THE LIKELIHOOD OF A MAJOR NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFENSIVE AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAM BEFORE JUNE 30, 1975

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-242-8-4-0
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 23, 1974
• Content Type: NIE

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Secret
NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATE
The Likelihood of a Major North Vietnamese
Offensive Against South Vietnam
Before June 30, 1975
DOE review completed.
MORI/CDF
C01133549
pages, 1, 2, & 4 -
13
Secret
NIE 53/14.3-1-74
23 May 1974
N2
DIA, USAF, review
completed.
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ATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
zed Disclosure Subject
to Criminal Sanctions
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NIE 53/14.3-1-74
THE LIKELIHOOD OF A MAJOR
NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFENSIVE AGAINST
SOUTH VIETNAM BEFORE JUNE 30, 1975
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SECRET
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCE'T
AS NOTED IN THE TEXT, AS FOLLOWS:
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation I of
the estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments
of State, Defense, Treasury and National Security Agency.
Concurring:
The Deputy Dilrector of Central Intelligence representing the Central Intelligence
Agency
The Director of Intelligence and Research representing the Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, National Security Agency
The Assistant General Manager for National Security representing the Atomic
Energy Commission
The Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury representing the Departmen
of the Treasury
Abstaining:
The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside
of his jurisdiction.
ALSO PARTICIPATING:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
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THE LIKELIHOOD OF A MAJOR
NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFENSIVE AGAINST
SOUTH VIETNAM BEFORE JUNE 30, 1975
PRECIS
A major Communist offensive in South Vietnam is unlikely during
1974. The picture for the first half of 1975, however, is less clear, and
there obviously is a substantial risk that Hanoi will opt for a major
offensive during this period. But our best judgment now is that Hanoi
will not do so.'
If unforeseen and dramatic new developments occurred, the Com-
munists could easily shift course to take advantage of them.
- They have the capability to launch an offensive with little warn-
ing.
- We expect the North Vietnamese to reassess their situation this
summer or fall,
`The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, believes that the "best judgment" expressed
in this paragraph is unduly optimistic. He believes that the chances are at least even that North
Vietnam will undertake a major offensive during the first half of 1975. For his reasoning see
the footnote to paragraph 15 on page 8.
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, and the Assistant General Manager for
National Security, Atomic Energy Commission, share this view.
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- Changes both in South Vietnam and in the international situatio i,
particularly in the US, will weigh heavily in their calculations.
- The North Vietnamese would also consider the views of the Sovi t
Union and China, but the influence of Moscow and Peking on a y
reassessment in Hanoi would not be decisive.
Should a major offensive occur, the Communists could retake Quay g
Tri City, and perhaps capture Hue in MR 1, Kontum and Pleiku citi s
in MR 2 and Taffy Ninh City in MR 3. If the Communists persisted "
their offensive, this initial situation would probably be followed by a
period of inconclusive fighting and, over time, further GVN losse
ARVN might bei unable to regain the initiative, and it would be que -
tionable whether the GVN would be able to survive without comb t
participation by US Air Force and Navy units. At a minimum, larg -
scale US logistic support would be required to stop the Communi t
drive.
Even if there is not a major offensive during the next year, curre t
Communist strategy does call for some increase in the tempo of th
conflict.
Furthermore, it is clear that at some point Hanoi will shift back t
major warfare.
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DISCUSSION
1. Hanoi continues to demonstrate its deter-
mination to impose Communist control on the
South. The North Vietnamese leadership, how-
ever, presently views the task of achieving
victory in the South as "complex," "difficult,"
and "protracted." In this sense, Hanoi is faced
with a continuing dilemma. The Communist
position in South Vietnam is not perceptibly
improving. Even if the GVN's economy deteri-
orated markedly or US aid were curtailed,
the Communists would still not he able to top-
ple the GVN without major military action.
Sharply increasing Communist military pres-
sure, on the other hand, would involve a con-
siderable gamble. Should South Vietnam suc-
cessfully weather a Communist offensive, the
GVN's position would be further strengthened.
But should the North Vietnamese repeatedly
postpone a decision in favor of major military
action, they would run the risk of having the
GVN's strength evolve to a point where they
could not topple it.
The Military Balance
2. North Vietnamese forces in South Viet-
nam are now stronger than they were at the
time of the cease-fire:
- Hanoi is pressing ahead with its military
modernization and improvement pro-
grams.
- The NVA/VC have. more men, armor,
artillery, and air defense weapons in
South Vietnam than they did when the
cease-fire went into effect.
--- The Communists already have on hand
sufficient materiel to support offensive
operations at the 1972 level for well over
a year. An improved logistics and per-
sonnel infiltration system permits year-
round deliveries to South Vietnam.
'The military balance and the outcome of various
offensive scenarios are treated in detail in an Inter-
agency Memorandum entitled South Vietnamn: A Net
Military Assesswnent, SC 01984/74, dated 2 April
1.974.
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- There are an additional six infantry divi- power pools in the southern part of South
sions in reserve in Notth Vietnam which
could be rapidly deployed to South Viet-
nam.
- Communist forces have improved with
the infiltration of personnel and the in-
stitution of remedial training programs
to overcome shortcomings that emerged
during the fighting in 1972.
- The Communists nowt have wider mili-
tary options during de period June to
September than previously. (This is the
rainy season in most of the country.)
But the recent improvements in Commu-
nist capabilities do not fully alleviate the
problems the NVA have traditionally en-
countered in operating during the wet
season.
3. The South Vietnamese have also strength-
ened their force structure:
- South Vietnam maintaihis about twice as
many combat troops under arms as the
Communists have deployed in the South.
The South Vietnamese received suffi-
cient material before the cease-fire-
most importantly aircraft, armor and ar-
tillery--to assure that Oven now they re-
tain a country-wide edge in firepower
assets.
In the 16 months singe the cease-fire,
the South Vietnamese logistic command
moved from almost total dependence on
the US to a position where it is now able
to do a creditable job.
4. In the event of a major Communist of-
fensive, the outcome would depend on the
availability of US support fot South Vietnam:
- If the Communists committed a substan-
tial portion of their six-division strategic
reserve and built up replacement man-
- They could retake Quang Tri ity, per-
haps capture Hue, and mak sizable
gains in southern MR I.
- In western MR 2, Kontum ai d Pleiku
cities might also fall, and so e gains,
possibly including the fall of ay Ninh
City, would accrue to the Co imunists
north and northwest of Saigon in MR 3.
- If the Communists persisted in their of-
fensive, this initial situation wo Id prob-
ably be followed by a period of neonclu-
sive fighting and, over time, further
GVN losses. ARVN might be i nable to
regain the initiative, and it ould be
questionable whether the GVN ould be
able to survive without combat articipa-
tion by US Air Force and Navy units.
- At a minimum, large-scale US logistic
support would be required to top the
Communist drive.
The Political Balance
5. Politically, the GVN is stronger han the
Communists .
The GVN has a generally effect)
ernmental structure extending c{
villages and hamlets. Its police a
tary presence in most populate
severely limits Communist a,
President Thieu retains the bac
the army and the acceptance
South Vietnamese; he has suo
isolated or out-maneuvered mos
non-Communist opposition.
.ve gov-
[own to
^d mili-
d areas
aivities.
king of
Df most
essfully
of the
- The Communists are not optimi~
they can extract major concessio:
Thicu for the foreseeable future
there is an early prospect for a c
government through a "Third F
tic that
.is from
or that
oalition
Xce."
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Hanoi has recognized that Communist
political stagnation is its most serious
weakness and has instructed its southern
cadre to make a maximum effort to re-
build the infrastructure and undermine
the GVN. Under present circumstances,
however, Communist proselyting cannot
achieve quick results through recruiting
new cadre or penetrating the GVN. These
efforts cannot seriously erode the govern-
ment's present political position, nor is
there any prospect that the current Com-
munist strategy will topple the GVN.
6.... but the Communists are persisting
in political efforts which they still believe may
yield some dividends.
In some limited areas Communist terror-
ism is on the rise.
- They are infiltrating civilians from the
North into Communist enclaves.
- They apparently hope their military
presence in the South will add an aura
of durability to the PRG.
The Economic Balance
7. Both Saigon and Hanoi face major eco-
nomic problems which leave them heavily de-
pendent on continuing assistance from their
respective allies:
-North Vietnam-Although a number of
critical sectors of the economy damaged
by US bombing have now been restored,
serious long-standing economic problem
areas remain. These include inadequate
food production, insufficient consumer
goods, little industrial capacity, and con-
sequently heavy dependence on foreign
economic assistance.
-Although there are some signs of strains
in the North Vietnamese social system,
there is no indication that the leadership
faces any serious challenge to its control.
- There has been no apparent curtailment
in Hanoi's support for either the war or
its present reconstruction efforts. Con-
tinued support for its current war effort
in the South does not require significant
diversion of economic resources from the
North. Many of Hanoi's current economic
targets, however, could not be achieved
even in peaceful conditions.
- South Vietnam-The South Vietnamese
economy has been in a serious slump for
two years, and the outlook is for more of
the same and possibly a worsening of the
situation. Rapid inflation (67 percent in
1973), unemployment (between 15 and
20 percent), and a threat of declining
agricultural output are major problems.
- These problems are basically the result
of dislocation caused by continuing war-
fare in South Vietnam, increasing prices
of critical imports, and declining real
amounts of US assistance.
- Thus far the resilience of the South Viet-
namese people as well as the protection
afforded by the extended family system
have prevented economic dislocation
from generating political instability. But
these factors of themselves do not in-
crease the GVN's stability-they simply
attenuate the negative impact of adverse
economic conditions.
- Assuming continued US assistance at
present levels, economic problems will
not prove decisive over the next year.
- Over the longer run, however, continued
econome deterioration would be likely to
produce increasing corruption, possibly
urban disorders, and declining GVN ad-
ministrative and military effectiveness.
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SECRET
The Shape of Things td Come
8. Certain general considerations will affect
Communist behavior:
A) Hanoi continues to see the cease-
fire agreement and subsequent de-
velopments as o fering some bene-
fits which it would not jeopardize
lightly:
- Militarily, the agreement, produced a
US withdrawal which] allowed the Com-
munists to enhance their military capa-
bilitics in South Vietnam.
-Politically, the agreement added a de-
gree of international respectability and
legitimacy to the PRIG and provided a
basis for Communist insistence on being
consulted about future political arrange-
ments in Saigon.
B) The international environment con-
tinues to place ceitain constraints on
Hanoi:
- The North Vietname$e leaders are still
concerned that the US might recommit
its air power if the GVN were confronted
by a massive Commm nist military chal-
lenge.
-Hanoi cannot have full confidence in the
reliability of its allies, the USSR and the
PRC, as long as they ',remain committed
to a policy of detente with the US.
C) Economic considerations also place
some constraints o~ Hanoi:
- With continued assistance from the
USSR and China, North Vietnam should
be able both to step up its military
action in the South and make economic
progress in the North., A major increase
in the level of hostilities, however, would
run the risk that Moscow and Peking
might reduce their assistance.
A major offensive-while no of itself
sufficient to derail Hanoi's c Trent eco-
nomic programs-would com licate the
implementation of future arge-scale
development efforts,
D) The situation on the group in South
Vietnam cuts both ways. The Com-
munists do not seem to b~ urgently
preparing for a major offe
live, but
the very magnitude of the current
Communist military presence in the
South increases the danger of large-
scale fighting:
-Hanoi's leaders apparently do not think
that they now can take control in the
South in one swift campaign. C mmunist
ideology and experience ha e condi-
tioned them to think in terms o stages.
- The Communists confront a m? jor prob-
lem in achieving the proper mix of mili-
tary and political initiatives. G ven their
weak political position in South Vietnam,
they cannot decrease military pressure
on the GVN without losing m mentum.
They doubt that they can sig ificantly
improve their political positio without
successful military action on a expand-
ing scale against government- ontrolled
areas of South Vietnam. On he other
hand, the extension of milita y action
would be difficult in areas here the
Communist infrastructure did not pro-
vide a base for supporting such action.
-Some infiltration of men and
and the development of some r
base areas over the past year
necessary to hold territory anc
port the current Communist
military strategy.
- The Communists are, howev
equipped to move more quic
ever before; troops can coin
from the North rapidly and with
supplies
gads and
has been
to sup-
political-
er, now
kly than
e down
very lit-
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He attrition, and the movement and pre-
positioning of supplies is no longer the
gradual process it once was.
- On balance, the Communists do not ap-
pear to be under any immediate compul-
sion to go for broke; however, they would
not be making such massive logistic prep-
arations, keeping-and supporting----so
many troops in the South, and moving
in so many more, if they were not still
seriously contemplating large-unit war-
fare.
Hanoi's Intentions Through June 1975
9. Available evidence now indicates that
North Vietnamese leaders tentatively decided
in late 1973 on a period of military, politica ,
and economic buildup which would last well
into 1975.
The most recent COSVN instructions,
which reflect decisions on the conduct
of the war made at the secret 21st plenum
of the Lao Doug Party in the fall of 1973,
emphasize the need for a continuing
military buildup in the South and a
considerable period of infrastructure re-
building. They call for a strengthening
of Communist-held "liberated" areas, ex-
panding into contested areas, and propa-
ganda, terrorism, sabotage and subver-
sion in government-controlled areas. A
number of cadre have interpreted these
instructions as applicable to the years
1974 and 1975.
- According to decisions a few months
later, at the well publicized 22nd Lao
Dong plenum, North Vietnamese lead-
ers in early 1974 established guidelines
for a substantial economic reconstruc-
tion program of the North in 1974 and
1975. At least one senior North Viet-
namese official has publicly cautioned
that Hanoi should not pay so much
attention to strengthening the Commu-
nist position in the South lest the North-
ern reconstruction effort would be jeop-
ardized.
- The current Communist military posture,
including the measured pace of conscrip-
tion and infiltration, current retraining
of Communist forces, the withdrawal of
some main force divisions and AAA units,
does not reflect the kind of urgency that
previously has preceded military esca-
lation. There is also a marked absence
in South Vietnam of tactical deployments
and cadre briefings, and in North Viet-
nam, of mobilizations and civil defense
measures. Given the advanced state of
Communist military preparedness, how-
ever, it must be recognized that such
indicators may provide very little warn-
ing of a new offensive.
10. In any event, the current Communist
strategy calls for an increase this year in the
tempo of the conflict:
- Hanoi plans to test its military prowess
and probe for weaknesses in the GVN's
position.
- Main Force units are to be com-
mitted more frequently.
- Operations to expand "liberated"
areas and Communist LOCs are to
increase.
- Such action could intensify without
either side actually planning for it.
The Communists are bent on expand-
ing their control and the GVN is
determined to keep Communist
forces bottled up in their present
enclaves. Should favorable conditions
develop, either side might further
expand its military effort to exploit
the situation.
Hanoi may want to gauge the reactions
of its major Communist allies and, more
important, of the US.
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SECRET
11. At some point this 11 summer or fall, we
expect the North Vietnamese to reassess their
strategy and initiate planning for the next
stage.
Communist officials have told their cadre
in the South that they should be ready
for "new developments" if the situation
changes in South Vietnam or interna-
tionally. Cadre have! been exhorted not
to become confused If Hanoi switches to
a new policy line.
12. In such a reassessn ent, several factors
may influence Hanoi to i reaffirm its policy
against a major esca atiom
Hanoi may continue! to see such escala-
tion as too risky as long as it cannot
count on certain victory.
- The North Vietnamese may continue to
believe that any major military escala-
tion risks a recommitment of US air
support.
- Hanoi may question Soviet and Chinese
willingness to support a major and pro-
longed military offensive.
- Hanoi may sec ccongmic deterioration in
the South as in itself ultimately under-
mining the South 'Vietnamese political
and social structure,, and therefore be-
lieve large-scale military action to be
unnecessary.
13. At the same time, there are factors
which may influence Hanoi toward a major
escalation.
- Hanoi may decide it~ current strategy is
costly and not worki.g well.
-Increased RVNAF !,pressure, either in
retaliation against Communist attacks or
to forestall expected', Communist initia-
tives, could result in erosion of important
Communist base areas in the South.
-A breakdown in detente, or ther inter-
national developments, could produce
Soviet or Chinese encouragement for a
North Vietnamese military escalation.
- Similarly, a determination that US op-
tions were seriously curtailed by domestic
political developments could encourage
Hanoi to escalate.
Conclusions
14. In sum, we do not believe that the Com-
munists will undertake a major of nsive this
year.
15. Hanoi, however, will be reassessing its
strategy as time passes, and the picture for
the first half of 1975 is less clear. Chi nges since
last fall in South Vietnam and in the inter-
national situation, particularly in tl e US, will
weigh heavily in Hanoi's calculations, and
there obviously is a substantial risk that Hanoi
will opt for a major offensive. But our best
judgment now is that Hanoi will of decide
to do so during the first half of 1075.3
' The Director, Defense Intelligence gency, be-
lieves that the "best judgment" expre.sed in this
paragraph is unduly optimistic. While agreeing with
the judgment in paragraph 14-i.e., tha t the Com-
munists are unlikely to undertake a ma or offensive
through the balance of 1974-he also no s that most
of the supporting evidence is essentially short term in
nature, and there is now no direct evidence of Hanoi's
intentions for the first half of 1975. Nevertheless,
North Vietnam has not only assiduous] maintained
its major offensive option in South Victn- in, but ma-
jor sections of the Estimate make a persuasive case
that Hanoi can and will readily abandon its present
strategy of localized military action in the South.
Expanding Communist military capabilities, coupled
with Hanoi's inability to make much progress in
South Vietnam under current circumstan ~es, increase
the danger of a major North Vietnamese offensive.
The Director, DIA, believes that the chances are at
least even that North Vietnam will undertake such
action during the first half of 1975.
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF,
and the Assistant General Manager for National Se-
curity, Atomic Energy Commission, shar this view.
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16. Nevertheless, the Communists do have
the capability to launch a major offensive with
little warning whenever they so choose. In the
event of an unforeseen and dramatic change
in the situation, the Communists could easily
move militarily to take advantage of a target
of opportunity. Finally, even if there is not a
major offensive during the next year, it is
clear that at some point Hanoi will shift back
to major warfare in its effort to gain control
of South Vietnam.
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1. This document was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy
is for the information and use of the recipient and of persons under his jurisdiction o a
need-to-know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the foil
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c. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, for
Department of the Army
d. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
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2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance ith
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4. The title of this document when used separately from the text should be clas-
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Secret
Secret
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