MEETING WITH SENATOR SCOTT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-508-3-5-9
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: February 6, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/09/01 : LOC-HAK-508-3-5-9
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
through which most enemy logistics flow to Laos, Cambodia
and South Vietnam: the Mu Gia Pass, the Ban Karai Pass and
~- Because the port of Sihanoukville was closed to the enemy
when the Lon Nol government came to power in Cambodia
in March 1970, the North Vietnamese and Vietcong must
depend on the Ho Chi Minh Trail through southern Laos
to support their operations in South Vietnam and Cambodia.
There are three principal exit points from North Vietnam
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE February 6, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
DR. KISSINGER
AL HAIG
Meeting With Senator Scott
The purpose of your meeting with Senator Scott is to brief
him in general terms on the operation which will be conducted by
the ARVN in Laos, as well as bringing him up-to--date pn the Chup
operation in Cambodia.
Talking Points.
Tell Congressman Ford that in order to insure continued U. S. troop
withdrawals under the Vietnamization program, the President has
decided to provide U. S. air assistance for two South Vietnamese
operations, one to be conducted in Laos and the other, which is
already in progress, in Cambodia.
Operation in Laos.
Using the map which covers all of Southeast Asia, briefly explain
the significance of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the key role of the
logistics hub in the vicinity of Tchepone.
the area just north of the DMZ.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
W
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MEMORANDUM lp
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
-- Tchepone is the control center where routes leading from
these North Vietnamese exit points merge. A major base
area is located in the area.
- From the base areas in the vicinity of Tchepone some of the
supplies move eastward directly into the southern area of
South Vietnam. South of Tchepone the logistics route splits
into several segments. The main portion of the enemy supplies
moves down the old trail bordering the South Vietnamese border and
entering South Vietnam at various points and the newly developed
complex along Highway 23, through Attopeu, and down the Mekong
corridor leading to Cambodia.
The magnitude of the enemy's preparation for this year's
logistical campaign surpassed previous efforts. The North
Vietnamese have sharply increased the amount of military
equipment and supplies which they have introduced into the
southern Laotian area. They have also significantly increased
the armed forces deployed there. The maximum peak surge in
logistics activity is estimated to occur early in the dry season
between the middle and end of February. At the present time
a large number of supplies are probably in the vicinity of
Tchepone and approaching Tchepone.
Describe the operation as follows:
-- Early on February 8, South Vietnamese armed forces will cross _
into Laos and attack enemy sanctuaries close to the border of
South Vietnam between the 16th and 17th parallels.
The South Vietnamese action is'intended to disrupt the flow of
supplies and men further south down the Ho Chi Minh Trail
and thereby to enhance the safety and security of South Vietnam
as the U. S. continues to withdraw personnel under the Vietnamizatirn
program.
U. S. involvement will be as follows:
The U. S. will assist by providing whatever air power -- combat,
logistics and medical evacuation, either fixed wing or helicopter .--
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/09/01 : LOC-HAK-508-3-5-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/09/01 : LOC-HAK-508-3-5-9
TOP SECRET /SEZ TIVE W
is required to augment the capabilities of the South Vietnamese.
In addition, U. S. artillery will support the ARVN from positions
exclusively within the territory of South Vietnam. Therefore,
except for the artillery and some troop and logistics lift for
ARVN forces, U. S. operations in Laos will not be essentially
different from those carried on in the past.
. No U. S. ground troops or advisors will cross into Laotian territory.
The .recursion into Laotian territory is justifiable:
The territory in which this action will take place has been subjected
to U. S. air attacks since 1965 and is therefore not a new theater
of military, operations. It has become more critical because of
the closure of Sihanoukville.
. The territory of Laos on which this action will take place has been
invaded and controlled by North Vietnamese armed forces for
many years in violation of international law and in violation of
obligations undertaken by North Vietnam in the 1954 and 1962
Geneva Agreements.
. The original Laotian civilian population has long since fled from
the area which is totally occupied by North Vietnamese armed
forces. The Laotian government has admitted its inability to
exert its control or to expel the North Vietnamese.
? The actions being taken by the South Vietnamese, assisted by us,
are fully consistent with international law.
? The actions are being reported to the President of the Security
Council of the United Nations by the GVN and to the Geneva
Co-Chairman and to the International Control Commission
Governments.
-- The action is primarily the result of a South Vietnamese decision
and is of limited scope and duration.
There will be no occupation of Laotian territory and South
Vietnamese forces will retire when their mission is accomplished.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/09/01 : LOC-HAK-508-3-5-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/09/01 : LOC-HAK-508-3-5-9
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Chup Operation.
Because of the extensive enemy operations in Cambodia, the
President has also agreed to provide air support, where necessary,
to South Vietnamese forces that have recently launched an operation
along Route 7 between the S?uth Vietnamese border and Koxnpong Chain
on the Mekong River.
~- The pperation is designed to disrupt enemy base areas and forces
in the Chup plantation area. It will:
Clean out newly established sanctuary areas being developed
by three enemy divisions operating in the area and thereby
frustrate enemy attempts to initiate main force operations in
the vital areas of III and IV Corps in South Vietnam.
Concurrently relieve pressure on the still poorly equipped and
poorly trained Cambodian forces.
Maintain the momentum of Vietnamization through the benefits
acquired in the leadership development and combat experience
of our ARVN forces. (The Cambodian operation resulted in a
quantum improvement in ARVN competence and capability.)
The Chup operation involves U. S. air support only in those
instances in which the South Vietnamese are unable to meet the:::
needs of their forces within their own resources. The following
assistance will be provided where needed:
. Tactical and fighter bomber air support.
. Helicopter gun ship support.
Logistics and troop lift support, utilizing helicopter and
fixed wing aircraft.
Medical evacuation.
The operation does not involve U. U.S. ground forces or U. S. military
advisors.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
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TOP SECRET/SEMI TIVE
V
-~ The operation is expected to extend throughout the dry
season.
-- Thus far the operation appears to be quite successful:
Preliminary reports indicate that in several sharp
engagements with the enemy in the Chup plantation area
the ARVN have killed some 170 of the enemy and detained
15 while losing less than 30 of their own troops
R Initial objectives have been seized.
After most careful deliberation, the President has concluded that both
these operations are necessary to insure the success of our withdrawal
program and of Vietnamization.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/09/01 : LOC-HAK-508-3-5-9