BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE RELOAD CAPABILITY PACIFIC FLEET, USSR(SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00171R000201890001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 16, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

l 1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP84TO0171 R000201890001-2
ROUTING
TO:
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
1
ARCHIVES
2
3
4
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
REMARKS:
PAPER PRINT
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.
DATE
NPIC/IEG/SSFD
9/83
(Security Classification)
NOFORN
(See inside cover)
CONTROL NO. Z-14077/83
w
Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
(Security Classification)
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP84T00171 R000201890001-2
 1..1 V _...... 1.:.1_..1...1. ..
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP84TO0171 R000201890001-2
Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved
(WNINTEL) or (D)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution- Proprietary Information Involved
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL ... This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP84TO0171 R000201890001-2
 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP84TO0171 R000201890001-2
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP84TO0171 R000201890001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP84TO0171 R000201890001-2
SECRET
(c) NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER
Page 1 of 2 Attachment to 2-14077/83
Copy NPIC/IEG (9/83)
16 SEPTEMBER 1983
BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE RELOAD CAPABILITY
PACIFIC FLEET, USSR (SWN)
1. SIGNIFICANCE: THE SOVIETS HAVE DEMONSTRATED THE ABILITY TO
LOAD THE THREE CLASSES OF NUCLEAR-POWERED BALLISTIC MISSILE
SUBMARINES (SSBN; D-III, D-I, AND Y-I) ASSIGNED TO THE PACIFIC
FLEET USING AMGA-CLASS MISSILE TENDERS (AEM). THIS ACTIVITY
OCCURRED BETWEEN JULY AND EARLY SEPTEMBER 1983 AT PETROPAVLOSK
K NAVAL MISSILE LOADING FACILITY. (SWN)
2. REMARKS: THE SOVIETS HAVE THREE AMGA AEM IN THEIR INVENTORY
WINO IN THE PACIFIC FLEET AT PETROPAVLOSK AND ONE IN THE
NORTH FLEET. RECENT D-III SSBN MISSILE TRANSFER ACTIVITY
CONFIRMS THE ABILITY OF THE "DAUGAVA", THE THIRD UNIT OF THE
AMGA CLASS, TO HANDLE THE SS-N-18 SLBM. AMGA-CLASS AEM HAVE
PREVIOUSLY BEEN ASSESSED AS BEING ABLE TO HANDLE SS-N-8 AND
SS-N-6 SLBM. THE "DAUGAVA" DIFFERS FROM THE OTHER TWO UNITS OF
THE CLASS IN SEVERAL RESPECTS. THE "DAUGAVA" IS LONGER THAN
THE OTHER TWO UNITS AND HAS A SOLID RATHER THAN A
LATTICE-CONSTRUCTED CRANE. THE CRANE HAS A S-METER GREATER
REACH AND IS CAPABLE OF LIFTING HEAVIER LOADS. IN ADDITION,
THE TWO MAIN HATCHES ON THE "DAUGAVA" ARE LONGER THAN THOSE ON
UNITS 1 AND 2. THESE DIFFERENCES MAY HAVE BEEN MADE TO
FACILITATE SS-N-18 SLBM HANDLING. (SWN)
D-III/SS-N-18 MISSILE TRANSFER ACTIVITY -- MISSILE TRANSFER
OPERATIONS INVOLVING THE SS-N-18 SLBM WERE IN PROGRESS
A D-III
WAS BERTHED OUTBOARD THE "DAUGAVA". AN SS-N-18 MISSILE
TRANSPORTER WAS ON THE PIER NEXT TO THE AEM AND AN SS-N-18
MISSILE AIRFRAME WAS SUSPENDED FROM THE AEM'S CRANE (GRAPHIC 1
OF 2, BOTTOM). ALTHOUGH BOTH OF THE MAIN HATCHES OF THE AEM
WERE OPEN, THE MISSILE TRANSFER WAS PROBABLY BETWEEN THE
MISSILE TRANSPORTER AND THE D-III. GRAPHIC 1
OF 2, TOP), A D-III SSBN WAS AGAIN BERTHED OUTBOARD THE
"DAUGAVA". ONE MISSILE TUBE DOOR ON THE SUBMARINE WAS OPEN
WITH AN SS-N-18 MISSILE AIRFRAME SUSPENDED FROM THE CRANE OF
THE AEM OVER THE TUBE. NO MISSILE TRANSPORTER WAS PRESENT AND
These notes have been prepared for briefing purposes only and should not be used for detailed analytical work.
Their use should be restricted to the particular briefing board(s) they were prepared for and must be considered
valid only for the reporting period as indicated by the date of issue.
WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGr.NCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP84TO0171 R000201890001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP84TO0171 R000201890001-2
SECRET
(c) NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER
Page 2 of 2 Attachment to Z-14077/83
Copy NPIC/IEG (9/83)
16 SEPTEMBER 1983
THE FORWARD HATCH OF THE AEM WAS OPEN, SUGGESTING THAT THE
MISSILE WAS STORED ONBOARD THE AEM OR WAS TO BE TRANSFERED INTO
THE AEM. (VOT ON GRAPHICS), THE "DAUGAVA" 25X1
WAS INVOLVED IN THE TRANSFER OF SS-N-18 MISSILE AIRFRAMES. AN
SS-N-18 TRANSPORTER WAS ON THE PIER, THE CRANE OF THE AEM WAS
ELEVATED, AND ITS AFT HATCH WAS OPEN. (SWN)
D-I/SS-N-8 MISSILE TRANSFER ACTIVITY A 25X1
D-I SSBN WAS BERTHED OUTBOARD THE "DAUGAVA" (GRAPHIC 2 OF 2,
TOP). THE CRANE OF THE AEM WAS ELEVATED OVER ITS OPENED
FORWARD HATCH, AND NO MISSILE TRANSPORTERS WERE PRESENT AT THE
PIER. THE ABSENCE OF A MISSILE TRANSPORTER AND THE OPEN HATCH
SUGGESTS THAT THE MISSILE WAS TO BE TRANSFERED EITHER TO, OR
FROM, THE AEM. (SWN)
Y-I/SS-N-6 MISSILE TRANSFER ACTIVITY -- SS-N-6 MISSILE TRANSFER
25X1
25X1
SSBN WAS BERTHED ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE OF THE PIER FROM THE AEM
(GRAPHIC 2 OF 2, BOTTOM). ONE OF THE MISSILE TUBE DOORS WAS
OPEN AND THE CRANE WAS EXTENDED OVER THE MISSILE BAY. ALTHOUGH
BOTH HATCHES ON THE AEM WERE OPEN, AN SS-N-6 MISSILE
TRANSPORTER WAS RETURNING TO THE MISSILE STORAGE AREA
INDICATING A PROBABLE TRANSFER BETWEEN THE Y-I AND THE
TRANSPORTER USING THE CRANE OF THE AEM. A Y-I SSBN 25X1
WAS AGAIN BERTHED ACROSS THE PIER FROM THE AEM (NOT ON
GRAPHICS). TWO MISSILE TUBE DOORS WERE OPEN AND THE CRANE WAS
TURNED TOWARD THE SUBMARINE. 'BOTH HATCHES ON THE AEM WERE
CLOSED-AND AN SS-N-6 MISSILE TRANSPORTER WAS AT THE FOOT OF THE
PIER. ANOTHER Y-I WAS BERTHED ACROSS THE PIER 25X1
FROM THE AEM AND THE CRANE WAS TURNED TOWARD THE SUBMARINE (NOT
ON GRAPHICS). HOWEVER, THE CRANE OBSTRUCTED THE VIEW OF THE
REAR OF THE MISSILE BAY. BOTH HATCHES WERE CLOSED AND NO
MISSILE TRANSPORTER WAS PRESENT. (SWN) 25X1
25X1
These notes have been prepared for briefing purposes only and should not be used for detailed analytical work.
Their use should be restricted to the particular briefing board(s) they were prepared for and must be considered
valid only for the reporting period as indicated by the date of issue.
WARNING NOTICE
INTr LLI(~I'NCI::SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED
SECRET
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP84T00171 R000201890001-2