1. YOUR PEKING 21 RECEIVED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-462-7-11-9
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2011
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: July 19, 1973
• Content Type: CABLE

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/12/20: LOC-HAK-462-7-11-9
''OP C '-'T, 3E July 19, 1973 R EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
TO: JENKINS/HOLDRIDGE
1. Your Peking 21 received.
2. The following is the text of a message passed to me by the LOPRC
today:
Quote
1. The Chinese side has noted the proposal put to the Chief of the
Chinese Liaison Office Huang Chen that Dr. Kissinger visit China on
August 6. As the first half of August is inconvenient to the Chinese
side, we would welcome Dr. Kissinger to visit China on August 16.
2. The Chinese side suggests that the two sides simultaneously publish
the news of Dr. Kissinger's visit to China on August 6- or 9. The contents
of the news to be published may be decided upon later through consulta-
tions.
End Quote
State Dept. review
completed
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ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/12/20: LOC-HAK-462-7-11-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/12/20: LOC-HAK-462-7-11-9
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rs_ lqL_ M 7/.5b~
PEKING 21
July 19, 1973
TO: HENRY KISSINGER
FROM: JENKINS/HOLDRIDGE
REF: WASHINGTON 019
1. We believe it significant that Cambodia is only subject
of Chinese message, and that we detect no change whatever in
our relationship and any other context. Lack of grace and
wording we believe in part caused by Magnuson lack of grace
in interview with Chou. It is very possible that first and
third of reasons you conjecture are at play (para two your
tel). If party congress is taking shape, it may indeed be
inconvenient for you to come at time planned. Believe fundamental
policy change not involved. Chinese calculate we are in weak
position in Cambodia. They were unquestionably angered by our
last spurt of intensified bombing, not to mention Chou's anger
produced by Magnuson's counseling "patience" while that was
going on. Even the attitude of others of the Congressional
Party was read by the Chinese as arrogance and was well designed
to trigger sensitive Chinese pride. As one of many instances,
Mrs. Magnuson remarked to Wang Hai-Jung, whom you well know is
close to Mao, that the best ambassadors which Americans could
possibly send to China would be washing machines and electric
irons.
2. Chinese in their public statements have carefully avoided
doing anything like all the way with Sihanouk's position, such
as e.g. Chou En-lai's banquet speech of July 6 was much milder
than Sihanouk's. Anniversary of Mao's May 20, 1970 declaration
on Cambodia passed this year without a murmur, another example
of Chinese care in public. Yet they believe that he is the
only answer at this stage, and we believe that they also consider
that it is the most graceful way out for us, too. Sihanouk,
despite his (AEEVEJUSTNOM), has indicated that the slate can
be wiped clean so far as the United States is concerned. The
Chinese are convinced that we cannot win militarily, and
could not even if the Congress had not acted as it has -- although
we might have further postponed the day of reckoning similar to
the one which they believe we now face.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/12/20: LOC-HAK-462-7-11-9
 ,.- No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/12/20 : LOC-HAK-462-7-11-9
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3. We do not read this as a brutal message, but rather a
restatement of a firm Chinese position. On the other hand
the Chinese doubtless find this no time for grace, given the
above considerations and probably puzzlement as to why we do
not now see the situation much as they do. We do not believe
the Chinese want to embarass the United States, and certainly
not you personally, in any way they can avoid. They probably
reason there is no alternative to the course they want us to
take. And they appear to have considerable faith in Cambodian
nationalisms ability to prevent a vacuum which would tempt
the Soviets or even leave the path open to a very disturbing
degree to the Vietnamese. They doubt we can prop up Lon Nol,
and believe we should accept what appears to them to be the
best way out for us as well as them. All of our basic areas
of common ground appear intact to us.
4. We therefore suggest you consider postponing (not cancelling)
your trip with a correct note just short of cool, with
observation date now contemplated may not be convenient for
either side, and suggesting that a date perhaps in September but
to be later determined seems advisable. You may still wish
Ambassador Bruce to have frank call on Ch'iao, or in this case
Chou, to test whether our fundamental relationship is not indeed
still fully intact, and explore in detail what the Chinese
have in mind.
5. If you have any thought of trying to make contact with
Sihanouk or elements close to him, you might wish to indicate
so to the Chinese, who certainly will be expecting some response
to their message. You could do this in the note to them on your
visit or through Ambassador Bruce, pointing out in either case
the inappropriateness of using the Mauritanian channel referred
to by Sihanouk is his AFP interview of July 17, and noting that
a better channel is needed.
6. Warm Regards.
END OF MESSAGE
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/12/20: LOC-HAK-462-7-11-9