INDOCHINA CONTROL MAPS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-310-3-9-4
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: June 27, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
INFORMATION
SECRET/$ENSI'I'IVE June 27, 1972.
MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. EIS~CNGER
FROM:
SUBJECT:
JOHN H. HOLDR.IDGE
C
Indochina Coxxtrol Maps
?
Mr.' Helms has sent you a CTA Intelligenc~:.Mexxiarandum entitled "Maps
of Communst-Dominated Areas of Indochina: Their Limitations and.
Relevance to a Cease-fire, " (Tab ) .
Attached to the xnemorandurxa~ are maps of Indochina and of Laos, Cambodia,.
and South Vietnam d.epictang areas dominated, on. June 6, 1972, by the
Communists and those dominated by friendly.goverx.er~ts. These areas
are broken down into five categories:
-- Direct enemy military influence depicted by red circles where
enemy main force infantry units are concentrated (except far Chinese
forces in. Laos);
-- Predominant Communist influence, where the Cornnxunists have
a significant military ar administrative presence or both acid the friendXy
government does .not;
-- Predominant friendXy influences where the situation is the. exact
reverse of .that above;
-- Contested, where neither side has a clearly superior xxal.litary farce
or admixu.strati.ve apparatus in the area;
--? Neither dc~rninated nor seriously contested by ei hher_;~i,d~where
ncii~lryx :ids: i.~.~.> a ib .~...cat~L x-~.~~.;.~.L;~.x?y u~ ?f :. i:~.;str~.~., s. ~~?-~:;,.,;.cu.
The rrmap of South Vietnazn indicates that nearly half of the territory is eithex
Coxnrnunist-controlled or contested,. with GVN' control confined to the coast,
southern MR-3 and northern and southeastern MR-4. The maps of Laos
and Caxr~.bodia indicate that about three fourths of these countries are under
Communist control..
SECRET/SENSITxVE
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/18 : LOC-HAK-310-3-9-4
Limitations
The memorandum lists the following general limitaia:ons of these maps in
farmulati.ng cease-fire protrisions:
-- Because- of the fluid military situation, maps may depict divisions
pf territory which could be untenable after acease-fire was declared.
-- The reaps tend to equate military occupation of an area with control
of the area. .This might not be accurate in a cease-fire situation.
'-- Control of territory and control of people axe two quite different
matters, as seen by the recent flow of refugees to GVN-controlled territory.
--- ~'he scale of the maps is too small to accurately show the true
situation orx the ground which usually more closely resembles a leopard~spnt
situation which, in turn, would be difficult to resolve in a cease.-fire
agreement...
In conclusion., the rnexnoranduxn points out that the enemyts influence in
much of the area described as being under his control, has not been. tested.
This can also be said of GVN pacification gains. Many of the enemy's
territorial gains may be fragil and temporary because he lacks adequate
local administrative structures.
~.,
Mr. Helms, in his .covering rnexnoranduxn to you (Tab .~!~), cautions. that these
maps were not designed as a xaegotiating tool and do not give the GVN the.
benefit of any doubt. He adds: "In any actual negotiating situation, we
could prepare. a rather different but eminently defensible set to support
an allied bargaining position, particularly an .opening. position.'
Comment. I believe these maps would h 4ve been considerably enhanced
by overlays .showing population concentxations and changes i.~x the control
situation since the offensive began. In addition., it would also be helpful to
show areas of direct GVN military influence. There should also. probably
be maze wkit~. area: on the yilal~s. ltz rnucl~ of t:he s{a.~.ded arras -~- e:~i~ecial.lyr.
those showing Cornm:unist control --- thexe are neither friends ear foes.,
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/18 BLOC-HAK-310-3-9-4
CENTRAL tNTELLlG~NCE AGENGY
WASF?{INCsTON, D.C. 2aS03
oFF~e~ of rH~ nrnEeroR
21 dune x.972
?
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President'
for National Security Affairs,
SUBJECT Indochina .Control Maps
7'``-0L /
1. Attached is a set of maps illustrating one approach to de-
picting territorial control in Indochina, together with a rnern.orandutxa
explaining the concepts employed and some of their inevitable limita-
tions in ]sight of the inherent complexity of the problems involved,
These maps were developed in consultation with Mr. Sullivan. (We
also dragooned Mx. Golby into this exercise to exploit his background
and knowledge. )
2. Recipients of this package will have a natural tendency to
focus on the maps and not the accompanying memorandum of explana-.
tion. At this state, any such tendencies should be resisted. Unless
viewed in the context established by that rnernorandum, the maps ruts
the risk of being misleading.
?
3. The xnaps are developed from a b June data base. .They
should, therefore, be considered as illustrating a method of approaching
the prablern you posed, not as a definitive summary of the current
situation. If the approach is deemed sotand, more current versions
could of course be prepared, keyed to a different base date. ~Ta mattex
what date. any such neaps are keyed to, however, they will have at least
two dimensions of inevitable :distortion.., First,' a cartographer's need
to draw lines will ctnavaidably convey an impression of the .tidy delinea-?
tion and precise demarcation that does violence to the messy, ,overlapping
confusion of the real situation. Second, the tidy lines of any map
inevitably suggests a degree of precision and completeness in our data
base that does not exist 'and is never likely to be achieved,
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/18 : LOC-HAK-310-3-9-4
5 k~C: K t':'1' ~ ~ L'' lV ~ ~.'1' 1. V
4. Finally, these rna;ps are designed to illustrate a technique
for depicting our best estimate of how things actually stand. They
wexe not dcsi~;ned as a negotiating tool. In any actual negotiating
situ t~4ar't, t~rc: coulea r:~rel~arG~ ~. ra'.l'.c~r cliffc~:rtx:t but ~i~-xinez:tly defensible
set to support an allied bargaining position, particularly an opening
position. The attached maps xxzake no effort to .give the GVN the benefit
of any doubt, whereas an actual negotiating set would clearly be de-
veloped under somewhat dif ~exent criteria.
Richard I3elrns
Director
?
Copies to:
Under Secretary Johnson
Mr. Sullivan
Deputy Secretary Rush
Mx. Nutter
Admiral Moorex
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/18 : LOC-HAK-310-3-9-4 % ~ ~,,
Serrr_t
?
?
Intelli ence Mema~andum
g
Mains o}'Communist Dominated Areas of Indochina:
Their Limitations and Relevance to a Cease-~'rxe
Secret
~.~
21. June 19 7 2
No. 2046/72
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/18 : LOC-HAK-310-3-9-4
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/18 : LOC-HAK-310-3-9-4
Sr;C;K~;"1'
25X1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2l June 1972
MAPS OF COMMUNIST-DOMINATED AREAS OF INDOCHINA:
THEIR LIMITATIONS AND RELEVANCE TO A CEASE--FIRE
1. The four maps accompanying this memorandum
are intended to depict, as of 6 June ].972, those
areas of Indochina dominated by the Communists and
those areas dominated by governments friendly to
the uS. The first map shows the areas of direct
Communist military presence in Indochina as a whole.
The other three are separate maps of South Vietnam,
Cambodia, and Laos--and each attemgts to show the
areas of predominant Communist or friendly influence
in more detail than does the overall Indochina map.
2. We have divided the territory. of Indochina
into five categories on the maps, according to the
following criteria:
(a) Direct Enem Militar Influences
These are areas, epicte y red
circles on the maps, where enemy
main force (i.e., NVA) infantry
units are concentrated.* The larger
circles have a fifteen--mile radius,
and are centered on the location.
of the headquarters of each enemy
main force division, as of the date
of the map.. The smaller circles
have a five-mile radius and are
centered on the headquarters of
None pf t e C inese units in northern Laos are
shown, nor do these illustrative maps show those
enemy units which are protecting the trails in
lower Laos.
SECRET
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/18 : LOC-HAK-310-3-9-4
~F.C~R 1~'T
?
?
each "independent" enemy main force
regiment--i.e., those regiments which
are not subordinate to one o? the
divisions depicted by the larger cir-
cles . The size of the ca..rcles was
derived. by establishing the minimum
radius which would encompass the op-
erating regiments of each division
and the operating battalions of each
independent regiment. The employ-
ment of the circles and their dimen-
sions are r~bviously fairly arbitrary
techniques of depiction. These cir-
cles acre not intended to provide
tactical in~ormatian about the spe-
cific areas of operation of each ma-
jor enemy unit. Frequently, one or
more regiments of a division wi1.l
operate at a distance considerably
greater than fifteen miles from its
divisional headquarters. Neverthe-
less, these circles do show in gen-
eral terms the concentration of NVA
main force infantry units, and they
do show the areas of Indochina where
the impact of the current military
offensive is being felt the most.
The overall map of Indochina shows
only these circles, and does not
depict other areas of lesser Commu-
nist influence, which are contained
in the individual country maps..
(b) Predominant Communist Influence:.
T ese are areas where the Communists
have a significant military and/or
administarative presence and the
friendly government does nat. There
may be occasional armed clashes in
these areas but, as of the given.
date, Communist domination is not
seriously threatened. In the Commu-
nist-controlled parts of Laos and
Cambodia, armed clashes are infre-
quent although friendly patrols may
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/18 : LOC-HAK-310-3-9-4
~F.(,;R F.T
quite regularly gather intelligence
and conduct clandestine operations.
Predominant FriendllrInfluence: These
are areas where the riendly govern-
ment has a significant military and/
or administrative presence and the
Communists do not. Again, there may
be occasional armed clashes, but
friendly domination is not seriously
threatened. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the .criteria for friendly
control tend to be more stringent than
for Communist control, primarily be-
cause we have more information about
the shortcomings of friendly control
than we do of :enemy control...
{d) Contested; Territory is considered
contested if neither side has a
clearly superior military force or
administrative apparatus in the area.
In most contested areas, both sides
are present in some strength and
clash frequently. We have also in-
cluded in our definition, however,
some areas in which both sides have
few forces and do not exert much
military effort to exclude each
other. "Contested" territory thus
includes such disparate areas as the
current battleground to the north
and west of Hue, and parts of Cambo--
dia where most of the "contest" con-.
lists of a competition between the
two sides to extort more goods, serv-
ices, and taxes from the local popu-
l~tions.
(e) Neither dominated nor seriousl con-
teste by either s~. e: xis ~s ter-
ritory where there are practically
no permanent enemy or friendly forces,
practically no administrative appa-
ratus of either side, and not much
SECRET
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/18 : LOC-HAK-310-3-9-4
interest on the part of either in
establishing a permanent presence.
Tn some cases, of course, such ter-
rtory is used by one side or the
other--or both--as a passage route
for the transport of supplies and
reinforcements. Most earlier maps
have put such territory into the
"contested" category, thus creating
an impression of military or pol~.t-
ical confrontation over far wider
areas of Indochina than is in fact
the case. In South Vietnam, for
example, areas which we have placed
in this category have no significant.
GVN regional, popular or police
forces in local villages and hamlets.,
They also do not have hamlet or vil-
lage governments which are respon-
sive, in a meaningful way, to GVN
provincial administrations. At the
same time, there are no significant
enemy forces in these areas either.
3. It is important to note that all maps of
this type have certain built-in limitations in terms
o? their value as tools to assist in formulating pos-
sible provisions of a cease-fire agreement. The grin-~
cipal limitations are as follows:
(a) The maps at best can depict the con-
trol situation only at a given in-
stant in time. Tn a fluid military
situation where tactical control of
areas is constantly changing, the
maps, may well. depict divisions of
territory which could be politically,
militarily or economically untenable
after a cease-fire was declared, or
even after the -pa-ce of military ac-
tivity slackened.
(b) The maps of necessity tend to equate
military occupation of an area with
control of the area. Yet there can
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/18 : LOC-HAK-310-3-9-4
SECRET
be a substantial difference between
occupying an area and controlling
it. Under reasonably stable condi-
tions, information systems such as
the HES can be devised to .measure
"control" i.n a fairly meaningful
fashion. During a major military
offensive, however, the measurement
of control is increasingly dominated
by military deployment and battle re-
sults. This is adequate to portray
territorial control in the tactical
situation, but such maps cannot por-
tray with fidelity the degree of con-
trol which each side would have in
certain. areas in a cease--fire en-
vironment.
A most important consideration af-
fecting all such maps is the fact
that, in Indochina, control of ter-
ritory and control of people are
two quite different matters. For
example, the enemy's territorial
gains resulting from his present
offensive are not matched, in any
immediate sense, by populations
gains. The present flow of refu-
gees to the GVN side testifies to
this. The fact that most of the
population has preferred not to
remain in areas occupied by the
NVA, however, would create new
problems for both sides if there
were a cease-fire, GVN~controlled
urban centers presently crowded
with refugees might become an eco-
nomic liability if, under the cease-
fire, the surrounding rural and
food producing areas were left under
enemy control.. Conversely, from the
North Vietnamese standpoint, a cease-
fire might leave Hanoi's forces faith
certain areas of limited value in
terms of political control because
they had been largely de-populated.
SECRET
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/18 : LOC-HAK-310-3-9-4
SEGRET
?
(d) The attached maps also have an in-
herent limitation of scale--the
scale. is so small that information
cannot be presented in sufficient
detail.. In many areas of South
Vietnam it would be impossible--
even if we had the necessary infor-.
mation--to depict the .degree of con-
trol which each side now exerts in
particular provinces or districts,
without developing individual maps
of each province and in some cases
each district. In brief, we are
faced with the old leopard-spot
problem, and there are. areas of
South Vietnam where at present the
numbers of spats, and their pattern,
cannot be depicted on one country-
size map. This also means, of
course, .that a control situation
exists which would be exceedingly
difficult to resolve in a cease-
fire agreement.
?
4. A final eneral comment: Much of the ter-
ritory in Sou .Vietnam currently under Communist
influence is largely devoid of population or--at
best-~-thinly populated. Also, in much of the South.
Vietnamese territory which appears on our maps as
being under Communist influence, the degree of in-
fluence which the enemy actually possesses has not
been tested. (The same used to be said, with some
justification, of GVN pacification gains.) Many of
the North Vietnamese divisions now operating in South
Vietnam are doing so without the benefit of a strong
local organization, and their success in developing
a local administrative structure remains to be seen.
Many of the enemy's recent territorial gains which
are shown on the. map of South Vietnam may be as
fragile and temporary as any ever depicted on a
pacification map.
SEGRET
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/18 : LOC-HAK-310-3-9-4
SECRET
ATTACHMENTS:
1.
Map of Indochina: Areas of Direct Communist Mili-
tary Influence as of 6 June 7.972
2.
Map of South Vietnam: T
erritorial Control as of
6 June 7.9 7 2
3.
Map of Cambod
ia: Territ
orial Control. as of 6
JunE 1972
4.
Map of Laas:
Territoria
l Control, as of 6 June
-7-
SECRET
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 fig. Hoy
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010!08118 : LOC-HAK-310-3-9-4
 1NDOCHiNA
POPULATION
RllRAL POPULATION
Perroes per sgwre mAe
2.5 2~.__ 130_ S20 I,BIO
IO 30 2~ 7IXI
Persons pei square ki~omeEw
HUE ~o,DOOt~soa,ooo
Vinh 3o,oooro7o,oo0
Kontum ? Ifl,000 ro 30,000
Attopeu a Olher populated places
Scale 1:3,50'3,0
9 2 75 I 125
Mlle
0 24 50 75 100 _.115
~ t ~~?x,~'~ ~~ ~ ~- ~ '
1 'f ~ . x
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Tnalabat?~at ~ ('' ;
d~'ON SOR
ComSan
Area Direr: Q mu
i~~ary Inflen e
s~f~I~une ~
Ban P~'ie ~hut~f
circles, indieate approximate areas 4f operataon, large roar
i~afantty divisisns; ~matf for indtpertder~#;infariiry regim~t##
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E ET
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~,~
luwaoua eEG'"niu9".w'aan?a 911
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?ii~~':R~ea~?
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/18 : LOC-HAK-310-3-9-4
$;6?iech'
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 No Objection
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R'Mtt#i8~,';~doli
Ae~.'~pti~~a
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 Ancl~txng F+ech?:
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SOUTH VIETNAM
TerritorNal antral
as ~f 6 June 1972
~'~?
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 ?~ -. , ~ .
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nompong..,~ C ~i~.~~.~ I
,w ~i~ ~ ~.. ~6n
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~~
Con So
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 hah Rang
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/18
1" f S a,yyA ,-ai"
~.~J'3~~"yl' +~ 1CeyW~
,~2~Y~,X F?1~RRy..
t~~~'Y~hanThr~t .
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Mall KE. GA
Direct Communist military influence
Circles indicate approximate areas of operation:
large ~!ar infantry divisions; small far independent
infantry regiments.
CON SON
SOUTH VIETNAM
Territorial Control
as of June 1972
Predominant friendly influence
Neither dominated nor seriously
contested by either side
Contested
Statute Mips
25 50
RET
~acauv t
?.F::IUU?.D ~AOM A~i0uA1~f Uf!'~kGRA?~li SurFn
Scala 1:2,750,400
25 `.>Q
Statute Miles
25 50
Id1E S`:?ANQ -8QUf?IDA!?~'::H$PR.'E5fc F3?AT1L3N:---
E; NOT -. 1+3EC Cc55A-Ri1~'Y ALiTHCI#3TA73 V-~:~~~
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 Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/18 : LOC-HAK-310-3-9-4
~fi?aradit
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/18 : LOC-HAK-310-3-9-4
~han ?h~sai
Batti"
Phsng~Chon
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SisatcetR:
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/18 : LOC-HAK-310-3-9-4
is man ,
C#i7Qng
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Grta?,;:
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/18 : LOC-HAK-310-3-9-4
Secret
Secret
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/18 : LOC-HAK-310-3-9-4
:T:CRET Sl;NS1TxVI
NecXot~a.tzncl Scenario for Passible DRV Offer to Swap Prisoners
fnr~j^~.~ thdrawal
In es:=once what this study does is provide a possible negotiating
sGen~xrio -- starting with assumptions about the political/
milit~.-ary situation; poses a DRV counterproposa]. to the President's
May f, proposal.; suggests our "best" position response to this
and t'ien discusses our possible fallback positions.
A. 7'l~ese assumptions are made at the outset to set the stage
for the scenario:
-- So long as Hanoi holds our prisoners, US/GVN military
pressures against NVN will. continue at current or
increased rates.
At a minimum, these pressures will make it impossible
for Hanoi to continue its invasion; at a maximum, they
will destroy the military and industrial capability of
NVN.
-- The USSR and PRC will continue to provide NVN with
military and economic aid, but will not take the extra-
ordinary action required to totally offset U.S. military
pressures.
-- These circumstances will induce Hanoi to undertake new
negotiating initiatives in the near future to bring
U.S. air/naval activities to an early end in the North
and South.
-~- The urgency to achieve this will force Hanoi to alter its
basic position from insisting on both a political and
military settlement to agreeing to negotiate the
military elements separately, as envisioned in our May 8
proposal.
B. The study has selected the foJ.lowing possible DRG counter-
~ro~oral to our May S proposal. T ere are, of course,
numberless possible counter-proposals, but the one chosen
has all the elements needed for a full discussion on the
options open to us.
All U.S. forces will withdraw from South Vietnam within
a fixed period of time.
SECRET/SENSIT~VE
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/18 : LOC-HAK-310-3-9-4
SECRET SENSIT2VE - 2 -
All U.S. POWs wall be returned within the same period,
their release to proceed concurrently with the withdrawal
of U.S. forces.
- -- The U.S. wa11 cease all acts of force against both zones
of Vietnam at the time an agreement is reached. The
Vietnamese patriotic forces in the South will refrain
from undertaking any hostile actions against U.S. forces
,, ~. ~:: they withdraw...:.
-- At the tame of an agreement, the U.S. would provide some
sort of guarantee against the resumption of acts of force
to remain effective following the withdrawal release
period.
The paper then d~.scusses specaf3.c principles by which the
the U.S. should be guided ~n its counter--proposal. The
response, as an essential general principle, should be
positive with a view to locking Hanoi into negotiations
relating to the principles in our May 8 proposal and to
maintain maximum U.S. domestic and congressional support.
Specific principles for negotiating to provide best solutions
are:
U.S. Withdrawal:
-- Agree to total withdrawal of all forces, but try to
retain a military assistance/advisory presence as an
Cambodia.
--~ Seek a withdrawal period of apgraxamately three months
to avoid major disruptions of Vietnamazation programs
or negative impact on RVN morale, but sufficiently brief
to prevent NVA forces from exploiting the stand-down and
to satisfy U.S. public demand for early release of our
POWs.
-- Make clear that "withdrawal" applies only to U.S. forces
remaining in South Vietnam and does not encompass mili-
tary assistance to the RVN or any U.S. military forces
outside Vietnam related to the Vietnam war.
Release of Prisoners:
--- Seek the release of all U.S. prisoners prior to, rather
than concurrently with, the withdrawal of U.S. forces
from South Vietnam.
-- Insist on a complete accounting of .all MIAs.
SECRET/SENSITT~JE
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/18 : LOC-HAK-310-3-9-4
;ai;c_lz~~~ ~ };raslT~vE
_ ~_ 1~._.
--- Insist on effective international supervision of the
release process (e.g., ICRC).
Insist that release include all POWs,
where they are. held in Indochina.
regardless of
D. U.S. Fallback Negotiating Positron
On the assumption that Hanoi will reject our original counter~-
pr~pns~~xl, fallback provisions are discussed. Under the
four areas far negotiating -- U.S. Withdrawral, Release of
Prisoners, Cessation of Hostilities, and Guarantee Aga~.nst
Inc Ids of Force --- various alternat~.ves are discussed.
Th~:+ pa~?er's hypothesis is that NVN is interested in a swap,
bt~t not in a ceasefire even if unsupervised. Therefore,
although it details our negotiating positions on a ceasefire,
the paper does not specifically address the problem if the
hang--up between us is over whether the ceasefire is unsuper-
vised. Since the fallback does provide for us to accept the
ICC -- despite its history of ineffectiveness -- as the
supervisory authority, the effect is to suggest that we
would require a general ceasefire in~Vietnam, but that if
necessary we would live with no effective supervision.
Even in the fallback position, the paper assumes that the
USG would insist on keeping its. right to resume the use of
force after the POWs have been recovered, if NVN continues
its infiltration.
SI?GREY/SENSITIVE
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/18 : LOC-HAK-310-3-9-4
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Critics]. Analysis
The study underlines that the Communist forces already
hold extensive sanctuaries, which the Cambodians can-
not challenge. Thus, an accommodation, which would be
useful to the NVA/VC in reestablishing the_pre--April
base areas, would have to incJ.ude GKR willingness to
attempt to close off the border to ARVN troops and to
completely reverse its current political posture of
cooperation with the United States, South Vietnam,
and Thailand.
It appears highly unlikel~th~at the _GKR could deliver
on such an agreement. The most the GKR could cfo is
to cancel cooperative border agreements with the GVN,
forbid ARVN across border operations and attempt to
focus international attention on future GVN border
penetrations. Given the history of the allied cross
border operations in April--June 1970, Lamson 719 and
ARVN's almost continuous operations in southern Cam-
bodia during the last two years, neither the North
Vietnamese nor the ,GKR would be likely to expect that
a forma. closing of the border would cause ARVN to
remain in South Vietnam.
Lon Nol prabablx understands that we hold most of the
cards, which alone should restrain him. There are
poss. le options open to the U.S. wh~.c could be
carried out individually or two or more simultaneous~.y
depending on the circumstances if he should choose to
accommodate with Hanoi. For instance, we can point
out forcefully to Lon Not that we are aware of rumors
of an accommodation which would be contrary to our
interests; at the same time, we would explain
that we did not intend to attempt to restrain ARVN
from military action in Cambodia.
SI~;CRET/S1?NS r'1'IVE
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/18 : LOC-HAK-310-3-9-4
SEC1tI:'1'/S].~.'TVS TTIVE
Critical Analysis
-- The study does not offer much hope of effecting
counteractions should Hanoi attempt to use POWs as
hostages. The study notes that Hanoi in 1966 drew back
from talk of trying our POWs as "war criminals" in the
light of world opinion. ..Only once, in 1967,.;-do we know
it placed POWs at potential targets. Recently, Hanoi:
has pJ.ayed down the "war criminals" theme. Especially in
recent weeks, it has been broadcasting POW statements of the
threat of bombing to them, but it has not said where they
are, and so far it does not seem to be planning a serious
effort to cause us to avoid bombing specific targets by
us~.ng thc_POWs as hostages. ,,..
--- The study lists and minimizes the likelihood of flamboyant
use of the POWs bar Hanoa.. Zt Zists several less dramatic
and more like~~r measures: announcement of the deaths of
POWs a.n bombing raids; putting .the POWs in '.'safety zones"
and calling for our observance of them;. cutting their mail.
--- On the military side, the paper notes that international
law admits of proportionate retaliation, but details are
nat given. The effectiveness of retaliation in protecting
the prisoners from use as hostages is questioned, and it
wou~.d be counterproductive if Hanoi had not admitted their
use as hostages.
-- Probably our best hope for preventing Hanoi from using our
POWs far hostages is the anticipated unfavorable reaction
of world opinion to this type of tactic.
--- The possibility is mentioned that Hanoi might indicate
that it intended to send the prisoners through the mine--
fields by ship, but the only proposal is that we recom-
mend a~.ternative ways of repatriating them. The fact
is that, whether or not Hanoi adapted this particular
stxategem, it would undoubtedly demand the clearing of
the mines in any settlement.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/18 : LOC-HAK-310-3-9-4