WEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070036-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: December 20, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Weekly Review
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establish a "correcting mechanism" that would
determine each member's share of the community.,.,.
budget.
1S
lA~' ' :v
The left wing of the Labor Party, the chief
repository of anti-market sentiment in Britain,
has been slow to react to the conference outcome
and seems uncertain of the line it should pursue.
Anti-marketeers are unlikely to be dissuaded,
however, and relent in their campaign against
continued British membership.'
Privately, however, British officials are
Wilson has charted a strategy of trying to pleased with the summit. The press has also re-
reassure Britain's partners in Europe and the sup- acted optimistically and has suggested that, al-
porters of the EC at home without arousing left- though minor obstacles still exist, renegotiation is
wing Laborite A week before the summit, he no longer a major problem.
endorsed continued membership if renegotiations
are successful. He forced the leftists into a defen-
sive position by claiming that his conditional en- Reaction from the left wing of the Labor
dorsement was consistent with official party doc- Party, temporarily outmaneuvered by Wilson's
trine. To support his case, Wilson cited the rene- tactics, has been subdued. The parliamentary de-
gotiation statement in Labor's election manifes- bate on the summit was low key, highlighted by
to-listing the terms necessary to ensure Britain's Wilson's statement implying that the government
continued membe?.-ship-even though it was origi- would not be bound by any decision from a
nally drafted as an anti-market measure. special Labor Party conference on the EC issue. If
for no other reason than to keep the issue alive
Wilson has nevertheless struggled to avoid until the referendum is held, the anti-marketeers
alienating EC opponents within the Labor Party. are likely to insist that Wilson's conditional en-
At the EC summit meeting last week, he made a dorsement of membership misrepresents party
well-publicized show of toughness-especially to- policy. Even if the EC partners meet most of
ward the French-which was probably designed to Britain's terms for renegotiation, anti-marketeers
contradict claims that he has been too , rnpliant are still likely to try to, exploit the fears of many
toward the other EC governments. In a; apparent Britons that the government will surrender much
effort to keep anti-market skeptics in 1's.,e, govern- of its sovereignty to the European Communities,
ment leaders have played down the concessions despite specific government reservations about
;-ained at the summit. In their public statements, the political role of the EC. Opponents of the EC
both Wilson and Foreign Secretary Callaghan are may be counting on this issue to swing the refer-
taking the line that some progress has been made, endum vote aoa*n-;t cnntinij 0_r,__7 ember-
but that renegotiation has a long way to go. ship. 25X1
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The deteriorating economic situation in
many NATO countries was very much on the
mind of the ministers. Although they took note
of a number of scheduled improvements in mili-
tary equipment as well as a 4 percent real increase
in West European defense budgets in 1974, they
recognized that inflation and escalating costs
could seriously weaken Western defense programs
in the future. The ministers heard reports from
several countries in which this has already begun
to occur, notably Britain, Italy, and the Nether-
lands. Britain's defense cutbacks came in for very
little specific criticism, however, since most of the
other allies seem relieved that the cuts leave
London's NATO commitment largely intact. The
allies are nevertheless uneasy that some of the
announced British moves may adversely affect the
security of NATO's northern and southern flanks.
In searching for ways to deal with the prob-
lem of rising defense costs, virtually all of the
ministers supported increased standardization of
weapons and specialization of military tasks in
NATO. Few, however, were inclined to go much
beyond the studies NATO is already condu-ting
of areas in which this "rationalization" might be
beneficial.
The defense ministers endorsed the US pro-
posal that NATO force plannir,g be oriented to a
"long-range defense concept." Several of the min-
isters insisted, however, that all three elements of
the NATO strat-gy of flexible response-strategic,
tactical nuclear, and conventional-be given equal
emphasis in the long-range concept. They had felt
that an earlier US draft put too much emphasis
on conventional forces.
The ministers spent much of their time on
East-West issues. The discussion of the Vienna
force reduction negotiations revealed the frustra-
tions of many West European governments caught
between domestic pressures for reducing defense
spending and the lack of progress at the talks. The
Most of the force reductions discussion
focused on a possible offer by the West to reduce
tactical nuclear weapons in the context of the
ienna talks. Several foreign ministers agreed
with Secretary Kissinger that perhaps it would
not be a good idea to introduce such a nuclear
element so soon after the Vladivostok agreement
on SALT principles, but some thought that
NATO should begin studying the matter so as to
be ready when the time seemed right.
When the ministers discussed the European
security conference, the French came in for some
thinly veiled criticism. Although Paris has been
claiming that the Brezhnev-Giscard communique
only gave conditional approval to concluding the
conference at summit level, many other NATO
members feel that Paris has gone further toward
putting its stamp of approval on a summit than
most of them are prepared to go. Several min-
isters made the case that allied unity was large;y
responsible for whatever progress had been made
so far and that the French should not jeopardize
chances of obtaining future Soviet concessions.
Greece's future relationship with NATO was
not addressed directly, although this question will
have to be dealt with now that the Greeks have
formally requested discussions regarding the with-
drawal of the Greek armed forces from the al-
liance's integrated military structure. There was a
good deal of talk about the need for a settlement
in Cyprus, however, and for stabilization in the
Middle East generally. Several ministers pointed
with concern to the growing Soviet naval strength
in the Mediterranean.
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Few blueprints for action emerged last week
from NATO's ministerial discussions in Brussels,
but many of the defense and foreign ministers
were pleased by the depth and `rankness of the
exchanges and the wide range of subjects covered.
Belgian, Dutch, and Canadian foreign ministers
favored re-examining the Western negotiating
position. The Belgian foreign minister said that
his government was firding it difficult to reject
out of hand the recent Soviet proposal to freeze
forces in central Europe for the duration of the
negotiations. Brussels does not think such a freeze
would have an adverse impact on agreements to
Le reached later in Vienna.
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Turkey is now entering its fourth month
with only a caretaker government at the helm,
and there are no immediate prospects for a break
in the political stalemate. Amid signs of growing
dissatisfaction within the military over the bicker-
ing among civilian political leaders, Justice Party
leader Demirel has renewed his efforts to form a
center-right coalition. Armed forces leaders are
reluctant to become embroiled in strictly political
matters, but if the Demirel effort falls short and
no other alternative is immediately available,
prospects for some ty!:)e of military involvement
will rapidly increase.
The caretaker Irmak government has coordi-
nated its Cyprus policy with the major political
parties. Despite the general consensus, there is
widespread doubt that a caretake,' government
can take any new initiatives to help move the
Cyprus problem toward a settlement. Now that
Turkey has been given a reprieve until February 5
on the cut-off of US military assistance, there is
likely to be increased pressure on civilian politi?'
cians to form a government that can make sub-
stantial progress on Cyprt!s and avoid the halt in
aid.
There is a growing sentiment in the armed
forces, particularly among junior officers, that the
military will have to force a solution on the
politicians. This sentiment does not favor a direct
military take-over, but rather the installation of
former prime minister Ecevit at the head of a
minority or coalition government to lead the na-
tion into new elections. Ecevit's performance
through the Cyprus conflict reportedly has con-
vinced the military that he is the politician most
capable of dealing with Turkey's pressing prob-
lems.
The armed forces could, however, accept
Justice Party leader Demirel if his current efforts
to form a center-right coalition are successful. So
far, Demirel has been pledged 218 votes in the
national assembly, only six short of an absolute
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majority. He will have difficulty picking up the
remainder, however, as the Democratic Party has
already rejected his offer to join in an "anti-left
coalition" that would exclude Ecevit's Republi-
can People's Party. Democratic leader Bozbeyli
has charged that Demirel is now trying to split the
Democrats in order to obtain a majority.
If Demirel's effort has not succeeded by the
time the Turkish holiday period begins on Decem-
ber 23, he may well give it up, claiming that at
least he has made a serious effort. Ecevit has
come out of the Republican People's Party con-
gress with a strengthened hand and might make
yet another efforrt to form a government after
the holiday period ends in early January. F_
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FRANCE: CHIRAC'S POWER PLAY
French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac's
abrupt take-o-nr of the Gaullist Party last week,
end was a power play that has brought simmering
divisions within the party to a boil. In the long
run, however, it could strengthen the ailing move-
mer, i.
The party bosses or "barons," who domi-
nated the movement under De Gaulle and Pom-
pidou, were caught off balance by the speed of
Chirac's move. Most of them vehemently opposed
his election and, unless he can win their support,
the party may split at the national congress sched-
uled for late February.
Chirac has been considered an opportunist
and a traitor by orthodox Gaullists since he de-
serted the party candidate, Chaban-Delmas, for
Giscard prior to the first round of the presidential
election last May. Chirac has gradually consoli-
dated his position in the party and el. idently feels
he is now strong enough to make his move.
During the next two months, the baron: will
have to decide if they should swallow their pride
and work with Chirac to restore the party's lost
prestige and influence. Their alternative is to try
to bring about his removal from the government-
if they could undermine his support within the
party, his usefulness to President Giscard would
be limited-but they would risk splintering the
Gaullist movement in the process.
Acceptance by the barons of Chirac's leader-
ship would put the party firmly under the prime
minister's thumb. Even it the barons oppose him,
however, Chirac will probably emerge in control
of a leaner, more' unified party. Chirac has the
support of an erit'iusiastic majority of the Gaullist
National Council-they gave him a standing ova-
tion last Sunday-and as prime minister he con-
trols important financial resources. Gaullist funds
have been drying up since Giscard's election cut
off the flow of government money into party
coffers. Chirac reportedly used the prospect of
partial restoration of financial support to ensure
his election as secretary general last weekend.
Moreover, by assuming the le;~rlership, Chirac has
apparently isolated the barons from the party
apparatus. His chances of consolidating his con-
trol over the Gaullists appear good, and the day
of the barons may be over.
'Giscard's attitude to the coup is unknown,
but he was consulted by Chirac and presumably
gave him the green light. Giscard, who has re-
cently been leaning over backward to placate the
Gaullists, may feel that he will be in a stronger
position to implement his policies with the
Gaullists firmly under Chirac's control. There is
some speculation that Chirac's take-over rep-
resents an interim step toward "Giscardizat on"
of the Gaullist Party, but the move also serves
Chirac's own personal ambitions.
Stronger representation in the cabinet could
increase Gaullist influence on Giscard's policy,
at the same time it could give the President more
latitude to cooperate with the US. Although the
Gaullists do not trust Giscard-the barons call him
"Giscariot" because he turned against De Gaulle
in the crucial 1969 referendum-and are espe-
cially wary of his reputed "Atlanticism," they
might oe more flexible if they felt they had some
control over his policies.
Chirac's act;on last weekend may have been
triggered by efforts to undermine his position in
the party. Recently, disaffected Gaullists have
been wooed by former foreign minister Michel
Jobert. Jober has never been a member of the
movement, but his appeal to nationalism closely
mirrors that of De Gaulle. He has organized a
movement of his own -,,0ich is gaining support
from many Gaullists.
Prior to Chirac's power play, there were per-
sistent rumors of a comeback by the Gaullist
barons-Chaban-Delmas, Maurice Couve de
Murville, Michel Debre, and Olivier Guichard.
Guichard in particular was touted as the man who
could lead the Gauliists out of the wilderness.
Unless the barons can unseat Chirac in the next
two or three months, which is unlikely, Guichard
is probably the only one with a political future. If
he can reach an accommodation with Chirac. he
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VENEZUELA: AN EMERGING POWER
Benefiting from massive oil revenues and
under the ambitious leadership of President
Carlos Andres Perez, Venezuela is extending its
economic and political influence in regional af-
fairs and has arrogated to itself a role as leader of
the less-developed countries.
One of the major goals of the Perez adminis-
tration is a summit meeting in Caracas of all Latin
American chiefs of state-including Fidel
Castro-in mid-1975. Within the past two weeks,
Perez has garnered significant backing, including
support from the seven nations officially re-
presented at the Ayacucho anniversary celebra-
tions in Lima and from the Central American
chiefs of state who met with him last weekend. A
meeting of Caribbean leaders tentatively sched-
uled for January in Caracas is expected to lend
additional support for Pe' :;z' proposal.
An agenda has not yet been circulated, but
official Venezuelan statements indicate that Perez
intends to focus on at least three main areas of
interest to Latin Americans:
? restructuring the OAS;
? establishing a permanent forum where
Latin leaders meet and discuss Latin Amer-
ican problems;
? arranging for Latin raw material produc-
ers to be guaranteed a fair price for their
experts and access to foreign technology.
Perez disclaims any personal intention to
assume a role of leadership in Latin America, but
Leaders of Venezuela and Central America
Venezuelan leaders privately are pleased with the
new-found source -if power and influence that
their massive oil revenues are bringing. To further
strengthen Perez' position, Venezuela is expand-
ing its political and economic influence in the
'Caribbean littoral with investments, loans, and a
multimillion-dollar aid fund for Central America.
Further, Caracas has indicated that similar oil-aid
programs could be extended to larger Latin coun-
tries.
Perez has also pledged Venezuelan financial
assistance for the less-developed Caribbean islands
that are vital to Venezuela's security and attrac-
tive in terms of economic potential. Last May,
Venezuela announced its intention to set up a
$25-million trust fund within the Caribbean
Development Bank to be used specifically for
"regional integration." In August, Perez gave an
interest-free loan of $15.7 million to Guyana for
budget stabilization.
He recently offered the Associated States
and Grenada $10-million to buy and operate the
bankrupt Leeward Islands Air Transport System,
the vital, short-haul inter-island carrier. Perez
probably knows that neither this nor the loan to
Guyana is likely to be repaid. Other pending deals
are a possible loan to the Dominican Republic so
that it could purchase the, country's one oil
refinery, and a joint merchant-fleet venture with
Trinidad.'
Cuba has not been overlooked in all this
activity. Perez believes his country is no longer
bound by OAS economic and political sanctions
directed against the island, and he has indicated
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he will resume diplornatic relations "when it is
convenient." In a startling reversal of position,
the governing Democratic Action Party and its
elder statesman, former president Romulo Betan-
court, have given their approval to Perez' efforts
to re-esteiblish relations with Cuba. In Lima, Perez
personally invited Fidel Castro to his summit
meeting next year; press reports claim Raul Roa,
on Castro's behalf, invited Perez to visit Cuba in
January to coincide with his proposed trips to
Mexico arid Central America.
The local press has covered Perez' activities
to th-i virtual exclusion of the opposition political
parties, which are still in considerable disarray
more than a year after the elections. Support for
Perez cuts across party lines and reflects the gen-
eral public enthusiasm for his flamboyant style
and his policies. For 1975, Perez is carefully pre-
paring a full round of activities that will keep him
in the limelinht. These include several projected
trips outside the country.
The emergence of the Venezuelan President
as a major leader in Latin America will not be
viewed indifferently by othe ' ?afi:-i powers. They
already see Venezuela's new? ::i,d wealth and
ambitious leadership as a challe, a to their tradi-
tional spheres of influence. Neva heless, more is
likely to follow, as Perez will probably use the
traditional New Year's Day address to the nation
to provide further details of the foreign policy
objectives of his government during the rominn
BOLIVIA: ACCESS TO THE SEA
President Banzer is claiming that he scored a
major diplomatic triumph at the meeting of Latin
American leaders in Lima iast week when he got
Chile and Peru to focus on Bolivia's land-locked
status. Government propaganda has taken up his
line, calling a paragraph in the "Declaration of
Ayacucho" on Bolivia's lack of an outlrt to the
sea 'a major fo: aign policy achievement.
The "Declaration" only recognizes Bolivia's
right to pursue the issue, however, and does not
commit either Chile or Peru to support Banzer's
goal of regaining the outlet to the sea his country
lost during the War of the Pacifli- in 1881. Bolivia
is allowed to use the ports of Arica in Chile arid
Materani in Peru, but Banzer finds this arrange-
ment unsatisfactory because of Chilean and
Peruvian tariff charges on Bolivian imports.
Traffic congestion in the Peruvian port is also a
problem.
Banzer's chances of obtaining a major con-
cession on an outlet to the sea at this time are
slight because, in spite of the "Declaration,"
tensions between Chile and Peru prevent either
country from making a special deal with Bolivia.
The issue is an emotional one in Bolivia, however,
and may temporarily bolster his sagging popular-
ity. Although Banzer has recently strengthened
his dictatorial control over the country, and still
retains military backing for his policies, his sup-
ing the past year.
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LATIN AMERICA: TIES WITH EC
The EC is seeking to expand its formal ties
with Latin America, now limited to trade pacts
with Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil. The Latin
Americans themselves have been pressing for
years for more attention from the EC, which only
recently ha; begun to look beyond its African
associates to other underdeveloped areas.
The EC Commission has begun negotiations
with Mexico on a new type of non-preferential
agreement intended to serve as model for other
Latin American countries. Mexico had requested
an agreement with the EC covering commercial,
financial, investment, industrial, and technical co-
operation. Lacking the legal standing and com-
petence to negotiate such a broad agreement, the
commission has proposed a commercial agr. e-
ment that establishes a mixed committee whose
jurisdiction over trade matters would gradually be
extended as the EC achieves unified policies in
other areas. The community has meanwhile ex-
tended its existing bilateral trade agreement with
Argentina for one year in order to allow time to
negotiate a broader arrangement along the lines of
the Mexican model.
Relations with Latin America have been hurt
by serious community restrictions on Latin
American exports. Last June, the EC unilaterally
imposed a ban on meat imports that has resulted
in a loss of more than $100 million for Latin
America. Community Larriers to imports of
wheat, coffee, and bananas have also led to Latin
American demands for a more stable trade rela-
tionship as well as guaranteed access for some
exports.
The Latin Americans have always been wor-
ried by the trading preferences granted by the EC
to its associates in Africa. Expansion of such
preferences to other African, Mediterranean, and
Commonwealth countries has reinforced Latin
American fears of exclusion from EC markets. If
the Latin Americans do not gain equal access to
community markets, their export opportunities
will be restricted to the Western Hemisphere,
resulting in continued trade dependence on the
US.
The EC now acknov ledges that there is little
it can c'o to ease the beef problem for the Latin
Americans or to give them equality-in community
markets with other developing countries that now
enjoy associate status. As a result, the EC has
been concentrating on trade promotion measures
to increase Latin American sales in Europe. Sev-
eral new promotional activities were discussed in
Brussels at the latest semi-annual meeting of Latin
American ambassadors and the permanent EC
representatives of the Nine. The EC also pledged
at the ambassadorial meeting to continue its de-
velopment cooperation activities, to provide im-
proved trade opportunities through the corn-
munity's system of generalized irade preferences,
and to su American regional integra-
.-
tio
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CHILE: COURTING THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS
A decree was issued on December 17
elevating General Pinochet from the presidency of
the military junta to the constitutional presidency
of the nation. The move is not only the culmina-
tion of his growing personal power, but may also
be an effort to de-emphasize military rule in an
appeal to the Christian Democratic Party.
Since taking power in September 1973, the
military government has tried repeatedly to coax
Christian Democrats to join the administration,
because this would do more than anything else to
enhance the government's legitimacy. Much of
the Christian Democrats' distaste for the regime
and some of its policies have been lost on Pinochet,
who apparently views the ,.?-oblem as one of form
more than substance. By assuming a more con-
stitutional posture, Pinochet may hope to give the
Christian Democrats a face-saving entry into the
government if his effort to win their acceptance
proves successful.
The timing of Pinochet's nod to constitu.
tionality is interesting, as the Christian Democrats
appear to have emerged unscathed from their
most recent clash with the government. Last
week, just days after left-wing party leader Renan
Fuentealba was expelled from the country for
engaging in political activity, Interior Minister
Benavides met with party president Patricio
Aylwin and vice president Osvaldo Olguin.
Benavides reportedly expressed the government"s
concern over its poor relations with the party and
asked how the situation, could be improved.
.Aylwin and Olguin suggested that an improve-
ment in relations could begin only after Fuen-
tealba is allowed to return and Claudio Huepe,
another left-wing party leader, is released from
detention. They also pointed to an anti - Christian
Democratic campaign within the government's
right wing as a major source of friction.' Un-
ruffled, Benavides asked the Christian Democrats
to prepare a memorandum outlining their differ-
ences, and went on to request once again the
party's help in improving the government's image
abroad.
There can be no question that Pinochet
would prize the effect, both domestically and
internationally, of Christian Democratic partici-
pation in the government. It also appears evident
that he is prepared to make some concessions to
win them over-as well as to accomplish as much
image polishing as possible without them. It
remains doubtful, however, that Pinuchet ap-
preciates the full extent of the Christian Dem-
ocrats' estrangement. The human rights issue,
which is probably the party's underlying basic
concern, is obviously v'ewed with much less
urgency by the government. On economic policy,
a considerable liberalization of government
programs would be required to meet the Christian
Democrats even half-way.
Pinochet would probably find that the
easiest concession to make would be to mute
anti-party polemics within the government and
military hierarchies. Having become president, he
could also quite easily suggest the possibility of
elections, perhaps at the local level. Whether such
a modified approach would suffice to draw the
Christian Democrats closer is an open question,
but their decision at such a juncture could only
be made after intra-party soul-searching, possibly
resulting in the alienation of
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OPEC: HIGHER REVENUES
OPEC oil ministers concluded their meeting
on December 13 with a communique that was
deliberately vague. The meeting's only apparent
substantive result was the adoption of a new
pricing system. Under this system, the govern-
ment take will be $10.12 per barrel for the light
Saudi crude that serves as a benchmark for all
OPEC oil prices. This take represents an increase
of 38 cents or 3.9 percent above the level estab-
Iishad by OPEC for the fourth quarter of 1974.
The revenue levels are effective for nine months
beginning January 1. If all members apply this
measure uniformly, the consumers' oil import bill
for that period will increase by about $3 billion.
Some non - Persian Gulf OPEC members
may not hike their revenues by the full 38 cents.
The African members, who already receive over
$11 per barrel, are encountering heavy consumer
resistance. Faced with declining production, the
African producers may use the elimination of the
posted-price system to establish more competitive
prices. Venezuela, on the other hand, is likely to
demand an increase of more than 38 cents per
barrel.
Iranian Minister of Interior Amouzegar says
that the benchmark price for sales of govern-
ment-owned oil to third parties will be $10.46 per
barrel. Competition presumably would force the
producing companies to adopt the same price.
According to Amouzegar's figures, company prof-
its would amount to 22 cents a barrel after sub-
tracting government revenues ($10.12) and pro-
duction costs (12 cents). The companies maintain
that production costs will be close to 23 cents a
barrel in 1975, reducing profits to a meager 11
cent-, a barrel. Amouzegar's arithmetic-which
apparently applies to Iran plus other countries
that obtain 100 percent ownership of their in-
dustries next year-has not been confirmed by
OPEC officials or by other oil minister3.
The important issues of production cuts and
the linking of oil prices to inflation in the indus-
trial countries have been put aside for future
discussion. These issues, as well as consumer reac-
tion to the new prices, are likely to be discussed
at a meeting of oil and foreign ministers to be
held in Algiers on January 24.
In administrative matters, the OPEC minis-
ters appointed Chief M. O. Feyide of Nigeria as
secretary general effective January 1. Chief Fey.,
ide will replace Dr. Abderrahman Khene of Alge-
ria, who held the office for two years. The next
ordinary meeting of OPEC is
9 1975 in Libreville Gabon.
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RHODESIA: HARD BARGAINING AHEAD
Prime Minister Smith has taken the first step
toward implementing his truce agreement with
Rhodesian insurgents by allowing long-imprisoned
rebel leaders to resume political activity in
Rhodesia. The first round of public statements by
both sides, however, shows that Smith and the
insurgents are not yet ready to compromise on
the c1tical issue of how a transition to majority
rule '.an be accomplished. In fact, no agreement
has even been reached on when settlement talks
can begin or where they will be held.
Late last week, Joshua Nkomo, head of the
Zimbabwe African Peoples Union, and Ndaba-
ningi Sithole, head of the Zimbabwe African Na-
ti anal Union, appeared together in Salisbury after
returning from Lusaka, Zambia. They had made
the trip to meet with exiled Rhodesian insurgents
and try to formulate a common bargaining posi-
tion for dealing with Smith. The public appear-
ance of the two leaders, their first in a decade,
followed Smith's announcement that he was
releasing all black nationalists under detention in
Rhodesia in return for a cease-fire agreement.
Nkomo and Sithole were accompanied by
Bishop Muzorewa, head of the pion-insurgent
African National Council, the only nationalist
group Smith has allowed to function openly in
Rhodesia. In a joint statement, the three leaders
confirmed that Nkomo and Sit`iole had agreed to
merge their organizations wit'i the African Na-
tional Council under Muzorewa's chairmanship,
and that they would implemei t a cease-fire as
soon as Smith agreed to a date for a constitu-
tional conference. Muzorewa subsequently
implied tha` guerrilla operations were already
being suspended in anticipation of an early release
of all political detainees, numberino about 400.
Early this week, Rhodesian government officials
said that some 200 detainees were being released
immediately.
It is not yet clear, however, whether the
cease-fire will be hor;ored by the exiled nation.
alists who have been directing guerrilla operations
inside Rhodesia since late 1972 fron, bases in
Zambia. During the Lusaka talks, Herbert
Chitepo, head of the Zimbabwe African National
Union's guerrilla base in Zambia, opposed accept-
ing a cease-fire until Smith had guaranteed an
early transition to majority rule. Chitepo argued
against giving up the tactical advantages gained by
his group-wh;ch has fielded most of the guerril-
las-and stated that the insurgency was the key
factor in forcing Smith to make concessions.
Although Sithole, Nkomo, and Muzorewa
appear more open to compromise than Chitepo,
their joint statement [as' week asserted that a
constitutional settlement must provide for an
early transition to majority rule. Smith said in a
subsequent radio interview, however, that he was
opposed to any franchise that might result in
majority rule within five years.
Smith is probably asserting a hard-line posi-
tion in order to convince white Rhodesians that
any concessions he makes in the course of a
constitutional conference will be unavoidable.
Smith is fearful that allowing the long-imprisoned
nationalist leaders to resume public appeals for
early majority rule may arouse such expectations
among black Rhodesians that a prolonged impasse
in settlement negotiations could bring about
popular demonstrations and possibly provoke
civil disorders.
Smith's security forces depend on a limited
pool of white reservists. Without substantial
external support, they could have difficulty
coping with extensive rioting or a resumption of
guerrilla activity. South African Prime Minister
Vorster announced last week that the 1,400
South African police who have been serving in
Rhodesia will be withdrawn as soon as terrorism
actually ceases. Vorster apparently is warning the
white Rhodesians that South Africa will not back
them in any die-hard resistanc aiority
rule. 25X1
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LIBYA SEEKS NUCLEAR CAPABILITY
Libya is receiving help from a number of
countries in the development of a nuclear pro-
gram. Although the facilities Tripoli is seeking can
be used for peaceful purposes, their acquisition
would be a small first step toward President
Qadhafi's ultimate goal of achieving a nuclear
warfare capability.
Tripoli has turned to France and Sweden for
assistance in setting up a nuclear research center.
A French firm reportedly has accepted a $30-
million contract for work on the center that may
include construction of a research reactor with
enriched uranium fuel and associated research
facilities. Two government-controlled Swedish
companies have also expressed willingness to help
with the center and to provide training to Libyan
nationals.
Tripoli has awarded a West German firm a
contract for a heavy water production plant that
is presumably intended to supply heavy water for
use in a natural uranium reactor. US officials have
attempted to learn the details of the contract
from the West German ambassador, but he claims
to know nothing about the transaction.
These arrangements do not take Libya much
beyond the planning and research stages, and
Libya's bureaucratic confusion and lack of
indigenous talent will retard its efforts to develop
a nuclear capability. Nevertheless, Qadhafi is
det:rmiried and has the financial means to buy
further advances.
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