VISITS; 40 COMMITTEE; NSC MEETING ON ISRAELI REQUESTS; PREPARATION FOR RABIN VISIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-124-4-6-3
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: September 6, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

~., No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/09/21 : LOC-HAK-124-4-6-3
"I'HE WHITE HdllSl;
SEGRET /SENSITIVE /XGDS
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS: P xe silent Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
? Nelson Rockefeller, Vice president-Designate
Lt. Gen. Brent Scawcroft, Deputy Assistant to
the President far National Security Affairs
DATE: September 6, 1.974
PLACE: Oval Office
The White House
SUBJECTS: Visits: 40 Con:7m.ittee; NSC Meeting on Tsraeli Requests;
Preparation fax Rabin Visit
MORI/CDF
000578040
Kissin er: I think inviting the cosmonauts to a picnic would be over-
doing ;.t a bit. Dobrynin would make a big deal of it, and this is tie
sort of thing the French put in speeches.
we wYll tell him we wrll try to find a day in December.
About a press conference: If you ha:-e one next week, T ti~an't.
President: 'Next Friday, I think.
Kissin~ex: On the Schrx-zidt visit: He couldn't came in October and pro-
posed September 25. T suspect French mischief. you shouldn't be
pushed. I think you should go back to the original schedule.
~3.~3~.; We shouldn't interrupt Leone.
Kissingg~; That would be very land taste. Tf he can't came in Octobex
SECRET /SENSITIVE /hGDS
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/09/21 : LOC-HAK-124-4-6-3
SECRET /SENSITIVE /XGDS
it shouldn't be a pxoblem.
President: Let rx~e know Monday. If the committees were informed
Kissinger: We have to have these things. We'll need them mare far
Portugal, Spain, and so on.
Kissinger: They were regularly informed.
President: Let's ride it out and we'll see,
At our meeting today I will go into the Israeli arms requests, then
CIA will brief, then I will explain the strategy. The CIA will have
charts showing the farces the Arabs can bring to bear.
What is it we are trying to da ? What are the others trying to do ?
What are some of the pxablems ?
We want to guarantee the security of Israel, but we want to prevent
the coalescence of the Arab states -- that would create an unmanage-
able situation for us. We also want to prevent the resurgence of Soviet
influence. We want to prevent an Israeli-Arab war and the consequent
confrontation with the Soviet Union. If negotiations stall, or if there is a
war, there will be an embaxgo. That would push Europe over the cliff.
..__
-The Eu e,~,~.'.~~sp~a.r~.s.~,..tQ..,th~...C,~Pxus ~tls.a:.~.~ s,haw~...e~,~ ~o;s~
T_h_ere would be a massive anti-U. S. blow~uk?.~ The same will happen
in Japan. The Soviet Union has suffered because they opexated too
cautiously in the pa: t. They wexe too much in the middle. They
won't be caught doing too little again. That makes an Israeli victory
more dangerous than an Israeli defeat. Last time we had a massive
airlift and a massive showdown, and we would have lost the ability to
present ourselves to the Arabs as a means to a solution.
As fox the Israelis, another wax would result in world pressure for
the '6'7 borders. It would be tough far the U. S. alone to resist, and
the result would be demoralizing like what was done to Czechoslovakia
in ' 38.
We have been giving the Arabs the feeling that each of them. had some-
thing to gain--Egypt immediately; Jordan in the mid-term, and Syria
somewhat later. The Syrians know that Israel doesn`t want to moire;
they. also know that the mare the others are satisfied the more isolated
they will be, so they will woxk to lump everything together. With
SECRET /SENSITIV
/XGDS
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/09/21 : LOC-HAK-124-4-6-