IMAGERY ANALYSIS MONTHLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01184A000200580001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Top Secret
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Top Secret
Imagery Analysis
Monthly Review
May 1979
Copy ~~_ ? 1
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Foreign
Assessment
Center
Imagery Analysis
Monthly Review
April 1979
The information and judgments presented in this publication were
derived principally from analysis of imagery. Although information
from other sources of intelligence may be included for background,
this publication does not reflect an all-source assessment and has
not been formally coordinated within CIA. (U)
Comments and queries on the contents of this publication.are welcomed.
They should be directed to the analyst whose name and green line extension
appear after each article. (in
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Top Secret
Imagery Analysis Monthly Review
Contents
SS-20 Force Deployment to be Completed Prior to 1985 (TSR) ................................................ 2
Imagery-based projections indicate that if the Soviets complete a 30-base
SS-20 IRBM force composed of 270 transporter-erector-launchers (TELs)
it will probably occur prior to 1985. (TSR)
Construction Status of the Missile Scrvice Tower at Songlin Missile Test Center (TSR) .............. 9
Photo coverage of the Songlin Missile Test Center during April 1979 shows
that construction has resumed on a missile service tower which will probably
be used for communications satellite launches. (TSR)
Impact of Imported Technology on the Soviet Ammonia Industry (U) ......................................... 4
Imagery analysis indicates that the Soviets will surpass the US as the world
leader in ammonia production capacity by 1980. (S)
Firs[ Deployment of New Soviet Towed Artillery Weapon (TSR) .............................................. 7
Analysis of recent imagery of Tomichi in the Far East Military District
revealed the first known deployment of a new Soviet large-caliber towed
artillery piece. (TSR)
New OIA Publications ............................................ ...........13
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Too Secret
SS-20 Force Deployments to be Completed Prior to 1985 (TSR)
Imagery-based projections indicate that if the Soviets complete a
30-base SS-20 IRBP,~ force composed of 270 transporter-erector-launchers
(TELs), it will probably occur prior to 1985. A 270-TEL force represents
about the midpoint of the Intelligence Community's projection that the
Soviets will deploy 250 to 300 TELs. The projected completion date is
based on the current production rate for one of the system's critical
components--the sliding-roof building (SRB), each of which houses one
SS-20 TEL--and on the annual support base construction rate. (TSR)
Components for 54 SRBs are being produced annually at the Bryansk
Guided T4issile Support Equipment Plant II and the support base construc-
tion rate is currently six new starts per year. Each base has nine SRBs.
A sufficient number of buildings will have been produced and new bases
started by the fall of 1981 to complete a 30-base force. At the current
rate of construction, at least three additional years are required after
completion of the SRBs before construction of the bases is complete. Thus,
for a 30-base force, SS-20 deployment should be complete by late 1984. (TSR)
(TOP SECRET RUFF)
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Impact of Imported Technology on the Soviet Ammonia Industry (U)
Photographic analysis indicates that the Soviet Union's program to
import arrunonia plants based on ?'Jestern technology will enable the Soviets
to surpass the US as the world's leader in arrnnonia production capacity by
1980. As part of a major program that began in the early 1970s, the USSR
is scheduled to complete 45 large-capacity imported armnonia plants by the
early 1980s. The total production capacity of these plants is expected to
be 19.6 million metric tons per year, about twice the Soviet's 1970
ammonia production capacity of 9.0 million metric tons. The Soviet Union
also expects to complete the construction of a 2,250-kilometer arrnnonia
pipeline system with approximately 30 distribution points as well as the
construction of two port facilities to handle arrmlonia exports and chemical
imports. (S)
According to some Soviet sources, reliance on foreign technology for
the growth of the Soviet's ammonia capacity stems from the failure of the
Soviet machine building industry to develop the chemical processing equipment
needed for large-capacity anunonia plants. Photographic evidence indicates
that the Soviets may have used some of 'the technology they acquired from
the purchase of foreign ammonia processes and equipment to develop their
own large-capacity ammonia process. They have modified the ammonia-
synthesis process at several of the imported plants that use a US process
and have added a combination of Soviet and foreign processing equipment.
These modifications suggest that they experimented with the US process
prior to putting what they claim to be their own large-capacity arunonia
process into corrmtercial use. (TSR)
The rapid growth of the Soviet ammonia industry will impact primarily
in two areas--Soviet fertilizer industry and the world ar~mlonia market.
Large-scale growth is expected in Soviet nitrogen fertilizer production
capacity (urea and armlonium nitrate) and the production capacity of ammonia-
based complex fertilizers. The infusion of large quantities of atrnnonia into
this expanding fertilizer industry is essential to the Soviet Union's
priority program to increase agricultural yields. This growth in ar?unonia
production capacity is also expected to generate increasing amounts of
excess ammonia in an already depressed z~~orld market. P4ost of the excess
anunonia probably will be handled initially under extensive multinational
compensation agreements, insuring that the USSR will be a major exporter. (U)
For additional details on the development of the Soviet ammonia
industry, see IS 79-10049I:, Im act of I orted Technolo
on the Soviet Ammonia Industry, April 19 9. TS"-)
(TOP SEC:~ET RUFF)
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Top Secret
Comparison of the Growth of
Soviet and US Ammonia Production Capacities (U )
----.--
o ~
1965 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82
Year
USSR
US
1970
9.0
13.9
1971
10.0
14.1
1972
10.8
15.3
1973
12.0
15.2
1974
13.0
15.9
Year
USSR
US
1975
14.1
16.6
1976
14.8
16.6
1977
15.6
17.9
1978
20.2
20.9
1979
25.1
21.5
Note: Soviet figures are derived from Soviet industrial sources
and photographically derived plant completion estimates.
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Top Secret
USSR
First Deployment of New Soviet Towed Artillery Weapon (TSR)
Photographic coverages show that some
time during that period the Soviets deployed a new large-caliber towed
artillery piece to an artille bri ade at Tomichi in the Far East Military
District. The sighting is the first evidence of deployment
of this weapon to an active ground force unit, although it had been ob-
served previously at Perm Armaments Plant 172 in March 1976 and at various
artillery and ordnance test ranges since then. (TSR)
This is the first new towed artillery piece deployed by the Soviets
since the D-30 122-mm howitzer was first observed in 1963. A recent
trend in Soviet artillery has been the introduction of four new self-
propelled artillery weapons. These new self-propelled weapons have been
deployed primarily in maneuver divisions and in heavy artillery brigades
subordinate to front commanders. The identification of this new towed
weapon indicates that the Soviets still see a role for towed artillery
in their combat support artillery units at the army and probably the
front level. (TSR)
This new artillery piece is apparently a replacement for the P~[-46
130-mm field gun, which has been in service with Soviet artillery brigades
and divisions for more than 20 years. At Tomichi, 18 of the new artillery
pieces have been identified, and the normal complement of 36 M-46 130-mm
field guns associated with the artillery brigade are no longer present.
If this new weapon is to be a replacement for the D~-46, we expect that 18
more will be deployed to Tomichi and that additional deployments will
probably occur at other artillery brigades and probably artillery divisions.
Approximately 1,700 AEI-46 field guns are presently held in Soviet artillery
brigades and divisions. (TSR)
Little information is available on the characteristics of the new
weapon that would make it superior to the reliable D'I-46 field gun. However,
the absence of limbers and the addition of tandem axles on the new artillery
piece probably allow it greater road and tactical mobility. The new weapon
appears to have a larger caliber than the T?i-46 and, with its approximately
2-meter-longer barrel, it may be more accurate and have a range greater
than the 27,500 meters attributed to the older weapon. (TSR)
(TOP SECRET RUFF)
To Secret
Moy 1979
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Top Secret
China
Construction Status of the Missile Service
Tower at Songlin r7issile Test Center (TSR)
Photo coverage of Songlin (Sung-lin) Missile Test Center during April
1979 shows that observable construction activity on a 76-meter-high missile
service tower has resumed. The tower, when completed, will be virtually
identical to one at Launch Complex D, Wuzhai (4Vu-chaff) Missile Test Center.
Based on its location, Songlin will most likely be used to place communica-
tions satellites into geostationary orbits. However, the complexity of its
support facilities suggests that Songlin may have additional functions. A
comparison of the rate of construction of the service tower at Wuzhai and
the present rate of construction at Songlin indicates that the Songlin
tower should be externally complete by the end of 1979. (TSR)
Initial construction of the tower at Songlin began in early November
1978 and progressed at a very rapid rate until late January 1979, when the
main tower structure had been completed and a large missile handling crane
had been positioned on top. From the end of January until mid-April 1979
there was very little visible construction activity on the tower. Some
assembly of the missile service arms took place, but installation of these
arms on the tower did not begin until mid-April. (TSR)
Although it is unclear why the pace of construction at Songlin has
been so erratic, it may be related to the availability of specialized
construction crews that are also working on the tower at ~~7uzhai. (TSR)
(TOP SECRET RUFF)
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Top Secret
New OIA Publications (U)
The following reports have been published by the Office of Imagery
Analysis since the last issue of the Imagery Analysis P?~onthly Review.
1. IS 79-10066)
Soviet Communications Rel
B
l
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a
atta
ions:
April 1979 TOP SECRET RUFF
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2.
IS 79-10057K~
~ Photographic Anal
sis
f S
i
,
y
o
ov
et
Attack Submarine Construction Pro rams, April 1979 TOP SECRET
RUFF
3
IS 79
1
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.
-
0049K,
T I act of I orted Technolo on the
Soviet Ammoni
a Industry, April 1979 (TOP SECRET RUFF
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GJ/~ I
4
IS 7
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.
9-10063K,
Chinese Electric Power Indust
r
J 1
anuary 976
- December 197
8, April 1979 (TOP SECRET RUFF
y,
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Top Secret
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