Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
Body:
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-185-8-37-8
titE~tORAtiDI~M
THE 1~VHITE HOUSE ~ -~ /~~ ?
SECRET/XGDS
MEMORANDUM OF CONVER5ATI~N
DATE AND TIME:
President Nixon
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Amb. Kenneth Rush, Deputy Secretary of State
William Clements, Deputy Secretary of Defense
William Colby, Director,- CIA
Arimiral Thomas Moorer, Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Major General Brent Scowcraft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
Wednesday -October 17, 1973
x:00 p. m.
WSAG Principals: I~Ziddle East War
President: I want to thank you all far your efforts.
No one is more keenly aware of the stakes: Oil and our strategic position.
We can't go dawn the road to a ceasefire without a negotiating effort which
will succeed. The purpose of the meeting this morning [with fog Arab
Foreign Ministers] was to contribute to this. Sarre of these -- not the
Algeriax~s~-- are desperately afraid of being left at the, mercy of the Soviet
Union. The Saudis, Moroccans, and even the Algerians, fear this. The
other aspect is our relations with the Sacrist Union. This is bigger than
the Middle East. We can't allow aSoviet-supported operation to succeed
against an Americaxx-supported operations. If it does, our credibility
everywhere is severely shaken.
We went through this with India and Pakistan. I told the Foreign Ministers that
Israel can play the press, but they should know that iarx the India-Parkista_n cvar,
the public was pro-Indian and I supported Pakistan not because it was popular
but because it was right.
SECRETiXGD5
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-185-8-37-8
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-185-8-37-8
SECRET /XGDS
Ia order to have the influence we need to bring Israel to a settlement, we
have to have their confidence. That is why this airlift. Yau rennember,
Tom [Moorer], that before Cambodia, Westy said we need only go for
Parrot's Beak, and I said take it all.
I know the sealift is controversial but we must be credible. I want it to
go forward. Our diplomacy will probably work before it gets there, but
we must get the message to Israel and to the Soviet Union. We can't get
so much to them that they will be arrogant, but we can't be in the position
where Israel puts pressure on Congress for us to do more.
Kis singer; They have a good plan.
Kissinger: Mr, President, this has been the best-run crisis since you have
been in the White House. We have launched a massive airlift yet we have
gotten only a small bitch in 'PASS and you stand here getting Arab coxn.pli-
rxxents in the Rose Garden.
President: There is sti11 lots of danger. There are lots of units in that area.
The Soviets have gat to choose: Will they risk our whole relationship in order
to test us in the Middle East? They have got to know we won't be pushed
around in our support of any nation anywhere. The second point is that we
have to do enough to have a bargaining position to bung Israel kicking and
screaming to the table.
Kissinger: As the Soviet Union is doing now with Egypt.
President: I know one problem is our NATO friends. We are going to go ahead
and do it. It is very important that DOD be just as effective on the sealift as
on the airlift.
Maarer: Portugal is the only place to land and the crosswind can halt every-
thing. Ten years ago we had bases everywhere.
President: We have to rethink that, and we won't forget the Portuguese.
We are not out of the woods, but we should know in a few days.
Clements: Your military services have just reacted in an outstanding fashion,
Mr. President.
President: So have you a1I. Thank you very much.
SECRET /XGDS
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-185-8-37-8