CABLE TO BRENT SCOWCROFT FROM JERRY BREMER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-259-6-61-1
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 29, 2010
• Sequence Number: 61
• Publication Date: May 9, 1974
• Content Type: CABLE

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/29: LOC-HAK-259-6-61-1
S E C R E T 0911522 MAY 74
HAKTO-65
FM: JERRY BREMER
TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
1. REFERENCE YOUR TOHAK 120, SECRETARY DOES NOT WANT KARNOW
TO PUBLISH THE LETTER.
2. BEST REGARDS
BT
#0065
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
MORI/CDF
C03344769 pages
4-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/29 : LOC-HAK-259-6-61-1
 _ __
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/29 : LOC-HAK-259-6-61-1
4ONFIDENTIAL
MAY 9, 1974..
HAKTO
TO: GENERAL SCXMCROFT.
1. Reference your TOHAK 120, Secretary does not want Karnow to publish
the letter.
2. Best regards.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/29: LOC-HAK-259-6-61-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/29 :
LOC-HAK-259-6-61-1 w
STANLEY KARNOW WANTS TO PUBLISH
LETTER SCOWGROFT SENT HIM ON YOUR
BEHALF.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/29 :
LOC-HAK-259-6-61-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/29: LOC-HAK-259-6-61-1
34,G4 +J
Z 0902062 MAY 74 ZFF-1 ZFF-4 ZYH
FM THE SITUATION ROOM
TO USCONSUL JERUSALEM
ZEM
C O N F I D E N T I A L
TOHAK120
WH41226
PLEASE DELIVER TO BREMER/RODMAN FOR THE SECRETARY
TO HAK 120
TO: HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
YOU WILL RECALL THAT YOU ASKED ME TO WRITE A LETTER TO
STANLEY KARNOW AFTER YOU LEFT POINTING OUT TO HIM SEVERAL
ERRORS OF FACT IN HIS ARTICLE ABOUT YOU IN THE NEW REPUBLIC.
STANLEY HAS NOW CALLED ME TO ASK IF MY LETTER CAN BE PUBLISHED,
OBVIOUSLY ACCOMPANIED BY FURTHER REMARKS BY HIM AS PART
OF A CONTINUING DIALOGUE. I SEE LITTLE TO BE GAINED BY ENGAGING
IN SUCH AN EXCHANGE, BUT YOU MAY FEEL OTHERWISE. THE LETTER I
SENT HIM IS AS FOLLOWS:
MAY 1, 1974
DEAR MR. KARNOW:
z
State Dept. review completed
pages 4-5
JUST BEFORE HE DEPARTED FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, SECRETARY KISSINGER
ASKED IF I WOULD WRITE TO YOU IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR
NEW REPUBLIC ARTICLE, "WHERE'S HENRY NOW?" HE DOES NOT
AT ALL WISH TO ARGUE WITH THE JUDGEMENTS YOU SET FORTH, BUT
HE WANTED ME TO POINT OUT TO YOU THAT THE ARTICLE DOES CONTAIN
A NUMBER OF FACTUAL INACCURACIES.
WITH REGARD TO THE VIETNAM SETTLEMENT, FOR EXAMPLE, THE U.S.
HAD NEVER HAD, UNTIL OCTOBER 1972, AN OPTION FROM THE
NORTH VIETNAMESE FOR A SETTLEMENT ON TERMS WHICH DID NOT
INCLUDE PRESIDENT THIEU'S OUSTER.THE QUESTION OF NORTH
VIETNAMESE FORCES REMAINING IN SOUTH VIETNAM HAD NOT
FOR FOUR YEARS BEEN AN OBSTACLE TO A SETTLEMENT. THAT
OBSTACLE, BEFORE OCTOBER 1972, HAD BEEN THE DEMAND FOR'
THE REMOVAL nc TWTV11_
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/29: LOC-HAK-259-6-61-1
MORI/CDF
C03344769 pages
4-5
 WITH RESPECT TO THE MEETING OF THE NATIONAL S>?:CUK11 Y
COUNCIL OU7 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/29: LOC-HAK-259-6-61-1
OCTOBER, IT IS WHOLLY INCC C1 lu SAY 1nAt UNLT
SCHLESINGER WAS PRESENT. A TENDING THE ENTIRE MEETING -
WERE SECRETARY SCHLESINGER, DIRECTOR COLEY, ADMIRAL
MOORER, GENERAL HAIL, AND MYSELF. IN SHORT, EXCEPT FOR
THE PRESIDENT, THE ENTIRE EXECUTIVE MEMBERSHIP OF THE
NSC WAS PHYSICALLY PRESENT, THERE NOT BEING AT THAT TIME
A VICE PRESIDENT. MOREOVER, OUTSIDE THE MEETING ROOM THERE
WAS A TASK FORCE OF THE NSC STAFF WORKING ON SOVIET ASPECTS
OF THE SITUATION AND, IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, A
SIMILAR TASK FORCE WORKING ON MIDDLE EAST ASPECTS. I SHOULD
ALSO POINT OUT THAT THE JUDGEMENTS RENDERED BY THE
MEETING PARTICIPANTS WERE UNANIMOUS.
YOUR STATEMENT ABOUT AN ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE WHEAT
DEAL AND THE CONCLUSION OF THE FIRST STRATEGIC ARMS
LIMITATION AGREEMENT IS ALSO INACCURATE. THE WHEAT DEAL
HAD NOTHING WHATEVER TO DO WITH THE 1972 SALT AGREEMENT.
WHEAT WAS NEVER DISCUSSED BY PRESIDENT NIXON AND GENERAL
SECRETARY BREZHNEV AT THE SUMMIT. THERE HAD EARLIER
BEEN DISCUSSIONS ABOUT WHEAT BETWEEN LOWER LEVEL OFFICIALS,
BUT THEY PROVED TO BE ABORTIVE. THE AMOUNTS BEING CONSI-
DERED WERE DEEMED TO BE TOO SMALL TO BE WORTHY OF CONSIDERATION
AT THE SUMMIT. THE WHEAT DEAL WHICH WAS SUBSEQUENTLY
CONSUMMATED WAS NOT PICKED UP FOR AT LEAST FOUR WEEKS
THEREAFTER AND THEN IN PURELY TECHNICAL CHANNELS-- AND
IN TERMS VERY DIFFERENT FROM WHAT HAD BEEN EARLIER PROPOSED.
I MIGHT POINT OUT, IN CLOSING, THAT YOUR INTIMATION THAT
SALT I MAY HAVE "OFFERED THE RUSSIANS AN EDGE" HARDLY
APPEARS JUSTIFIED. THE RESTRICTIONS ON OFFENSIVE WEAPONS
CONTAINED IN SALT I LAY IN THOSE AREAS WHERE THE USSR
HAD UNDER WAY VERY ACTIVE PROGRAMS--THE CONSTRUCTION
OF LAND AND SEA BASED LAUNCHERS. CONVERSELY, AREAS WHERE
THE U.S. ENJOYED RELATIVE ADVANTAGE--BOMBERS AND MIRV'S--
REMAINED UNCONSTRAINED. AN EXAMINATION OF THE GROWING
DISPARITY IN THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND
THE USSR SINCE THE SALT I AGREEMENT AMPLY ILLUSTRATES
THIS LATTER POINT.
SINCERELY,
BRENT SCOWCROFT
MAJOR GENERAL, USAF
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
DO YOU WANT TO LET HIM PRINT THE LETTER?
WARM REGARDS.
681
233 1
J
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/29: LOC-HAK-259-6-61-1