FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS TALKS AT HELSINKI (SALT V)

Document Type:

CREST [1]

Collection:

Library of Congress [2]

Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):

LOC-HAK-533-3-14-1

Release Decision:

RIFLIM

Original Classification:

Document Page Count:

Document Creation Date:

January 11, 2017

Document Release Date:

December 15, 2010

Sequence Number:

Case Number:

Publication Date:

July 20, 1971

Content Type:

MEMO

File:

Attachment	Size
LOC-HAK-533-3-14-1.pdf [3]	310.41 KB

Body:

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/15: LOC-HAK-533-3-14-1 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL . WASHINGTON. D.C.' 20505 TOP SECRET/NODIS/SALT National Security Decision Memorandum 120 TO: DOS, OSD Reviews Completed The Members of the National Security Council The Attorney General The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency The Director of Central Intelligence Further Instructions for the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks at Helsinki (SALT V) The President has reviewed issues arising from the preparation of the draft agreements directed by NSDM 117 and has decided as follows: employing ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars. This is a tentative decision, pending further study of the issue by the Verification Panel. If raised by the Soviets, the Delegation should take no position on this issue without further guidance.from Washington. This decision the Delegation should seek an arrangement where-new. large phased- array radars will be built only as mutually agreed by the U.S. and : USSR. (This decision .represents a change in NSDM 117.) The agree- meAt must, however, make explicit reference to limits on Hen House radars and the right to U. S. equivalency as directed by NSDM 117.. 3. The agreement should be written in a manner which. does not prohibit deployment of possible future ABM systems other than systems controls on new large phased-array radars and has decided that draft agreement) should be used. . 2. The President has considered the question of. stringent Defensive Limitations Agreement 1. Definitions of ABM system components to reinforce. corollary constraints should be included in the defensive agreement. Wording ing similar to that in NSDM 117 (and in the alternative provided in the constitutes a change in NSDM 117.) TOP SECRET/NODIS/SALT No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/15: LOC-HAK-533-3-14-1 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/15: LOC-HAK-533-3-14-1 TOP SECRET/NODIS/SALT Draft Agreement on Limiting Strategic Defensive Weapons should be amended to apply solely to ABM systems limited under the agreement. The question of a similar provision relating to offensive systems should be referred to Washington. 4. The language proposed by the Delegation in Article 11 of the. 5. The period between the time a country invokes supreme national interests and then withdraws from the agreement is to be six months. (This is a change from the Detailed Statement.) 6. The notification period discussed in IV. C. 2 of the Detailed Statement is to be six months. (This constitutes a change from the, one year in the Detailed Statement. ) 7. The formal review provision discussed in IV. D. of the Detailed Statement is affirmed. Offensive Limitations Agreement 1. The freeze dates and provisions in I. A. 1 and 2 of the Detailed Statement are affirmed. The provision in I.A. 2 is. intended to prohibit the completion of the new-type silos at the operational SS-9 fields.. The phrase "externally completed" is. to be used in relation to the December 31, 1971, freeze on MLBMs. needs no specific language regarding ICBM use in FOBS role. The Delegation can make it clear to the Soviet Delegation that the term is intended to allow completion of the 12 SS-9 launchers now under active construction. 2. The definition of ICBM launchers should include an appropriate statement that ICBM launchers, even if deployed for use against targets within MR/IRBM range, would be counted. The ICBM launcher definition launchers for R&D and similar purpose is affirmed. 3. Paragraph I.B. in the Detailed Statement regarding missile. 4. The Delegation should seek a declaration by each side or an explicit understanding on the numbers of missile launchers involved in the freeze. The Chairman of the Delegation should seek the declaration or understanding as early as he believes it possible in the negotiations. TOP SECRET I NO DIS /SALT No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/15: LOC-HAK-533-3-14-1 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/15 LOC-HAK-533-3-14-1 TOP SECRET/NODXS/SAL 5 . The .verification ;provision iof the draft in eriix ;ag~reerxxex t, ?n offensive weapons should.include, is appropriate exp]i 3t langua.ge, 'the substance of Part ITS of the DetailedStatement regarding covered facilities fox,-,V, ,va1 v, s els. The SALT Backstopping Com n i.ttee ofthe. Under Secretaries Committee should review the `draft agreements in light of the above decisions. A Kissinger Henry cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff The Senior Members., U. S.. Delegation. to the Str t gic,Axxiss :I+ixnitations Talks TOP SECRET/NOfllS/SALT No Objection o Declassification in Full 2010/12/15: LOC-HAK-533-3-14-