MESSAGE FROM MR. LADD, PHNOM PENH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-449-1-10-1
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: December 8, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/26: LOC-HAK-449-1-10-1
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT
74,-//)/('
THE PRESLDENT
HENRY A? tassmarat
Message from Mr. Ladd, Phnom Penh
In response to a quary from General Haig, Mr. Ladd has forwarded
views on irresponsible news reporting from Phnom Penh, commented on
the military situation in Cambodia and warmly endorsed a visit from
General
Although I recommend you rood Mr. Ladd's cable In it* entirety, it makes
the following points,
-- Mr. Wheeler of Associated Press end Mr. Foster of Scripps
Howard, both stationed in Phnom Penh. are appsr.ntly the worst violators
of objective reporting on the Cambodian situation. Ladd suggests they
have become prophets of doom for the following reasons:
1. They do not have all the facts,
Z. They ere not qualified observers.
3. They carry residual resentment en
effort In Cambodia (and in Vietnam).
tire U.S.
4. la May and June they predicted Imminent collapse and
now seek to exploit every negative factor they can uncover to justify
their earlier noiejudgmeats.
S Ladd considers them sick* both mentally and phyotcilly.
that some of their more responsible associates share
goes on to Outline difficulties currently being experienced
by Combediam force* and attributes much of them to their limited equipage
and training and to their lock of experience at the battalion and brigade level.
T OP SECRICT/SZNISTrIV
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ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
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FiN ELY
3 December 19 70
MEMORANDUM FOR: Brigadier General Alexander M. Haig
Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The following message (Phnom Penh 414) from Mr. Ladd for
Brigadier General Haig was received this morning, 3 December 1970:
"Top Secret Sensitive Exclusive Eyes Only
"To: Brig. Gen. Haig, The White House
"From: Mr. Ladd, Phnom Penh 414
"1. I know full well the pressures of irresponsible news
reporting under which you must labor. Wheeler and all of the other
U.S. newsmen are briefed on a background basis every Thursday
afternoon by the Ambassador. From time to time I participate in
these briefings and on a time consuming almost daily basis am
privately interviewed by individual newsmen. The newsmen also
occasionally travel to some nearby field unit and talk to local FANK
commanders. The journalists draw their own conclusions from their
relatively limited observations and write according to what I suppose
they consider a profound analysis.
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"2. In my own case, I draw my conclusions from 30 years
of study and professional military and academic association with the
? Far East in general and during the past ten years, Indochina in
particular. I also have access to a great deal more pertinent and
timely information than do the journalists to include intelligence,
logistics, training, FANK plans, FANK assets, etc. I have never
been "optimistic" nor have I "long insisted the war was going favor-
ably for the Cambodians" as I understand Jim Foster of Scripps
Howard recently reported. That may be one journalist's interpretation
of my analysis of facts as I see them but it is just that -- his interpre-
tation colored by his own views and coast (sic) in opposition to his own.
TOP SEPSITIVE
Ric MI V ,
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"3. Certainly you must be aware that there are some jour-
nalists here who would like nothing more than to see this U.S.
effort in Cambodia fail and to make Mr. Nixon appear foolish.
Fortunately, those who feel that way in a dedicated sense are
relatively few. Unfortunately, most of them live here in Phnom
Penh and partially because of their datelines and emotional accounts
seem to get banner play at home. On several occasions I have told
you of their irresponsible conduct both professionally and personally.
A review of my message file to you will verify this. At first I
believed I might be able to get through to them in some small way
to give them a more objective picture of what is actually going on in
Cambodia. Those men simply do not care even to think objectively
much less write objectively.
"4. I believe the Wheeler, Foster and other prophet-of-doom
stories vary so drastically from the Ambassador's official assess-
ment and my previous report to you because:
"a. The writers do not have access to all of the infor-
mation necessary to make a responsible military assessment
of the over-all situation in Cambodia.
"b. The writers are not professionally qualified to make
an objective military analysis of the over-all situation in
Cambodia.
"c. For reasons of their own, unknown to me, the writers
carry a residual resentment to the entire U.S. effort in
Cambodia (and in Vietnam) and seek in every possible way
to discredit any U.S. success in this endeavor.
"d. In the earlier days of May and June these writers
predicted the imminent collapse of the poorly prepared
Cambodian military forces and of the salvation government
of Lon Nol. This did not happen and these men continue to seek
every negative factor they can uncover to belittle, discredit and
demean both FANK and the government.
2
1.
c,
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"e. Personally, I consider these single-minded disaster-
oriented writers to be sick both mentally and physically and
they are certainly doing a disservice to themselves, their
profession and their country. Some of their more responsible
professional associates agree with me on these points. The
Ambassador also deplores their distortions of facts.
"5. I cannot cite evidence of deliberate distortions. They
simply see every action, lack of action, event, statement, develop-
ment and rumor in an entirely different light than I do, than the
Ambassador does, than the DATT does and than
"6. I wrote the Ambassador's assessment which then became
a country team paper. Therefore, I shall not attempt to repeat it
here. The enemy announced that he would take the offensive in early
November. ?He makes, this sort of announcement periodically, as
you well know. He did launch an offensive in early November (after
some eight weeks lull in enemy activity) and he managed in 24 hours
to take and hold a short piece of road and to blow a bridge on Route 7.
He also took the Pichnil Pass on Route 4. His major offensive ended
with these two achievements. Other scattered attacks did take place
throughout the countryside but none were particularly significant.
It is my personal opinion that FANK forces on Routes 4 and 7 reacted
to the enemy offensive rather poorly and are remiss for having lost
control of both areas. Certainly they were and still are too slow in
reopening those roads. FANK is not, however, a well-trained or
experienced military force. The FANK units at any one point must
react to the enemy as best they can. FANK does have a few reason-
ably capable units but if these units are not directly involved in a
specific enemy action and happen to be employed elsewhere, FANK
does not have the capability of disengaging them immediately or ?
moving them rapidly to every brushfire. Also, as both the Ambassador
and I have reported, FANK leadership at battalion and brigade level
is lacking in professionalism, experience and confidence.
"7. In its own way, however, and in the fact of difficulties
most other forces that have fought the VC/NVA would consider
insurmountable, FANK has managed to struggle from a situation
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considered to be almost hopeless in May and June to a position in
which it can hold the enemy reasonably at bay and at the same time
improve its own military posture on a steadily growing basis. I
would be the last person to make any extravagant claims that FANK
is comparable to a modern and efficient military force or that it
should be expected to achieve feats of military brilliance. No one
else should expect miracles of FANK. With our limited material
assistance and their own courage, dedication and common sense,
the Cambodians are a damn site better off today than they were six
months ago. The government is non-communist and stronger than
it was six months ago. There are no American military stationed
in Cambodia other than the three working with me and the Attache
group. There is a war going on here against a determined enemy
aggressor force. With what has been provided to FANK and in strict
conformance with the restraints placed upon our penny-ante operation
here in. Phnom Penh, I am encouraged, but not optimistic, that the
mission you assigned to me is being achieved in accordance with the
President's guidance.
"8. A visit from you would be most welcome. There are many
matters I need to discuss with you and I am convinced your first-
hand assessment of conditions here would be of great service to the
President. I extend an invitation for you to stay with Betty and me.
First we want you to be with us and second, if you are not staying with
us I am sure I will be permitted very little time with you alone. It
won't be a deliberate effort to isolate us but such is the fate of
dignitaries who come this way. If it would be politically awkward
for you to accept my invitation on the grounds of long standing personal
friendship, I would appreciate your insistance on a few hours con-
sultation with me while you are here. I shall await news of your trip
through other channels. Why don't you bring Pat along with you?
Regards.
"Top Secret Sensitive Exclusively Eyes Only"
TO? ST-CP,:i SENSITIVE
E.311" "A179 SI
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