IMAGERY ANALYSIS MONTHLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01115R000100020002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Imagery Analysis
Monthly Review
Secret
11
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National Security
Information
Dissemination Control
Abbreviations
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or Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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NOCONTRACT (NC)
PROPIN (PR)
ORCON (OC)
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~ =~~1 Directorate of
I# Intelligence
Imagery Analysis
Monthly Review
Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are
welcome. They should be directed to the analysts whose names
and secure line extensions are listed in the table of contents.
The articles in this publication have been coordinated with
other CIA components. (U)
Secret
IA MR 83-012C
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I New Ilyushin Aircraft Expected (s)
Analysis of activity at the IIyushin Experimental Design Bureau (OKB) sug-
gests that the first prototype of a large, new aircraft may soon begin flight-
testing. (s
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2 Major Elements of Soviet SS-12/22 Brigade Sighted in Field Storage (s)
In June we observed major elements of an SS-12/22 surface-to-surface missile
brigade in field storage about 6 kilometers east of Yemilchino in the Soviet
Carpathian Military District. (s 25X1
4 Tyumen Higher Military Engineering Command School (s)
we have identified two military 25X1
installations at Tyumen in the Siberian Military District that constitute a High-
er Military Engineering Command School. (s 25X1
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5 Soviets Increase Operational Capability of Arctic Merchant Fleet (u)
The Soviets are increasing the operational capability of their Arctic merchant
fleet by acquiring Finnish-built ' multipurpose merchant ships that can also
serve as icebreakers. (S ~
6 Soviets Installing New Type of Catalytic Cracking Units at Two Petroleum Refineries (s)
The Soviets are installing a new type of catalytic cracking unit at their Moscow
refinery and at a refinery at Pavlodar, about 400 kilometers southeast of
Omsk. (s
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7 Leningrad Flood Control Dam Under Construction (U)
The Soviets have begun construction of a flood control dam designed to pro-
tect the greater Leningrad area from flood waters of the Gulf of Fin-
land. (s
8 Cuban Military Bunker Construction Program Proceeds at Rapid Pace (s
The First major Cuban military bunker construction pro ram to be undertaken
since the mid-1960s is proceeding at a rapid pace. (S
The North Koreans are constructing a standard-gauge rail line that will even-
tually connect the cities of Musan, Hyesan, and Manpo and provide an alter-
nate rail link between the northeast region of the country and the Pyongyang
area. (S
North Korea is making a major effort to expand the production capacity of its
nonferrous metals industry, to decrease dependence on aluminum imports and
increase earnings from the export of other nonferrous metals. (S
12 India Developing Capability to Produce Submarines (S)
We believe that a ship construction hall being built at Mazagon Dock, Ltd. in
North Korea Expands Nonferrous Metals Industry (S)
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Bombay will be used to construct submarines. (S
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Secret
New Ilyushin Aircraft
Expected (S)
Analysis of activity at the Ilyushin Experimental
Design Bureau (OKB) suggests that the first proto-
type of a large, new aircraft may soon begin flight-
testing. The aircraft has not yet been seen on
imagery, but it is probably one of two aircraft that
have been described the IL-92
and the IL-96. Both of these new aircraft are
probably intended to augment the Soviets' fleet of
long-range civil aircraft, which consists largely of
the Ilyushin-designed Classic and Camber. (s F
In early 1981 Genrikh Vasilyevich Novozhilov,
chief of the Ilyushin OKB, said his design bureau
was developing a new transport aircraft-desig-
nated the IL-96-which was based on the design of
the IL-86 wide-bodied Camber passenger aircraft.
Open sources have described the IL-96 as a long-
range derivative of the Camber employing a new
wing and new, more powerful engines. Although
one source has reported that an IL-96 prototype
recently began flight-testing, there is no imagery
evidence of this. The 11-92 has been described as
We have been expecting a new, larger Ilyushin
September 1983 several large test articles (major
airframe components) from Ilyushin aircraft have
been placed in open storage, suggesting that the test
rigs inside the dynamic test building of the OKB
have been cleared. We believe the rigs were being
prepared to test articles for a second prototype,
which suggests that testing of the first prototype is
nearly complete. This is consistent with the Ilyushin
practice of building the first prototype for flight-
testing and using a second for static testing. A
similar pattern of activity-the movement of test
articles into open storage-preceded the initial
rollout of the last four Ilyushin aircraft. (s
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another Camber derivative, but there is conflicting
information as to whether it will use a new en one
or the same engine as the IL-86. (S~ 25X1
If they are successfully developed, both aircraft will
probably join the Soviet long-range civil fleet as
aircraft that are intended to be less costly to
operate than the Classic and Camber. Both the
Classic and Camber are much less fuel efficient and
require significantly more maintenance when used
over long routes than do similar Western aircraft
now in service. (S
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Soviets Expand SS-12/22
Brigade in Carpathian Military
District (S)
In June, we observed major elements of an SS-
12/22 surface-to-surface missile brigade in field
storage about 6 kilometers east of Yemilchino in
the Soviet Carpathian Military District. At the time
this was the best look at a fully equipped SS-12/22
brigade since the late 1960s.
On coverage of June 1983 we identified 12 trans-
porter-erector-launchers (TELs), four MAZ heavy-
duty cranes, 12 probable launch control vehicles,
and about 150 other support vehicles. This number
of TELs and support equipment was consistent
with Intelligence Community estimates for this
brigade at that time. On coverage of late October,
however, the amount of equipment had increased.
The brigade is now equipped with 18 operational
TELs, three probable training TELS, at least 8
MAZ heavy-duty cranes, 18 launch control vehi-
cles, and about 250 other support vehicles. This is
the first confirmed sighting of an 18-TEL-equipped
SS-12/22 brigade in the Soviet Union. Such an
increase in the number of TELs was not unexpected
and indicates that expansion of SS-12/22 brigades
will probably parallel that which has occurred in
SS-1 Scud tactical missile brigades, many of which
have increased from 12 to 18 TELs. (s
Apparently, the Soviets are storing the equipment
for this brigade in the field because they are
renovating and expanding its vehicle storage area in
Yemilchino. This occasionally occurs when Soviet
ground force units expand and renovate their
garrisons. The construction which began in 1982
was not yet complete by October 1983. (S n
Recently the Soviets stated that they intend to
deploy additional operational-tactical missiles-like
the SS-12/22-into Eastern Europe in response to
the introduction of Pershing II missiles. These
deployments probably would affect some of the six
SS-12/22 brigades located in the western USSR.
The construction at Yemilchino, however, makes a
move by this brigade unlikely, because we do not
believe the Soviets would invest significant time and
resources to expand and renovate a garrison for a
unit they intend to relocate. Nevertheless, the
deployment of SS-12/22s to Eastern Europe will be
a political decision, and depending on its scale,
could affect any or all SS-12/22 units in the
western USSR.
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Secret
Location of SS-12/22 Brigades in the Western USSR
Baltic
Sea
Eighteen SS-12/22 TELs in Field Storage, Yemilchino, USSR,
October 1983
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Tyumen Higher Military
Engineering Command
School (s)
tary installations at Tyumen in the Siberian
Military District that constitute a Higher Military
Engineering Command School. These installations
were previously believed to be garrisons for unre-
lated nondivisional engineer units. Graduates of the
school are assigned to military engineering units
throughout the USSR and the groups of forces.
The school apparently receives some new Soviet
engineering equipment for student familiarization
before it is available to engineer units. For exam-
ple, the Amphibious Bridging System (Wheeled)
was on display at Tyumen in early 1978 but was
not seen in an engineer unit until 1979. The tracked
version of the same system was at Tyumen in 1981,
again before it was issued to engineer units.
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he school's
second installation, southeast of the city, contains
the troop billets and equipment park for a mainte-
nance battalion that supports the schoolLde-
scription corresponds with Tyumen Army Barracks
AL-2, which contains a barracks and administra-
tion area, a training area, and a large, open vehicle
park with equipment stored for several engineer
regiments or brigades. (S
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Secret
Soviets Increase Operational
Capability of Arctic Merchant
Fleet (U)
The Soviets are increasing the operational capabil-
ity of their Arctic merchant fleet by acquiring
Finnish-built, multipurpose merchant ships that can
also serve as icebreakers. Up to now Soviet mer-
chant ships did not have an ice-breaking capability,
and their operations in Arctic waters without ice-
breaker assistance were normally restricted to the
months of June through September. The new ships
have been designated the SA-15 class by the So-
viets, and they are the first merchant ships ever
designed for service in Arctic regions of the Soviet
Union. The Soviets have contracted for a total of
14 SA-15-class vessels, and open sources indicate
that five had been received by September 1983.
Open sources also indicate that the initial SA-15
received by the Soviets conducted sea trials in
March 1983. To date only one SA-15-class vessel
has been seen on imagery. This vessel was identified
in July 1983 at Leningrad. (s
to accommodate both dry bulk products and gen-
eral cargo goods. Each ship is equipped with three
20-ton-capacity deck cranes and one 40-ton-capaci-
ty twin deck crane. In addition, a stern ramp can
be used for loading and unloading vehicles and
other mobile cargo, and a roll-on/roll-off (Ro/Ro)
deck can accommodate vehicles up to 4.3 meters
high and 5 meters wide. Open sources have re-
ported that the SA-15-class ships can break level ice
about 3 meters thick and that each will be equipped
with two 38-ton-capacity air-cushioned vehicles that
can be used to transfer cargo to and from trans-
shipment points in areas where no port facilities are
available. (s 0 25X1
These SA-15-class ships will enhance Soviet capa-
bilities to support oil and gas projects in regions of
West Siberia. Their Ro/Ro capability also makes
them well-suited for shipping military vehicles and25X1
equipment. (u)
The SA-15-class ships are 20,000-dead-weight-ton
vessels with two decks and five cargo bays designed
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Soviets Installing New Type of
Catalytic Cracking Units at
Two Petroleum Refineries (S)
The Soviets are installing a new type of catalytic
cracking unit at their Moscow refinery and at a
refinery at Pavlodar, about 400 kilometers south-
east of Omsk.' In late September 1983, the unit in
the Moscow refinery appeared ready to begin start-
up operations. In July 1983 the unit in the Pavlodar
refinery appeared to be about four to six months
away from start-up. (S
Catalytic cracking is the main process used to
convert heavy oils into lighter products such as
gasoline and diesel fuels. These new units represent
the Soviets' first attempt to build catalytic cracking
units since they built one at the Omsk refinery in
1975. the Omsk unit
did not perform well and had to be redesigned. A
crane is frequently observed at the Omsk unit,
which suggests that the Soviets continue to have
problems with it. Because the new-type catalytic
cracking units that are under construction at Mos-
cow and Pavlodar do not resemble the Omsk unit,
the Soviets may have discarded the Omsk design.
Other catalytic cracking units were built by the
Soviets in the 1950s and early 1960s, but these
designs have also apparently been discarded.
(S
According to statements in the Soviet press, both
the 10th and the 1 1 th Five-Year Plans contained
goals to increase the cracking capacity of petroleum
refineries and to reduce the wasteful burning of'
heavy fuel oils in power plants by substituting gas
and coal. The Soviets have begun to convert some
of their power plants to burn gas or coal instead of
heavy oils, which increases the amount of heavy
oils available for processing in the refineries. By
increasing the cracking capacity of their petroleum
refineries to process heavy oils, the Soviets could
increase production of gasoline and diesel fuel
without correspondingly increasing crude oil pro-
duction. This will be important if Soviet crude oil
production peaks and begins to decline in the late
1980s as expected by CIA. (s
If the design of the catalytic cracking units being
installed at Moscow and Pavlodar is unsuccessful
and the Soviets continue to substitute gas and coal
for heavy fuel oils in their power plants, they will
probably have to purchase catalytic cracking tech-
nology-and at least some of the more sophisti-
cated equipment for the units-from the West. As
many as 13 catalytic cracking units-which each
take about 2 years to build-would be needed if the
Soviets expect to reduce the amount of heavy oil
being burned in their power plants by 260,000
barrels per day by the end of 1985 as planned.
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Leningrad Flood Control Dam
Under Construction (U)
The Soviets have begun construction of a flood
control dam 25 kilometers (km) in length that is
designed to protect the greater Leningrad area from
flood waters of the Gulf of Finland. Leningrad has
suffered from frequent flooding that occurs as a
result of storms in the Baltic Sea. The dam, which
the Soviets refer to as a sea shield, will extend from
Gorskaya on the north shore of the gulf, across
Kotlin Island, to Bolshaya Izhor, on the south
shore near Lomonosov. (s
Although planning for the sea shield project began
in the mid-1960s, actual construction did not start
until sometime between July 1979 and June 1980.
By mid-August 1983, about 8.5 km of earth and
stone embankments were under construction ex-
tending from both shores and east and south from
Kotlin Island. Road- and rail-served construction
support bases had been built at Gorskaya and
Bolshaya Izhora, and a third construction support
base had been constructed on Kotlin Island.
If completed as planned, the sea shield will be 35
meters wide and 8 meters above the mean water
line. A six-lane highway will be constructed across
the top of the dam and two large gates, which will
be closed when flood waters threaten, will be
constructed across shipping channels. The Soviets
have indicated that this construction project is
expected to cost at least a half-billion rubles and
take about ten years to complete. (S
The British have just completed construction of a
much smaller flood control barrier across the
Thames River near London. England's barrier cost
about one billion dollars (just over a half-billion
rubles) but is less than one km long and cannot
serve as a bridge crossing. (u)
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Cuban Military Bunker
Construction Program Proceeds
at Rapid Pace (S
The first major Cuban military bunker construction
program to be undertaken since the mid-1960s is
proceeding at a rapid pace. At least 260 bunkers
have been observed in various stages of construc-
tion since the first one was seen in July 1982.
Nearly one-half (117) have been identified since
March 1983. Bunkers have been observed under
construction at 35 sites, including army bases, air
defense installations, naval weapons storage areas,
ammunition plants, military schools, and in remote,
undeveloped areas. When the construction program
is completed, the bunkers will greatly improve
Cuba's ability to protect its military material from
air attack. Cuba also has several command and
control bunker complexes under construction or
recently completed, including a large one south of
Havana. No comparable construction program for
personnel bunkers has been observed under way in
of the bunkers are at known Cuban facilities. Those
that are not are located far from the installations
housing the Soviet brigade, whose forces might be
used to provide security for any particularly sensi-
tive advanced weapon system sent to Cuba.
(S F_~
Cuba. (
The primary function of the bunkers appears to be
materiel and munitions storage. Their size will
accommodate virtually any piece of military equip-
ment currently in the Cuban inventory. The bunk-
ers with
lengths varying from 15 to 45 meters. All are drive-
in or drive-through, are built of prefabricated
concrete sections, and are earth-covered. The num-
ber of bunkers at individual sites ranges from one
to 35. (s
Most of the bunkers are large enough to store an
SS-20 transporter-erector-launcher with missile but
there are several indications that they are not
intended for that purpose. None of the complexes
is large enough to house an entire SS-20 regiment.
Most of the complexes are unsecured; the rest are
only fenced. There is no evidence of efforts to
camouflage or conceal the facilities. Finally, most
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Rail Line Under Construction in
North Korea (S)
The North Koreans are constructing a standard-
gauge rail line about 280 kilometers (km) long that
will eventually connect the cities of Musan, Hyesan,
and Manpo and provide an alternate rail link
between the northeast region of the country and the
Pyongyang area. Militarily, this new rail line will be
less vulnerable to interdiction by South Korea
because it is both away from the coast and adjacent
to the border with China. Economically, this new
rail line will probably s-ipport the development of
hydroelectric power along the Yalu River and of
new industries including lumbering and mining in
the north-central section of the country. (
Based on the pace of construction, the rail line will
not be complete for several years, but as of August
1983, a total of 92 km of roadbed construction had
been observed an imagery. A 20-km segment of
roadbed construction extended northeast from the
vicinity of Manpo, and 72 km of roadbed construc-
tion extended west from Hyesan along the south
bank of the Yalu River. We believe that construc-
tion of this segment of the rail line will continue to
parallel the Yalu River until it reaches the area
where the river turns north. At this point the rail
line will probably continue west toward Manpo.
Because of the mountainous terrain, numerous
tunnels and bridges will have to be constructed.
We have been unable to determine the status of
construction along the rail segment that will link
Hyesan and Musan because there has been no
imagery of this area in over a year. When last
observed in September 1982, less than a 1-km
segment of ground scarring for the roadbed ex-
tended nnrtheast from Hyesan. (S
Rail Line Under Construction, North Korea
Standard-gauge
rail line
Rail line
under construction
Proposed rail line
150
Kilometers
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North Korea Expands
Nonferrous Metals Industry (S)
North Korea is making a major effort to expand
the production capacity of its nonferrous metals
industry, to decrease dependence on aluminum
imports and to increase earnings from the export of
other nonferrous metals. In the early 1970s North
Korea had a copper plant, a copper and zinc plant,
and a zinc and lead plant and was a net exporter of
all three metals. In the mid-1970s construction
began on two additional nonferrous metals plants,
a Soviet-equipped aluminum plant at Pukchang,
and a Japanese-equipped zinc plant at Tanchon.
Construction slowed during the late 1970s, proba-
bly due to North Korea's major economic prob-
lems. The nonferrous metals program was acceler-
ated in the early 1980s when work resumed at
Pukchang and Tanchon and construction began on
a Japanese-supplied zinc recovery plant at Nampo,
the Chongju Copper/Lead plant, the Unhung Cop-
per Plant, and the Komdok Copper/Lead/Zinc
Plant. (S
The Pukchang Aluminum Plant was nearing com-
pletion in August 1983. It will be the North
Koreans' only aluminum plant and will enable
them to lower their dependence on imported alumi-
num which they currently buy on the world market.
A comparison of the main aluminum production
building at Pukchang with similar Soviet buildings
indicates that it will have an annual production
capacity of 20,000 metric tons, and a North Korean
defector has reported that the plant will have this
production capacity. Alumina, the raw material for
the aluminum plant, may be supplied by what
appears to be an alumina plant that is in a mid-to-
late stage of construction 37 kilometers southwest
of Pukchang. (S
The two new Japanese-supplied zinc plants at
Tanchon and Nampo, which were in a late stage of
construction in August 1983, will enable the North
Koreans to refine a purer zinc and to recover larger
amounts of precious metals, such as silver, that are
often associated with zinc. Special intelligence indi-
cates that the Nampo Zinc Recovery Plant was
designed to recover 8,400 tons of zinc and 36 tons
of silver per year from the residue of the existing
Nampo Copper and Zinc Plant, and that the
annual zinc production capacity of the Tanchon
Zinc Plant will be 50,000 tons. (S
The Chongju plant began operations in August
1982, and the Unhung and Komdok plants should
be complete by 1985. We have not yet determined
their production capacities. (S F_~
??ruKcnang
Sunchon
Munchon
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India Developing Capability to
Produce Submarines (S)
We believe that a ship construction hall being built
at Mazagon Dock, Ltd., in Bombay will be used to
construct submarines. Completion of the construc-
tion hall will give the Indians their initial subma-
rine construction capability. India has a growing
surface ship construction capability but has pur-
chased most of its surface combatants and all of its
eight submarines from the Soviet Union. (S F_
The first submarines built at Mazagon Dock will
probably be West German-designed TR 1500 coast-
al submarines. In 1981 India reached an agreement
with the West German shipbuilding firm How-
aldtswerke Deutsche Werft (HDW) for the con-
struction of up to six of these diesel-electric subma-
rines. The first two units are being built in West
Germany, with delivery of the first unit scheduled
for late 1984. The West Germans have licensed
India to build two more units with materials and
technical supervision to be provided by HDW.
India may exercise an option to build the last two
of the six units they contracted for under license.
The West German press has identified Mazagon
Dock as the construction site for these submarines.
The agreement with HDW also includes the trans-
fer of technology that should permit India to
continue building submarines after the contract
expires. (S
The agreement with HDW makes India one of the
few Third World nations (along with Argentina,
China, North Korea, and Yugoslavia) to develop
or acquire the sophisticated industrial technology
required for modern submarine construction. Suc-
cessful production of the TR 1500 will provide the
Indian Navy with a modern submarine to augment
its force of older F-class submarines. In addition,
the experience gained in building the relatively
simple TR 1500 should enable India to build larger,
The probable construction hall at Mazagon Dock is
being built on an expanded mole that lies between
the inclined building ways and a fitting-out basin.
Foundation work for the construction hall began in
August 1982. Since August 1983, wall-supporting
columns and arched-roof trusses have been erected
for a main building that is about 99 meters long, 27
meters wide, 16 meters high, and has a 54-meter-
long annex that may be used for component
fabrication or subassembly. Since the TR 1500 is 61
meters long it
appears likely that the construction hall will have
sufficient capacity to build at least two TR 1500
submarines simultaneously. Excavation within the
mole indicates a launch basin is being built for
vessels that will be produced within the construc-
tion hall. (S
India has produced surface combatants at Mazagon
Dock since 1966. The first ships produced here
were Leander-class frigates built under license from
Great Britain. In 1978 the yard began construction
of the Godavari-class frigate, an indigenously de-
signed variant of the Leander-class. Despite its
efforts to produce naval vessels indigenously and
the consequent agreement with HDW, India contin-
ues to rely on the Soviet Union as its principal
source of naval combatants. Since 1970, the Indian
Navy has acquired three newly constructed modi-
fied Kashin-class guided-missile destroyers, three
Nanuchka-class guided-missile patrol boats, six Na-
tya-class fleet minesweepers, and 16 Osa I and II
missile craft from the Soviet Union. In addition,
the Indians reportedly are continuing negotiations
with the Soviets on additional purchases of naval
ships. (s
ocean-going submarines in the future. (s
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2bAl
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Development of Libya's Ground-Based Air Defenses, 1980-8.25X1
The following reports have been published by the Office of Imagery Analysis since the last
issue of the Imagery Analysis Monthly Review.
Imagery Research Papers
(Secret 25X1
2. IA 83-10117C,I ~ Soviet Ground Force Trainine Cvcles: An Aid in Identifying25X1
3. IA 83-10126,
Secret Codeword
Imagery Analysis Reports
Assessment of Soviet Transient Concealment Activities (Tor25X1
25X1
1. IA 83-10120, El Salvador: Government Military Success in the Guazapa Volcano Aera
(Secret 25X1
2. IA 83-l"
Noforn
The Soviet Military Presence in Cuba (Top Secret Codeworc25X1
25X1
3. IA 93-10127 Nirnrnvun-FI cnlvador: Potosi Probable Waterborne Infiltration Point (Secret_ __ _ .
Imagery Analysis Memorandums
1. IAM 83-10106C,
trict (Top Secret
Soviet Front Signal Units in the Carpathian Military Dis?25X1
3. IAM 83-10124, ~ BL-10 Land-Attack Cruise Missile Launch Indicators ai25X1
Kapustin Yar Missile Test Center (Top Secret Codeword
25X1
Radar-Equipped Target Barge Possibly Associated with 25X1
SS-N-22 Antiship Cruise Missile Test Program (Top Secret Codeword 25X1
Secret
SC 628461/83
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 Secret
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Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP91TO1115R000100020002-1