Published on CIA FOIA (foia.cia.gov) (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom)


HAYKAL RECALLS 7 NOV. TALK WITH KISSINGER

Document Type: 
CREST [1]
Collection: 
Library of Congress [2]
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
LOC-HAK-136-1-2-7
Release Decision: 
RIFLIM
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date: 
August 12, 2010
Sequence Number: 
2
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 2, 1973
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon LOC-HAK-136-1-2-7.pdf [3]270.54 KB
Body: 
FBIS 90 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY /L. A. - No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/08/12: LOC-HAK-136-1-2-7 HAYKAL RECALLS 'WV TALK WITH KI55INULK y L041042 PARIS L' EXPRESS IN FRENCH 26 NOV-2 DEC 73 PP 76-77 L (ACCOUNT BY AL-AHRAM CHIEF EDITOR MOHAMMAD HAYKAL OF HIS 7 NOVEMBER CONVERSATION WITH DOCTOR KISSINGER: " MOHAMMAD HAYKAL: KISSINGER TOLD ME..." THIS MATERIAL IS COPYRIGHTED) (TEXT) ON WEDNESDAY 7 NOVEMBER -MR HENRY KISSINGER MET DENT ANWAR AS-SADAT IN CAIRO. IN THE EVENING HE WITH PRESI ASKED TO SPEAK WITH FAMOUS EGYPTIAN JOURNALIST AND POLITICAL ADVISER MOHAMMAND HASSANAYN HAYKAL, EDITOR IN CHIEF OF THE NEWSPAPER AL-AHRAM. THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE WANTED TO EXPLAIN U. S. POLICY IN THE NEAR EAST AND ATTEMPT To GET A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF ARAB FEELINGS. THEIR PRIVATE CONVERSATIQN TOOK PLACE AT THE HILTON HOTEL, WHERE MR KISSINGER OCCUPIED A SEVENTH-FLOOR SUITE ON THE NIGHT OF 7 NOVEMBER. "WHO ARE YOU," ASKED MOHAMMAD HAYKAL, WHO REPORTED THEIR CONVERSATION IN AL-AHRAM, WHEN HE ENTERED. TO THE EGYPTIAN MR KISSINGER COULD HAVE BEEN A "NEGOTIATIOR" IN THE VIETNAM AFFAIR: THE UNITED STATES WAS DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN IT. BUT IN THE MIDDLE EAST? MOHAMMAD HAYKAL POINTED OUT THAT THE U. S. SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL PREVENTED MR KISSINGER FROM POSING AS A "MEDIATOR." "REGARD ME," THE AMERICAN ANSWERED, "AS A PARTY INTERESTED IN THE SOLUTION OF A CRISIS AFFECTING WHAT WE REGARD AS A SENSITIVE PART OF THE WORLD--AND WHERE WE HAVE STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL INTERESTS COUPLED WITH SECURITY C:NSIDERATIONS." A CERTAIN ROLE MR KISSINGER THEN SPELLED OUT, POINT BY POINT, THE BASIS OF U. S. POLICY: 1. WE HAVE STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THIS AREA. 2. THE SOVIET UNION, THE OTHER WORLD SUPERPOWER, ALSO HAS INTERS HERE. 3. WE ARE ENDEAVORING TO CREATE A NEW INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM BASED ON DETENTE IN 114E AFTERMATH OF IHE COLD WAR. BUT DETENTE MUST NOi CAUSE US TO ABANDON TI4IS AREA TO THE SOLE INFLUENCE OF THE OTHER SUPERPOWER. 4. WE DO NOT WANT TO SEE AN ESCALATION OF A CRISIS WHICH MIGHi HARM DETENTE, BECAUSE THIS WOULD BE SO GRAVE THAT ALL MANKIND WOULD BE AFFECTED BY THE CONSEQUENCES. 5. WE HAVE PARTICULAR TIES WITH ISRAEL, WHOSE SECURITY WE HAVE PLEDGED TO PROTECT. NEVERTHELESS WE BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL'S SECURITY CAN BECOME A REALITY ONLY ON CONDITION T(+A'1 YOUR SOVEREIGNTY IS RESPECTED. 6. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT OUR SPECIAL TIES WITH ISRAEL ARE IRRECONCILABLE WITH THE TIES OF FRIE-.DSHIP WHICH WE WISH TO MnTPJTeTN AND STRENGTHEN WITH YOU. No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/08/12: LOC-HAK-136-1-2-7 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/08/12: LOC-HAK-136-1-2-7 EITHER UUR OWN OR CUN.JUNC-11UN W11h Ulht~KS. N lhk- CONTRARY, WE WANT TO SEE ITS PEOPWS GIVEN THE WAY OF LIFE All CONDITIONS OF SECURITY' WHICH THEY WANT AND WHICH CORRESPOND WITH WORLD REALITIES. "THESE ARE THE ELEMENTS OF OUR POLICY AS SPELLED OUT BY PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON AND AS I SEE 'THEM MYSELF, WITHOUT BEING EITHER WHAT YOU CALL AN 'INVOLVED PARTY' OR A ' MEDIATOR."' "YET YOU WILL CONCEDE THAT WHAT It IN FACT, REPRESENT IS THE 'INTEREST' WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS IN THE NEAR EAST CRISIS--AN INTEREST WHICH SPURS IT TO PLAY A CERTAIN ROLE WITH A VIEW TO PROTECT G N ITS OWN INTERESTS AND THE INTERESTS OF OTHERS, WITHOUT THERE BEING ANY INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN THE TWO. "I KNOW THAT HERE I AM TOUCHING UPON A COMPLEX PROBLEM WHICH IS DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH--MORE DIFFICULT THAN GETTING THE GATES OF CHINA OPEN AND MORE DIFFICULT THAN ESTABLISHING UNDERSTANDING WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THE PRESENT PROBLEM HAS A FULL COMPLEMENT OF EXPLOSIVE ELEMENTS OF A HISTORICAL, NATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL NATURE; IT IS CRAMMED WITH VESTIGES OF LONG-STANDING AND RECENT DISPUTES AND WITH SUSPICION COMPLEXES AND PHOBIAS. "I CAME TO THIS PROBLEM FORSEEING WHAT AWAITED ME, KNOWING WELL THAT I REPRESENTED NEITHER AN "INVOLVED PARTY' NOR AN AUTHORIZED 'INTERMEDIARY.' ALL I CLAIM TO BE IS THE SPOKESMAN OF U.S. 'CONCERN.' "LET ME NOW 02NFIDE TO YOU TWO THINGS RELATING TO MY APPROACH TO PRQBLEMS. "THE FIRST IS THAT I DO NOT LIKE 70 TAKE ON A PROBLEM UNLESS I CAN WORK OUT ITS ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OR AT LEAST A LARGE PROPORTION OF THIESE ELEMENTS. IN THE CASE OF VIETNAM U.S. PUBLIC OPINION WANTED THE WAR TO END. IT SO HAPPENED THAT THE REALITIES OF OUR TIME IN PEKING AND MOSCOW WERE ON MY SIDE. BUT IN THE NEAR EAST CRISIS I* CANNOT CALCULATE PRECISELY WHAT MAJOR TRUMPCARDS I HAVE IN MY HAND. SECONDLY, I HAVE A FAILING.... I HAVE ACCUMULATED A SMALL AMOUNT OF THE ASSET OF SUCCESS WHICH I DO NOT WANT TO LOSE. AND I AM NOT TALKING ABOUT THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE...." A LITTLE PATIENCE HERE MR KISSINGER DIGRESSED A LITTLE. HE TOLD MOHAMMAD HAYXAL THAT HIS SON'S SCHOOLFRIENDS HAD TOLD HIM THAT SO ME OF THEIR COMRADES DID NOT THINK THAT HIS FATHER DESERVED THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE AT ALL. "DONT WORRY ABOUT IT," KISSINGER JUNIOR TOLD THEM, "MY MOTHER SAID THE SAME THING!" MR KISSINGER LAUGHED AT THE MEMORY AND THEN ADDED: "MY REPUTATION IS AT STAKE." HE BELIEVES HE HAS SOME CHANCE OF SUCCESS BUT DEMANDS A LITTLE PATIENCE. "I CONFESS No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/08/12: LOC-HAK-136-1-2-7 _ _ No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/08/12: LOC-HAK-136-1-2-7 TMAT I AM AFRAID OF ARAB ROMANTICISM," HE SAID. "PEACE IS NOT JUST AROUND THE CORNER. IT WILL TAKE TIME: SOME 6 MONTHS OR SO OR EVEN A YEAR BEFORE WE SEE ANYTHING CONCRETE EMERGE. WORLD POLITICS IS NOT A CONJURER'S BUSINESS." MR KISSINGER THEN EXPLAINED THE REASONS WHICH PROMPTED HIM TO ASK FOR THE FIRST CEASE-FIRE THE DAY AFTER HOSTILITIES STARTED: "I WAS NOT TAKING ISRAEL'S SIDE, AS YOU BELIEVED ." ON THE CONTRARY, HE STATED, "ALL OUR EXPERTS BELIEVED THAT IF YOU RESTARTED THE WAR YOU WOULD BE EXPOSING YOURSELVES TO A DECISIVE ATTACK BY THE ISRAELI ARMED FORCES. IT WAS THEN THAT I PROPOSED A CEASE- FIRE AND A RETURN TO THE ORIGINAL LINES. I BELIEVED THIS MEASURE WOULD BENEFIT YOU MORE THAN ISRAEL." "I REASONED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING LOGIC," MR KISSINGER SAID, "THE EGYPTIANS HAD EMBARKED ON A PERILOUS ADVENTURE, PROBABLY DRIVEN BY DESPAIR. BUT THE ISRAEL MILITARY FORCES WOULD CONTERATTACK STRONGLY, WHAT WOULD HAPPEN THEN? EGYPT WOULD TURN TO THE SOVIET UNION TO GET IT OUT OF THIS MESS. THE POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES WOULD THEN BE EITHER THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD INTERVENE IN A WAY WHICH WOULD OBLIGE uS TO INTERVENE IN TURN--A FEARFUL PROSPECT FOR BOTH US AND THEM--OR THE SOVIETS WOULD REFUSE TO INTERVENE BY SENDING FORCES BUT WOULD ENTER EGYPT, NEVER TO LEAVE. AND THAT WAS ALSO AN UNPLEASANT PROSPECT FOR US." ' DEC 15362 GDK/WA No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/08/12 : LOC-HAK-136-1-2-7 ~ L No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/08/12: LOC-HAK-136-1-2-7 XXX PROSPECT FOR LI (TEXT) "A MERE 2 DAYS LATER FIGHTING WAS RAGING IN THE SINAI. OUR CALCULATIONS ON THE SIZE OF YOUR CONCENTRATIONS WERE WRONG; OUR FORECASTS AS REGARDS YOUR COMBAT CAPABILITY WERE ALSO WRONG. I ASKED FOR REPORTS ON THE PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE FROM THE PENTAGON AND SEVERAL TIMES ASKED THE U.S. ARMY HIGH COMMAND: 'JUST WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THE NEAR EAST?' I WAS TOLD: `THE SITUATION IS TOTALLY DIFFERENT FROM WHAT WE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE.' WE RECEIVED REPORT AFTER REPORT ON THE CROSSING OF THE CANAL, THE FIGHTING ABILITY OF YOUR FORCES AND THE ARMORED BATTLES IN THE DESERT. AND THE WAR CONTINUED." A FIRM STATEMENT A CEAS IN ORDER TO REINITIATE THFAVIDEA ORAB~E MO MENTEWNENETHE TWOSINGER SAID THAT HE HAD TO AWAIT A ADVERSARIES, BELIEVING THEY HAD ACHIEVED A "CERTAIN SUCCESS," WOULD ACCEPT THE IDEA OF CALLING A HALT "WITHOUT GIVING THE IMPRESSION OF HAVING SUFFERED A DEFEAT." THE CONVERSATION TURNED TO THESIZE ENDFSTHE U.SMRAIDIS ISRAEL AS COMPARED WITH SOVIET AID TO EGYPT MADE A FIRST FIRM STATEMENT: "DO NOT DECEIVE YOURSELF, THE UNITED STATES COULD NOT--EITHER TODAY OR TOMORROW--ALLOW SOVIET ARMS TO WIN A BIG VICTORY, EVEN IF IT WAS NOT DEISIVE, AGAINST U.S. ARMS. THIS HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH ISRAEL OR WITH YOU." HIS SECOND FIRM STATEMENT RAN; "EVEN IF THE ISRAELIS HAD NOT HAD THE ARMS WE SENT THEM, THEY WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PREPARED IN THE POWERLESS SITOUATION YOU SUEZICANALEBEFOREYEVEN RECEIVING THEIR COUNTERATTACK OUR AID." A PRINCESS THEREAFTER IT WAS MR KISSINGERS'S TURN TO ASK THE QUESTIONS. "SINCE WHEN HAS SINAI BEEN EGYPTIAN?" "I WILL SEND YOU A COLLECTION OF LOVE LETTERS WRITTEN ON PAPYRUS 5,000 YEARS AGO. THEY WERE WRITTEN BY AN EGYPTIAN OFFICER FROM THE AL-ARISH GARRISON TO HIS WIFE, A PHARAONIC PRINCESS. 'I AM THINKING OF YOU IN THIS DISTANT PLACE WHERE I MUST REPULSE THE ENEMY WHICH IS ATTACKING THE FRONTIERS OF THE SACRED HOMELAND,' HE TELLS HER. MR KISSINGER, WE ARE AMONG THE MOST ANCIENT PEOPLE IN HISTORY...." MOHAMMAD HAYKAL ENDED BY SPELLING OUT HIS CONCLUSIONS. HE ADMIRES MR KISSINGER BUT SUSPECTS THAT HE THINKS SOLELY IN TERMS OF CORRELATIONS OF FORCES--NOT A GOOD MEANS FOR SOLVING THE CONFLICT. BUT IN ANY EVENT MOHAMMAD HAYKAL NOTES THAT ONE ESSENTIAL FACT REMAINS: THE UNITED STATES IS STILL THE ONLY COUNTRY CAPABLE OF "BRINGING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON ISRAEL AND EVEN MAKING IT BACK DOWN,. ON CONDITION THAT THE U.S. PRESIDENT LEADS INSTEAD OF BEING LED." (ENDALL) 4 DEC 15262 GDK/JZ No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/08/12 : LOC-HAK-136-1-2-7

Source URL: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/loc-hak-136-1-2-7

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[3] https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/LOC-HAK-136-1-2-7.pdf