CULEBRA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-176-4-1-1
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 13, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/09/30: LOC-HAK-176-4-1-1
N'Ll1MUKAJNUUNl V W
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
INFORMATION
July 13, 1970
CONFIDENTIAL/ EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR DR
KISSINGR~`--~" '
.
FROM: Viron P. Vaky "V
SUBJECT: Culebra
I enclose a memo of conversation with two lawyers on the
.Culebra case. Note that they allege Bryce Harlow is
involved.
NAVY, FBI reviews
completed..
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
STATE review
complete
CONFIDENTIAL/ EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/09/30: LOC-HAK-176-4-1-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/09/30: LOC-HAK-176-4-1-1
V W
MEMORANDUM
CONFIDENTIAL /EYES ONLY July 10, 1970
4:30 PM
Participants: Richard Copaken, Covington & Burling
Tom Jones, Covington & Burling
Viron P. Vaky, NSC
Mr. Copaken asked what my "investigations" had revealed. I said that I did
not want him to labor under any misunderstanding. I was not investigating
anything. I had passed on the allegations he had given me lask week to
persons who should have .;hat information. I had no operational responsi-
bility for the Culebra matter.
I added that from all I had been able to gather from talking to people who
should know, I had found absolutely nothing to confirm the allegations. I
added that Dr. Kissinger know nothing of the matter and had not been briefed
on Culebra. The NSC Staff had no operational responsibility in this matter.
Copaken said that the information that Kissinger knew nothing of the matter
did not square with their information. He asked if there was any reason for
Kissinger to be less than candid with me. I replied that I did not think so.
Copaken then said he wanted to give me information in a longer time-frame,
because this was relevant. He then proceeded with an historical account,
the main points of which were the following:
Munoz Marin was the father of the Commonwealth concept for Puerto
Rico and his idea was to develop it over time and "perfect" it; this
via uld be far more in the in erest of the US than independence or state-
hood. His principal lieutenants during his 15 odd years as governor
were Roberto Sanchez and (fnu) Negron. Sanchez spent most of his
time in Washington in liaison with the USG. Over time Sanchez be-
came a close friend of Abe Fortas, who was the Commonwealth's
attorney here.
During the Dominican crisis CIA operated out of Puerto Rii.co and used
Fortas' link with Sanchez to get Munoz Marin's acquiesence. The CIA
agent in Puerto Rico was a Sacha Boldman or Goldman. This was the
same agent who had channeled CIA assistance to a school in Costa Rica
for Latin American political leaders.
CONFIDENTIAL /EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/09/30: LOC-HAK-176-4-1-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/09/30: LOC-HAK-176-4-1-1
w IRW
CONFIDENTIAL/ EYES ONLY - 2 -
Sanchez became Governor in 1964. Personal scandal- -divorce and re-
marriage to his secretary with whom he had been having an open affair--
affected his candidacy for reelection. Negron became a rival candidate
and Munoz Marin advocated unity of the party behind Negron, However,
Sanchez insisted on being a candidate, and both he and Negron became
candidates for the 1968 election, thus splitting their party.
At this point, Sanchez obtained USG support through Fortas. CIA/AID/Navy
aid was given to his campaign. There were disruptive actions directed
against Negron. According to the theory, Negron's essential conservatism
would have wrecked the Commonwealth and created severe problems; hence
USG support for Sanchez.
When, however, it became evident that Sanchez could not defeat Negron,
support was switched to Ferre as the lesser of two evils. CIA/FBI and
particularly US Navy support was given to Ferre, and he won. This gave
the Navy a hold over Ferre.
Ferre, according to Copaken, contributed heavily to President Nixon's cam-
paign and is on close political terms with him. Given this fact, plus the Navy's
hold, the Navy believes it will have its way on Culebra. The result is a surface
duplicity, while they work out a deal underneath.
Ferre's family leases the only drydock facilities in San Juan from the US Navy;
he has copper interests on the island. By cooperating with the US Navy he
obtained USG support in a host of similar matters, or vice versa; his coopera-
tion with the US Navy may have been secured by trading for things he wanted
from the USG in other things.
Copagen alleged that there is close cooperation with the "White Ho use" certainly
at the political level. Bryce Harlow went to Puerto Rico for July 4th celebra-
tions, but one of the things he went down for was Culebra (precisel y what Harlow
was to do about Culebra, Copaken refused to say).
I repeated to them after hearing this long exposition, that I had never heard of
any of these things and did not know of anything personally which would corro-
borate the sinister picture they were painting. They asked me to pass the in-
formation on; I said I would do so and repeated that the NSC staff had no opera-
tional responsibility in the matter.
They asked to whom else they might present their information, since they were
concerned to avoid damage to the US image and the Government. I suggested
the Secretary of the Navy or the Secretary of Defense, since this was where
the decision now rested, as I understood it.
CONFIDENTIAL/ EYES ONLY end.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/09/30: LOC-HAK-176-4-1-1