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HANOI'S INTENTIONS DURING THE DRY SEASON

Document Type: 
CREST [1]
Collection: 
Library of Congress [2]
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
LOC-HAK-558-12-20-7
Release Decision: 
RIFLIM
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date: 
September 9, 2010
Sequence Number: 
20
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 31, 1971
Content Type: 
MEMO
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon LOC-HAK-558-12-20-7.pdf [3]112.48 KB
Body: 
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/08/30: LOC-HAK-558-12-20-7 IP ?Sgega-VH-C#14T-4UNS-GODIE--WORD? INFORMATIGN December 31, 1911 MEMORANDUM FOR: FRO1,11 SUBJECT: ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY HENRY A. KISSINGER TOM LATIMER Hanoi's Intentions During the Dry Season NSA Review Completed A pattern of troop deployment is occurring on the part of the Vietnamese communists reminiscent of certain campaigns agaiast tb,e French in the 1950.s. Since early OctOber 1971, an estimated 54.000 North Vietnamese troops have been pot into the infiltration pipeline. Of that total some rt. 000 ars destined for base areas in the ceatral highlaads and another 23, COO are moving toward Cambodia or the souther* *re* of South Vietnam. In addition, there is good evidence that the communists *re preparing to launch major attacks in the aorthernmost provinces of South Vietnam, probably by mid-February. Cornzimusications involviag the North Viet- namese 301Ith Division which is still inside North Vietnam, iadicate that it may be absut to deploy into the northernmost province of South Vietnam, Chiang Tri. Intercepted communications also suggest that the North Viet- namese 320th and 3243 Divisions are also about to deploy from North Vietnam to South Vietaam. The 324B Division may be going to MR Tri- Thien-Hue in the northern two provinces while the 32011: may be headed further south to the B-3 Front are* in the central highlands. We have alreedy seen the kick-off of tht North Vietnamese dry *WOOS campaign in the Plaine des Jerrea and their effort to drive Laotiaa forces offthe Bolovens. They may even intend to threaten the Mekong River town of Pakse. ? In Cambodia, although communist initiated actioa has slacked off lately, there art signs that they may initiate additional attacks in the Tonle Tech region 200n. Waging simultaneous campaigns in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam is an old Viet Minh tactic. In 1954, prior to the Dien Bien Phu battle, Vo Ngwyea Glop seat his forces into Laos and down into Cambodia, both to draw. French attention aad troops away from the major battlefield in Vietnams and also to -fflECRIEV-C9NT-A4145-6013.1 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/08/30: LOC-HAK-558-12-20-7 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/08/30: LOC-HAK-558-12-20-7 5X9N417 Wrap. to-f.Migairg.nti) strengthen the party's band in both those countris a. reviler, in 1951. Giap stood and fought against the French at Hoe Binh while his guerrillas slipped behind French lines and gained control over large areas of the Red River delta. Finally, there was the 1162 battle at Kb. Sash which tied down a large number of U.S. Marines while the Tet offensive was mounted against urban centers throughout South Vietnam. In short, we may be seeing the preparations for yet another multi-pranged Vietnamese communist military &ow of strength. if that is the case, we can expect further attacks in northern and southern Laos, more action by the communists in Cambodia and renewed offensive activity in South Vit- particularly in the central highlands and northern Military Region I. The timing for suck offensives is awybody's guess. My own is that Hanoi will try to stage as impressive display of military power prior to the Presi- dent's trip to Peking. ? They probably do not count on toppling the Laotian or Cambodian Governments with this upcoming offensive, let alone the Saigon government but they may well believe that they can demonstrate to the Chinese that they are in a "winning position" and are justified in holding out for maximum terms for a negotiated end to the war. -- They may also haile that a maximum possible result of the offensive would be to whip up American public pressure on President Nixon to settle the war on Ifauoias terms. SZCRET/CONTANS CODEWORp TL:nra:12/ 31/71 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/08/30: LOC-HAK-558-12-20-7

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