ASSESSMENT OF CAMBODIAN MILITARY SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-459-11-9-1
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: December 15, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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~L_No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/04/26 : LOC-HAK-459-11-9-1
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T~SE WHITE HOUSE
`.~'OP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FRAM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
.SUBJECT: Assessment of Cambodian Military Situation
An accurate, factual assessment of the situation in Cambodia
is difficult to achieve because of the lack of valid information
relating to FANK capabilities and enemy actions. While the Lon'
Nol strategy is well known, the detailed planning infarmation on
FANK operations in support of this strategy is not available on
a timely or reliable basis. As a result, many of the points made
in this assessment are judgmental in nature.
The enemy's current effort in Cambodia .appears designed to
ensure the security of his logistic corridor from southern Lavs,
build up the ~.nsurgency, isolate Phnom Penh, interdict Cambodian
LOCs, and .force the FANK into a defensive posture where it must
react to Comtaaunirt initiatives. While basically employing economy
of force tactics, the enemy is prepared to raise the level of com--
bat where conditions are favorable. Enemy strength in Cambodia i.s
estimated to number 50,000--60,000 VC/NVA and 5,000---10,000 Khmer
Corrnnunists. Approximately half the VC/NVA are combat troops.
Enemy forges have already cut Routes 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 and
Route 1 is threatened. Route 5 has been periodically inter-
dicted and will, probably come under increasing pressure. The
only major water route, the Mekong River, is susceptible to
interdiction and the enemy can, be expected to attempt to .block
the channel by mining or the sinking of a large vessel. Control
of Route 1 and the Mekong River is tenuous; it is anticipated
that these arteries could be priority targets for early attack.
This would leave the capital. with only its air LAC. The isola-
tion of Phn?m Penh would weaken and disrupt the central government
by undermining its economic base: and political influence. Amore
'immediate result would be the isolation of FANK forces in the
countryside fxom their supply centers which are located in the
hhnam Penh area.
Assuming-continued Allied military and logistic support to
the FANK, this-enemy probably cannot overrun Gambadia. The Com-
muni,~s could, however, within the near term, commit a sizeable
Information
December 15, 1970
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/04/26 : LOC-HAK-459-11-9-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/04/26 : LOC-HAK-459-11-9-1
TOk SECRET
number of theadditional 59 VCENVA battalions deployed in Cambodaa
between the RVN border and the Mekong. The FANK in all probaba.l--
ity could not cope with this enlarged force without additional
outside assistance, to include a greater commitment of ARVN forces.
Furthermore, the combat activity during the past two. weeks has high-
li.ghted the marginal combat effectiveness of FANK forces. Only
time can remedy the deficiencies in FANK leadership, .training, and
experience.
Significant enemy supply movements into Cambodia have not been
detected to date. kiowever, within the next four to six weeks. some
of the supplies which entered the Laotian Panhandle since maid-
November should be arriving in the enemy's Base Areas in Kratie,
Chhlong, and Prek Kak. while the enemy's actual logistical situa-
ta:on is unclear, there is no indication that a lack of supplies
has been a critical limiting factor in ha_s current operations.
The enemy's most likely course of action in Cambodia in the near
term will be to continue interdiction and harassment throughout
the country, intensify his efforts to isolate Phnom Penh, and
exploit his current position in the Kompong Cham area.. Should
the enemy initially experience a measure of success against the
"combined ARVN/FANK forces at Kompong Chain, he will probably attempt...
to exploit his advantage, However, if the ARVN~FANK task force is
effective, the VN/NVA forces probably will avoid contact and await
a more favorable opportunity.
- FANK forces have undergone significant changes and growth
from an ill-trained and equipped force of about 37,500 men in March
1970, to approximately 163,000 men today. However, the leadership
available at the beginning of the expansion period, considered
barely adequate at that time, is the same core of officers and
NCOs available today. An important adjunct to leadership is an
effective command and control system. zn addition to equipment,
training and experience, a structure is necessary which facila.ta~es
timely accurate reporting and, in turn, leads to balanced tactical
decisions and timely reaction. The conflicting and delayed reports
of the friendly and. enemy situation emanating from FANK would
indicate that such a structure is not functioning at this time.
Training has been completed for 18,761 Cambodians and
3,755
additional troops are receiva_ng out-of-country training.
FANK in-
country formal training has been conducted for 27 companies. The
l65 million dollar MAP add-on will, overcome many unsophisticated
equipment and ammunition shortages. The high morale and determina-
tion of the Gamboda_an people is a most encouraging factor, but the
GKR forces must be rated marginally effective at best.,
Lon Nod. is employing an economy of force strategy which concen~
trates friendly forces south of Routes 6 and 7 -and relinquishes in
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/04/26 : LOC-HAK-459-11-9-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/04/26 : LOC-HAK-459-11-9-1
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TOP SECRET
the near time game control of the less populated northeast area,
of, Cambodia to 'the enemy. Tha..s strategy is designed to utilize
available friendly military forces for the defense a~ large ,
cities, major LOCs, bases, and'seaports and security of price
and coffee areas.
While a reassessment of this strategy is not considered
necessary, it should be realized that the accomplishment of near
term .goals. of the GKR will not be realized until FANK has reached
the level of effectiveness necessary to establish effective can-
trol of selected areas. FANK inability to maintain LOCs in an
open condition has been amply demonstrated. Weakness of the GKR
in-.depth control of the population?has been manifested in the
recent increase in terrorist-type incidents.
The defense of Cambodia is strengthened by both US and VNAF
aircraft-including fighter bambers, fixed wing gunships and B-52s
which attack suitable targets. The enemy build-~up is hampered by
the intensive US air interdiction campaign directed against enemy.
LOCs which extend through Laos into Cambodia and RVN. VNN opera-
tions deny infiltration by sea and provide security on the lower
Mekong. The RVNAF are presently conducting three cross-bordex:
operations involving 10,891 troops, to prevent reestablishment
of VC/NVA base areas. A fouz?th operation was, initiated 14 Decem-
ber then the assault echelon of a .2,1'70 man task force landed at
and is operating in the vicinity of Kompong Cham. RVNAF, in
coordination with the FANK, is actively planning follow--on opera-
tions in ,the Chup Flantation, Kampot-Takeo, Lompong Som and Phnom
Penh areas. ?
Careful balance is. maintained between RVNAF participation
in out-of-country operations and the continuation of in-country
efforts. The RVNAF ability to participate to any major extent
in Cambodia is related directly to the generation of farces in
excess to in-country priority efforts, ability o~ US forces to
.relieve RVNAF for out-of-country operations and the provision by
the US of requisite support to insure success. The GVN recognizes
the impact of maintaining a friendly GKR. Considerable suppart
has been provided to the GKR in ttze forms of equipment, limited
training of FANK forces and the conduct of operations within
Cambodia. However, GVN/GKR ability to respond with speed and
firepower .is constrained by extremely limited airlift and heli-
copter capability.
In summary, Asianixation of the efforts against the common
enemy is being put to a test, with a sober picture painted in
light of the current enemy capability and demonstrated Level of
..FANK effectiveness. .
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/04/26 : LOC-HAK-459-11-9-1
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 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/04/26 : LOC-HAK-459-11-9-1
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~7HE WHITE I-1UUSE
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/04/26 : LOC-HAK-459-11-9-1