HAS HANOI DECIDED ON OFFENSIVE?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-453-2-18-7
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2009
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: November 29, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/12/10: LOC-HAK-453-2-18-7
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCI
TOP SECRET .,SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY K.T. GER
FROM: W. R. Smy
SUBJECT: Has Hanoi Decided ?n.Offensive?
I' have asked several Vietnam analysts why recetrt estimates have stated that
Hanoi has not yet.decided'on.a dry season offensive. They replied as follows:
There is no. eviden~ce in. North Vietnamese public. or intercepted material which
suggests any tactical dispute or any uncertainty about whether to proceed. In-
stead, the case for alleged indecision rests on two bases: first, that the North
Vietnamese do not have quite enough troops in the Highlands and in the COSVN
to provide a substantial reserve for a major offensive; second, the historical
experience that the North Vietnamese often do not fully commit themselves to
an offensive until they see how the first moves in a potential offensive have gone.
The analysts also indicated that there is a measure of bureaucratic protection in
the claim for indecision: it makes it easier for an analyst to argue that the
North Vietnamese changed their mind after he had made his estimate.
However, I was also told that if infiltration continues along present lines
and ultimately goes as high as projected in one sensitive North Vietnamese
intercept, Hanoi will have more than enough reserves to launch a major
offensive. I was. also told that the new route structure is so good that Hanoi
does not really need to commit its troops to the South as early as in the past.
The only real question, according to the analysts, is the type of offensive.
They doubt that Hanoi will repeat the 1968 or 1972 exercises, but may instead
try for the kind of rolling offensive that,could "bloody'' South Vietnamese forces
without generating enough steam to provoke American Congressional support for
our involvement. Estimates differ: whether the North Vietnamese would really
gain much from that kind of operation.
An element of uncertainty, which you can judge better than I,, is whether
Mowcow and Peking have really weighed in firmly. My impression has
always been that neither felt free to do so and that the North Vietnamese
ultimately heeded no counsel but their own. I am not sure if that still holds
in the days of detente. NSA review
completed
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY XGDS
DECLAS - IMPDET
BYAUTH - HAKI$SThTGER
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/12/10 : LOC-HAK-453-2-18-7
November 29, 1973