MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-462-4-1-3
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 27, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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UNDERSTANDLNG ON LAOS ?
. On the basis of respect for the principles of the 1962 Oen.eva
Agreement on Laos and the Agreement on restoring peace and achieving
national concord in Laos signed on February 21, 1973, the D. R. V.N. and
the U.S.A. reaffirm their strong desire that the current negotiations hetwez-n
the two Lao parties will promptly come to a success.
2. The D.R. V.N. and the U.S. have been informed by the Lao
parties that:
(a) The formation of the Provisional National Union Government
would be achieved by July 1, 1973 at the latest.
The U.S. and DRV will exert their best efforts in that
direction.
(b) After the formation of the Provisional National Union Govern-
ment, the withdrawal from Laos of all foreign military personnel, regular
and irregular troops and the dissolution of all military and paramilitary
organizations, including the "special forces" organized, equipped, trained
? and commanded by foreign powers, will be completed within a period of
no more than 60 days.
(c) After the return of all persons captured and detained became
of their collaboration with the other side in wartime, each Lao party has the
obligation of getting and supplying'information to the other party about the
? missing in action, irrespective of their nationality.
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May 25, 197 3
DRAFT COMMUNIQUE
1. In conformity with Article 2 of the Agreement, the United
States will cease immediately, completely, and indefinitely aerial
reconnaissance over the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.
2. In conformity with Article 2 of the Agreement and with the
Protocol on Mine Clearance:
(a) The United States will resume mine-clearance operations
within five days from today and will successfully complete those
operations within [twenty-five] [thirty] days thereafter.
(b) The United States will supply to the Democratic Republic
of Viet-Nam means which are agreed to be adequate and sufficient for
sweeping mines in rivers.
(c) The United States will announce when the mine clearance
in each main channel is completed and will issue a final announcement
when all the operations are completed.
3. In implementation of Article 2 and 3 of the Agreement and
Articles 2, 3, and 4 of the Protocol on the Ceasefire in South Viet-Nam:
).At
hours, G. M. T. , , 1973 [time of signature
of this communique] the High Commands of the two South Vietnamese
parties shall issue identical orders to all regular and irregular armed
forces and the armed police under their command, to strictly observe
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RIP
the ceasefire throughout South Viet-Nam twenty-four hours later and
scrupulously implement the Agreement and its protocols.
(b) The Two-Party Joint Military Commission shallimmediately carry
out its task pursuant to Article 3(b) of the Agreement to determine the areas
controlled by each of the two South Vietnamese parties. This task shall
be completed as soon as possible. The Commission shall also immediately
carry out its task to agree on the corridors, routes, and other regulations
on the movement of means of military transport of one party through areas
of control of the other party. The Commission shall also immediately
discuss the movements necessary to accomplish a return of the armed forces
of the two South Vietnamese parties to the positions they occupied at the time
the ceasefire entered into force on January 28, 1973.
(c) Twenty-four hours after the ceasefire referred to in paragraph 3(a)
enters into force, the commanders of the opposing armed forces at those
places of direct contact shall meet to carry out the provisions of Article 4
of the Ceasefire Protocol.
4. 'In conformity with Article 7 of the Agreement:
(a) The two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept the introduction
of troops, military advisers, and military personnel including technical
military personnel,. into South Viet-Nam.
(b) The two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept the introduction of
armaments, munitions, and war material into South Viet-Nam. However,
the two South Vietnamese parties are permitted to make periodic replace-
ment of armaments, munitions, and war material, as authorized
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3 -
by Article 7, through designated points of entry and subject to supervision
by the Two-Party Joint Military Commission and the International Com-
mission of Control and Supervision.
In conformity with Article 15 of the Agreement, military
equipment may transit the demilitarized zone only if introduced into South
Vietnam as replacements pursuant to Article 7 of the Agreement and
through a designated point of entry.
(c) Twenty-four hours after the entry into force of the ceasefire
referred to in paragraph3(a) the Two-Party Joint Military Commission
shall discuss the modalities for the supervision of the replacements of
armaments, munitions, and war material permitted by Article 7 of the Agree-
ment at the three points of entry already agreed upon for each party. Within
fifteen days of the entry into force of the ceasefire referred to in paragraph 3(a),
the two South Vietnamese parties shall also designate by agreement three
additional points of entry for each party in the territory controlled by
that party.
S. In conformity with Article 8 of the Agreement:
(a) Any captured personnel covered by Article 8(a) of the Agree-
ment who have not yet been returned shall be returned without delay, and
in any event within no more thai thirty days from today.
(b) All the provisions of the Agreement and the Protocol
regarding the return of captured and detained Vietnamese civilian person!
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shall be scrupulously implemented. All Vietnamese civilian personnel
covered by Article 8(c) of the Agreement and Article 7 of the Protocol on
the Return of Captured Personnel shall be returned as soon as possible.
The two South Vietnamese parties shall do their utmost to accomplish
this within forty-five days from today.
(c) In conformity with Article 8 of the Protocol on the Return
of Captured Personnel, all captured and detained personnel covered by that
Protocol shall be treated humanely at all times. The two South Vietnamese
parties shall immediately implement Article 9 of the Protocol and,within
fifteen days, allow National Red Cross Societies they have agreed upon to
visit all places where these personnel are held.
? (d) The two South Vietnamese parties shall cooperate in obtaining
information about missing persons and in determining the location of and
in taking care of the graves of the dead.
(e) In conformity with Article 8(b) of the Agreement, the parties
shall help each other to get information about those military personnel
and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action, to determine the
location and take care of the graves of the dead so as to facilitate the exhuma-
tiori and repatriation of the remains, and to take any such other measures
as may be required to get information about those still considered missing
in action.
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6. The two South Vietnamese parties shall implement Article 11
of the Agreement, which reads as follows:
"Immediately after the ceasefire, the two South Vietnamese
parties will:
"?achieve national reconciliation and concord, and hatred and
enmity, prohibit all acts of reprisal and discrimination against
individuals or organizations that have collaborated with one side
or the other;
ensure the democratic liberties of the people: personal
freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of
meeting, freedom of organization, freedom of political activities,
freedom of belief, freedom of movement, freedom of residence,
freedom of work, right to property ownership and right to free
enterprise."
7. Consistent with the principles for the exercise of the South
Vietnamese people's right to self-determination stated in Chapter IV of
the Agreement:
(a) The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord
consisting of three equal segments shall be formed as soon as possible,
in conformity with Article 12 of the Agreement.
(b) The two South Vietnamese parties shall sign an agreement
on the internal matters of South Viet-Nam as soon as possible and shall
do their utmost to accomplish this within forty-five days from today.
(c) The two South Vietnamese parties shall implement Article 13 o
the Agreement, which reads'-as follows:
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"The question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam
shall be settled by the two South Vietnamese parties in a spirit
of national reconciliation and concord, equality and mutual respect,
without foreign interference, in accordance with the postwar
situation. Among the questions to be discussed by the two South
Vietnamese parties are steps to reduce their military effectiyes
and to demobilize the troops being reduced. The two South Viet-
namese parties will accomplish this as soon as possible."
8. In implementation of Article 17 of the Agreement:
(a) The vo-Party Joint Military Commission shall immediately
be accorded the eleven points of privileges and immunities agreed upon
by the Four-Party Joint Military Commission. Frequent and regular
liaison flights shall be made between Saigon and Loc Ninh and Saigon
and Hanoi as required for the operations of the Two-Party Joint Military
Commission and the Four-Party Joint Military Team.
(b) The headquarters of the Central Two-Party Joint Military
Commission shall be located in Saigon proper or at a place agreed upon by
the two South Vietnamese parties where an area controlled by one of them
adjoins an area controlled by the other. The headquarters of the Regional
Two-Party Joint Military Commissions and the teams of the Two-Party
Joint Military Commission, except for teams at the points of entry, shall be
located at places agreed upon by the two South Vietnamese parties where a'n
area controlled by one of them adjoins an area controlled by the other. The
accommodations of the military delegations of each party shall be located in
the area under its control. The lo-cations of these headquarters and teams
shall be determined by the Two-Party Joint Military Commission within fifteen
days after the entry into force of the ceasefire referred to in paragraph 3(a
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IP 11,
(c) Once the privileges and immunities mentioned in paragraph 8(a)
are accorded by both South Vietnamese parties, the Two-Party Joint
Military Commission shall be fully staffed and its regional commissions
and teams fully deployed within fifteen days after their locations have been
determined.
(d) The Two-Party Joint Military Commission and the International
Commission of Control and Supervision shall closely cooperate with and
assist each other in carrying out their respective functions.
. In conformity with Article 18 of the Agreement and Article 10 of
the Protocol on the International Commission of Control and Supervision,
the International Commission, including its teams, is allowed such move-
ment for observation as is reasonably required for the proper exercise of
its functions as stipulated in the Agreement. In carrying out these functions,
the International Commission, including its teams, shall enjoy all necessary
assistance and cooperation from the parties concerned. The two South
Vietnamese parties shall issue the necessary instructions to their
personnel and take all other necessary measures to ensure the safety of
such movement.
10. Article 20 of the Agreement, regarding Cambodia and Laos,
shall be scrupulously implemented.
11. In conformity with Article 21 of the Agreement the United
States-Democratic Republic of Vietnam Joint Economic Commission shall
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resume its meetings four days from today and shall complete the first
phase of its work within fifteen days thereafter.
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:U.S. APPROACH TO MBFR
The U.S. approach to IVIBFP_ is based on a concern for maintaining
a credible defense posture that would protect Allied security interests.
Thus, the outcome of MBFR must maintain or enhance Alliance
military security. This requires rectifying the Pact's present
advantages in size, offensive orientation, and reinforcement capa-
bilities through measures which will provide approximate parity and
shift the composition of Pact forces to a more defensive-oriented
force posture.
? Our approach also must take into account; pressures within the
Alliance for unilateral reductions; the effort to advance Allied
interests in negotiations with the East; the improvement already
achieved in East-West relations; and finally that the rough balance
in strategic forces places a prerriium on a credible conventional
iefen.se.
In this context the U.S. approach to MBFR. is:
? -- To achieve a more stable military balance at lower levels
.of forces.
? To maintain and improve Alliance military capabilities
. throughout the process, and to undertake reductions only in the
context of nectotiated agreements with the East.
-- To obtain Alliance agreement on what constitutes the
essential military requirements of any outcome for MBFR.
--To put forward a concrete proposal that forces the
Eastern side to address the issues that con.cern us and demon-
strates we are in earnest..
..?
We recognize that MBFR must be pursued carefully and patiently and
that it cnuld well be a long and difficult process.
A key issue is the scope of M.BFR: what countries' forces should be
involved,, how large reductions should be considered; and what should
,be the geographic extent of any meaSures. We believe that;
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reductions should not exceed ten percent in either
stationed or indigenous forces.
-- Stationed forces should be the focus of negotiations, not:
indigenous forces.
MBFR should be confined to Central Europe, that is, the
two aerrnanies, the Benelux countries, Poland and Czechoslovakia
with appropriate arrangements to ensure that Soviet forces in Hungae -
do not circumvent any agreement.
With these considerations in mind, three alternative outcomes have
been developed which are acceptable to the U.S.
1. Phased common ceiling reductions of stationed and then
indigenous forces based on a tene-eercent NATO cut. In the first
phase the U.S., Canada and Benelux would withdraw a total
of 34,000 ground forces while the Soviets withdraw 83, 000 ground
personnel. In the second phase the FRG, Belgium and the Netherlands
would reduce 46,000 ground troops while the GDR, Poland and
Czechoslovakia reduced 29,000.
? 2. Parity in NATO/Pact ground force levels through a one-sixth
reduction in U.S. and Soviet ground forces. This would be about a
ten percent reduction in stationed forces on the Allied side and a four
percent reduction in overall NATO manpower. It would amount to a
U.S. cut of 32,000 and a 65, 000 Soviet reduction. The implementation
reductions would be in two phases to permit assessment of results in
the first Phase.
3. A mixed-package 20-percent reduction of offensive force elements.
This approach illustrates how we might gain a greater degree of stability
in the European balance by reducing forces which either side may-
consider threatening. On our part this is the size and offensive
orientation of Soviet armored forces.
On the Pact side, one tank army would be withdrawn Iron-i East Germany
(60, 000 troops, 1,500 tanks). On the Allied side, there would be a
reduction of 1,000 nuclear warheads, 36 U.S. Pershing missile
launchers and three air squad-ons containing a total of 54 U.S. F-4
fighter-bombers along with associated personnel. .The result would
be rough parity in stationed ground forces.
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In the pursu.i:_..g any of these outcomes, we would also seek constraints
on mi.lit..-yry activities before reductions. Thee could include pre-,
announcement of major exercises and movement of stationed forces
into the area as well as limits on the size, location, number and
duration of major exercises. To meet the need for flexibility,
agreement on such constraints cannot be a precondition to negotiation
of stationed force reductions. However, constraints should accompany
such reductions and would be a pre-requisite to a negotiation of
indigenous force .reductions.
As for verification, the U.S. believes that our..MBFR position roust
be designed as to be verifiable by national means (and including a.
commitment not to interfere with such means). In addition, we
?would be prepared to consider the possibility of .proposing negotiated
inspection measures; for example, observation of withdrawals and
special inspection arrangements in the post-IviBFR period. ?
We are now consulting with our Allies seeking their reaction to these
outcomes and developing guidelines to be approved by Ministers for
a. preparation of a??contrete negotiating position., including reductions,
by the time negotiations begin on MBFR in the 'fall.
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fir
Alarqui.s Childs
Talking With Chou En lai
1
1
1
PEKING?When warships of the So-
viet fleet sailed past China's front door
through the Taiwan Strait it stirred a
wave of speculation throughout Asia.
The response from the United States
command headquarters in Hawaii was
a statement that American ships were
still patrolling the waters between the
Chinese mainland and the island of
Taiwan that is Chiang Kai-shek's re-
doubt.
For the man who hears such a heavy
.responsibility for the management of
both foreign and domestic policy in
the People's Republic this was one
more proof of what he has long be-
lieved. Premier Chou En-lot, in a dis-
cussion with this reporter lasting more
than three hours, explained his convic-
tion that the confrontation between
the United States and the Soviet Un-
ion has been transferred from the Mid-
dle East to South Asia.
His conviction is grounded in an un-
shakable distrust of Soviet motives.
Chou believes the intent of the Krem-
lin hierarchy, led by Leonid 13rezlinev,
.is to lull the West into a false sense of
security while the Soviets pursue their
goal of hegemony everwhere.
Americans who argue for a reduc-
tion or even the entire elimination of
American forces stationed in Germany
are, in Chou's view, naive. How, he
asks,'can there be any assurance that
if western troops are pulled back, the
large Soviet concentrations in the five
satellite powers will he reduced?
Chou is profoundly skeptical of the
agreements signed in Moscow by
Nixon and Brezhnev a year ago. De-
spite those agreements, he says, gestur-
ing with his expressive hands, the nu-
clear arms race goes on up and up at a:
terrible cost. And there can be no rea-
son to believe that it will not end in a
nuclear war.
- As for China's policy, the premier is
confident that a Soviet strike across
the northern border, so long a major
threat, has been deterred. The deter-
rence has been achieved hy successful
? diplomacy on the one hand and by ex-
tensive and costly measures of prepar-
edness?a strong army, rapid nuclear
missile development, tunnel digging?
on the other hand.
The agreements signed with the
United States and Japan, underwritten
by,the personal missions to Peking of
President Nixon and Japan's Prime
Minister Kakuei Tanaka, have re-
moved the threat of a two- or even a
three-front war.
. The nightmare of such a war, how-
ever fantastic and improbable It may
seem to the outsider, is what Chou and
others at the top of the new China
have lived with for many years.
Through the %Os and into the 40s Ja-
pan waged a savage war of conquest.
Chiang Kai-shek conserved his forces
for the civil war that followed. Then in
the 50s, after the Chinese had success-
fully repulsed American troops in Ko-
rea at the Yalu River, came the Dulles
policy of trying to bring China down
by isolating her and cutting off any ex-
change with the outside world. No
Premier Chou En-lai: "Confident that a Soviet strike across
the northern border has been deterred."
wonder, then, that Chou and his col-
leagues have lived so long with the
nightmare of fear:
On the diplomatic level India has se-
veral times approached Peking with a
desire to talk. But Chou says that ne-
gotiation will not be possible until 90,-
000 Pakistani prisoners still held by In-
dia out of the war of late 1971 are re-
patriated.?.A border issue must be set-
tled, with India holding a large chunk
of Chinese territory south of the Mc-
Mahon Line.
The key to peace, however, is Indo-
china and the premier confesses he is
baffled by American policy in Cambo-
dia. The American bombing he sees as
a futile attempt to hold a small place
that was once a green oasis.
Why, he asks, should the United
States support Lon Nol in Phnom
Penh who is no old friend of the
United States? If Prince Sihanouk,
who has the complete backing of the
People's Republic, could be returned,
he maintains, Cambodia would be an
independent and neutral state. In this
way the peace settlement in Indochina,
which Chou sees as a grItifying devel-
opment, could be further implemented.
As the premier looks at AnierIcaa
policy in Asia, the error has been in
trying to hold small placeS and
thereby sayailiting the large. The
American involvement in Cambodia is
after all, only three yEai-s old, dating
from the Nixon incursion, Why should
the conflict there not be settled ,
peacefully?
An earthy peasarit figure of speech
says a lot About the American error;
do not sacrifice the melon for the see-
arne seed.
Since the Nixon mission the premier
understands the United States, anti in
his relationship with Henry Kissinger
there is friendship. Yet, the tragedy of
Cambodia and the threat to peace rf
the continued bombing cannot be
nosed.
19:73. United FtaktUre Brndicate
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A -2 ? ? , ? .
ThurMay. .1141- 24.1973 THE WASHINGTON' POST
' " /1\1: C " et
r ? ? 7,1
-r,
LA. 41. ILA 1-111- CAL.
A
aed by0-71-7,
By .Atiaiirey Marder i clear tvar between the two , though clearly aimed at
!S111)(7-POWCTS, China, the proposal risked
, '.fity Soviet Union in IN() se?: Newhouse. a former staff ; ;wow:it-nit NATO, whose mem-
.
crEtiy p:oposcti. to the United member of the Senate rocciin ; hership includes two other nu-
tati's a nian for -joi,nt ri?tatia.; Relations Committee, obtained clear .powcrs,
Britain and
access to many secret es? ,
Ati...-:.. z-tetton".aainst China if it: . ? - ' lirance. ? The Soviet s never
. changes between the Nixon : ? , . , . 1 ..
el:act iv ?winit
.k.uricherl?- a nuclear attack administration and the Soviet; \v""'" :( \PI" - ? -
might constitute provocative
a; iilst either one of Clem ac-, union in pre?paring his hook. 7
..... , acttons. ?
ct?iitlin. a..
..; to a book just pub-. His account, at numerous,
"Washinotnn rejeCted the
Ili:hell. ; points, cites "back channel" : idea ? ' immediately-? i .-1;
i j .
.
communications between Prcs- swift...
,:..- Th,..., omposal. de.serawd ns.
Went. Nixon and Soviet party ; rt informed the ether
e7.p... situ-in:tr.:: -glimpse of Mos-. N,vre governments, lest they
chief Lemlid. I.? Brezhnev, and:
hear of it through another
., China phobia," is related between presidential adviser ; channci and conclude .0.0
in a revealinii: detailed account
Henry X Ki inner and Analfi'-:sALT really did forrshadoW.
%tiatimis, in the Arncri7itu F. Dobrynin, the Soviet am.';,??,,zre,,t_power
eit;17-ovie ra
t Stt e2te .Nrrns
hassi;tdorin siiinzton. ? ;Mum" axis or condomi-
t ron-ations 'ISALT) hy
The Soviet proposal ;con-
; In a footnote,. author New-
":n)iitor John Newhouse. His
cerning other nuclear powers,. ,
nouse commentt?d. -Perhaps
? iteo:,. "Cold Dawn. The Story Newhouse tvrote, was first
OM" day we will know whether
. :of S.?%. LT." is .1:wing currently
raised hY chief Soviet nel=?t'a'' Henry Kissinger. during his
ris1zed in The New Yorker tor Vladimir S. Semenov in ; visit to; Peking in July,
? early stages of sm.:tr. nc?itotia- 1971, told Premier Chou En-lai
'''tat"' resr"?ce ;lions in Helsinki. with theU.S. about i11oscow's remarkable
to the Soviet proTosal. Ne w ,
, delegation headed by Gerard: anti -China initiative:"
11:q:5f; report rd. was A "flat
as a byprodut?t, C' ; The writer said that
The Newhollse account "'Washington's .flat ? negative
. of t.r.r? 'C discussions.; he sad,
toe t.inited States and the So- states; ; (to Moscow's proposal) . had
v;4??i U.-titin were stimulated "lit 1 hi
1?Isinkii Schierl" had again deflected the issue ?of
called ?attention to 'provoca-i.provocative attacks. but Seine-
heir at:coo:Tient to. reduce live attacks by third nuclear: now warmtd that more would
11-17 risk that alt.-accidental or powers.' a subject the Amerb he' heard of it . . . Someth?ing.
? nuclear firing cans managed to finesse. ; it seemed wmild have. to be
c""'d he misi"1"r":, "But- on JulY 7 0070k at a done to silence the problem."
preied as the opening of a nu-. concert in Vienna, Semenov This problem. Newhouse
;reopened the .issue by putting wrote, was "In-irmlessly?in-
lit 'squarely to Smith in the ? deed, nsrtully--satislied by
f form of a Proposal, which was two related accords known as
formally presented three days; the Accidents and Hot Line
!later. ; A r:ree mcni s." Both were
"A stunning glimpse of Mos signed in Washington on Sept.
cows China phobia wps
Provided: on 11...alining of plans: The . first is .
for some ? 'provocative' action: "Agreement on Measures to
tot...alit-v.4i, the two sides?the; Reduce the Risk of the Out-
"United States and the Soviet; break of Nuclear War" he-
ilinion---would take joint steps; tween the United States and
-to prevent ? it or, if?too late,; the Soviet UMon, It is de-
joint retaliatory action to pu.nd signed to prevent. the two pow-
iso the. guilty Party'. ? ers from stun:Nina into nu-
"The Soviets, in effect, werei elear war and to reduce the
proposing no less olan a sti_ I. risk:that the action of a third
provolx a nuclear
perpower alliance against !Power could
other nuclear powers. Al_lwar between . ?
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This accord requires each
Parly to notify tho other itiv
mediately if an zweidero
.itrianthorizod or tittexplaino(:
incident, including hit
Orlection of unidentified oh
jeclF by missile !yarning .sys
tcnts, could create the risk o:
n:telear war
I. nit ed States
Croon,
? The rein forcing hot-lint.
a?.::rrirent.? established addi
tinrst? communication. circuit.
bets con Moscow and Wash
iiiton to assure reliable link;
for emergency and general us.
age.
hot wc" th,
and the Soviei
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1Zece
MAy rtii)71
The Chinese side has seriously studied the last
Soviet draft of the "Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear
War" and in comparison with the draft as it now stands after
the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Moscow discussions in May along with the
U.S. comments. The Chinese side cannot but arrive at the
same conclusion it reached on the previous proposals: The
current draft agreement still aims at the establishment of
U.S.-Soviet nuclear hegemony over the world, hence Brezhnev's
statement that the United States and the Soviet Union should
be partners. The Chinese side was already aware of this at
the time of the Sino-U.S. talks last February.
Dr. Kissinger has made many comments and explanations
in regard to the draft agreement, stating that the prevention
of nuclear war is a desire and the renunciation of nuclear
weapons a future goal and not an obligation, and that the
development of U.S.-Soviet relations is not directed against
third countries, but that if at any time it appears to the
United States and the Soviet Union that there is in inter-
national relations the risk of either of them getting involxed
in a nuclear war, they will immediately enter into urgent
consultations with each other and take measures accordingly,
and that every obligation undertaken by the two parties
after consultations obviously applies to third countries.
This remains to be domination of the world in all respects
by the two nuclear hegemons.
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AI. ?
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Dr. Kissinger explained that the U.S. side has to
conclude this agreement for the following objectives:
First, to gain time. Secondly, to force the Soviet Union
Into a posture of peace so that it would be difficult
for the Soviet Union to launch a surprise attack. Thirdly,
to give the United States legal basis to speak on behalf
of countries with which it does not have arrangements and
to protect them. However, the price to be paid for these
objectives is much too high. Once the conclusion of the
U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on the prevention of nuclear war
this June is announced, the United States will inevitably
turn to a position in favour of Gromyko's proposal on the
"non-use Of force in international relations and the per-
manent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons" at the
Security Council and the 28th session of the U.N. General
Assembly. The false sense of security will not be confined
to Europe alone but will spread to the world and definitely
make inroads into the United States. This will have a
demoralizing effect on efforts to strengthen defence and
resist foreign pressure. All will turn to economic war,
which exactly meets Soviet needs and dovetails with Soviet
strategic plans. There will also be some among the people
of the world who Will be hoodwinked.
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- 3 -
China has never feared isolation. And there is no
lack of far-sighted people in western countries and the
Third World who will also have some misgivings about this
agreement There are now in the draft the following two
formulations: 1. It is stated in the preamble that this
agreement is "in conformity with agreements to which either
has subscribed"; 2. Article VI states that "nothing in this
agreement shall affect or impair ... (c) the obligations
undertaken by the United States ...toward... allies or
other countries in treaties, agreements and other appropriate
instruments." In the comments as well as his conversation
with Brezhnev, Dr. Kissinger further said that agreements
and appropriate documents included the Shanghai Communique,
presidential letters and the President's annual report.
We greatly treasure the principles jointly confirmed in the
Shanghai Communique. Therefore, we will refute at an
appropriate time those documents and positions that do not
accord with these principles, and will state China's position.
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/13: LOC-HAK-462-4-1-3
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
0 NDUIvi OT. cQVEa$JTION
PARTICIPANTS:
Ambassador Huang Hua, People's Republic of
China Ambassador to the United Nations
Mr. Kilo
Mrs. Shih Yen hua, Interpreter
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
sident for National Security Affairs
Commander Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
DATE AND TIME: Sunday, May 27, 1973
10:00 - 11:15 a.m.
PLACE: PRC Mission to the UN
New York City
Kissinger; I want to talk first about my talks in Paris last week, then
bring you up to date on a few other matters. We are looking forward
to receiving your Ambassador when he arrives Tuesday.
ualtau Ambassador Huang Chen arrives in New York on the 28th,and
will leave for Washington at 10:30, and arrived in Washington on the
29th.
Afiss),nger: I will see him that day. We leave for Iceland on the 30th.
I may not be able to set up a meeting with the President before we
leave, but certainly afterward. But I count on seeing him on Tuesday.
Dees that nlean then you are out of the picture, Mr. Ambassador?
Ifiaartiv (Laughing) Almost/
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
xctipqriELTIC cmLy
?
Dt3Li".
t.yrt cp4 CAT EGO ikY
1 (ri
11..3;2
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Aptbonty; EP 12A
B N
0
leas
1EXCLUSIV
er; Then you must come to Washing ?
ONLY
?Vjeng: On May flth, Prime Minister Chou received Mr. Bruce, Chief of
the Liaison Office, and he told Bruce that the two sides could maintain
contacts between Huang Chen and Dr. Kissinger in Washington and Ambas-
sador Bruce and Vice-Minister Chiao Kuan-hua in Peking, but the New
York Channel could be open if necessary. This could be our last meeting
in New York.
sirozcer: I have always enjoyed meeting with you in New York.
Bus, I know it is inconvenient for you.
Kis r: But it is always a pleasure.
We appreciate very much the reception Ambassador Bruce had in Peking.
We cannot do as well for you yet in Washington. I will talk to your Ambassa-
dor when he gets there. Whatever we can do to facilitate our relations,
we will do.
UAW The Administration doesn't have any accomniodations on hand.
Kissinger: No, we have to buy it. Have you ever been to Washington?
Huang: No,
.151Aalker: We will have to give a dinner for you.
That will be very nice.
: Mr. Ambassador, I want o talk briefly about our meetings
arts] last week.
We went through the Agreement article by article, and came to a tentative
agreement on Vietnam and on Laos. And we are prepared to sign a joint
communique with them which calls for implementation of various parts
of the Agreement. I will leave you a copy of this Communique and of the
understanding on Laos as it now stands. [Dr. Kissinger handed over the
document at the end of the meeting, Tab A.]
The difficult problem we now face is Cambodia, The North Vietnamese say
they have no real influence because Sihanouk is in Peking and you are the
only people who have influence. I frankly do not believe this is true, I
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9.6---4
XCLUSIVELY EYES ()Ivey 3
believe you have some Influence but not the sole influence.
Here is the problem as we see it. We cannot be put in the position where
the issue is settled by purely military means, because it is difficult for us
to observe other parts of the Agreement if some parts are being systemati-
cally violated.
We agree with the objective which your Prime Minister pointed out to Ambas-
sador Bruce--to have a neutral, independent and free Cambodia. As I said
to your Prime Minister in Peking, our basic objective in Cambodia does
not seem to us incompatible with China's objective. And frankly we do not
think our basic objective in Indochina is incompatible with China's objective.
We would like as far as possible to give each nation a chance to develop itself
and to prevent a bloc ?which could support the hegemonial objectives of out-
side powers.
We recognize it is an extremely complex problem in Cambodia. But here is
o tentative thinking--and there is some importance, if it is at all possible,
havingin some understanding before we go over again--which will be June 5.
ng; June 5th.
Kis : June 5th. We are prepared to stop our bombing in Cambodia,
and we are prepared to withdraw the very small advisory group we have
there. And we are prepared to arrange for Lon Nol to leave for medical
treatment in the United States, In return we would like a ceasefire--if
necessary, say for ninety days--a negotiation between the Sihanouk group
and the remainder of the Lou Nol group; and while this negotiation is
going on in Cambodia, we would authorize some discussions between the
staff of Ambassador Bruce and Prince Sihanouk in Peking. And when this
process is cotripleted, in some months, we would not oppose the return of
Prince Sihanouk to Cambodia. But it is a process that has to extend over
some time, and it must not be conducted in a way that does not take into
account our own necessities.
We have not presented it in so much detail to the North Vietnamese, but we
have presented the basic idea.
Now if we cannot come to an understanding, we will have to find means of
pressure, no matter what Congress does--not on you but on the other parties
there.
I-1 ng: What do you mean by the other parties?
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Aetherity, 12/0
B ? NARA Pal
T/SVINSI T,TSIV Y yr Q14 lir 4
TOP
4,1, The parties to the Paris Agreement. I mean the North Vietna-
mese. And then certainly, even if we sign this communique it will not be
implemented. Because we can certainly not give economic assistance to the
North Vietnamese under those conditions. So we want to bring this to the
attention of the Prime Minister, first to show him we have taken his consider-
ations to Ambasssador Bruce very seriously, and also to say to him that if
we could reach some understanding or get some assistance prior to our next
meeting, it could lead to permament peace in Indochina.
mkt:or:. Well you have gone ahead of me. the question of Cambodia because
I also have got something for you.
lasitatu When I become a really experienceddiplomat, I will know--
because the Ambassador will speak first!
liyang: We must show respect for you because you are our honored guest!
Rooks at talking paper] In his talk with Ambassador Bruce on May 18th,
the Prime Minister touched on the question of Cambodia and the Premier
mentioned the question of Cambodia could not be solved in Paris. It is
imperative that the two sides respect the sovereignty of Cambodia.
Kissinger: The two sides the North Vietnamese an
Huag: The United States On the Cambodian side, Prince Sihanouk as well
as the resistance forces at home, are willing to conduct negotiations with
the U.S. side. The Chinese side considers that the sooner the U.S. side
stops its intervention in the affairs of Cambodia, the better. It will serve
the overall interest. And Premier ChOu En-jai also mentioned that Mr.
Mansfield once aSketl fOr another visit to China, and he wondered whether
he still has this desire.
Kiss neer: He always has this desire, but he is not competent to talk for the
United States Government with Sihanouk. But he still has this desire. I can
let you know, or let your Ambassador know.
Huang: I just wanted to remind you of what the Prime Minister said to Ambas-
sador Bruce.
Kissinger: We agree with the Prime Minister, the sovereignty of Cambodia
must be respected. And we are prepared to stop all, military action in the
circernatancas,I. described, and we are willing to listen to other ideas on this
subject. And we are also willing to let the members of Ambassador Bruce's
staff begin conversations with Prince Sihanouk as soon as a ceasefire is
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DEC
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?
ranged,
t tlu
X 5
Cambodia. So we would be prepared to work within the spirit of
e Minister has said.
convey what you have said ab?u..Cambodia to Peking.
Good.
[The meeting broke for s cks. I
When I saw your colleague in Washington, I promised a paper on how we look
at the Mutual Force Reduction negotiations. This is our basic approach to
the problem. (13r. Xis singer hands over a paper, Tab al We have not dis-
cussed this with the Soviet Union yet, We have given it to our allies. Sena-
tor Fulbright called me yesterday and he complained bitterly about your
Prime Minister's views on NATO as expressed to Marquis Childs [see Post
icle, Tab C]. Be claimed it was my influence! I told him the Prime
Minister had been on the Long March and isn't influenced so easily.
[laughter]
l4iang:We have read the two articles by Marquis Cbiids.
Xislingert They were very good. I think they came out very well.
Huang; He has basically reflected his conversations with Chou En-lai,
but as to the historical part it is not too accurate. He is not very familiar
with modern Chinese history, particularly revolutionary history in China.
Maybe he doesn't have any reference material!
Kissinke Certainly, and he is not as intelligent as Joe Alsop. He is a
good transmission belt but not very analytical.
Ag: He hasn't dwelt on Europe and the other questions in the context of
world situation.
Yes.
think maybe he has told what the Prime Minister told Mr. Bruce In
greater detail than in the Washington Post.
KisSinger; Frankly, I tell you in Washington I use Marquis Childs to convey
simple ideas and Joe Alsop to convey complicated ideas. But I think the
total impact of his articles was very positive.
Rum Ye ?
TOP SECRMS N TIV XCLU VTLY EYES ONLY
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Ithutings.x: And the nuances of which you are aware the American public
would not know anyway.
I wanted to say one word about Korea. We are going to make a specific pro-
posal to you in answer to your question of how the suspension and ultimate
dissolution of UNCURK can be achieved. And we have been talking to the
South Koreans and we think we can make major. progress.
We have also talked to the South Koreans about a general policy to pacify
conditions on the Korean peninsula.
I 'wanted to let you know where our present t enking is. It is not yet a o
agreement between them and us, but we are moving in that direction.
We are prepared, under conditions where the PRC and Soviet Union recognize
South Korea, to recognize North Korea. South Korea will withdraw its objec-
tions to membership in UN organizations for North Korea. If South Korea
is admitted to the UN as a member, it will not object to the admittance of
North Korea. And if there is any discussion at the UN of the Korean question,
South Korea will not object to the participation of a North Korean delegation,
together with a South Korean delegation. So we are using our influence to
calm matters on the Korean peninsula. And we will give you further details
as this policy develops. But this is being given to you on a very confidential
basis.
We see you have o reply to the questions in our message last week.
jcissxngeEl No, we will give it to you next week. But I can give you our gen-
eral policy. On troops, as I told your Prime Minister, we plan on a gradual
withdrawal.
liagag: As far as I understand from what you say just now, is it fair to say
the U. S will not object to the discussion of the Korean question in the United
Nations this year?
Kissinger: Yes.
Llua..,...nra It means you will not oppose the inclusion of this item on the agenda.
Ssinger: That is my understanding of the present discussion with South
Korea. That is a change in our position. But we are hoping the Vice Foreign
Minister will not shoot too many cannons. [laughter]
We will always consider this question from an overall interest.
SECRETTOP VE EXC SIV ELY EYES ONLY
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Authority
ONLY 7
..ge ? The:.::.:.,only:.,,,,othe.,...ii0iikthet...rnar be of some .interosto',,you is, 'there
.? ? ..? ..????? ? .
Soviet proposal to us in
er of 1970 [i!ab J and that is essentiallyCorrect.
Ha: We have read it.
Aissine : That is all I have.
I want to see if the Ambassador, as a former military man, has committed
all his reserves. [Mrs. Shih pulls out a paper] I see he hasn't!
Huang: Prime Minister Chou En-lai has entrusted me to convey this message,
that is, on the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war between the U.S.
and the Soviet Union. (Huang hands over Tab E which Dr. Kissinger reads.]
I don't understand the last sentenc
The last sentence: "At the appropriate time we will refute those
ts and will state China's position."
r: Yes, what does that mean?
jjappg:, It means China will state its position on the question of some kind of
treaty on the prevention of nuclear war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
KiS Singer ; And say what?
Huang:. Well, we will state it at the appropriate time.. I think you are aware
of China's basic position on this question.
Xisling r: Let me say, first, we will not change our basic position at the
General Assembly and Security Council. Last year we abstained and we will
continue to abstain.
nem So there are only two countrieswhich oppose. t.
We two.
}uang: We and Albania.
Kissinger: Last year we abstained.
Yes.
:y9P .,SEcRET/SENSITIVE JEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
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ErL4?S,5. No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/13: LOC-HAK-462-4-1-3
Kissinger: This is the position we will maintain.
8
}Iwo; But abstention does not mean opposition.
Kissinger: No, but we are not changing our position as the result of any
discussions with the Soviet Union. [Dr. Kissinger reads the Chinese paper.]
It is a very thoughtful paper.
I am certain that...We will consider this very seriously and will talk to
your Ambassador in Washington about it. And I am sure you will consider
that it is in neither of our interests to create the impression that China puts
the Soviet Union and the United States on the same level. We will not parti-
cipate in any policy to isolate the People's Republic.
Will that agreement be concluded during Brez nev's visit to Washi
ne?
g
Kissinger: We will have to make a final decision this week.
Huang: No matter whether you abstain on Gromyko's proposal in the UN, as
the message states, once you sign the agreement this creates a false sense
of security and this sense of security will spread to other parts of the world
and lull the vigilance of more people.
Kissinger: It is a very strong point.
..littwa This agreement will have more impact than the Grornyko one. Having
read the latest draft agreement, as a result of your consultations in Moscow,
I feel it is a sort of lullaby. You are virtually telling people they can put up
their pillows and sleep.
Kissinger: I have explained to you our thinking about it, which is not the same.
Our thinking is. it will either force the Soviet Union to live up to this agree-
ment, or if it does not it will give us a basis for opposing them more effec-
tively.
Euang: My impression from our previous conversations with you was that
the United States was not prepared to conclude this agreement this year. And
you were prepared not to stop discussion but not to conclude it over a long
period of time.
Kissinger; If you compare 'where we started...The problem arose because
almost every condition we raised was accepted.
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atter That means you have very similar positions, close positions.
Not in reality. And not in objective. If we want to have an agree-
ith the Soviet Union we donit need a formal agreement. If we want to
conduct an anti-Chinese policy with the Soviet Union, we have offers to do
this. I agree with you about Soviet objectives. The question really concerns
the tactics to meet them.
_Huang: No matter what your objectives or objective ,desires, once the agree-
ment is announced, its real effect will be that it will lull the vigilance of the
world people, and secondly the Soviet Union will have the opportunity to con-
duct propaganda to isolate China. This is my personal observation.
Kissinger: I appreciate that. I will discuss this urgently with the President.
But as I said in Peking in February prevention of the isolation of China is
one of our principal objectives. I had a long talk with President Pompidou,
in which I explained to him why the survival and strength of China is essen-
tial for the security of Europe. I will give a summary of that conversation
to your Ambassador Tuesday. The French gave me a verbatim record.
Can I do that in French? Or should I get it translated?
llatairt.... They have rio French translation there.
Kissinge ? All right, I will get it translated. Do we have any other matters?
(After further pleasantries and warm handshakes, Dr. Kissinger then
departed. j
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