THE CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS INDUSTRY OF THE USSR 1955-61 AND PROSPECTS FOR 1965

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• Document Release Date: May 7, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS INDUSTRY
OF THE USSR
1955-61 AND PROSPECTS FOR 1965
November 1962
THIS REPORT SHOULD NOT BE REPRODUCED IN
WHOLE OR IN PART WITHOUT THE PERMISSION
OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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NOTICE
This report has been loaned to the recipient
by the Central Intelligence Agency. When it
has served its purpose it should be destroyed
or returned to the:
CIA Librarian
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.
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THE CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS INDUSTRY
OF THE USSR
1955-61 AND PROSPECTS FOR 1965
CIA/RR ER 62-3 9
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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FOREWORD
This report is concerned with recent and projected developments in
the construction materials industry of the USSR. ID the first section
the rates of growth of the industry are compared with other segments of
the Soviet economy, and several indexes of the production of construc-
tion materials also are compared. In the second section the component
branches of the industry are examined, including their relative impor-
tance and the individual problems and possibilities for the development
of the more important component industries.
Data for 1961 are fragmentary, and the data that have been published
usually are preliminary and subject to revision. Because of these fac-
tors, preliminary data for 1961 are included in the tables wherever pos-
sible but are not often included in the discussion. For example, in-
dexes for production of construction materials in 1961 have been calcu-
lated from preliminary data for products representing less than one-
half of the total value of production of construction materials.
When final data for 1961 are available, this index will be revised
for 1950, 1955-61, and 1965 with a detailed methodology of the deriva-
tion of prices and output and the subtractions necessary to obtain the
value-added index.
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Summary
CONTENTS
I. Construction Materials in General
A. Importance in the Soviet Economy
B. Comparison of Indexes of Production
II. Components of the Construction Materials Industry . . .
A. Relative Importance and Increases in Production
of the Component Industries
B. Component Industries
1. Cement
2. Precast Concrete
3. Wall Materials
4. Rock Products
5. Other Construction Materials
Appendix A.
Appendix B.
Appendix C.
Appendixes
Statistical Tables
Methodology
Source References
Tables
1. Indexes of Production of Construction Materials, Con-
struction-Installation Work, and the Total Industrial
Production in the USSR, 1950, 1955-61, and 1965 . . .
2. Indexes of Production of Construction Materials and
Average Annual Rates of Increase in the USSR and the
US, 1950, 1955-61, and 1965
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Page
1
3
3
5
8
8
11
11
15
18
20
22
25
31
35
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Page
3. Relative Gross Value and Average Annual Rates of In-
crease in Production of Construction Materials in
the USSR, 1955, 1960, and 1965 9
4. Means of Increasing Production in the Cement Industry
in the USSR, Selected Periods, 1951-65 13
5. Price per Unit, Production, and Value of Construction
Materials in the USSR, 1950, 1955-60, and 1965 . . . . 27
6. Capital Expenditures Required to Increase Production
Capacity for Nine Construction Materials in the USSR,
1959-65 29
7. Number of Plants Producing Selected Construction
Materials in the USSR 30
Charts
Figure 1. USSR: Indexes of Comparative Growth in Pro-
duction of Construction Materials,
Construction-Installation Work, and the
Total Industrial Production, 1950, 1955-61,
and 1965 following page
Figure 2. USSR: Share of Major and Minor Materials in
the Gross Value of Production of Construction
Materials, 1955, 1960, and 1965
following page
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6
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THE CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS INDUSTRY OF THE USSR
1955-61 AND PROSPECTS FOR 1965
Summary
The volume of construction in the USSR has increased at such a rate
that the problem of inadequate supplies of construction materials has
not yet been significantly eased in spite of the continuing emphasis on
expanding output. Projected rates of growth during 1961-65 suggest
that the supply shortage may become even more acute. Nevertheless, a
representative index of production of Soviet construction materials
increased at an average annual rate of more than 12 percent during
1951-60. The corresponding rate for the US was about 3 percent.
In an attempt to facilitate the growth and at the same time to
assist in lowering the costs of construction, the emphasis on a number
of the important components of the construction materials industry is
shifting. These intra-industry structural changes have favored the more
highly fabricated materials in general in order to aid in the industrial-
ization of construction and to help reduce its requirements for lumber
and steel. The materials receiving primary emphasis are cement and pre-
cast concrete. Cement is the indispensable ingredient for precast con-
crete, the expanded output of which is to be substituted for structural
lumber and steel, thus reducing the consumption of these two products
per unit of construction. Moreover, the increased use of precast con-
crete components will assist in lowering construction costs by shifting
more construction operations into plants, thus permitting better organi-
zation and mechanization of production processes. The output and use
of large wall panels (a subcategory of precast concrete) is being ex-
panded rapidly in order to decrease the extensive reliance on brick as
a wall material.
Plans for production of precast concrete components have been over-
fulfilled in the past, and this trend probably will continue, but pro-
duction will not be sufficient to satisfy the greatly increased require-
ments of the expanded construction program. The quality of precast con-
crete, however, will remain low (requiring excessive maintenance of
structures composed of this material) because of the need to continue to
scrimp in the use of cement and because of the low quality of the rock
products available for concrete aggregates. These shortages will result
from the failure both to fulfill the goal for production of cement and
to plan and produce adequate rock products of good quality. Difficul-
ties in the large wall panel program will prevent fulfillment of its
production goals, and, as a result, the primary dependence on brick for
masonry wall materials will continue.
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I. Construction Materials in General
A. Importance in the Soviet Economy
The significance of construction materials in the Soviet econ-
omy is indicated by their share of the expenditures of the construction
organizations and their share of the basic inputs of industry. During
1950-60, between 53 and 56 percent of the actual expenditures on
construction-installation work were for construction materials (includ-
ing the cost of transportation to the construction site). By 1965 this
share is planned to increase to 60 percent, 1/* primarily because of
the increased fabrication of materials in construction material plants
(in the case of precast concrete) and because of the increasing mechani-
zation of construction work on the site. As of 1 January 1960 the con-
struction materials industry utilized 5.3 percent of the industrial pro-
ductive fixed capital assets (valued at replacement costs, in 1 July
1955 prices). In addition, the industry accounted for 7.1 percent of
the total number of industrial wageworkers in 1960.** 2/
A comparison of the annual rate of growth of construction ma-
terials since 1950 with the rates of growth of industrial production
and of the construction industry indicates that although output of con-
struction materials has exceeded the rate of increase of the total in-
dustrial production, it has generally lagged behind the increase in the
volume of construction (see Table lxxx). The rate in excess of that
for industrial production is to be expected because construction ma-
terials are components of capital goods, which on the average have ex-
ceeded the rate of increase for other goods in the Soviet economy for
many years because of the priorities assigned to them. Nevertheless,
the volume of construction up to 1960 has so increased that the problem
of inadequate supplies of construction materials has not yet been measur-
ably eased. Future projected rates of growth of the construction and
materials indexes suggest that the shortage of construction materials
will become even more acute in 1965, although, if the original Seven
Year Plan goals for construction and construction materials were merely
* For serially numbered source references, see Appendix C.
** These percentages somewhat understate the resources used in pro-
duction of construction materials because presumably those in the
lumber, steel, and glass industries are not included. For the prob-
able Soviet definition of construction materials, see B, p. 5, below.
*** Table 1 follows on p. 4.
3
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Table 1
Indexes of Production of Construction Materials, Construction-Installation Work,
and the Total Industrial Production in the USSR a/
1950,
1955-61, and 1965
1950 = 100
1950
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961 12/
1965 .21
Computed value-added index of production
of construction materials d/
100
178
191
218
253
290
318
338
492
Value-added index of total industrial
production e/
100
162
179
199
217
235
250
267
N.A-
Index of value of construction-
installation work f/
_
100
172
195
221
258
293
332
347 Ei
530 h/
a. These indexes are based on value.
b. Preliminary.
c. Estimated.
d. This index is derived from unrounded data and may not agree with an index derived from the rounded data
shown in Table 5, Appendix A, p. 27, below. For an explanation of the term value added as used in this re-
port with reference to the construction materials industry of the USSR, see the methodology, Appendix B. The
figure for 1961 was derived as explained in the methodology.
e.
f. Excluding private housing and collective farm construction, which, on the basis of preliminary evidence,
probably would raise the index slightly. Data for 1950 and 1955-60 are based on source V.
g. 2/
h. On the basis of performance during 1959-60, an estimated average annual increase of 10 percent was used
for 1965, and the result was rounded.
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fulfilled, the index of construction would have increased to only 413
and that of materials to somewhat above 480. Even if the revised goals
for construction materials were fulfilled, that index would have been
revised only to somewhat above 490 and still would have been consider-
ably below the level expected for construction in 1965.*
B. Comparison of Indexes of Production
Listed below in Table 2** are four indexes of production of con-
struction materials in the USSR and one for the US. An analysis of the
assumptions made for each index indicates the validity of each of the
Soviet indexes and the comparability to the US index and explains the
varying rates of increase among the Soviet indexes. The Soviet indexes
are shown in the chart, Figure 1.***
The old and new official Soviet indexes are based on the gross
value of production of construction materials, excluding transportation.
The extremely rapid rate of increase in these indexes is caused mainly by
the exclusion of lumber and steel, as they are subcategories of larger
industries. Flat glass also is excluded, but because it accounts for less
than 2-1/2 percent of the total value of construction materials during
1950-65, it has little effect on the index. These materials combined
occupy a large but declining share in the gross value of production
during 1950-60. In 1950 they accounted for 64 percent of the value
of all materials, but although the computed index of the gross value of
all materials increased at an average annual rate of 12.8 percent from
1950 to 1960, the comparable rate for these materials was only 7.9
percent, and their share of the total decreased to 41 percent.t This
situation is due to the relative maturity of the lumber industry even
in 1950 and the trend toward the substitution of precast concretett
for both lumber and structural steel during the period, so that the
* The planned increase in construction is derived from a planned
60-percent increase in 1965 above the level of 1958 (in centralized con-
struction). 6/ The alternative increases in the construction materials
index were all calculated as in Table 5, Appendix A, p. 27, below, by
making the necessary changes in the individual commodities.
** Table 2 follows on p. 6.
*34-* Following p. 6.
t These percentages are based on the computed gross value of produc-
tion derived from Table 5, Appendix A, p. 27, below, unless otherwise
indicated. When lumber, steel, and flat glass are omitted from this
index, it becomes almost identical with the new official Soviet index
and increases as follows: 1955, 227; 1956, 264; 1957, 324; 1958, 394;
1959, 466; and 1960, 541.
tt This category includes only concrete cast at some place removed
from where it is to be used, as opposed to monolithic concrete, which
is cast in place.
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Table 2
Indexes of Production of Construction Materials
and Average Annual Rates of Increase in the USSR and the US a/
1950, 1955-61, and 1965
Index
(1950 =
100)
Average Annual Rates of Increase
(Percent)
1950
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961 12/
1965
1951-60
1961-65
Official Soviet index of the gross value
of production of construction materials 2/
Old index
100 g
229 d/
254 2/
310 2/
375 2/
460 2/
543 f/
N.A.
940 (Plan) g/
18.4
11.6
New index
100 h/
235 Ey
261 i/
324 i/
392 hi
469 hi
550 hi
616 1/
980 i/
18.6
12.2
Computed index of the gross value of production
of construction materials in the USSR hi
100
180
195
224
261
301
332
357
520
12.8
9.4
Computed value-added index of production of
construction materials in the USSR k/ 1/
100
178
191
218
253
290
318
338
492
12.3
9.1
Value-added index of production of construction
materials in the US m/
100
118
121
121
115
129
129
128
N.A.
2.6
N.A.
a. These indexes are based on value.
b. Preliminary.
c. Excluding lumber, steel, and flat glass. The old index is based on pre-1960 data. The new index is based on changes in the classification of industries and probably
includes some of the new and faster growing although minor industries.
d.
e.
f. Gross output in 1960 increased by 18 percent above the level of 1959. 2/
g. The level of 1965 is to be more than 2.5 times the level of 1958. The minimum (2.5 times) was assumed. 12P/
h. 11
i. Data for 1956 were computed on the basis of the same percent of increase for 1956 over 1955 as in the old series. Data for 1957 were computed on the basis of the same
percent of increase for 1958 over 1957 as in the old series. Data for 1965 are estimated on the basis of the same increase as in the old index.
j. Gross output in 1961 increased by 12 percent above the level of 1960. 12/
k. These indexes are derived from unrounded data and may not agree with indexes derived from the rounded data shown in Table 5, Appendix A, p. 27, below. Derivation is
explained in the methodology, Appendix B.
1. For an explanation of the term value added as used in this report with reference to the construction materials industry of the USSR, see the methodology, Appendix B.
n"
6
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6
5
.400
300
200
100
1
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Figure 1
USSR: Indexes of Comparative Growth in Production of Construction Materials, Construction-Installation Work,
and the Total Industrial Production, 1950, 1955-61, and 1965
k?
4?
eS
,
,
cP
se
_e?
4,--
.,.?.4'
e
I
414'
te
.....?????
.....ss?????
........."'
......"`"
Total,
....+?
......s.""
Production
dustrial ......, .......
_LP ........
1950
=100
36727 10-62
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
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1965
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inclusion of precast concrete in all indexes requires the inclusion of
lumber and steel to obtain a realistic index of the increases in con-
struction materials.
The computed value-added index of production of construction ma-
terials is a more valid index for the USSR than either of the gross
indexes. This index includes all of the materials in the computed gross
index but excludes the inherent duplication of the computed gross index.
A comparison of the rates of increase reveals that the computed gross
index increases only slightly faster than the value-added index in the
USSR. This situation occurs because most of the commodities are bulky,
and consequently the extractive and processing stages are usually combined
and are performed by the same enterprise, so that the multiple accounting
for a commodity that results from further processing by other enterprises
is minimized. The rate differential that does occur is caused primarily
by the rapidly increasing production of precast concrete, which does
introduce more double accounting into the index.
The value-added indexes for the USSR and the US given in Table 2*-
are close enough in concept and coverage to allow meaningful comparisons
to be made, but with some reservations.** Although transportation of
the finished products is generally excluded from both indexes, there are
some Soviet products which are priced including transportation and for
which there was no valid indication of what part of the price reflected
this element. In 1960 the total value of these products was 7.6 percent
of the total gross value, but because generally these were not high-bulk,
low-value products, transportation was a relatively small share of their
value. Similarly, the US index is dependent not only on production
statistics but also on shipments and sales statistics for a number of
commodities, and this fact introduces a slight distortion in the index
as a result of changes in inventories.
There are two factors that slightly lower the US average annual
rate of increase compared with that for the USSR, as indicated in Table 2.
Because of the cyclical conditions in the US, an average annual rate of
increase based on a period from 1948 to 1960 is a better period to mini-
mize this cyclical factor and yields a rate of 3.0 percent. The second
factor cannot be quantified but is of sufficient importance to be noted.
The value-added index for the USSR is estimated to include a representa-
tive sample that covers more than 90 percent of the total value of con-
struction materials. The US index, however, does not include several im-
portant construction materials, such as aluminum products, plastics, and
synthetic floor covering, which have been increasing at a much more rapid
* P. 6, above.
** For a more detailed comparison of these value-added indexes, another
US index, and a materials input index of Soviet construction, see the
methodology, Appendix B.
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rate than the total of the other materials, and this omission introduces
a slight downward bias into the index. Although aluminum products and
plastics used in construction also are excluded in the Soviet value-
added index, their exclusion has little effect on the index because of
the relative insignificance of these commodities in the Soviet economy.
II. Components of the Construction Materials Industry
A. Relative Importance and Increases in Production of the Component
Industries
The relative gross value of production of the various construc-
tion materials is a good measure of the comparative importance of each
material to the construction industry.* A significant shortage in the
supply of any material, however, can make its output particularly criti-
cal and can increase its importance to the economy beyond that measured
by its comparative gross value (for example, cement).
The relative importance and average annual rates of increase,
based on gross value, are given in Table 3** for 18 basically different
subcategories of materials (also see the chart, Figure 2.***). Six of
these materials account for 84 to 87 percent of the gross value and are
classified as the major materials. With the exception of precast con-
crete in 1955, the industry producing each of these materials is a ma-
ture industry with a relatively high level of output, so that the dif-
fering rates of increase are a good measure of the relative priority of
each industry when compared with the average rate for the major materials.
The first two of these materials increase at rates above the average
for the group during both periods and account for increasing shares of
the total output in both 1960 and 1965. The rapid rate of increase in
cement and precast concrete reflects the increasing emphasis on the use
of concrete in construction. The rapid increase in the value of wall
materials during 1961-65 is primarily due to the shift in emphasis from
the less expensive brick to large wall blocks because, in terms of
physical units, wall materials will increase at an average annual rate
of 8.2 percent during 1961-65.
The other major materials, with the exception of rock products
and steel in 1961-65, increase at below-average rates for the group of
major materials in both periods. Although output of rock products in
* Cement is the only material for which increases in quality are, re-
flected in the value figures in the various years. The average quality
of cement has a measurable economic effect in construction. See B,
p. 11, below.
** Table 3 follows on p. 9.
*** Following p. 8.
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Figure 2
USSR: Share of Major and Minor Materials in the Gross Value of Production
of Construction Materials, 1955, 1960, and 1965
Minor Materials
13.996
Construction Lumber
37.096
1Cement
6.396
Precast ?
Concrete
5.796
Wall Material
15.296
Rock Products
6.496
Construction Steel
15.696
1955
Minor Materials
13.496
Construction Lumber
27.596
Note: Figures may not add to too percent because of rounding of the original data.
Cement
7.296
Construction
Steel
12.096
Precast Concrete
19.496
Wall Material
14.796
5.8
Rock
Products
1960
Cement
8.696
Minor Materials
16.596
Precast Concrete
20.596
Construction Lumber
19.996
Wall Material
15.696
Construction Steel
13.296
5.796
Rock
Products
1965
36728 10.62
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Table 3
Relative Gross Value and Average Annual Rates of Increase in Production
of Construction Materials in the USSR 2/
1955, 1960, and 1965
Percent
Major materials
Relative Gross Value
Average Annual
Rates of Increase
1955
1960
1965
1956-60
1961-65
86.1
86.6
83.5
11.2
8.6
Cement
6.3
7.2
8.6
16.2
13.2
Precast concrete (including
prestressed)
5.7
19.4
20.5
44.6
10.6
Wall materials
15.2
14.7
15.6
12.3
10.7
Rock products
6.4
5.8
5.7
11.0
8.7
Construction steel
15.6
12.0
13.2
7.2
11.5
Construction lumber
37.0
27.5
19.9
6.6
2.5
Minor materials
13.9
13.4
16.5
12.2
14.1
Linoleum
0.3
0.4
0.9
16.7
30.9
Flat glass (window and
polished)
1.9
1.7
1.7
10.1
10.6
Construction lime
1.3
1.1
1.2
9.0
10.9
Gypsum and gypsum board
1.0
1.1
1.2
14.5
12.0
Tile (flooring, facing, and
roofing)
1.1
1.1
1.4
14.1
13.6
Soft roofing
1.3
1.0
1.2
8.3
11.8
Asbestos cement products
1.8
1.9
2,4
13.9
15.2
Iron and ceramic sewer pipe
0.8
0.8
0.8
12.2
11.0
Sanitary technical equipment
1.5
1.7
1.9
16.4
11.4
Mineral wool insulation
0.3
0.3
0.6
20.1
21.5
Wood fiber slabs
0.2
0.5
1.5
32.6
34.7
Refractories
2.4
1.8
1.7
6.6
7.8
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
Average annual rate of increase
Gross value
13.0
'9.4
Value added
12.3
9.1
a. The categories of materials have been condensed from Table 5, Appendix A, p. 27, below,
and the percentages in this table have been derived from the value data in Table 5. Totals
and average annual rates are derived independently from unrounded data and may not agree
with the rounded data shown.
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the later period increases at about the same average annual rate as that
for the group, their share as an input into other construction materials
must increase from 21 percent in 1960 to 25 percent. in 1965. This factor
suggests that, rather than being mitigated, the shortages which existed
during 1960 will become more serious in the future. The rate of increase
for steel in the first period is depressed by an absolute decrease in
the use of rails in 1960 compared with 1955 (from 31 to 20 percent of
the total), and the high rate in 1961-65 is made possible by a rapid in-
crease in the use of steel pipe in construction from 17 percent of the
total in 1960 to 27 percent in 1965. The very law rate of increase in
production of lumber is due to the substitution of concrete for lumber
in construction and to the decreasing emphasis on cast-in-place con-
crete, which entails a greater use of wood for forms and scaffolding.
Among the Minor industries, particularly high rates of increase
are evident for linoleum, mineral wool insulation, and wood fiber slabs.
All three of these were infant industries in both 1955 and 1960, so
that their bases were low, but the expansion of their output also has
been receiving considerable emphasis because of their need in the hous-
ing program and the possible savings in their use as substitutes for
other materials.
Two of the major categories in Table 32* construction steel and
lumber, are unique in that they are subcategories of considerably
larger industries. In the USSR in 1955 and 1958 the total tonnage of
steel used in construction was 28 and 26 percent as large, respec-
tively, as the total apparent consumption of rolled steel in each of
those years, and, excluding rails and pipe from construction steel,
the tonnage used was 17 and 16 percent as large, respectively, as
all rolled steel.** In the US in the same years, construction steel
was 16 and 20 percent as great, respectively, as the apparent con-
sumption of rolled steel, and, excluding rails and pipe from construc-
tion steel, the comparable figures are 11 and 15 percent.*** Thus a
* P. 9, above.
** Production plus imports minus exports equals apparent consumption.
The total quantities of construction steel are presumed to be in fin-
ished forms, so that the loss in weight in converting from rolled steel
to the forms used in construction is not accounted for in these figures.
On the basis of US experience, about 30 percent of all rolled steel in
the USSR in 1955 and 1958 was allocated to construction.
*** In the US in 1955, 18 percent of the apparent consumption of rolled
steel was converted into the various forms for the use of the construc-
tion industry, and in 1958 21 percent was converted. US percentages in
the text have a slight upward bias because the loss incurred in manu-
facturing pipe is excluded from the figures for total US rolled steel
but not from the Soviet figures. However, [footnote continued on p. 11]
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greater share of total rolled steel is used in construction in the
USSR than in the US, but by excluding pipe and rail from construction
steel the difference is lessened.
A greater share of the apparent physical consumption of indus-
trial wood (all logs except firewood) is used in construction in the
USSR than in the US. In 1958, 59 percent of the apparent consumption
of industrial wood was used for lumber and ties in the USSR and 51 per-
cent in the US.*
B. Component Industries**
1. Cement
Production of cement in the USSR has been increasing at a
rapid rate, but it has not kept pace with demand in the past, and this
trend will continue. During 1956-60 the volume of physical production
of cement increased at an average annual rate of 15.2 percent, and
annual production was usually relatively close to planned levels.***
Also during this period, production of cement per million rubles of
construction-installation work (hereafter called a construction unit)
increased from 225 tons in 1955 to 236 tons in 1960, so that the con-
sumption of cement per construction unit was increasing.t According
the figures for total rolled steel are not identical categories in both
countries, because the US figure excludes cold rolled steel. If, to
avoid this problem, a figure for the total shipments of rolled steel is
substituted in the US, all percentages are increased from 1 to 2 percent.
* Lumber and ties are converted to logs by dividing by a factor of
0.67. For an explanation of the rationale of equating the use of lum-
ber and ties with the use of wood products in construction, see Appen-
dix B.
** Unless otherwise indicated, annual production figures and average
annual rates of increase in this section are taken from Table 5,
Appendix A, p. 27, below. The value of construction-installation work
was obtained from the sources given in Table 1, p. 4, above.
xxx Under the Sixth Five Year Plan the 1960 goal was 55 million metric
tons. (Tonnages are given in metric tons throughout this report.)
This figure was later lowered to 52 million tons. The final plan for
1960 was 45.5 million tons, and this goal was fulfilled. 11+/
t In this discussion, production and consumption are used inter-
changeably because net imports were of relatively small magnitude dur-
ing 1955-60, reaching a peak of 6.4 percent of the total apparent con-
sumption in 1956 and decreasing in each year since, so that in 1960
they were only 2.8 percent. With the rapid increases in production
and the probably stable level of net [footnote continued on p. 12]
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to the original goals for 1965, production of cement was to increase
to 75 million to 81 million tons, thereby making from about 310 to 340
tons of cement available per construction unit. During 1959 and 1960,
however, increases in the volume of construction-installation work indi-
cated that the plan for 1965 will be substantially exceeded, so that
only about 240 to 260 tons of cement would have been available per con-
struction unit in 1965. To compensate for the expanded need, the pro-
duction goal for cement in 1965 was increased to 84.6 million tons. 15/
However, this increase will allow only about 270 tons per construction
unit in that year, and, with the estimated production of 81 million tons
in 1965, only about 260 tons per construction unit will be available.
This gap probably cannot be made up by imports, and, as a result, a
shortage of cement will remain a major hindrance to the construction
effort.
The prime cause of the difficulty in expanding production
in the past has been the lagging expansion of capacity in the cement
industry.* This shortfall is caused by a failure to concentrate in-
vestment on the most important projects, an underestimation of the in-
vestment required (that is, costs are greater than planned), and the
fact that completions of projects have taken longer than specified in
the norms. A major contributing factor to the slowness in completing
projects has been the shortage of cement plant equipment. In the past
the USSR has been dependent on imports from East Germany for most of
its equipment. During 1950-55, complete equipment for production of
10 million tons of cement, or 23 plants, was imported from East Germany.
These imports have continued, although the USSR is now attempting to
become almost self-sufficient in the manufacture of this equipment. At
4 major machine building plants, 29 production lines (kilns and ancillary
equipment) were scheduled for completion in 1958-59, but not one com-
plete line had been delivered by September 1960, and, in mid-October
1961, not one line had been completely delivered of the 12 scheduled
for that year. 16/ Poor advance planning contributes to the equipment
shortage also, as frequently insufficient time is allowed for delivery,
and equipment is sometimes scheduled to arrive after the planned com-
pletion date for the plant.
imports (primarily from Communist China and Rumania), there will be even
less relative difference between production and apparent consumption in
the future.
* Assessment of past performance in the expansion of capacity of the
cement industry is difficult because of the frequent revision of invest-
ment plans and the often conflicting statements on plan fulfillment and
increased capacity made by otherwise reliable sources. Future and even
present plans for adding new capacity often reveal significant areas of
indecision or undue flexibility in the planning apparatus.
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During 1956-60 the total of annual plans for additions of
new capacity was fulfilled by only 55 to 65 percent, and yet annual
production plans were generally fulfilled. Since 1958, however, par-
ticular emphasis has been placed on fulfilling annual plans for addi-
tions to capacity. In 1961, for example, 27 projects (which accounted
for 76 percent of all cement capacity to be commissioned) were included
in a list of 434 top-priority projects. 17/ As a result, actual annual
additions have more closely approached planned levels. For example,
in 1960 the plan was fulfilled by 78 percent, and in 1961 a 71-percent
fulfillment was achieved. 18/ To fulfill the production goal for 1965,
however, the fulfillment of annual goals* for adding capacity must be
further improved, as the possibility of gains by intensifying produc-
tion at existing plants is considerably diminished. Unless the priori-
ties for adding new capacity in the cement industry are increased sig-
nificantly, the production goal for cement in 1965 will not be ful-
filled.
Another problem facing the Soviet cement industry is the
regional disparities between production and consumption. These dis-
parities do not appear to be easing significantly, because expansion
of existing plants has been the primary means of increasing produc-
tion. The proportional trends in the various means of increasing
production are given in Table 4.
Table 4
Means of Increasing Production in the Cement Industry in the USSR
Selected Periods, 1951-65
Percent
Time Period
Intensification
of Production
and Modernization
of Equipment Expansion New
at Existing Plants of Existing Plants Plants
1951-55 a/
62
1952-58 b/
(25
271
48
1959-65 TPlan)
c/
11
52
37
a. 20/
b. 21/
c.22/
* The total planned addition to capacity for 1961-65 is to be )-i-9.4 mil-
lion tons at 26 new plants and 45 expanded or reconstructed existing
plants utilizing 109 new production lines. 19/
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The relative decrease in reliance on modernization results
from the realization by the planners that this means of increasing pro-
duction has become quite limited. Early indications in the 1959-65
Plan were that new plant construction would be expanded, a move that
would tend to improve the distribution in the regional production of
cement because new plants are usually constructed in areas that are par-
ticularly deficient in the supply of cement. The actual plan, however,
sharply reduced the reliance on new plants and increased the emphasis
on the expansion of existing plants. These changes are prompted by an
acute need for increased production of cement and-by the high cost of
new plants compared with the other means of increasing productive capac-
ity as well as the difficulties in getting new plants into operation
according to plan. Capital expenditures, per unit of capacity, for
building new plants average 33 percent higher than the expenditures
required to expand existing plants,* and whereas the minimum time re-
quired to build a new plant has been from 2-1/2 to 3 years, existing
plants frequently can be expanded in 1 year.
The greater difficulty in constructing new plants is re-
flected in the number of new plants planned and completed during
1956-60. Twenty-seven new plants were originally scheduled to be com-
missioned, but this figure was decreased to 16 when the production plan
was revised downward. Actual commissionings are now estimated to have
been nine or ten plants, with the majority of the plants commissioned
considerably later than scheduled during the period. In addition, new
plant construction was particularly deficient in the Eastern Regions
Of the USSR. This situation has caused a continuation of the regional
shortage of cement and an inordinately long average length of haul,
which has actually increased from 550 kilometers (km) in 1955 to 595 km
in 1958, so that the plan to reduce the average length of haul to 325 km
in 1965 23/ probably will not be met.
A further problem in the transportation, loading, and un-
loading of cement has been the heavy losses of cement (stated to be as
high as 15 percent) suffered during these operations. 24/ The solution
to this problem requires more and better loading and unloading equip-
ment; storage facilities; and the widespread use of special railroad
cars and trucks for hauling cement, as in the US. It is very unlikely
that significant improvements will be made in these areas by 1965.
It is possible that by 1963 the USSR will surpass the US in
the annual quantity of cement produced. In 1962 the USSR plans to pro-
duce 57.1 million tons, and this plan probably will be fulfilled. Pro-
duction in the US for 1962 is estimated at about 59 million tons (includ-
ing portland, masonry, and other hydraulic cements). In the USSR the
* See Table 6, Appendix A, p. 29, below.
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annual production has increased by an average of almost 6 million tons
per year since 1958, while in the US the estimate for 1962 is only about
4 million tons above the level of 1958. However, although the quality
or average grade* of cement in the USSR has been increasing, it will be
considerably below that of the US even in 1965. The quality of cement
is very important because the quantity of cement required to make con-
crete of a given strength varies with the quality used. Thus the higher
average quality cement in the US is equivalent to a greater quantity of
Soviet cement -- for example, in the USSR an average grade of 460 was
originally planned for 1965 (and probably will be achieved), while the
average grade in the US is about 550. 25/ The US grade is equivalent
to 12.5 percent more cement than the Soviet grade, so that in 1965,
although the USSR will produce about 81 million tons, it will be equiva-
lent to about 72 million tons of US dement.
2. Precast Concrete
Since 1954, considerable emphasis has been given to the pre-
cast concrete program in the USSR. Premier Khrushchev has indicated
his interest in this program as one of the principal means of fulfill-
ing industrialization plans and attaining a high rate of growth in the
construction industry. The economic rationale for this program is as
follows:
a. The use of precast concrete as a substitute for
lumber and steel permits a decrease in the use of such materials per
construction unit. Shortages of these materials have been a hindrance
to the construction effort for a number of years.
b. A reduction in the requirements for on-site labor
per construction unit and an increase in the efficiency of the construc-
tion labor force are attained. There is a considerable reduction in the
need for skilled labor, such as bricklayers, structural steel workers,
and carpenters for form work. Semiskilled and unskilled labor can be
more efficiently utilized by transferring such persons to more mechanized
and regularized fabrication processes in precast concrete plants.
c. A reduction of construction costs during the long
and severe winters that are characteristic of most parts of the USSR
is accomplished by performing more construction tasks in plants -- for
example, concrete pouring and brick laying on-site during below-freezing
* The grade number, or mark, of cement in the USSR indicates the 28-
day compressive strength (measured in kilograms per square centimeter)
of a cube made up of one part of cement to three parts of sand and a
water-cement ratio of 1 to 0.5.
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temperature requires temporary enclosure and heating of the work area,
a procedure that is relatively expensive.*
d. The transfer of functions to plants permits the
relocation of the limited supplies of equipment into plants, where the
equipment -- such as concrete mixers and batch plants -- can be more
efficiently utilized.
In terms of planned levels of production since 1955, the
precast concrete program has exceeded expectations, and this situation
will continue, although plans frequently have been revised upward.
The 1960 plan, for example, was increased from 28 million cubic meters
(cu m) under the Sixth Five Year Plan directives, to 28.8 million cu m,
and production was 32.3 million cu m. For 1965 the goal has been in-
creased from a range of between 42 million and 45 million cu m to 47.2
million cu m, and production should exceed this revised goal and reach
at least 52 million cu m. 26/ By 1965, precast concrete will be the
most important construction material (in terms of value) and will account
for about one-fifth of the total value of construction materials in that
year.
The rapid increase in produttion of precast concrete has
permitted a considerable increase in its consumption per construction
unit because production and consumption in any given period are roughly
the same. In 1955) 53 cu m were used per construction unit; in 1960,
167 cu m were used; and under the old construction plans the amount was
scheduled to increase to between 175 and 188 cu m per construction unit.
This trend not only reflects the substitution of precast concrete for
lumber, steel, and other masonry wall materials but also reflects its
use in place of monolithic (poured-in-place) concrete. In 1955, for
example, precast concrete accounted for 15.6 percent of the total con-
crete; in 1957 it had increased to 26.5 percent; and under the original
Seven Year Plan goals it was to have increased to more than 35 percent
in 1965. 27/
Because the construction goal for 1965 will be significantly
exceeded, the plan for production of precast concrete was increased,
but not enough to compensate for the increase in construction. Even
with the estimated exceeding of the goal for production of precast
concrete in 1965) the use per construction unit will remain about the
same as in 1960. Numerous statements by Soviet officials that the use
* In the USSR, chemicals such as calcium chloride are used to permit
placement of concrete in cold weather without heating, but this practice
has a deleterious effect on steel reinforcement and the strength of the
concrete and is not sufficient in extremely cold weather.
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per construction unit will continue to increase indicate either that
production of precast concrete will have to increase at a greater rate
than presently expected or that the further industrialization of con-
struction will be handicapped.
Several problems continue to plague the precast concrete
program in spite of the rapid rate of increase in production during
the past. A continuing shortage of reinforcing steel, of rock products
of good quality, and particularly of cement has had serious ramifica-
tions. Attempts to use less than the optimum amount of cement in order
to make it go further have caused a significant deterioration in the
quality and strength of concrete. This deterioration has been com-
pounded by the generally poor quality of rock products available for
aggregates, a situation that has required the use of more cement than
would be necessary with aggregates of good quality. Also, optimum use
is not made of the available reinforcing steel, which is sometimes
carelessly placed, so that the maximum benefits are not obtained from
the available steel. The result of these shortages, together with the
extremely rapid expansion of production of precast concrete, has been
a poor quality of concrete products, resulting in relatively high
maintenance costs of structures composed of concrete. A further prob-
lem that faces the industry has been caused by the overmechanization
of precast concrete plants, resulting in extremely high maintenance
costs in the plants.
There are two important subcategories in the precast con-
crete program that have presented problems -- prestressed concrete*
and large wall panels. Prestressed concrete has been emphasized as
long as precast concrete, but goals for prestressed concrete have been
lowered and are still badly underfulfilled. In 1958, only 75 percent
fulfillment was achieved and in 1959 81 percent. In 1960, only 58 per-
cent of the original goal for that year was achieved. Production
of prestressed concrete has a particular importance in the USSR because
it permits savings of as much as 50 percent in the weight of steel and
10 percent in concrete. 28/ More expensive special types of steel,
however, should be used that can withstand and hold the stress. This
program has suffered because of the greater investment required, the
acute shortage of the special steels required, and the technical dif-
ficulty in producing prestressed concrete. In the last several years,
plan fulfillment has increased somewhat, partially because of lowered
* In making prestressed concrete the reinforcing steel is put under
tension -- that is, one end of the steel is anchored and then the
steel is stretched -- before pouring concrete into the mold. The
tension is released when the concrete has hardened sufficiently, and
thus a compressive force is exerted on the concrete that increases
its strength.
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1
goals but also because of the use of electrothermal prestressing.* It
is doubtful if the added costs of electrothermal prestressing (compared
with regular reinforced concrete) are economically justified by the
increased strength of the final product, but, using this syttem, the
present goal for 1965 for production of prestressed concrete of 11 mil-
lion cu m will probably be fulfilled.
Production in the large wall panel program commenced in
1958, but in 1959 only 355,000 Cu m were produced, which was only a
41-percent plan fulfillment. In 1960, 952,000 cu m were produced.
By 1965, 500 enterprises are to be constructed for production of large
wall panels. Of the 122 plants scheduled for completion in 1959-60,
however, only 20 were constructed by the middle of 1960. 30/ Two of
the major deterrents to the success of this program have been the
shortage of equipment and the slow development of production of the
light fillers (aggregates) necessary for this program. Although sig-
nificant increases will be made, production in 1965 probably will fall
short of expectations, and the USSR will continue to rely primarily on
the traditional masonry wall materials.
Any over-all evaluation of the precast concrete program in
the USSR must take into consideration the unique circumstances and
goals in that country. Given the limitation on available construction
materials in the USSR (particularly the shortage of steel and of lum-
ber), a dictatorial form of government which permits standardization,
and the goals of the construction industry (rapid expansion, particu-
larly of the housing program), the precast concrete program is eco-
nomically justified. Because of the haste with which the precast con-
crete program is being expanded, however, the advantages of the program
are not being maximized. This haste is reflected in the poor quality
of the product and in the failure to take precautions that, by yield-
ing a considerably better product (as well as less waste of materials),
would in turn lower the need for the extensive maintenance on precast
concrete buildings which is inevitable under the present circumstances.
3. Wall Materials
This category is defined as all masonry construction mate-
rials used for walls except reinforced concrete. The largest subcate-
gory is brick (both clay, or baked, and silicate, or sand-lime, which
is unbaked). The other subcategories are natural stone, both field
* In electrothermal prestressing the steel is electrically preheated
(causing expansion) and then is anchored by the ends in the concrete
mold. Cooling self-stresses the steel. In 1959 this method accounted
for 94 percent of all prestressing in Moscow (which produced about
30 percent of the prestressed concrete in the USSR). 29/
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and dimension (cut); large wall blocks; and other types of wall mate-
rials (mainly small wall blocks). Large and small wall blocks are
composed of cinders, slag, or sand, with cement or lime used as a
binder.
It is difficult to evaluate plan fulfillment for wall
materials because of the paucity of plans released and the general
lack of reliable figures. These problems stem largely from the ex-
tensive number of widely scattered plants, frequently of limited
size. For example, at the end of 1959 there were more than 6,500
brick plants in the USSR.* This situation results from the widely
available raw materials and the low value compared with the bulk of
the products, making extensive transportation highly uneconomic.
These conditions make centralized planning and statistical reporting
very difficult. Long-term plans in particular have been nonexistent
or highly unrealistic, as in 1960, when the plan to produce 61 billion
units of wall materials was fulfilled by 73 percent. 11/
During 1961-65 the average annual rate of increase in the
gross value of production of wall materials will exceed the average
rate for major construction materials. In terms of physical units,**
however, the 8.2-percent average annual rate of increase in production
during the period will be one of the lowest for any construction mate-
rial, exceeding only the rate for lumber and refractories. The larger
increase in the value figure reflects primarily the conversion away
from the less expensive brick*** to the more costly large wall blocks.
In 1960, brick accounted for 80 percent of all wall materials but will
decline to 67 percent in 1965, while large wall blocks will increase
from 3 percent in 1960 to 15 percent in 1965 in spite of an estimated
shortfall of 35 percent in plan fulfillment. 32/
The low rate of increase in physical units will result in
a decline in the use of wall materials from 256,000 and 231,000 stand-
ard brick units per construction unit in 1955 and 1960, respectively
to 212,000 units in 1965/ as production and consumption are roughly
identical. This decline is explained by the substitution away from
brick to large wall panels, which are part of the precast concrete
category. The conversion from brick to large wall blocks is a move in
the same direction. These changing relationships result from the
* See Table 7, Appendix A, p. 30, below.
** The dimensions of a standard brick unit are 25 by 12 by 6.5 centi-
meters, and 400 of these units equal 1 cu m. This brick is considera-
bly larger than the average US brick.
*** Soviet production of brick at present is still four to five times
as great as US production, and the USSR also exceeds the US in produc-
tion of most of the other masonry wall materials.
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attempts to minimize the use of skilled labor (bricklayers) on the
construction site and to transfer as many labor-consuming processes
to plants as is feasible.*
The share of brick in the total construction materials
will not decrease to the extent planned, however, partially because
brick is a traditional material, and, although costs of investment
and production are high, it is still frequently the most advantageous
wall material in small towns and in outlying areas. Furthermore, the
ambitious plans for both large wall blocks and panels will not be ful-
filled, so that primary dependence on brick will continue, and the
intended extent of the decrease in on-site construction labor will not
be achieved.
4. Rock Products
In the USSR in 1957, 39 percent of rock products, or non-
metallic minerals, are estimated to have been sand, 15 percent gravel,
and 46 percent crushed stone and rubble. In the US in 1959, 21 per-
cent was sand, 35 percent gravel, and 44 percent crushed stone.
Although rock products are not used by the construction industry ex-
clusively, other consumers utilize a relatively small percentage of
the total production in the USSR. In 1957, 91.3 percent of all rock
products were consumed in the construction and construction materials
industries. The remainder was consumed by the metallurgical industries
(7.5 percent)** and the chemical industries (1.2 percent). L[,/ Almost
half of all rock products are utilized in production of concrete.
Output of rock products has not increased as rapidly in the
past several years as have the other major construction materials (ex-
cept lumber and steel), and rock products lag behind all but lumber in
the average annual rate of increase of major materials during 1961-65.
Considering the rapidly expanding need for rock products in precast con-
crete, this industry has received insufficient emphasis and is an inef-
ficient producer of a low-quality product that is subsidized in the
Soviet economy. The poor quality of the products of this industry also
is responsible for compounding the cement shortage. Recent Soviet cal-
culations indicate that the use of aggregates that do not conform to
specifications causes an overexpenditure of more than 2 million tons of
* See p. 15, above.
** In 1960, Soviet blast furnaces yielded 34.2 million tons of slag,
almost two-thirds of which was granulated and used as construction ma-
terials in the manufacture of portland slag cement and as concrete
aggregate and road ballast. 11/
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cement annually. This overexpenditure was largely caused not only by
the poor quality of the aggregate but also by the frequent failure to
use clean aggregates and to classify the aggregates by size, as in 1957,
when more than one-half of the gravel and almost one-third of the
crushed stone produced in the Soviet economy was not graded by size. 35/
The subsidization of the rock products industry is evident
in the excess of prime costs* above the selling price. In 1957 the
average prime costs for production of rubble stone exceeded the aver-
age selling price by 22 percent, crushed rock by 41 percent, and gravel
by 35 percent. Only the average prime cost of sand was lower than its
average selling price (by 5 percent). 36/ In that year, based on these
figures, prime costs exceeded the selling price by 27 percent for all
rock products.
In an analysis of the importance of the rock products in-
dustry in the Soviet economy, this undervaluation of production is
noteworthy. In addition, in 1958 the total expenditure on the trans-
portation of rock products was 7.7 billion rubles** or about 2.2 times
the gross value of output in that year. 37/ Assuming that the 1957
cost factors were valid in 1958, these two factors added about 8.6 bil-
lion rubles to the value of rock products received by consumers, so that
if this amount is added to the gross value of construction materials
and of rock products, the latter becomes about 18 percent of the total
rather than 5.9 percent.***
The failure to give sufficient emphasis to this important
industry has resulted in a shortage of rock products in the Soviet econ-
omy and a low level of efficiency. In 1960 the rock products indus-
try satisfied the demand of the national economy by only 80 to 85 per-
cent and the demand of reinforced concrete producers for crushed stone
and fine gravel by only 65 to 70 percent. This shortage also is sug-
gested by the ratio of rock products and production of cement in
the USSR and the US. In 1959 the USSR produced almost two-thirds as
* Prime costs include all factor input costs (including amortiza-
tion) but exclude profits.
** Unless otherwise indicated, ruble values throughout this report
are given in 1 July 1955 rubles (ruble values in use before the Soviet
currency reform of 1961) and may be converted to US dollars at the rate
of exchange of 6 rubles to US $1, which reflects average relative prices
of construction materials in the US and the USSR.
*** The gross value of construction materials does not include trans-
portation costs (except for a few materials), but because, in the case
of rock products, transportation is such a significant portion of the
cost to the consumer, rock products would be a significantly larger
percentage of the total even if the gross value included transporta-
tion costs for all materials.
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much cement as the US but only one-third the quantity of rock products.*
The efficiency is reflected in the low level of mechanization of the
industry in 1959, when more than 4o percent of the enterprises were
classified as not even medium-mechanized enterprises and more than 4o
percent of the labor force was engaged in manual operations. 38/
Although there is increasing emphasis on the rock products
industry, it continues to be probably the most backward of the con-
struction materials industries. Investment plans for the industry have
been increased, and the goals for 1965, which have been given as high
as about 450 million cu m, are not (even if they were attained) of
sufficient quantity to satisfy consumers. In addition, the quality of
production will remain low, so that this industry will continue to
cause problems (particularly of quality) for the precast concrete pro-
gram, which will in turn cause a continuation of the overconsumption
of cement.
5. Other Construction Materials
The products briefly evaluated in this section are the
three groupings of older commodities (which will account jointly for
6 percent of the gross value of production of construction materials
in 1965) and the newer commodities. Except for asbestos cement prod-
ucts, output of these older commodities is greater in the US than in
the USSR, and for the newer commodities, Soviet production is only a
very small fraction of output in the US.
Asbestos cement articles consist almost exclusively of
flat shinglea, corrugated panels, and pipe.** The plants are gener-
ally either adjacent or in close proximity, to cement plants because
the product consists of roughly 85 percent cement to 15 percent as-
bestos (by weight). In 1958, about two-thirds of the roofing on
houses and civil buildings in cities and workers' settlements was
asbestos cement, and about one-third of the pipe in the country was
asbestos cement (excluding steel pipe). 39/ The rapid increase in
production by this industry in recent years will continue, and the
* Because of the lower average quality of cement in the USSR than
in the US in terms of effectiveness, the Soviet production was equiva-
lent to somewhat more than half of the US production (see 1, p. 11,
above). In addition, road construction is a much larger share of
total construction in the US than in the USSR. This type of construc-
tion requires a more intensive use of rock products than most other
types.
** Flat products are statistically counted in standard units (4o by
4o by 0.4 centimeters) that weigh 1.2 kilograms each, and pipe are
counted in standard kilometers, 200 millimeters in diameter, and weighing
approximately 19 tons per kilometer.
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goals for 1965 probably will be fulfilled, permitting expanded use
particularly of flat products for sidings. Asbestos cement products
are relatively inexpensive and light in weight, and their expanded
use is economically justified.
Production of flat glass for construction (window and
polished or plate glass) has increased at a comparatively modest aver-
age annual rate in the past and will continue at about the same rate
in the future. Production of window glass is sufficient for domestic
needs (although of poor quality), but polished glass is in short sup-
ply, and production will increase at almost double the average annual
rate for window glass during 1961-65. Nevertheless, production of
polished glass in 1965 will continue to be a negligible proportion of
the total construction glass -- that is, only 3.7 percent of production
of window glass. In the US, polished (plate) glass is about half of
the volume of window (sheet) glass.
Sanitary technical equipment is defined to include heating
boilers and radiators, bathtubs, and water heaters. Their production
has been increasing at a rate which is above the average for all con-
struction materials and although this will continue during 1961-65 the
average annual rate during 1961-65 will be 5 percentage points less
than that of 1956-60. Production of these articles currently is inade-
quate for the needs of the Soviet economy and this shortage will con-
tinue. The production plans in 1960 for heating boilers and radiators
were fulfilled by 85 percent, and the production plan for bathtubs was
fulfilled by 93 percent. In 1965 the planned production figures are
only 92, 90, and 80 percent, respectively, of the projected demand in
1965 for these items. 40/
The new materials are those which are produced in negligible
quantities at present but whose production is expected to increase very
rapidly during the balance of the Seven Year Plan. Most of them are
substitutes for other, more expensive products. Included among these
new products are the following three broad categories: plastics, waste
wood products, and insulation. These materials are important because
their use affords savings in costs as well as in other materials in
short supply such as lumber and metals.
The most important category of plastics is synthetic floor
coverings. Linoleum, which is the most important type, was planned
to increase at an average annual rate of 34.5 percent during 1959-65
and in 1965 was to account for approximately one-third of all flooring
(both in new construction and in maintenance). The large increase in
production was based on the possible savings in cost compared with
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other types of flooring. During 1959, pro4uction costs for linoleum
were only 53 percent of the wholesale price of 22 rubles per square
meter (sq m) and this price was to be reduced to 16 rubles per sq in,
so that linoleum would cost 10 rubles per sq m less than plank floor-
ing and 57 rubles per sq m less than parlpet flooring. In 1965 the
planned production and use of 100 million sq m of linoleum, therefore,
was to save more than 1 billion rubles as well as 7 million cu in of
lumber. Although the goal for production in 1958 was exceeded by 6.7
percent, the ambitious plan for 1960 was fulfilled by only 35.6 per-
cent, and the goal for 1965 therefore probably will be fulfilled by
about 50 percent. Even this production requires a very high average
annual rate of increase and should result in the saving of half a bil-
lion rubles and 3 million to 4 million cu m of lumber.
Other plastic products of some importance are pipe and
'sanitary technical equipment. It is planned to use 62,000 tons of
these products in 1965 to replace 600,000 tons of metals. These and
other uses of 'plastics in construction are to consume up to 30 per-
cent of the total volume of output of plastics in 1965. 41/ Although
production (and therefore consumption) will be considerably below the
planned levels, the total production of plastics probably will lag
considerably, so that their use in construction may approach that per-
centage in 1965.
The two principal waste wood products are wood fiber and
wood shavings slabs (or sheets). The former product will have the
highest rate of increase in production of any construction material
during 1961-65 and is classified as an insulating material. The
principal uses probably are for interior walls and partitions. Wood
shavings board is used in place of plywood and other lumber products.
It is only two-thirds as expensive as plywood, and 1 cu in replaces
1.47 cu m of lumber. The use of these products should result in con-
siderable savings of lumber and plywood. 42/
The most important insulation material is mineral wool.
Although its production increased rapidly during 1956-60 and probably
will continue to increase, at a slightly higher average annual rate,
production has not been sufficient to fulfill the demand for it. Dur-
ing 1957 and 1958, little more than half of the demand was satisfied, 43/
and, in spite of the large increases in production, the demand for this
material will continue to be badly underfulfilled through 1965.
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APPENDDC A
STATISTICAL TABLES
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Table 5
Price per Unit, Production, and Value of Construction Materials in the USSR 2/
1950, 1955-60, and 1965
Material
Cement
Precast concrete di
Of which:
Price per
Single Unit hi
Unit of Measure (1 July 1955
of Production _Rubles)
Thousand metric
tons
Million cubic 427
meters
Prestressed concrete 4/ Thousand cubic
meters
Wall materials
Of which:
Construction brick
Dimension and field
stone
Large concrete (includ-
ing porous) and sili-
cate wall blocks
Other wall materials e
Rock products
Construction steel hi
Construction lumber la/
Linoleum
Window glass
Polished glass
Construction lime
Gypsum
Dry gypsum plaster board
Flooring and facing tile
Roofing tile
Soft roofing
Asbestos cement shingle
Asbestos cement pipe
Iron sewer pipe and fit-
tings
Ceramic sewer pipe
Sanitary technical equip-
ment
Heating boilers
Heating radiators
Enameled iron bathtubs
Bath water heaters
Mineral wool insulation
Wood fiber slabs
Refractories
Fire clay
Dinas
Magnesite and chrome
magnesite brick
Magnesite powder
(metallurgical)
Total gross value
of production 1/
Less duplication li
Total value added in
production 1/Je
Billion stand-
ard bricks
Billion stand-
ard bricks
Billion stand-
ard bricks
Billion stand-
ard bricks
Billion stand-
ard bricks
Million cubic
meters
Thousand metric
tons
Million cubic
meters
Million square
meters
Million square
meters
Thousand square
meters
Thousand metric
tons
Thousand metric
tons
Million square
meters
Million square
meters
Million pieces
Million square
meters
Million stand-
ard units
Standard kilo-
meters
Thousand metric
tons
Thousand metric
tons
Thousand square
meters
Million square
meters
Thousand units
Thousand units
Million cubic
meters
Million square
meters
Thousand metric
tons
Thousand metric
tons
Thousand metric
tons
Thousand metric
tons
1950 1955
Value
(Million
1 July 1955
Production Rubles)
Value
(Million
1 July 1955
Production Rubles)
10,194 1,090 22,484
2,540
1.3 555 5.3 2,230
572 Negl. Negl. 75 43
13.0 3,120 25.6 6,100
0.231 10.2 2,360 20.8 4,800
0.232 1.3 302 2.4 1/ 557
0.490 o o o o
0.310 1.5 465 2.4 744
15.5
22
6.6
66.4
86
88
3.64
20.9
0.538
1.028
0.386
12,200
1,180
740
158
39.1
248
305
65
6
146
124
379
123
62
5,340
58.7
1.5 1/
76.9
263
4,154
1,721
4.7
2.2
961 166 2,570
3,570 9,320 6,290
10,200 83.3 14,900
33 6 132
508 99.8 659
17 1,502 loo
357 6,205 534
151 2,870 253
17 41.1 150
46 8.4 176
222.5 120 472.1 254
285.5 293 503.7 518
211 1,488.0 574
43 12,148 148
94 132.9 157
21 214.0 158
546,4
3,500
79.9
27.9
349 55 915 145
4.8 188 7.8 305
82 20 321 80
54 16 198 6o
0.7 46 1.6 104
6.2 37 16.5 99
2,631 384 3,878 566
734 91 728 90
233 88 608 230
313 38 667 82
22,400 40,200
475 1,290
21,900 38,900
1956 1957
Production
24,858
8.8
Value
(Million
1 July 1955
Rubles)
1958
Value
1 July 1955
Production Rubles) Production
33,308
19.5
2,780 28,896 3,290
3,670 13.8 5,750
203 116 341 195
26.7 6,44o 31.4 7,670
21.6 4,990 24.7 5,710
2.4 557 2.8 65o
0.3 147 0.6 294
Value
(Million
1 July 1955
Rubles)
1959 1960
Value
(Million
1 July 1955
Production Rubles)
Value
1 July 1955
Production Rubles)
3,860 38,781 4,54o 45,520
1965 Estimate
Value
1 July 1955
Production Rubles)
5,370 81,000
7,880 25.4 9,740 32.3 12,000
1,050 601 2,674
37.2 9,140 42.0
28.7 6,630 33.0
3.9 905 4.4
1.0 490 1.1
2.4 744 3.3 1,020 3.6 1,120 3.5
190 2,940 204 3,160 223 3,460 250
9,170 6,230 10,100 7,060 10,700 7,420 11,800
84.8 15,100 89.2 16,000 101.0 18,200 112.0
7 154 8 176 11.2 246 12.0 I/
112.2 741 120.9 798 133.1 878 139.8
1,790 119 2,000 li 133 2,200 146 2,960
6,388 549 7,208 620 8,385 721 9,258
3,000 264 3,504 308 4,005 352 4,421
46.6 170 59.0 215 67 244 85 I/
10.5 219 12.7 265 14.5 303 15.2
498.4 268 557.2 300 671.0 361 761.4
536.0 551 581.0 597 648.1 666 689.8
1,809.4 698 2,152.9 831 2,406.7 929 2,603.4
13,200 161 14,000 171 15,200 185 17,000 1/
150.5 178 170.4 201 196.1 231 228.0
238.2 176 273.8 203 292.9 217 317.7
1,057 167 1,237 195 1,316 208 1,414
8.5 332 9.5 371 11.3 442 13.6
375 93 428 106 516 128 608
247 75 331 101 393 120 516
1.9 124 2.3 150 2.6 169 3.3
21.3 128 29.2 175 34.9 209 52.1
4,024 588 4,202 613 4,365 637 4,638
655 81 623 77 620 77 654
748 283 785 298 835 316 958
757 93 934 115 913 112 952
43,500 50,100 58,400
1,730 2,430 3,170
41.800
47,700
55,300
1,530 4,092 2,340
10,300 44.6 10,900
7,620 35.5 8,200
1,020 4.7 1,090
539 1.4 686
1,080 3.0 930
3,880 280 1/ 4,340
8,360 12,600 8,920
20,100 113.0 20,400
264 13 286
923 147.2 972
197 3,825 254
796 9,562 822
389 4,622 407
309 106 386
318 18.5 1/ 387
410 824 li 443
709 750.1 771
1,000 2,991.4 1,160
207 18,600 227
269 254.9 301
235 349.6 259
223 1,548 245
532 16.7 653
151 715 177
157 613 187
214 4.o 260
313 67.6 4o6
677 4,922 719)
81 665 82
363 1,050 398
117 1,062 131
67,300
3,890
63,400
74,300
4,740
69,500
52
9,960
17,500
11,000 2/ 6,290
66 18,200
44 10,200
8 1,860
10 4,900
4 1,240
425 2/ 6,590
20,600 15,400
128 23,200
50 1,100
224 2/ 1,480
8,300 2/ 551
16,000 1,380
9,500 836
154 2/ 561
36.5 763
1,500 807
1,310 2/ 1,350
6,000 2/ 2,320
4o,000 2/ 488
330 389
750 555
2,400 2/ 379
28.3 2/ 1,110
1,520 2/ 377
1,000 305
10.6 2/ 689
300 2/ 1,800
11,400 1,940 ly
8,520
108,000
a. Most of the production data through 19.0 are from source . Some data were obtained from other published Soviet material. Where production data for 19
to three significant digits. All value data are rounded to three significant digits or less. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
b. All prices except those for precast and prestressed concrete, rock products, steel, and linoleum were obtained from source 45/. These prices generally do not include transportation from the producer to the consumer.
c. Cement is priced by type and by grade for five different price zones. 46/ The distribution of production of cement by regions and republics was used to determine as closely as possible the percent of the total that was produced in each
The percent for each zone was multiplied by the price of the average grade (weighted by type) for each year, and the results were totaled. To get the undelivered price, the prices of zone 1 were decreased by 16 rubles and the prices in the
rubles each. These prices are therefore weighted by price zone and by type, and each should be a true average price for the average grade of cement produced in the USSR. It was Apcessary, however, to assume that the national average grade
price zone and also that the national complex of types was produced in each zone. The increase in price from 107 rubles per ton in 1950 to 123 rubles in 1965 is due primarily to the rising quality of cement.
d. The quantity data for precast concrete include prestressed concrete. The value data for precast concrete exclude the value of prestressed concrete.
e. Planned.
f. Estimated.
g. Production data in this category are residuals left after deducting construction brick, dimension and field stone, and large concrete and silicate wall blocks from total wall materials. For pricing purposes, this residual is assumed to consist of small
solid wall blocks of slag concrete.
h. For an explanation of prices and production data, see the methodology, Appendix B.
i. In 1959 and 1960, production was given in square meters, and in 1959 production in units also was given. The ratio in 1959 was applied to the total number of square
j. Planned to be 1.7 times the level of 1958.
k. Based on the weighted average price of 170 rubles per ton in 1958.
1. See the methodology, Appendix B.
in. For an explanation of the term value-added as used in this report with reference to the construction materials industry, see the methodology, Appendix B.
0 were not available, plan data were used. Except when reported data are used, production data are rounded
of the five price zones.
other zones by 20
was produced in each
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Table 6
Capital Expenditures Required to Increase Production Capacity
for Nine Construction Materials in the USSR
1959-65
Current Rubles per Unit of Capacity 12/
Material
Unit of Measure
Construction
of New
Plants
Expansion
of Existing
Plants
Modernization
and Intensification
of Production
Cement
Metric tons
280
210
100 to 120
Precast reinforced
concrete components
Cubic meters
425
275 to 300
150
Rock products
Cubic meters
55
k30 to 35
25)
Asbestos cement
Nes
shingle
Thousand standard units
455
360
Asbestos cement pipe
Standard kilometers
22,800
13,100
Lime
Metric tons
200
150
75 to 125
Construction gypsum
Metric tons
105
Dry gypsum plaster
board
Thousand square meters
1,185
800
Window glass
Square meters (2 mm thick)
890
720
a. 47/. Capital investments are calculated as averages for 1959-65 for each material, taking into
account the share of enterprises of the various types and capacities. The first two categories are
primarily determined according to project data, and the third category is determined on the basis of
actual data on fulfillment during 1955-60.
b. Ruble values in use before the Soviet currency reform of 1961.
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Table 7
Number of Plants Producing Selected Construction Materials
in the USSR a/
Number
Material Year of Plants
Cement mid-1962 86 12/
Precast concrete Mid-1962 2,500
Rock products (extraction and processing) End of 1961 Almost 4,000
Brick Late 1959 Above 6,500
Asbestos cement articles End of 1960 30
Flat glass Early 1961 24
Soft roofing 1958 57
Slag concrete blocks 1957 48o
Gypsum c/ End of 1958 85
Mineral wool insulation d/ Mid-1959 34
_
Estimated total number of plants e/ End of 1961 15,500
a. The numbers of plants are all given in or derived from published Soviet sources. There is some
duplication because some of these plants produce more than one material. However, some minor in-
stallations whose output is not included in national output statistics are excluded from this
table.
b. Including six plants that are grinding installations only.
c. RSFSR only.
d. Plants and shops.
e. This estimate includes quarries but not steel or lumber plants.
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APPENDIX B
METHODOLOGY
This appendix is concerned with the derivation of the calculated
index of the gross value of construction materials in the USSR and the
derivation of the calculated index of the value added in production as
well as with the method of determining the quantity and value of steel
and lumber in construction. The product of this methodology is con-
tained in Table 5.* The method of determining the preliminary figures
for 1961 also is explained. In addition, further details on comparisons
of construction materials indexes are given.
To obtain the index of the gross value of production of construc-
tion materials, production of each of the materials for every year and
a price in 1 July 1955 rubles were obtained. The sum of the products
of the quantity and price for each commodity for each year yielded the
total value of production. The index was constructed from the annual
totals. To obtain the value-added index, the value of four commodities
(cement, gypsum, rock products, and steel) that are utilized in other
construction materials was removed from each annual total, thus adjust-
ing for the double counting of products. The input of each of these
commodities was determined per unit of finished product and was multi-
plied by the average price of the input commodity (for inputs of cement
and gypsum). However, the rock products and steel inputs were priced
according to the type of each commodity being used in a product -- for
example, in a cubic meter of precast concrete, calculations indicated
that there was one-fourth of a cubic meter each of gravel and crushed
stone and one-third of a cubic meter of sand. The average price of the
inputs was determined on the basis of the weighted price of each of
these rock products. The average weight of steel reinforcement in both
precast and prestressed concrete was determined and was priced accord-
ing to the special types of steel used in each product. The total value
of the four commodities used in other construction materials was de-
ducted from the gross value of production in each year to obtain the
value added in production, and an index was constructed from the annual
results.
The quantity of lumber in construction was determined on the basis
of total lumber produced and of production of railroad ties converted
into cubic meters. Although not all of the lumber produced is used in
construction, the value of the round timber used in construction is
offset by the value of the nonconstruction uses of lumber, and the
trends in the values of the two were judged to be similar. The regional
* Appendix A, p. 27, above.
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production of lumber and ties in 1955 was determined and then was
priced, by region, to obtain the average weighted price for both
commodities. The average transportation charges were available and
were deducted from the average prices.
The total amount of steel used in construction (excluding rails
and pipe) was given for 1955 and was derived for 3 other years. The
derivations were based on the input of a given tonnage per million ru-
bles of construction-installation work (the total value of construction-
installation work in each year was known). It was found that the
quantities obtained accounted for almost identical percentages -- that
is, from 15.3 to 15.9 percent of all the finished steel produced -- so
that the use of steel in construction (excluding rails and pipe) was
estimated for the other years on the basis of 15.6 percent of the total
rolled steel. The annual use of rails in construction was assumed to
be the same as the annual production (production for 1965 was estimated).
Trunk oil and gas pipeline for each year was converted from kilometers
to tons. Local gas and oil pipeline was estimated for all years on the
basis of the ratio between local and mainline pipe given by a Soviet
source for 1959-65. The ratio between the calculated figure for trunk
and local pipeline in 1965 and a figure for the use of all pipe in con-
struction in 1965 was applied to all previous calculations to allow for
the other uses of steel pipe in construction. The tonnage for con-
struction steel, rails, and pipe for each year was totaled to obtain
steel used in construction.
The total value of all construction steel was determined on the
basis of type. Structural steel used in construction was derived for
2 years, and the plan was given for 1965. The use in the past 2 years
was almost identical, and it was assumed that the quantities used in
other years were almost the same. The steel used in prestressed con-
crete was obtained from a source that gave the per-unit usage, which was
multiplied by production of prestressed concrete in each year. The ex-
pected use of regular reinforcing steel was given for 1965. When this
figure was added to structural steel and to steel for prestressed concrete
and then compared with the total steel usage in construction in 1965, a
residual of 9.8 percent resulted, which was assumed to be the percentage
that miscellaneous steel was of the total during all years. Regular rein-
forcing steel was then derived for other years as the residual between
total construction steel (excluding rails and pipe) and structural,
prestressing, and miscellaneous steel. The price of each of the types
of steel was estimated, using price books, and the quantity of each
type of steel was multiplied by its average price to obtain the total
value of the steel used in construction in each year.
Preliminary 1961 figures for the increases in the gross and value-
added indexes of production of construction materials were based on an
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available sample of commodities,* LI-.Y accounting for 42.5 percent of
the gross value and 45.4 percent of the value added in 1960. The value
of these commodities, however, in relation to both totals has been in-
creasing each year since 1955, so that it was estimated that these com-
modities accounted for 44.5 percent of the gross value and 48.o percent
of the value added in 1961. On the basis of these assumptions the total
value for each category was calculated, and the indexes were computed.
The principal differences between the computed value-added index
of production of construction materials in the USSR (hereafter called
the USSR index) and the value-added index for the US, calculated by
the Federal Reserve Board (hereafter called the FRB index), were noted
in I, B.** The specific exclusions from each index, however, were not
enumerated and are noteworthy. The USSR index includes a more complete
coverage of wall materials (the .LIEB index includes only brick) and sani-
tary technical equipment and includes linoleum (not all of which is used
in construction), refractories, and insulation, which are omitted in the
1,RB index. Conversely, the FRB index includes a more complete coverage
of hardware and metal fixtures, vitreous and porcelain fixtures, and
abrasives and a better coverage of asphalt products, lumber and wood
products (including plywood), and paints. Plywood and paints have been
excluded in the USSR index because the major portions of these products
in the USSR are consumed in other than construction uses, whereas in
the US the major portions of these products are used in construction,
so that their inclusion in the US is valid while these commodities in
the USSR are better excluded.
In addition to the IIEB index, the US Department of Commerce calcu-
lates an index for the US, 49/ but this is a gross value index using
1947-49 prices. The FRB index increases at a more rapid rate and has
25 to 30 percent greater coverage, by value, of construction materials
produced in the US than does the Department of Commerce index. The
Department of Commerce index is limited in the number of commodities
covered because it requires monthly reports on a material to include
it in the index, while the teRB includes all materials for which there
is annual data. The FRB index is more comparable to the USSR index
because it has more complete coverage, is a value-added index and prob-
ably has a more comparable price base.
There also is another index of construction materials in the USSR
calculated in a project published by the Rand Corporation. 50/ This
* The seven commodities for which preliminary production figures
have been published are cement, precast concrete, construction brick,
large wall blocks, window glass, asbestos cement shingles, and soft
roofing.
** P. 5, above.
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index increases at a lower rate than the USSR index (covering a period
from 1927/28 to 1958) and differs from the latter index as follows:
1. The Rand index, as the title denotes, is a materials input
index of Soviet construction and therefore attempts to measure the
apparent consumption of materials in construction and not production
of construction materials.
2. The latest price base used in the Rand index is in July-
December 1950 prices. These prices are higher in general than the
1 July 1955 prices used in the USSR index and are not recent enough
to allow realistic pricing of the newer items in construction mate-
rials, which are increasing at a rapid rate.
3. As the Rand index was calculated at an earlier date, it
lacks reliable data for the later years that were not available at the
time of publication. The index was forced to rely on projections of
production and relationships that existed during the 1930's. Subse-
quent data have indicated that much of the estimating was inaccurate --
as, for example, in the case of rails and rock products.
4. The USSR index is based on a broader sample of materials --
as, for example, in 1958, when more than 20 percent of the value of ma-
terials included in the USSR index is not included in the Rand index
(the Rand index does include paints). This determination is consistent
with the Rand estimate that the index includes only 60 to 70 percent
of the value of all construction materials, whereas it is estimated that
the USSR index includes somewhat more than 90 percent. The items omitted
in the Rand index, in general, are ones in which production has been in-
creasing at above-average rates and include precast and prestressed con-
crete, a number of masonry wall materials, refractories, mineral wool
insulation, linoleum, wood fiber slabs, polished glass, gypsum wall
board, ceramic pipe, and wall tile. The omission of these items is the
primary reason for the lower rate of increase in the Rand index than
in the USSR index.
5. A small number of the materials in the USSR index include
the cost of transportation,* whereas the Rand index attempts to exclude
all transportation charges.
* See I, B, p. 5, above.
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APPENDIX C
SOURCE REFERENCES
1. USSR. Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1958 godu (The National
Economy of the USSR in 1958), Moscow, 1959, p. 650. (here-
after referred to as The National Economy of the USSR in 1958)
Stroitel'nyye materialy, no 1, Jan 59, p. 5.
USSR. Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1960 zodu (The National
Economy of the USSR in 1960), Moscow, 1961, p. 627. (here-
after referred to as The National Economy of the USSR in 1960)
2. The National Economy of the USSR in 1960 (1, above), p. 87, 217.
3. Congress of the US, 87th Congress, 2d Sess. Joint Economic
Committee. Industrial Production in the USSR, Oct 62.
(Unpublished.)
4. The National Economy of the USSR in 1960 (1, above), p. 591.
5. USSR. SSSR v tsifrakh v 1961 godu (The USSR in Figures in
1961), Moscow, 1962, p. 302. (hereafter referred to as The
USSR in Figures in 1961)
6. Pravda, 5 Aug 60, p. 1.
7. The National Economy of the USSR in 1958 (1, above), p. 140.
8. USSR. Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1959 zodu (The National
Economy of the USSR in 1959), Moscow, 1960, p. 147. (here-
after referred to as The National Economy of the USSR in 1959)
9. Pravda, 26 Jan 61, p. 1.
10. Ekonomicheskaya gazeta, 14 Aug 6o, p. 2.
11. The National Economy of the USSR in 1960 (1, above), p. 226.
12. Pravda, 23 Jan 62, p. 1.
13. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Industrial
Production, 1959 Revision, Jul 60, p. S 44.
Ibid., Federal Reserve Bulletin, Aug 6o, p. 916.
Ibid., May 62, p. 631.
14. Stroitel'naya_gazeta, 23 Mar 56, p. 2.
Ibid., 9 Dec 60, p. 1.
Stroitel'nyye materialy, no 10, Oct 57, p. 6.
The National Economy of the USSR in 1960 (1, above), p. 305.
15. The National Economy of the USSR in 1958 (1, above), p. 64.
Stroitel'naya gazeta, 5 Mar 61, p. 1.
16. Loginov, Z.I. Tsementnaya promyshlennost' SSSR i perspektivy
yeye razvitiya (The Cement Industry of the USSR and Prospects
for Its Growth), Moscow, 1960, p. 57.
Ekonomicheskaya gazeta, 23 Sep 60, p. 2.
Stroitel'naya gazeta, 13 Oct 61, p. 1.
17. Ekonomicheskaya gazeta, 6 Jan 61, p. 1.
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Stroitel'naya gazeta, 15 Mar 61, p. 1.
18. Stroitel'naya gazeta, 26 Feb 61, p. 2.
Ibid., 3 Jun 62, p. 3.
Tsement, no 5, Sep-Oct 61, p. 4.
19. Stroitel'naya gazeta, 5 Mar 61, p. 1.
Stroitel'nyye materialy, no 5, May 61, p. 39.
20. Loginov, op. cit. (16, above), p. 65.
21. Ibid., p.162.
22. Lur'ye, Yu.S. Portlandtsement (Portland Cement), Moscow,
1959, P. 5.
23. Loginov, op. cit. (16, above), p. 142.
JPRS. 17B-N,27 Jul 59, p. 41.
24. JPRS. 14,479, 16 Jul 62, p. 10.
25. Tsement, no 1, Jan-Feb 59, p. 27.
Stroitel'naya gazeta, 28 May 58, p. 2.
Stroitel'nyye materialy, no 1, Jan 62, p. 2.
26. Stroitel'nyye materialy, no 10, Oct 57, p. 8.
The National Economy of the USSR in 1960 (1, above), p. 212, 318.
Pravda, 28 Oct 59, p. 2.
Zhilishchnoye stroitel'stvo, no 10, Oct 60, p. 24.
27. Krimski, N. Precast Concrete in the Soviet Union, Moscow,
1958, p. 23.
Stroiternaya gazeta, 4 Jun 58, p. 3.
Beton i zhelezobeton, no 7, Jul 59, p. 292.
28. Beton i zhelezobeton, no 9, Sep 58, p. 321.
The National Economy of the USSR in 1960 (11 above), p. 318.
JPRS. 2740, 1 Jun 60, p. 7.
29. JPES. 2911, 1 Jul 6o, p. 12.
30. The National Economy of the USSR in 1960 (1, above), p. 318.
Beton i zhelezobeton, no 10, Oct 58, p. 361.
Ibid., no 7, Jul 60, p. 293.
JPRS. 1642-N, 8 Jun 59, p. 20.
Stroitel'naya gazeta, 22 Jun 60, p. 1.
31. Stroitel'nyye materialy, no 5, May 58, p. 9.
32. JPRS. 1642-N, 8 Jun 59, p. 1.
33. JPRS. 11343, 7 Dec 61, p. 1.
34. USSR. Vsesoyuznoye soveshchaniye po stroitel'stvu, 10-12
aprelya 1958 g; sektsiya stroitel'nykh materialov (The All-
Union Conference for Construction, 10-12 April 1958; Section
on Construction Materials), Moscow, 1958, p. 133. (hereafter
referred to as The All-Union Conference for Construction)
35. Ibid., p. 134.
Stroitel'nyye materialy, no 3, Mar 62, p. 3.
36. The All-Union Conference for Construction (34, above), p. 147.
37. JPRS. 5734, 1 Oct 60, p. 23.
38. Ibid., p. 21, 22.
Beton i zhelezobeton, no 7, Jul 60, p. 338.
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39. The All-Union Conference for Construction (34, above), p. 379.
40. Izvestiya akademii stroitel'stva i arkhitektury SSSR, no 2,
Apr-Jun 61, p. 61.
The All-Union Conference for Construction (34, above), p. 185.
41. Ibid., p. 381.
Stroitel'nyye materialy, no 5; May 58, p. 21.
Novaya tekhnika v stroitel'stvel no 2, Feb 59, p. 19.
JPRS. 1923-N, 6 Oct 59, p. 20-24.
42. JPRS. 1781-N, 27 Jul 59, p. 30.
JPRS. 1923-N, 6 Oct 59, p. 22.
43. The All-Union Conference for Construction (34, above), p. 232.
Byulleten' stroitel'noy tekhniki, no 7, Jul 59, p. 26.
44. The National Economy of the USSR in 1958 (1, above), p. 259-271.
The National Economy of the USSR in 1959 (8, above), p. 231-244.
The National Economy of the USSR in 1960 (1, above), p. 305-319.
45. USSR. Spravochnik tsen na stroitellnyye materialy i oborudo-
vaniye (Handbook of Prices on Construction Materials and Equip-
ment), pts I, III, Moscow, 1956.
46. Ibid., p. 42-45.
47. Stroitel'nyye materialy, no 1, Jan 62, p. 4.
48. The USSR in Figures (5, above), p. 126, 127.
49. Commerce, Business and Defense Services Administration. Con-
struction Materials Statistics, 1947-57, 1959, p. 2.
Ibid., Construction Review. Published monthly.
50. RAND Corporation. RM-1872, A Materials-Input Index of Soviet
Construction, 1927/28 to 1955, pt I, by Raymond P. Powell,
14 Feb 57.
Ibid., RM-1873, A Materials-Input Index of Soviet Construction,
1927/28 to 1955, pt II, Appendixes, by Raymond P. Powell,
? 14 Feb 57.
Ibid., RM-2454, A Materials-Input Index of Soviet Construction,
Revised and Extended, by Raymond P. Powell, 28 Sep 59.
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