish refugees to Palestine because of the
unsettled conditions there, will reconsider this decision at its 25 January
Geneva meeting. The Jewish voluntary aid agencies, ohich have borne this
responsibility meanwhile, are reqeosting resumption of IRO financing and
are strongly supported by the US but opposed by the British, who contend
that conditions in Palestine rerain too unsettled to justify a reversal of
the present policy. A compromise proposal by the IRO Director General to
authorize temporary resumption of payments within the limits of the Organi-
sation's budget may also be opposed by the UK. Support for the British
position has been pledged by the Commonwealth representatives OD the
Executive Committee (Australia and Canada) while China and Belgium are ex-
pected to favor the compronine. Belgium, however, has indicated its belief
that the IRO should institute additional controls over refugee movements to
ensure that only eligible persons are repatriated with IRO funds and to
avoid billing IRO for such movements after they have been completed. Final
resolution of this, the most serious political-issue:which has confronted
the IRO, may prove less difficult as official British agitation over Anglo-
Israeli relations subsides and as Arab-Israeli truce talks progress. Re-
establishment of reasonably settled conditions in Palestine will almost
inevitably reduce UK opposition to renewed IRO activity in this field.
a 0 a
USSR opposes WFTU dissolution as Western labor leaders walk out.
Despite a last-ditch Soviet effort to forestall it, dissolution of the
World Federation of Trade Unions into its eastern and western components
will be the practical effect of the decision of the Western trade unionists
to walk out of the Paris meeting of the WFTU Executive Bureau. The British,
US and Dutch labor organizations decided upon this move when it became
apparent that the British proposal for suspension of the Federation for one
year would be rejected by the Soviet labor bloc. Substantial Soviet con-
cessions which might have been effective a few months ago (e.g., acceptance
of further limitations on WFTU activities and admission of the anti-Communist
Force Ouvriere) are almost certain to be refused by the now thoroughly dis-
illusioned TUC and CIO. Further Soviet attempts to postpone the outcore by
referring the TUC proposal to other WFTU bodies will be equally unsuccessful.
At a conference of the ERP Trade Union Advisory Committee in Bern im-
mediately following the Paris meeting, TUC and CIO leaders, together with AFL
representatives, are expected to begin consultations looking toward a new
labor international which would eventually unite the non-Communist labor forces
of approximately twenty countries embracing an estimated trade union membership
of 25 millions. Whether such a federation will be established promptly or only
after costly months of debate will depend largely on forthcoming conferences
between TUC and AFL-CIO leaders concerning the terms of US labor representation.
The TUC, while nominally committed to bringing the two US organizations into
closer relationehip, may be reluctant to hasten this develcpment since
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British labor would exert proportionately greater influence while US labor
remained divided.
With the failure of their efforts to salvage WFTU unity, the Soviet
trade unions will probably reorganize the Federation on a more exclusively
Communist basis and attempt to perpetuate the myth of world labor solidarity
by associating with themselves fractional leftwing groups within the TUC,
CIO and other Weetern labor organizations. The WFTU, retaining the ppoet
of dominant labor organizations in the remaining thirty-five to forty
countries, wculd continue to he a potent instrument for the projettior ef
Soviet propaganda and power in the noneCommunist world,, ?
o
?etellitegimirithdraw ftom ILO Recent indications that Poland and
Czechoslovakia may shortly withdraw from the international Labor Orpanization
probably reflect not only their own altered views toward the Organization but
also Soviet determination to avoid letting the ILO, eith eastern and western
parts intact, survive the demise of the WFTU The defection of Poland and
Czechoslovakia, once stanch ILO suppoeters, ras foreshadowed at the San
Frencisco Conference last summer when they attacked the allegedly uedenocratic
character of the ILO Constitutien and charged that MO structure felled to
represent adequately "the new demecraciee," Pressure from the USSR msy now
hasten this withdrawal as Soviet tactics are revised to reet the new lnLer-
national labor situation, So Long as the 17Fr0 cculd be maintained eedivided,
the strategy of the Scviet labor bloc was to tolerate Satellite partieipation
in the ILO, but at the sere time to criticize it as an ineffective tri-
partit,#) aeganizatior in which labor was inadequately represented and to stress
the primacy of WFTU as the only authentic VOiC6 of world labor. Now, however
the USSR apparently VS.8S the ILO left as the sole reeting ground of werld
labor and ray be unwilling to sanction Satellite participation in an organi-
zation which it holds in contempt as "reformist-dominated," The current
visit of the ILO Director General to Poland and Czechoe'eovakia ray -delay,
but is not likely to 'prevent, their exie from the Organization Yugeslavia,
the only ether Satellite ILO member, has not attended recent conferences and
has previously given notice of intention to withdraw.
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Further SC actipeionindoeesia, As UN censideration of the Indonesian
imbroglio enters a new phase, the Security Council, having failed to halt
Dutch "police action," will seek to compel the Netherlands to carry out its
promisee in the Linggadjati and Reneille Agreerents, Since restoration of
the 18 December status gyp, as desired by the Republic's Asiatic frlends, is
obviously impossible in the face of Dutch refusal to withdraw their forces,
the Council, recognizing this fait accomplii, will probably pass a resolution:
(1) calling upon the Dutch to follow a close schedule (in accordance with it
awn announced timetable) for the formation of a federal Indonesian government,
and the transfer or Netherlands sovereignty to it; and (2) establishing an
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expanded UN committee with stronger powers to supervise this process. The
final resolution, however, will be purposefully vague about gradual with-
drawal of Netherlandstroops. The SC is under pressure to take fp:roe such
further action because of both the threat of unilateral action by the
Asiatic states convening at New Delhi and the resultant loss of UN prestige
should the SC, seized of the question for many months, now act indecisively.
Council members, except for the USSR, Ukraine, France and Argentina (which
will probably abstain on any such resolution), have already expressed
qualified acceptance of the US draft enhodying these principles. In case
of an unanticipated French veto on the grounds that the UN lacks competence
to ?wieder such an internal dispute, the question will probably be referred
to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion.
Despite repeated statements that they will not comply with such a res-
olution, the Netherlands will probably not completely refuse to accept
its terms. The Dutch are also highly unlikely to withdraw from the UN and
their threats to do so are rather an attempt to discourage effective action.
Should the Netherlands fail to comply, however, serious international reper-
cussions might follow. The Asiatic nations might then claim that since the
Dutch would not be bound by UN decisions, they, too, should be free to take
unilateral action. Also the Republican UN delegation reportedly will seek
freedom of action by asking the SC to drop the issue. Faced with these
attitudes and with the improbability that a majority favoring stronger action
can he obtained, the SC can merely await a softening of Dutch obstinacy
resulting from eventual realization that economic attrition following upon
continued guerrila activity will seriously damage the Dutch exchequer.
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