,
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C0NFJN1TAL
'STAT
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Community Staff
Washington, D.C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
FROM:
ICS 0811-88
6 April 1988
Community Counterintelligence Old Security
Countermeasures Office
SUBJECT: DIA Requests for Review of DCID 1/7 Policies and Conditions
of Applicability
REFERENCES: A. Memo fr EXDIR/DIA to OD/CIA dtd 22 Feb 88
B. Memo fr ADCI to EXDIR/DIA dtd 6 Mar 88
C. DCID 1/7 dtd 27 Feb 87
1. References A and B are attached for basic background to provide at
least implied reason for a meeting scheduled between representatives of DIA
and CIA on Friday, 8 April at 1030 hours in Room 1015, Ames Building.
Recipients have been requested to attend for discussion of the subjects
addressed in reference A.
2. The issues to be discussed are only outlined in the references, and it
will be necessary to examine them in more detail at the meeting. The
undersigned, acting for CCISCMO in hosting this meeting, will not attempt to
define issues in this memorandum and defers to CIA and DIA representatives
respectively. I also want to avoid the risk of misstating positions of either
agency. Our first order of business will be to agree on just that--what the
issues are in plain language, understandable to generalists and specialists
alike. Where definitions are required as a basis to understand what follows,
they too will be stated in clear layman's language.
3. All parties are asked to enter the meeting with a cooperative, open
spirit and a willingness to meet each other at a point where mutually
acceptable solutions can be agreed upon. We have ourselves to blame for
permitting lack of earlier agreements to escalate the matters to the lofty
levels which will now focus on our deliberations. Coincidentally, the
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STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
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: CONF TIAL
SUBJECT: DIA Request for Review of DCID 1/7 Policies and Conditions of
Applicability
Information Handling Committee is nearing completion of the revision of DCID
1/16, which contains at least one similar condition generating contention
among Community members. If the DCI is forced to settle that issue himself,
it will affect at least part of what we will be discussing in our meeting(s).
All should recognize that one meeting is unlikely to resolve differences, but
we are all obliged to move rapidly to reach realistic agreements that will
satisfy operational needs and simaltaneously provide the proper protection for
intelligence sources and methods.
Attachments:
a/s
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CoNJ1crTIAL
SUBJECT: DIA Request for Review of DCID 1/7 Policies and Conditions of
Applicability
CCISCMO/ICS
Distribution of ICS 0811-88:
1
1
1 - ACSD/OIR
1 - C/TSS/OIT
1 - CPAS/DI
1 - EXO/OS
1 - A&CSB/ISG/P&TS/OS
6 -
1 - ICS Registry
1 - CCISCMO chrono
1 - CM chrono
1 - DCID 1/7 file
1 -
3
C0NUBNTIAL
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The Director of Central Intelligence
WashingtorLDC.2MM
ICS 0790-88
6 March 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Gordon Negus, Executive Director
Defense Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT: Security Policies Governing the Dissemination of
Intelligence Information
REFERENCES: A. Your memo, 22 February 1988 (U-4392/0S-4)
B. DCI Directive 1/7, "Security Controls on the
Ditsemination of Intelligence Information,
27 February 1987
1. The concepts and rationale expressed in your 22 February memorandum
clearly exhibit the limitations and inhibitions placed on certain DIA
operating procedures by strict application of the rules imposed in DCID 1/7
When I approved the revised (KID in February 1987 as Acting Director of
Central Intelligence, I understood that there were contentious issues
surrounding the NOCONTRACT, as well as other, controls. I realized that the
principal objections involved the dissemination caveats as applied to
contractors supporting DoD/DIA efforts. I approved the DCID with the
understanding that CIA and DIA officers would work together to attempt to
resolve the issues, with or without further revision of the DCID. The fact is
that CIA and DIA have not continued efforts at negotiating the issues.
2. Your memorandum contains three requests. The first one asks for my
support in a joint effort to review existing policy with the objective of
establishing new policy to protect sensitive intelligence while permitting'
Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community (SOICs) to make determinations
for release of information as exceptions to the rules. I am disappointed that
CIA and DIA have not carried on negotiations over these issues as I directed
and expected. I am charging the Community Counterintelligence and Security
Countermeasures Office (CCISCMO) of the Intelligence Community Staff (ICS)
with responsibility to organize and coordinate meetings between CIA and DIA to
discuss and work the issues involved.
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SUBJECT: Security Policies Governing the Dissemination of
Intelligence Information
3. The second request asks me to temporarily authorize the SOIC/DIA to
permit release of controlled intelligence in DIA data bases where sources
cannot be determined. I withhold that permission pending a recommendation
from the Director/ICS after he receives a status report following the meetings
between CIA and DIA on the overall problem area surrounding the subject. I am
requiring such a report and recommendation within 60 days. Should revision of
the DCID become necessary, CCISCMO will manage the necessary administrative
staffing and Community coordination.
4. With respect to your third request (that DIA be relieved of the
requirement for government personnel to be present with SAFE contractors when
access to controlled information is possible), this will be a topic for the
CIA-DIA negotiators to review since the SAFE program is a joint effort managed
by the two agencies. The common element in each of these requests is that
particular interests of CIA are involved.
5. Be assured that I am sympathetic to the problems surfaced and the
restrictions placed on DIA and, in fact, the entire Community. We share the
commitment to the proper dissemination and use of sensitive intelligence
information in consonance with our solemn responsibility to protect the
sources and methods from which it is produced.
2
obert M. tes
Acting Dir tor
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SUBJECT: Security Policies Governing the Dissemination of
Intelligence Information
CC ISCMO
Distribution of ICS
Original -
1 - ADCI
1 - ER
1 - AD/ICS
1 - INC
SIGINT
D/OS
0790-88:
Committee
(3 March 1988)
ICS Registry
CCISCMO subject (DCID 1/7)
CCTSCMO chronn
3
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: .88-0723X
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
U-4392/0S-4
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20340- 1 251
'g
MEMORANDUM
ign
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SUBJECT: Security Policies Governing the Dissemination of Intelligence
Information
Reference: DCI Directive 1/7, "Security Controls on the Dissemination of
Intelligence Information," 27 February 1987.
1. The Department of Defense (DoD) relies heavily on contractors to develop
large all-source data bases, sophisticated telecommunication systems, and state
of the art ADP storage, data iftegration, retrieval, and computational
capabilities. Strict compliance, however, with DCID 1/7 severely limits the
development, maintenance, and use of these sophisticated systems, and Allied
access to this critical data as well.
2. [KID 1/7 requires the consent of the "originator" for release of all
material carrying the ORCON, NOCONTRACT, NOFORN, or PROPIN caveat. In large
DoD intelligence data systems, the data bases have historically carried the
caveats of the data being entered, even though there is no reference to source
nor audit to a source on the data being entered. Subsequent effort, therefore,
to identify the source of each data item to pursue "release authorization" has
proven not only impractical, but also impossible in many circumstances. In
June 1986, therefore, DIA proposed a specific change to the DCID 1/7 which
recognized (1) the role of appropriately cleared contractors working under
authorized government contract; (2) the fact that no source reference was made;
and (3) would permit release of all-source data base information to-'those
specific contractors. During discussions of that proposal, your staff raised
the additional issue of DIA releasing data base information caveated NOFORN.
To date, my staff has been unable to reach accord with your staff on thtse
significant policy issues.
3. In addition to the difficulty in releasing automated data base information
where there is no source attribution, there are also clear cases where con-
tractor release is sought for data that does, in fact, clearly identify the
source. In late 1985 this Agency sought authorization to release automated
message traffic to contractors involved in the joint DIA/CIA SAFE program. In
January 1986, the DCI Security Committee agreed to this access, but with the
stipulation that government personnel be present at all times. This guidance
has proven to be wasteful and impractical due to personnel constraints.
DoD/DIA does not have sufficient resources to support major systems development
or enhancement initiatives without reliance on contractors who possess the
required security clearances.
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4. In summary, strict compliance with the provisions of DCID 1/7 severely
limits use of available technology to improve intelligence support to
operational forces. I would appreciate your support in a joint effort to
review the existing policy with the objective of establishing a new policy
that adequately protects sensitive intelligence sources while authorizing
Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community (SOICs) to make -controlled and
auditable release of NOFORN, NOCONTRACT, ORCON, and PROPIN intelligence
information where sources are unidentified and unidentifiable. In the
interim; request authority as the SOIC for DIA, to grant release of caveated
intelligence in DIA data bases where the originator cannot be determined.
Secondly, standard and practical procedures must be established for
authorizing system development contractor access to source identified
intelligence data where operationally required. In this regard, specifically
request that DIA be relieved from the requirement that government personnel be
present when SAFE contractors have access to NOCONTRACT and ORCON information.
77)
GORDON NEGUS
Executive Director
2
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