SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP98-00979R000100120001-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 15, 2014
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1951
• Content Type: NIE

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TOP SECRET 'ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
FOR
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIYATES
0,2P31
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION WITH
RESPECT TO GERMANY
NI E - 4
Published 1 February 1951
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION WITH
RESPECT TO GERMANY
NIE-4
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated
in the preparation of this estimate and concur in it. For
dissent by the Army, see footnotes to paragraphs 8 and 10,
on page 3. This paper is based on information available
on 29 January 1951.
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SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY
THE PROBLEM
To estimate probable Soviet courses of action with respect to Germany.
CONCLUSIONS
Soviet Objectives in Germany
1. The Kremlin has the ultimate aim of bring-
ing under its control the strategically impor-
tant area and resources of Germany. The
Kremlin regards any substantial part of Ger-
many not under Soviet control, particularly
if associated with the Western Powers, as a
major obstacle to the realization of this ulti-
mate aim and possibly as a threat to its own
security. The Kremlin will not consider as
satisfactory any solution of the German prob-
lem that does not promise to bring all of Ger-
many within the Soviet orbit as a step in its
aim for world domination. Currently the
Kremlin is pursuing interim objectives de-
signed to further the ultimate Soviet aim.
Foremost is the aim to undermine the Federal
German Republic, to forestall its rearmament,
and to prevent its political, economic, and mil-
itary association with the Western Powers.
2. Because of the strategic, economic, and po-
litical value of Eastern Germany to the Soviet
orbit, the Kremlin will continue to strengthen
Communist control within the German Demo-
cratic Republic, exploit its economic poten-
tial, develop its military potential and forces,
and further integrate it into the Soviet orbit.
The Kremlin will continue to use the German
Democratic Republic to the utmost to bring
pressure on the Federal German Republic and
even on the Western Powers.
3. The Kremlin intends ultimately to gain
complete control of West Germany. Unless
or until the Kremlin is prepared to precipitate
armed conflict, it will continue its efforts to
intimidate the West German population, dis-
rupt the West German economy, draw West
Germany's trade to the East, undermine and
discredit the allied occupation and the Federal
German Government, and develop Commu-
nist machinery for future subversion and
violence.
4. The Kremlin plans ultimately to eliminate
the Western Powers from Berlin and to estab-
lish that city as the undivided capital of the
German Democratic Republic and eventually
of a Satellite Germany. Meanwhile, the
Kremlin will use Berlin as a pressure point.
Courses of Action?East Germany
5. The Kremlin will further strengthen and
consolidate Communist control over the po-
litical and economic life of the German Demo-
cratic Republic. It will continue to integrate
the economy of the German Democratic Re-
public into that of the Soviet orbit. In fur-
therance of its determination to strengthen
its strategic position with respect to the West,
it will continue in East Germany to improve
existing military installations and to build
new ones, and it will increase the numbers,
armament, and capabilities of all branches of
the Alert Police. The Alert Police may be-
come an effective military force, and possibly
German prisoners of war may be returned in
organized units specially trained in the USSR
to augment Alert Police strength.
Courses of Action?West Germany
6. In West Germany, possible courses of So-
viet action run the gamut from political ma-
neuver to the use of armed force. Initially,
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the Kremlin will continue to seek its ends by
political maneuver, accompanied by increas-
ing menaces and shows of military force. It
will exploit four-power negotiations and nego-
tiations between East and West Germans. It
may even seek bilateral understanding with
the Federal German Government if and when,
through the lifting of controls by the Western
Powers, the Federal German authorities
should be in a position to enter into such an
understanding. It will intensify its efforts to
intimidate and demoralize the West Germans
and the Western Europeans. It will try to
distract, divide, and confuse the Western
Powers. It will continue to use Communist
parties and front organizations in Western
Europe or elsewhere to foment revolutionary
outbreaks and instigate or support additional
military operations in Asia or Europe when-
ever and wherever the Western Powers appear
least capable of taking effective counteraction.
7. The USSR will in the first instance direct
its efforts toward frustrating West German
rearmament, and probably estimates that its
chances of succeeding by methods short of
military action are favorable. The apprehen-
sions and divisions already created among the
Germans and among the Western Powers by
the mere proposal to rearm West Germany
would appear to give the Kremlin good
grounds for such expectations. Nevertheless,
we estimate that the Kremlin, in order to pre-
vent West German rearmament, will not be
willing to give up any of the elements of its
present control over the German Democratic
Republic or East Berlin which it considers es-
sential, or any of its capabilities for gaining
control of all Germany. We estimate further
that the Kremlin would regard prevention of
West German rearmament merely as a first
though necessary step toward attainment of
its ultimate objectives in Germany. We esti-
mate finally that the failure of West German
rearmament would not remove the danger
that the USSR might resort to military action
in order to secure its objectives or to forestall
any unfavorable shift in its power position.
2
8. If, over a period of time, the USSR came to
the decision that it could not prevent the ac-
complishment of West German rearmament,
the establishment of a powerful Western coali-
tion, and the close association of Western Ger-
many therewith, it would regard the emer-
gence of such a new European power situation
as a barrier to its European ambitions and
possibly as a threat to the security of the
Soviet orbit. The Kremlin would then either
adjust itself to the restoration of a power cen-
ter in Western Europe or resort to military
action to prevent it. The first alternative
would oblige the USSR to forego for an inde-
terminate period its European ambitions and
to lose the remarkably favorable opportunity
created by the postwar power vacuum. The
second alternative would involve acceptance
by the USSR of the virtual certainty of global
war.
The Kremlin has declared categorically
that it could not reconcile itself to the rearma-
ment of West Germany. Nevertheless it is
impossible for us to determine at the present
time which of the above alternatives the
Kremlin would eventually choose. In making
its decision as between these alternatives, the
Kremlin will undoubtedly take into considera-
tion the relative global power position of the
USSR (including atomic capabilities) as well
as the rearmament of Germany and Western
Europe. We believe that if the Kremlin
viewed the scale and nature of the rearma-
ment of Western Germany in conjunction
with the rearmament of the Western Powers
as likely to constitute nothing more than a
barrier to further expansion of the Soviet orbit
in Europe, it might logically adjust itself for
the time being to such a situation, while con-
tinuing to exploit its current advantages in
other directions. We believe that if, on the
other hand, Western German and Western
European military, economic, and political
power appeared to the Kremlin as likely to
develop sufficient strength to constitute a
threat to the security of the Soviet orbit, the
Soviet Union would probably resort to military
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action, at the time and place most advan-
tageous to it.*
9. If the Kremlin should decide to resort to
military action, it would not be obliged to act
immediately. Since West German and West-
ern rearmament would necessarily take time
before reaching dimensions considered dan-
gerous by the Kremlin, the Kremlin might
prefer to use this period for improving its posi-
tion in atomic and other weapons, lessening
its own vulnerability to air attack, generally
strengthening its industrial potential, and
continuing its attempts to undermine the
progress being made by the Western Powers.
10. The USSR, however, might conclude that
it would lose more than it would gain by wait-
ing, and might decide to resort immediately to
some form of military action. It might, for
example, still attempt to postpone global con-
flict by turning its Satellites against West
Germany under cover of existing mutual as-
sistance pacts directed against German "ag-
gression" in the hope that the Western
Powers could not take effective collective ac-
tion against such a challenge. On the other
hand, the USSR, in order to achieve maximum
surprise and quick success, might resort to
direct Soviet attack, accepting immediate
global war. We have at the present time no
basis for determining whether the USSR, in
making a decision for military action, would
strike immediately or prefer to wait.**
*The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, agrees that if a new Euro-
pean power situation emerged from the close association of a rearmed West Germany with a powerful
Western coalition, the U.S.S.R. would be faced with the alternatives of adjustment or resort to military
action to achieve Soviet-Communist objectives in Europe. G-2 agrees, further, that the first alternative
would require the U.S.S.R. to forego its ambitions in Europe for an indeterminate period and that the sec-
ond alternative would involve the virtual certainty of global war.
G-2 believes, however, that the Kremlin, once it recognized that such a situation was emerging, would
be unlikely to decide that it constituted "nothing more than a barrier" to which it could adjust itself only
"for the time being." The Soviets already view the Allied occupation forces in Western Germany, the
Western orientation of the Bonn Government, and the existence of NATO as "barriers" to further ex-
pansion in Europe, but the Soviets' tactics have indicated their belief that these barriers possibly could be
overcome without recourse to military action. The emergence of the power situation postulated above,
however, would require the Soviets to conclude that it represented a complete block to Communist aims
and constituted a threat to Soviet-orbit security which could not be overcome by non-military measures.
The political, economic, and military regeneration of Western Europe, which this prospect would imply,
would require an adjustment by the Kremlin not "for the time being" but for an indefinite long-term pe-
riod, thus losing for the foreseeable future the remarkably favorable opportunity presented by the current
weakness of Western Europe. The development of increasing Western power in Europe could then only
be checked by dynamic action?not by adjustment. Such an adjustment would be inconsistent with the
presently confident, uncompromising temper of the Kremlin, which is effectively supported by Soviet
armed forces in an advanced state of readiness for war. The maintenance and improvement of this
state of readiness for war by the Soviet armed forces, and the steady reorganization, improvement in com-
bat effectiveness and expansion, even beyond treaty limitations, by the Satellites, indicate an aggressive
and dynamic policy rather than one of peaceful adjustment to increased Western power. This aggressive
policy is also indicated by the current Soviet insistence on solution of controversial problems strictly along
lines which further their major objectives, accepting risks which might precipitate global hostilities. Such
an adjustment would also be inconsistent with our belief that the Kremlin considers the attainment of
control over all of Germany as a decisive step toward domination of all Europe, a gain which could not be
adequately balanced for an indefinite period by exploitation of advantages in other directions.
From the considerations stated above, G-2 believes it more likely that the Soviets would decide on resort
to military action rather than make the required adjustment. G-2 recognizes that the U.S.S.R. would con-
sider its global power position, including atomic capabilities, in making its decision.
**The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, does not believe that the
U.S.S.R. would realistically consider that it had a reasonable chance of postponing global conflict by turn-
ing its Satellites against Western Germany. G-2 believes that even under present conditions the Soviets
would consider that such an action would quickly develop into a general war.
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Courses of Action?Berlin
11. The Kremlin views the allied position in
Berlin as a major obstacle to the attainment
of long-term Soviet objectives in West Ger-
many and Western Europe, and as a continu-
ing impediment to the Communist program in
East Germany. The Kremlin has, however,
indicated for some time that it considers the
problem of Berlin subordinate to that of Ger-
many as a whole. Whatever further courses
of action the USSR may resort to will depend
on its estimate of the extent to which such
courses of action would contribute to or inter-
fere with realization of its over-all policy. In
addition to continued and intensified harass-
ment of the Western sectors of the city, it may
pursue the following courses of action, listed
in order of probability: (A) Partial or com-
plete denial to the Western Powers of access to
Berlin; (B) Direct attack on West Berlin by
German Democratic Republic forces; (C) Di-
rect attack on West Berlin by Soviet forces.
(A) Partial or complete denial to the West-
ern Powers of Access to Berlin. Both
the USSR and the German Democratic
Republic have the capability to inter-
dict allied land communications with
Berlin. Such Soviet action would be
designed to:
1. Affect the morale of West Berlin;
2. Strain the economy of the West-
ern sectors;
3. Force the Western Powers to en-
gage in dangerous and expensive
relief operations;
4. Cause a redeployment of trans-
port aircraft of the Western
Powers;
5. Provide the Kremlin with a
counter for political bargaining,
not only on Berlin, but on broader
issues; and
6. Possibly serve as a prelude to
Communist insurrection in West
Berlin.
The USSR may reinstitute limited re-
strictions like those of 1948-49, if only
for the purpose of exerting pressure.
More likely, however, the Kremlin will
estimate that even more drastic meas-
ures would not involve serious risk of
general war. The USSR will therefore
supplement its earlier restrictions. It
will adopt measures such as jamming
communications and other covert de-
vices for obstructing an air lift. If the
Western Powers maintain air access to
Berlin despite these obstructions, the
USSR may engage in antiaircraft "fir-
ing practice" in the corridors and later
may openly attack Western aircraft
with fighters. Such a Soviet fighter
attack would be undertaken, however,
only if the Kremlin were willing to ac-
cept a general war.
(B) Direct Attack ait West Berlin by Ger-
man Democratic Republic Forces. In
the near future, if not at present,
the German Democratic Republic
forces will probably have the strength
to overwhelm the garrisons of the
Western Powers in West Berlin. The
Kremlin must be aware that such an
attack by German Democratic Repub-
lic troops on West Berlin would pro-
voke counteraction by the Western
Powers which would be almost certain
to lead to general war. This course of
action therefore appears unlikely un-
less the Kremlin had decided to accept
general war with the Western Powers.
It is possible that the USSR in an at-
tempt to occupy all of Berlin and yet
avoid general war might first withdraw
its own occupation forces and then
use the military forces of the German
Democratic Republic, possibly in con-
junction with Satellite forces, to
achieve that objective.
(C) Direct Attack on West Berlin by Soviet
Forces. Such a Soviet course of action
would demonstrate Soviet willingness
to accept general war with the Western
Powers.
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