MODERNIZATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-502-2-4-7
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 30, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 12, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/30: LOC-HAK-502-2-4-7
MEMORANDUM ~ ,. ?'
THE WHITE HOUSE
1 1.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE November 12, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Modernization of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
In commenting on a lett'r from the spokesman for the Peace with Freedom
Committee, you expressed concern over failure to move faster on "Viet-
namization. " You indicated interest in Defense's answer to the allegation
that schedules for modernization and 'equipment are still those laid down
in 1968.
Attached at Tab A is Mel Lairds, response. He states categorically that
the allegation is erroneous and points out, inter alia, that:
-- A comprehensive plan for accelerated expansion and moderni-
zation was approved in April 1969.
A formal review of requirements to meet the combined Viet'
Cong-North Vietnamese army threat was ordered in August 1969.
-- A 14 percent increase in South Vietnamese military strength
was approved in August 1969.
-- Equipment delivery requirements are reviewed and adjusted
frequently and the program has been responsive to the situation.
-- Leadership, motivation and morale programs are also under
review, but it is more difficult to measure levels of improvement.
-- Modernizing procedures are sound, current and realistic;
and there is an ongoing effort to improve them.
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/30: LOC-HAK-502-2-4-7
 ?. o rf rT ...-.e rnW ss No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/30 : LOC-HAK-502-2-4-7
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON. Ol Q. Z0301
6 OCT 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Modernization of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
I understand you recently have received a report to the effect
that schedules for modernizing and equipping the Republic of Vietnam
Armed Forces have not been revised since they were drawn up In Decem-
ber of 1968. This report is erroneous. Equipment modernization
requirements and associated delivery schedules for the Republic of
Vietnam Armed Forces have been revised from the approval of modifi-
cations generated by a continuing review of the program, including
equipment requirements and delivery schedules.
In addition'to many'minor`adjustments, several major modifica-
tions to the program have been approved since 20 January 1969. For
example, on 12 February, an accelerated expansion and modernization
of the Vietnamese Navy was directed together with a review of per-
sonnel and equipment requirements. A similar review for the other
Republic of Vietnam Services already was under way. On 28 April,
a comprehensive plan for the accelerated expansion and modernization
of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces was approved. This plan
Included schedules for selective equipment turnover from US units
to Republic of Vietnam units and additional equipment requirements
for an increase in logistic forces. On 12 August 1969, 1 directed
a formal review of the current program for modernization and improve-
ment of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces with the goal of
developing in these forces the capability to cope successfully with
the combined Viet Cong -- North Vietnamese Army threat. At the same
time, I approved certain of the proposals which were presented by
the Government of Vietnam at the Midway Conference and subsequently
modified by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This approval involved, inter
alia, a 14 percent increase in strength of the Republic-of Vietnam
Armed Forces, and associated modern equipment requirements.
The RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program is dual in nature.
As I mentioned in my .memoranda forwarding the responses to NSSM 36,
the Program has a tangible side -- the provision of modern equipment --
which Is readily quantifiable, and an intangible side which is diffi-
cult to quantify objectively. This "softer" side includes training
and other military programs aimed at Improving leadership, motivation
and morale. Our management procedures for review and adjustment of
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/30: LOC-HAK-502-2-4-7
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equipment requirements have so far kept the Program current and
responsive to the situation in Vietnam. In general, these procedures
follow conventional staff channels.
Overall Program management responsibility within this Defense
Department is vested in the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-
national Security Affairs, and specifically in the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs. The latter
is charged with specific responsibility for Vietnamization. He
conducts daily meetings of a Vietnamization Task Group comprised of
representatives of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense. In addition,
I meet daily with the Assistant Secretary (ISA) and his Deputy.
The Program-is reviewed on a consistent and recurring basis by the
MACV, Pacific Command, Joint, and Service staffs. In Saigon, for
example, COMUSMACV changes and updates equipment requirements based
on his continuing appraisal of:
- The status of RVNAF individual and unit training;
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Progress on the intangible side of the Improvement and Moderniza-
tion Program is different in kind from progress on the equipment side.
Management aspects are less well defined and improvement harder to
measure. Management again is through conventional staff channels
and the Vietnamization Task Group. Although we can Identify and
monitor a number of indicators, we cannot measure rates or absolute
levels of improvement in leadership, motivation and morale.
I am seeking improvement of management procedures on the intangible
side of the Program. In addition to pressing for refinement of our
efforts to evaluate the factors just listed, I directed on August 12
a further review of our actions to:
- Determine the optimum RVNAF force structure.
- Develop strategy an4 tactics best suited to RVNAF
capabilities.
1
Improve RVNAF leadership
I believe the procedures being employed in modernizing the Republic
of Vietnam Armed Forces are sound, current, and geared to the realities
of the situation in South Vietnam. We are, of course, trying consistently
Recent combat experience;; and
Progress in octivating new RVNAF units.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/30: LOC-HAK-502-2-4-7