No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/09/20: LOC-HAK-32-5-26-2 %
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LEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY CO}(NCIL
MORI/CDF
C03320358
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Voluntary Agencies in India
A month ago, I wrote to you recommending the release of about
$10 million worth of food assistance to US voluntary agencies
operating in India. To respond to recent food shortages, those
agencies have drawn down their own supplies more rapidly than
is normal, and this approval is simply. to replenish them. The
food will go to CARE, Catholic Relief, Church World Service
and Lutheran World Relief.
rtac e . d )
Your T~'-S3pUIl..iC Lu A.a..:i.v G$i1.ta. t ~+.+..?~??.?? ~ a?.~, t~-??.. ~ wzraC rn ""held until
we see how the current contretemps comes out. " You were
referring to the Indian reaction to our arms supply decision.
With a month's perspective, it looks as if the Indians in the end
kept the reaction within bounds. This being a purely humanitarian
arrangement with our own organizations, I assume you would
agree that we should go ahead now. This is an arrangement which
it was agreed in 1971 should not be stopped, so it has been continuous.
Recommendation: That I be authorized now to tell`Maury Williams
to proceed in allocating $10 million worth of food supplies to US
voluntary agencies operating in India.
Approve Other
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/09/20: LOC-HAK-32-5-26-2
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/09/20: LOC-HAK-32-5-26-2
MEMORANDUM
kip
49
ACTIO 1026
NATIONAL SECURITY CO
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS) fMar 9, 1973
w
MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
.FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
SAMUEL M. HOSKINSON/
SUBJECT:
India's Food Situation
At Peter Flanigan's initiative, AID and CIA have produced assessments
of the food supply situation in India and possible requirements for assistance
from abroad. He has forwarded these assessments and his own comments
to you (attached).
The Indian Food Situation
As you know, there has been a serious drought mainly in an area of
Western India where some 200 million people (35% of the total population)
reside. As a result, India once again ?aces a "serious foodgraiii pruuluivL...
not yet of crisis proportions", but which could become so if the spring
rains are inadequate and there is another poor harvest next fall. The
biggest problem right now is of assu.r4ng the distribution of minimum
foodgrain requirements in the areas most severely affected by the drought.
India's present supplies of foodgrains, including about 2 million tons
purchased on commercial terms abroad (one million tons from the US
commercial market), appear to be sufficient to prevent widespread star-
vation until the spring harvest. This assumes, however, that the distri-
bution problem is overcome and the magnitude of shortage has not been
underestimated -- as has been the case at times in the past by Indian
officials.
In short, although the Indians could use help now the real crunch could
come next fall if the monsoon is again sub par.
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
I
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/09/20: LOC-HAK-32-5-26-2
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/09/20: LOC-HAK-32-5-26-2
4 qP 0
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
US Assistance
We have not had a regular PL480 sales program with India since the
war and no one is proposing a new program now. For one thing, the
Indians have been very reluctant to ask for help because of our political
problems. More importantly, the US does not at present have either
the grain availability or means'of transportation to help, at least in the
immediate future. Our own excess stocks have disappeared, our means
of transportation are already overloaded and a strong commercial export
demand is anticipated for US wheat in the year ahead. Any new program
for India at that time would, therefore, have to come out of regular. ongoing
programs for other countries -_ a most difficult problem. since these have
.already been pared back to their absolute minimums.
Looking ahead, prospects are favorable for an excellent US wheat harvest
in 1973. However, supplies available for PL480 programming are expected
to remain tight because of reduced carryover and continued high com-
mercial exports. Therefore, AID believes, and Flanigan agrees, that any
. rr Ar%n P T 1? r_.__-_ 197 L. . .L 1. l.3 .. '6w.r ':ait 4 AA decision on x,1_480 lui dtlUid 11'4111 ou 171 , 'a 'rCst. Zuj.~i'L&J._ p obab-ly ""?+
until Indian requirements and US availabilities can be more accurately
assessed. Flanigan also suggests promoting a multilateral framework'to
share the burden, if India needs substantial assistance later this year.
Our supply position on corn and grain sorghums is better and would probably
permit us to accommodate an Indian request.
AID concludes that the only possibility for helping India now would be
through temporarily increased food donations (oil, 'corn, milk, etc. )
to US voluntary agencies already providing relief assistance in India.
This is the only aspect of our entire aid program that was not touched by
the aid cut off and the voluntary agencies (CARE, Catholic Relief Church
World Service and Lutheran World Relief) have stocks already on hand in
India or in their pipelines for their regular programs which, if released now
and replaced later, could reach some 4 million hungry people. QMB says
that such a program up to $10 million could be accommodated within existing
budget ceilings for this year. There would be no conflict with projected
food programs in other countries.
The only reasons for not increasing our assistance to the private US vol-
untary agencies operating, in India might be political ones within the context
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/09/20: LOC-HAK-32-5-26-2
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/09/20: LOC-HAK-32-5-26-2
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
of our broader bilateral relations with India. There is no question about
the need or the ability of the voluntary agencies to help. The humanitarian
aspect is obvious.
in political terms a decision like this to give the voluntary agencies a
greater capacity to respond would be a minimal move on our part. We
have continued to provide assistance to these programs through the nadir
of our political relations and all we would really be doing now is giving
private US voluntary organizations a limited additional capacity to respond
quickly to an emergency and not augmenting the overall amount of assistance
they distribute in India. If we wanted to, we could, of course, play, this
assistance into the broader political context of the gradual improvement of
our relations with India.
Recommendation: That you approve the provision of about $10 million worth
of food assistance to allow the US voluntary agencies operating in India to
respond to the current emergency, and that the longer term Indian food
situation be kept under close review but no other actions taken now.
Approve
Other
~ f
Concurrence: Richard Kennedy& ,`1111
Robert Hormats
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/09/20: LOC-HAK-32-5-26-2
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/09/20: LOC-HAK-32-5-26-2
MEMORANDUM 4W 0,
b') d
COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY #51845
February 27, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM: PETER M. FLANIGAN
SUBJECT: India Grain Situation
Attached are two a?ssessm.ents of the grain supply and requirement
situation, the first an AID-USDA effort (Tab A), and the second a
separate assessment from CIA (Tab B). The essential conclusions
of both are:
1) India's grain situation is bad, but not desperate. It won't
become critical unless the next (Spring) crop fails.
Z) In any event, the U. S. does not at present have either the
grain availability or means of transportation to provide help'to
India.
3) On a short term basis, AID is considering a proposal by
which we could help with India's internal distribution problems by
using up to $10 million of voluntary agency (PL 480 Title II) stock
on hand, and replacing it later.
So far, there has been no GOI request for such assistance, and I
have instructed AID to hold up on any exploratory talks concerning
the use of voluntary agency stocks pending a policy decision that
we wish to give a signal to India re new U. S. assistance.
If, by next Spring, a deterioration in the grain situation points to
a need for large scale imports, I recommend that we then look
closely at the possibility of a multilateral, consortium approach.
The purpose would be to avoid pressure to giveawa.y?our most
sought after export, and instead enter into an arrangement with the
other developed countries under which a major portion of shipments
from the U. S. would be financed by them on a commercial, cash
basis.
T No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/09/20: LOC-HAK-32-5-26-2