NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE ON CENTRAL AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97M00248R000600100001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 28, 2014
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 20, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
2014/04/28: CIA-RDP97M00248R000600100001-3
TO:
Jr-JVCA,U 11V r. arAIIIIPPE,111.K.11-11
ROUTING SLIP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
X
2
DDCI
X
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
X
6
DDA
7
DDO
X
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
X
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/OLL
14
D/PAO
15
D/PERS
16
VC/NIC
17
NIO/LA
X
18
D/ALA/ DI
X
19
C/CATF/LA/DO
X
20
C/LA/DO
X
21
22
SUSPENSE
Date
Remq*S
TO #/: Please coordinate with State and DOD the DCI
action requiredsubpara (3) on p.2.
TO #9: NIO/LA to take lead in DCI
subparas (6) and (9) on p. 3.
s 'STAT
.)
J 41414 VT7Vaii rl??????".
cutiye Secretary
,
May 86
Date
3637 (10-81)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
2014/04/28: CIA-RDP97M00248R000600100001-3
r/ //IV/ /// /AW/ /// /// // /
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/28: CIA-RDP97M00248R000600100001-3
/
??
i! 4 T
COPY #5 (CIA)
/
OA
/
0/
Notice
/
0,4
OA
/
'10/ DATE NAME Access List
DATE NAME
/
0
/:/4
No. NSDD 225
NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL
INFORMATION
The attached document contains classified National Security Council
Information. It is to be read and discussed only by persons authorized by
law. /
Your signature acknowledges you are suCh a person and you promise you
will show or discuss information contained in the document only with
persons who are authorized by law to have access to this document.
Persons handling this document acknowledge he or she knows and
understands the security law relating thereto and will cooperate fully with
any lawful investigation by the United States Government into any
unauthorized disclosure of classified information contained herein.
/-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/28: CIA-RDP97M00248R000600100001-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/28: CIA--RDP97M00248R000600100001-3
? Lof 1?1 t I IV SYSTEM II
RET/SENSITIVE
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 20,. 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State
THE HONORABLE JAMES A. BAKER, III
The Secretary of the Treasury
THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
The Secretary of Defense
90382
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY
The Director of Central Intelligence
ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR.
The Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT: National Security Decision Directive on Central
America (S)
The President has signed the attached National Security Decision
Directive on "Central America: U.S. Policy on the Search for a
Negotiated Solution". (S)
FOR THE PRESIDENT:
John M. Poindexter
Attachment
NSDD-225
SEC /SENSITIVE
DECLAS IFY ON: OADR
'oP1. 4;
Of COEI
04"
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/28 : CIA-RDP97M00248R000600100001-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/28: CIA-RDP97M00248R000600100001-3
bE.C.:KET/ bEN51TIVIlp oraurctiiSYSTEM II
90382
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 225 May 20, 1986
CENTRAL AMERICA: U.S. POLICY ON THE SEARCH FOR A
NEGOTIATED SOLUTION (S)
As stated in NSDD-124 of February 7, 1984, it is an objective of
the United States in Central America to seek the resolution of
regional disputes and conflicts through dialogue and the achieve-
ment through negotiations of political settlements with verifi-
able agreements. The National Security Planning Group meeting of
May 16, 1986 reaffirmed that our objectives in Nicaragua are the
following:
(1) Implementation of the democratic commitments made by the
Sandinistas to the OAS in 1979;
(2) Termination of Nicaragua's support to Marxist/Leninist
subversion and guerrilla activity in any foreign country;
(3) Removal of Soviet bloc/Cuban personnel and an end to
Nicaraguan military cooperation with communist countries;
(4) Reduction in the Sandinista military apparatus to parity
within the region. (S)
The NSPG reviewed recent developments in the Contadora negotia-
tions and other diplomatic fora. It was agreed that the deadline
of June 6, 1986, which the Contadora Group has set for signing of
a treaty, has created a volatile situation, with possible
negative consequences for U.S. strategic interests and policy
objectives. U.S. interests and objectives would be seriously
damaged by an outcome in which the five Central American coun-
tries sign an agreement which fails to implement the above stated
objectives in a comprehensive package with concrete, verifiable
provisions that do not allow Nicaragua to circumvent its commit-
ments. A flawed treaty, particularly one which did not provide
concrete mechanisms for assuring and verifying compliance with
commitments for national reconciliation and democratization,
could facilitate the consolidation of a Marxist/Leninist regime
in Nicaragua and jeopardize U.S. security interests in the
hemisphere. (S)
The NSPG took note that the governments of Honduras, El Salvador
and Costa Rica are now supporting a Contadora treaty draft which
provides for stronger measures to deal with our security
objectives in Nicaragua, including reduction of the Nicaraguan
SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
SECRET
C.OPY Of 6 rir;7,-
cfileF
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/28: CIA-RDP97M00248R000600100001-3
e"'N
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/28: CIA-RDP97M00248R000600100001-3
SECRET/SENSITIM - 2 -
military apparatus. However, the treaty version supported by our
Central American friends does not contain a reliable verification
system or a specific timetable for ensuring Nicaraguan compliance
with the treaty's internal political commitments. The
verification system for security issues contained in that treaty
is also flawed by its provision for decision by consensus. (S)
Therefore, the Secretary of State should pursue a negotiations
strategy designed to achieve our Nicaraguan objectives as pre-
viously stated. To this end, he should undertake the following
actions:
(1) Continue efforts to encourage the governments of
Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica and Guatemala to
insist that a Contadora treaty must achieve the pol-
itical and security objectives defined in the Contadora
Document of Objectives, with emphasis on the need for a
comprehensive package ?in which all commitments are
simultaneously implemented, with concrete verification
procedures to ensure compliance. Strongly urge those
governments to ensure that verification mechanisms are
not subject to veto by Nicaragua or its friends.
(2) Convey to the presidents of the four Central American
democratic countries our serious concern that their
governments are now supporting a draft treaty which
does not provide for clearly verifiable implementation
by the Government of Nicaragua of national reconcilia-
tion and democratization, which must include full
political participation by the internal and external
opposition. Strongly urge the four presidents to
insist that a clear timetable for implementation of
political commitments be inserted or annexed to the
Contadora treaty.
v// (3) The Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central
Intelligence, should take steps to convey to the
governments of the Central American democracies
(including the military leadership) our military
concerns regarding inadequate or unenforceable security
provisions of a Contadora agreement.
(4) With the prior concurrence of the governments of
Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica and Guatemala, state
to the governments of the Contadora and Support Group
countries our strong support for the security provi-
sions advocated by the Central American democracies.
Where appropriate, state to the Contadora and Support
governments our concern with the shortcomings in all
existing treaty drafts concerning implementation of
political commitments.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
r
t.
tam
COPLE_Of
C/
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/28 : CIA-RDP97M00248R000600100001-3
1"'"' )FAN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/28: CIA-RDP97M00248R000600100001-3
-1/4.01 W
1 StCRET/SENSITIM - 3 -
(5) In coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury,
review and recommend economic policy measures which
could be taken to strengthen the Central American
policy of the Contadora and Support Group countries.
An action plan on these measures should be provided for
-review by the NSPG by May 28, 1986.
//
(6) With full regard for the need to avoid appearing to be
V/
directing the activities of the Central American
nations, devise a public diplomacy strategy to support
the negotiating position adopted by the Central
American democracies. This action should be carried
out in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the
Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of
USIA.
(7) In public statements and in briefings to Congress,
state that the U.S. can support an agreement which
meets our objectives, as stated above, but that a
treaty that does not meet our objectives would be
harmful for U.S. interests and the future of democracy
in Central America. The U.S. would not consider itself
bound to support an agreement which fails to achieve in
a verifiable manner all the agreed objectivesof the
Contadora process.
(8) Educate the Congress and public concerning the provi-
sions of the Contadora treaty draft supported by the
Central American democracies, making particular note of
the fact that the treaty would not require any actions
to be taken on signature by any party, much less the
U.S. Only on ratification by all five parties would
the treaty enter into effect. Congress should be
informed that this implementation schedule would also
apply to assistance to the Nicaraguan resistance. We
should convey to Congress that any slackening of our
support prior to ratification and the establishment of
verification mechanisms would undermine the chances for
success for such a treaty.
(9) In coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the
Director of the CIA, review and recommend alternative
means of obtaining our security objectives in Nicaragua
should the Contadora process fail to achieve a
satisfactory treaty by June 6, 1986. This review
should include an examination of the implications for
U.S. policy of shifting the negotiations to other fora
such as the Organization of American States. (S)
In pursuit of the above objectives and in implementation of the
actions indicated, all U.S. government agencies should keep in
SECRET! SENSITIVE
S OfkCOEZ
S R ET COPY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/28: CIA-RDP97M00248R000600100001-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2'014/04/28 : CIA-RDP97M00248R000600100001-3
VOTA.6.
Sa7RET/.SENSITIVIII -4 -
mind the importance, to our overall strategy for gaining military
aid for the Nicaraguan democratic resistance, of maintaining a
credible diplomatic track. All U.S. government agencies should
exercise due regard for the need to ensure that communist intran-
sigence is seen as the chief obstacle to a satisfactory,negotiated
solution. (S)
SECRET/SENSITIVE
v--9.-14--
SECRET
kiacr-ar"-?
n
Of Ei
67,44
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/28: CIA-RDP97M00248R000600100001-3